

- (1) If it is at all possible to speak of a possible removal of the present Hungarian system, the extremely strict state supervision should certainly be changed. Further, all forms and remnants of the even now existing police state should be eliminated. The people ought to be given greater economic freedom. I have in mind here primarily the agriculture, but also the industry. In this latter case (industry), opportunity should be given to the workers to construct and to develop the industry according to their own fancy (elképzelés). The direction of industrial development should certainly be changed (which in the Rakosi era overemphasized the heavy industry). Though in 1953 and after the mistake of such a development was clearly recognized, it now seems that Kadar and Munnich ~~is~~ gradually revert to it. These are the things which ought to be radically changed.
- (1 a) Your questions are very general and I find it difficult to answer them. I would retain all those things which the people consider good and proper. This is my general reply to your general question
- (1 b) If we wanted to be precise, then we must say that there is an innovation under the present regime, an innovation brought about by the Revolution which the people generally accept, and which even the Kadar regime did not dare touch thus far. This is the elimination of forced deliveries, and a relatively more normal agricultural policy. They do not as yet force collectivization and they do not employ those methods in general use before the

Revolution.

To come back to generally accepted features of the present regime; if the term "present regime" denotes the Communist governments from 1948 on, then I certainly must mention worthy innovations and laws enacted for the benefit of the workers, provisions which were very noteworthy and which represent progress if compared to previous times. To be specific, the insecurity of a worker as regards his employment no longer exists (*munkás alkalmaztatásának a bizonytalansága megszűnt*). A phenomenon so prevalent in the free world, whereby a worker gains employment today and may be laid off two weeks hence or a month hence by, and without any consequences to, the employer, a situation where a worker secures himself a job, but does not know how long his job and pay may last -- this is no longer the case in Hungary. The problem was solved partly by the institution of collective contracts these contracts laid down the principle that a worker could only be laid off under certain specific conditions. On the other hand, if layoffs were necessary, they could only be effected after the expiration of a "notice period," usually one and a half - two months during which time the worker had ample ~~ample~~ opportunity to look around for another job, since the collective contract also guaranteed him a specified number of hours per day or week, which he could use for job-hunting, hours for which he got full ^{pay} ~~pay~~ from his present employer.

The worker, then, felt more secure. I must add immediately

that wages and living standards in Hungary are much lower than those prevailing in the West, and that the condition of the Hungarian worker did not improve phenomenally by the mere addition of this fact of greater security. Greater security in itself certainly did not create a situation deserving praise, nevertheless, the fact that the worker was assured a permanent and stable employment by means of the collective contract is something deserving note and attention.

Another feature ~~is~~ I should like to mention is the social insurance, a system also closely ~~connected~~ connected with the ~~life~~ condition of the workers. The problem of social insurance is not really a new question in Hungary, it having been regulated in the 1920s and 1930s, when the OTI (Institute of National Social Insurance) was created. At that time the workers were insured against sickness and all received some money (táppénz) when sick. Employees were obliged to become members of this organization at the time of taking a job. Fifty percent of the premium was borne by the employers, the other half by the employee. This was changed after the second World War so that the employee bears the entire cost of the insurance now. The insurance coverage, ~~at~~ the same time, is extended to accidents, sickness, it covers medical expenses of the family members and provides free supply of medicaments.

(2)

Yes. There is a need for political parties, since politics without them is scarcely conceivable in a democratic state. The

Communists tried to do away with the parties and substituted one party for the many. In my opinion this represents a dangerous situation. The one party is necessarily a government party, with the most important posts relating to the direction of the state being filled by members of this party. This represents a great temptation both for the party and for the individuals. It is necessary, therefore, to have a democratic control, i.e., another party, which brings to light flagrant abuses and opposes obvious injustices, and is able to bring issues to a debate in Parliament, showing incorrect or improper actions or policies on the part of the government.

(2 a)

Yes, I believe it is very useful to have a situation where everybody is free to either organize or join a political party. By everybody I mean all people in full possession of their powers of political judgment. I have in mind here adults and people whose mental powers are not deficient.

(2 b)

I would not make any exceptions. This is a general rule, applicable to all. The right to freely organize and/or to join political parties is a fundamental human right, stemming from the fundamental right of man to organize for the purpose of achieving a certain aim he considers good or useful. Organizing for the purpose of achieving a certain aim is identical to organizing political parties in the life of a state. Therefore such organizing is everybody's fundamental right and everybody is free to enlist others to create for himself a following for whatever purpose, including the

purpose of trying legally to change such things which he considers bad.

- (3) I am for the fullest possible freedom in this question. Freedom of speech, just as the freedom to organize, is a fundamental right. Recognition of these rights and the freedom of fully asserting them are indispensable necessities in the life of a healthy state.

The Western democracies provide a good example for this; insofar as I was able to observe, it is very useful and healthy if a person may express his opinion. The contrary of this I have also observed innumerable times and experienced on my own skin in Communist Hungary.

- (3 e) People should not be forbidden to denounce the government. The government, in the final analysis, is not there for its own sake, it is, as Eisenhower aptly pointed out in one of his speeches, the supreme servant of the state. If this be so, then everybody has the right to pass judgment on this servant.

Now, if we take the laws of classical democracy, then the government should always express the opinion of the majority of the population (the opinion of the population should be faithfully represented in the Parliament) and its policy in the political, social, and economic sphere should always be a policy corresponding to the wishes of the population. Thus it is obvious that everybody has the right to pass judgment on the ~~way~~ way the government conduct

his business, including the right of denouncing the government for what a person thinks was an improper move on the part of the government.

(3 d)

I don't know what you mean by the phrase "detrimental to the state." What is it that is detrimental to the state? (Interviewer's reply: The meaning of the phrase is rather clear, I think, as it stands. It is another matter whether you admit or not that it denotes an objective reality. Some people say it does, others deny it. To cite you a recent example from Hungarian history some contemporaries of Count Károlyi felt that the Count's conduct and activities from 1916 on were detrimental to the Hungarian state. I don't know if this clarifies the point. Respondent's answer:) I cannot accept the proposition that any government or political tendency is to be equated with the interests of the state. The interest of the state may be, for instance, that the raw materials be not sent out at a low price. If somebody does sell raw materials to foreign states at a low price, such person engages in an activity detrimental to the state. It is also conceivable that the state, in a difficult situation, conducts some sort of a policy, in which case a protest against such a policy again is detrimental to the state. But the determination of whether a citizen's interpellation, or protest, or what have you, is detrimental to the state or not is not possible at the hour

the statements are made. Such determination is only possible at a later date. You mentioned Károlyi's anti-war policy from ~~1916~~ 1916 on. I don't know to this day -- I mean, this is a debatable question -- whether Károlyi's policy then was detrimental to the state or if his policy was the policy which represented the true interests of the state at that time. Historical facts seem to show that Hungary would have been better off if she had made her exit as early as 1916, just as another man, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, was right when in 1935 he demanded that Hungary pull away from Berlin, and immediately. He wanted ~~of~~ Hungary to break off all her relations with Germany and to try to ^{realign} ~~realign~~ her orientation with the other side. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky's policy was a policy "detrimental to the state" at the time, very many people attacked him, and he was eventually executed -- primarily for this reason -- at Sopronkőhida.

Now that both historical events are years behind us, we must come to the conclusion that in neither case was the interpellation and protest a protest against the state, or detrimental to the state. All we can say is that both men made anti-government statements and speeches.

I could accept the term "detrimental to the state" and all that goes with it ^{only} /in such a case if it were proven to me beyond any doubt that the person attacking the government or a certain

activity of the government, attacked a policy, or activity, or process, which in reality did represent the true ~~XXX~~ wishes or true interests of the people.

(4) Yes. I consider this proper, and base my ~~JUDGMENT~~ judgment on the principle that everybody has the right to freely determine his activities and participation in some action or expression of his opinion.

(4 b) A people is always within its right to change its bad government for a good one. More precisely, a government which does not serve the interests of the people, which disregards the opinion of the majority of the people when it acts and conducts its policy, may always be overthrown and the people are entitled to ^{replace} replace such government with another, which, in the people's opinion, is a better one.

There are legal ways and means to bring this about according to democratic precepts. You have the parliamentary elections, on which occasion, the population, if it so desires, simply does not give the majority to the government party, giving its confidence instead to another party which, in the opinion of the electorate, has a better program or would pursue a better policy.

Now all those governments which deviate (*eltávolodnak*) from democracy, try to exclude, to minimize, to reduce, or to completely eliminate this possibility of governmental change -- this means of

expression of popular opinion.

History has proven in innumerable instances that ~~KN~~ a people always tries to effect a change in its government by legal means first. This is quite natural, since every action proceeds first in the direction of least resistance, ~~WHERE~~ where there is less struggle, less bloodshed, and less risk. In my opinion, however, if there is no other way of effecting a change in the government, i.e., a change in the political leadership, then every people has a legal right to assert and to vindicate its will by the force of arms. This is why, in my opinion, all revolutions express the legal will (törvényes akaratát) of the people, and decrees and decisions which come into being in a revolution obtain their force of law in such cases through the will of the people.

(5)

This is another of those giant questions. If I am to answer this question, my task will be simplified by the fact that the Revolution has already broken the path before me, and has made certain decisions which were identical then, and are still identical now, with my views and opinions in this question.

In order to answer this question, then, we must analyze first of all the so-called economic demands of the Revolution and those decisions which were made in the Revolution respecting the future economic life of the country.

The most important and ~~KN~~ fundamental ~~THE~~ questions in this respect were the land question, and the question of the industrial

enterprises. As a result of the land reform and of the nationalization of industry after the second World War, great ownership changes came about ~~XX~~ in Hungary. Industrial enterprises became the property of the state, for the most part, and a significant portion of the great estates were parceled ~~out~~ among the poor (nincstelen) peasants. The economic changes ~~and~~ experiments of the 1945-1948 period are extremely important, because the 1956 Revolution sanctioned these changes and experiments or, if you prefer, the Revolution reverted back to them.

The Revolution's most important economic decision was that "we shall not give back the factories to the capitalists, nor the land ~~XXX~~ to the magnates." This decision ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ met practically no resistance or opposition in the country. I don't think I have to go into details ~~XXX~~ as to how this decision was to be practically implemented. A good indication of what would have happened is the well-known fact that over 50 percent of the TSzCs cooperatives established between 1948-1956, were disbanded, and the peasantry went back to that small-scale farming (kisparaszti gazdálkodás) which developed in the ~~XXXX~~ 1945-1948 period.

In the factories the situation was somewhat more complicated. Nevertheless, there, too, we can find important initiatives (beginnings -- kezdeményezés) and therefore useful directions. I have in mind here the workers' councils.

These workers' councils played almost exclusively a political

role during October-November 1956, and they continued to be almost the only power in the nation's large cities after the Revolution. Actually, the workers' councils were not organized with a political aim in mind. Their role and purpose was to be primarily economic; the organization, direction, and management of factories was to be their main function. One of their first steps in this direction was their preoccupation with effecting new labor union elections.

- (6) My affirmative answer to this question would naturally depend on the economic condition of these countries. Generally speaking, I would be in favor of this. However, I am much more in favor of social ownership (társadalmi tulajdon), rather than nationalization. To explain, heavy industry would not be owned by the state, but by the workers. (A dolgozók tulajdonát jelentené.) This was a new experiment and this is what the workers' councils wanted to bring about. In many cases they obtained very good results. The time was short, of course, and their experiments could not ripen, could not show their disadvantages and advantages.
- (6 a) See answer to Question 6.
- (6 b) I don't know of any factory in Hungary, especially larger factory, where a restoration to the former owners would appear necessary. Why? Because nobody seems to favor a return to the pre-World War I capitalist economy in Hungary.
- (6 c) I would try to answer this question in the negative and would

add that I am not in favor of too great differences in the distribution of income. I do not approve of a situation where a few people have very large incomes in a community, and very many people have very little. Social evolution throughout the world, including the United States, clearly shows that economic development invariably brings with it a process leading to equalization of the incomes.

(6 e) I am not in favor of any sort of monopoly.

(6 g) The Kőzért was not a well functioning, economically solvent, undertaking. First of all it could not satisfy consumer demand, secondly, because of its disorganized administration and direction, it could not effect a normal flow of even those ^{goods} ~~it had~~, ~~shipping~~ ^{shipping} to some place too much, to other places too little. Even from a purely economic point of view, the Kőzért always had a large deficit, and the state had to help it out with tens of millions of forints yearly.

(7) In principle I am in favor, I repeat, not of nationalization, but of social ownership. This ownership would include light industry as well. (Could you give me a more precise description or definition of "social ownership"? Answer:) Social ownership differs from private or state ownership in that a factory, for instance, would not be the possession of one or more people, nor would it be owned by the state and directed by an appointed director or commissioner, but the workers, people actually working in the factory, would own that factory. It would be similar to

a cooperative (szövetkezet) in that the capital of the factory would be made up of monies contributed by the many workers -- shareholders, and these people would also exercise, as owners, the direction and control over it.

- (8) Government planning has its advantages and disadvantages. ~~Even~~ Even here in the United States you have a long-standing debate with some favoring and others opposing it, a debate of free market versus government planning.

The unquestionable advantage of a planning bureau is that it can measure more precisely, and therefore is able to more completely satisfy, consumer demand. Here, of course, you have to distinguish between planning, which takes into account the population's interest and proceeds accordingly, and planned economy where planning is done according to the narrow wishes and ~~the~~ interests of the leadership of a state. In this connection Hungary in the period 1948-1956, presents a classical example. During this period planned economy was based on the proposition that we must develop the heavy industry. All other production, including the production of consumer goods, was subordinated to the overriding determination of bringing into being a heavy industry. This was an example of an improper planning, of what planned economy should not be. I cannot cite you, off hand, an example of good planning, all I can do is to refer to attempts at planning in the underdeveloped regions, where such planning attempts to gauge in a realistic fashion the apparent needs, and then channel the available material

and production capacity in that direction.†

The real purpose of planning, of course, is the elimination of surpluses in some areas and the prevention of shortages in others; direction of the industrial and agricultural apparatus in such a way that precisely the needed things and amounts are produced, or such amounts as are profitable.

(8 a) See answer to Question X 8.

(8 b) Government planning in Hungary reached a state of complete bankruptcy. The planning bureau degenerated into a bureaucratic state machine -- and ^{the} we already mentioned undue emphasis on the development of heavy industry largely contributed to this. After all, the country embarked upon this development without ^g possessing the necessary natural resources. Even if the planning bureau had conducted its direction of the economy in the best possible manner, this eventual bankruptcy could not have been avoided.

They were creating such industries between 1948-1956 for which the economic prerequisites simply were not secured. The development and operation of an~~XX~~ industry depends on the ~~XX~~ availability of raw materials, preferably cheap raw materials, and power. There are other prerequisites, but these two are the most important. Now in Hungary they created such heavy industries where neither the raw materials nor the power were inexpensive. Most of these had to be imported in part. And we developed these industries solely for the purpose of being able to tell in our

statistics that we had a heavy industry and that we developed it to such and such a degree.

(8c)

Hungary is also one of the industrially lesser developed countries and it is necessary that her industrialization be accelerated so that she may reach the *niveau* of the more developed Western countries. Because of this, it is imperative that the direction of the country's industrial development be centrally defined. This brings up the question of what industry should be developed. I am in favor of certain branches of the light industry, an area where Hungary has very favorable potentialities, and also the food industry. This would have to be the general direction of development under normal conditions. The Planning Bureau would have to determine the exact ratio of participations by the various industries in the overall production. This should be the outer limit of the bureau's competence ^d beyond which it should not go.

(8d)

I am not an admirer of state price fixings. This is very inflexible and should be resorted to only if the economy loses its own delicate balance. If you have a balanced economy, the natural interaction of supply and demand determine the price. You must, of course, take into consideration the influence exerted on the price structure by the international demand and supply (i.e., what and how much of it can you buy and sell on the markets abroad?). But given this variation the price itself is otherwise fixed by the supply and demand.

I am rather in favor of supporting, i.e., protecting certain

Hungarian industries. Price fixing by the state in these regions is justifiable and reasonable, I think. I have in mind here industries in the initial stages of development which otherwise have a very good base and prospect of development, but have not yet reached a point where they could successfully compete with similar industries abroad.

- (9) You are using here the term "state", a not easily definable and elusive thing.

If under the term "state" you mean government, and if such a government really represents the interests of the people, if it is a freely elected government, then such government has the right and may interfere (beleszólhat) in questions of principle in any ~~at~~ and all areas of human affairs^s. A government has the right to define and to fix (megszabni) the direction of the nation's political, economic, and cultural development. All this is true only so long as it meets the approval of the people, and not further. The moment this point is reached and overstepped the government becomes illegal (törvénytellené válik).

- (10) All constitutions define the duties of the citizens toward the state. I can only ~~see~~ approve these duties as defined by the constitutions.

- (10a) This brings up the question of just and unjust taxation, and its seems necessary to state my view of what constitutes just and unjust taxation.

Taxes are levied so that the government may have the means necessary to govern on the one hand, and to pay for other expenditures, - provided for in the budget - on the other. Under "taxes" I mean total amount of taxes collected, a sum equal to the state's total expenditures. Under normal conditions both the total tax revenue and method, or ways and means, of taxation are determined by elected members of the Parliament. It is quite obvious that all citizens of the state must share the burdens of governmental and national expenditures. After all these expenditures are made for the benefit of all, assuming, as always, that both Parliament and government are ~~selected~~^{elected} representatives of the people whose acts and decisions meet the approval of the majority of the population.

The partaking in these expenditures, the ratio of taxation, according to which the amount each individual pays in taxes are determined ought to be based, in my opinion, on the individual's income. Now, - and here we touch upon just and unjust taxation - an individual's taxes must never reach a point where they might impede that ~~man~~ person's ability to provide for his and his family's basic life's necessities. This would be the yardstick of just taxation. The other important ingredient in taxation is equality. Everybody must be equally obligated to pay his taxes. I don't have equal amounts in mind, all I emphasize^{is}/that there ought to be no loopholes, and no exemptions, legally or otherwise, should be permitted. A classical example of this would be the privileged tax-exempt status of the

Hungarian nobility in the 19th century. This, of course, is part of history now. What I ought to emphasize is the fact that while everybody was taxed in Hungary, the partaking in this obligation was disproportional, and therefore unjust. State enterprises enjoyed substantial tax-privileges while individuals were burdened beyond normal ability to pay.

- (10e) I feel that the state or, to be more precise, the government, has definitely more duties toward the state or nation, than it has rights.

Whatever rights a government may have, it gets these from Parliament, and it is the Parliament which determines when and under what conditions acts on the part of the government are justifiable and proper or not. The government's duties, on the other hand, are constitutional obligations. A government is elected by the people for the purpose of assuring peaceful development, of assuring human life; a government is expected to secure and to assure to its citizens those rights and possibilities which constitute pre-requisite conditions for a person's normal development and happiness, or at least contentedness.

- (11) Medical care has not improved much. The number of available hospital beds does not show a substantial increase after the war. The ratio of population and number of physicians, - the number of people falling under one doctor's care also did not decrease substantially, though there is some improvement in both the former and the latter.

On the other hand, there was a substantial increase in the number of such people who now receive regular medical attention, who appear periodically for medical checkups, - people who, in the old days, were obliged to remain home, and to try to find some remedies - often unsuccessfully - for their maladies and illnesses. These people receive regular medical attention and hospital care, if necessary. In spite ~~mg~~ of this increased demand and opportunity for medical care the pre-war doctor - patient ratio did not substantially change, - not many more patients ^{FALL} ~~fall~~ on a physician now than before, because there was a ^{PRO} proportionate increase in attending physicians also. In other words, there is a relative increase in both but the ratio did not get much better. Hungary would have to substantially increase the number of hospital beds on the one hand, and the hospitals should be modernized on the other. Also, the number of physicians should be substantially increased, because all too many people fall on a physician even now.

(12)

I am not in a position to tell you whether or not individual Hungarian citizens have more opportunities now than before the war to go to the movies, or to attend the theater and concerts. One thing however, is certain; more people go to these places now than before the war. The increase is not so much an increase of individuals' opportunities of satisfying these ^{cu} cultural needs, - after all, the standard of living is still lower now than that of 1938, and there was no substantial increase in people's incomes either, - certainly

no increase in their purchasing power. There was a substantial increase in the number of those, however, who take advantage of these ~~xxx~~ cultural opportunities. Thus, if a person went to the movies once a week in 1938, he continues to do so once a week now. But the number of movie-goers increased remarkably.

(13)

One could reply to this question in several ways. After 1945, the food supply in Hungary was extremely scarce. The reason for this was primarily the drought. We had very dry years from 1945 to 1948, with very little rain. The resultant grain ~~x~~ yields fell ~~xxxxx~~ short of the normal. If you add to this the fact that a sizeable portion of these reduced amounts of grain was sent to the Soviet Union as reparation, the emerging picture is obvious; there was less food available, and an individual's share necessarily fell short of his corresponding share of 1938. This situation improved after 1948, more food was available and an increase of the market supply was definitely felt, though the present state still falls short of the pre-~~xxx~~ world war zenith of 1938.

I should like to mention here an important aspect of this question; people spend relatively more now on food articles - the percentage of incomes spent on food now is higher than the corresponding spending between the two world wars. The reason behind this is - I believe - primarily ~~xxx~~ psychological; on the one hand, the industrial products, such as clothing, furniture, and household appliances are so expensive now that their purchase is a much more difficult

undertaking now than say in 1938. Thus, if a person wishes to purchase any of these industrial products, such an act requires much more effort and determination now than was the case in 1938. Now people are rather reluctant to make these increased efforts and, instead of dressing better, they eat better. This psychological moment is, in the final analysis, the explanation for all aspects of Hungarian life from 1948 on to the present; that hopelessness, those hopeless ~~in~~ conditions, that aimless life which characterized these years. A family was not able to plan, it could not order its own little existence in a fashion where a continuous year-to-year growth would be noticeable, where the reaching of certain aims could be more or less certainly predicted. People chose instead the day-to-day living which necessarily meant a decision that "we shall eat better, because that is all we have and may indulge in and nothing else".

(13a&b) If we compare 1956 or 1957, to 1946, ~~the~~ the result undoubtedly is ⁱⁿ 1957 or 1956's favor. If we compared these years to 1950, the result would be the same.

The situation as it exists now (1957 and 1958) has political reasons behind it. The Kádár government was anxious to consolidate the situation and it hoped ^v to achieve this consolidation ~~by~~ by securing after the Revolution a relatively great abundance of goods. It made determined attempts to satisfy consumer demands, to make ~~it~~ ^{sure} that people - at least in this respect - would have no reason to

complain or to be dissatisfied. This change is characteristic for the entire industry, with the majority of factories producing consumer goods only, or primarily. This is also clearly evident from Hungary's 1957 trade balance, which shows a large deficit. The government was importing huge quantities of consumer goods (it was the importation of these goods which caused the passive balance), goods which secured a larger and better supply for the population.

(14) The answer to this question is rather similar to the one dealing with satisfying cultural needs (12). I have to say again that people do not clothe themselves better - a person has no more suits or dresses now than he or she had in 1938, but very many more people have good clothing today than was the case in 1938.

(14a) You had a special situation in Hungary after the war. Most of the industry was at a standstill, beginning to operate in 1946 only. You also had a very large inflation which meant in practice the virtual absence of supply, and a tremendous demand caused the prices to rise. The inflation of 1946 had reached tremendous proportions, when people found it hard enough to satisfy their most basic food requirements. Considerations of clothing were definitely secondary. For this reason you cannot take 1946 as a basis of comparison. If you do compare 1946 to today, the difference you find is tremendous. Thus, the situation is much better than it was either in 1946 or 1950. If you compare today with 1938, then you find that more people have good clothing today, but one person does not possess more

now than in 1938.

- (15) The answer to this question is a determined yes. Industrial production has increased a great deal, not only as compared to 1950, but also as compared to 1938.

This is quite understandable, and this development in Hungary had ideological, or political causes, especially after 1948. Though the 1945-1948 period also shows a determined industrial development, the substantial *x tempo* in industrialization came after 1948. In the opinion of the Communists, one of the prime requirements of the victory of socialism is the necessity of converting predominantly agricultural countries to predominantly industrial states. In the Communists' view, this change-over, this industrialization, is capable of accomplishment only through the emphasized development of the heavy industry. They want to develop a heavy industry capable of securing within the country the needed supply of production machines and equipment. This would be the *raison d'être* of the heavy ~~ind~~ industry, over and above its defense and war potential, - since, after all, one of the primary purposes of heavy industry everywhere - Hungary included, - is to supply the means of war, or of defense.

Now the statistics of industrial development in Hungary show a tendency of continuous increase from 1948 to 1953, when this tendency stopped. If there is an increase after 1953, such increase is primarily evident in the light industry, emphasizing the production of consumer goods.

(15a) See answer to question (15).

(15b) See answer to question (15).

(15c) I don't think the kind of industrial development we had in Hungary was good or advantageous. I don't think the direction this development took was proper because it meant development of such industries, for the operation of which there was no basis in Hungary. Not so long ago, I read that the present regime is further developing the iron works of Stalinváros and that the production capacity of this complex is to be further increased. As I read ~~in~~ this article, I dug into this matter and found that the Duna Iron Works was, and still is, operating with a serious deficit. There is a substantial difference between the cost of production and the selling price of the finished product. This difference amounted to a net loss of millions of forints yearly. Identical or similar are the statistics for other heavy industry establishments which were brought into being from 1945 to 1953. This clearly shows that our industrial development occurred in those branches ~~from~~ for which the basic requirements are lacking in Hungary.

(15d) Not only certain things should have been done differently, but the entire industrial development should have been effected in an entirely different fashion. Hungary undoubtedly needed development of its industrial potential. An industrial development was imperative because the land reform could not satisfy the claims of upward of ~~up to~~ one hundred thousand people. About 52 percent

of Hungary's population depended for its livelihood on agriculture. A substantial number of these, while employed in agriculture, were unable to earn enough there to maintain themselves. We always had a large labor surplus. This was the reason behind our earlier attempts at industrialization, and this explains the relatively low wages in industry during the inter-bellum period. The land reform gave land to a great many people, but it did not provide all land seekers with land. Even after this fundamental reform, we still had several hundred thousand people who represented a surplus in agriculture, and these people necessarily had to gain employment in industries already existing and in those still to be created. This fact alone, aside from ~~any~~ any other consideration, would have forced us to industrialize.

Now the pre-requisite of any industrialization is the availability of conditions and raw materials necessary for production. Thus we should have directed the development of industry along those lines where the necessary pre-requisites for such an expansion were readily available. We should have developed our agricultural industry first, a very neglected field to this day. This, of course, is a political question, just as the question of developing heavy industry is a political question; those countries ^{with} which Hungary today maintains commercial relations are also predominantly agricultural countries. Thus, if Hungary is to be limited in her trade to those countries with which she actually has trade relations now, the

the marketing of her agricultural products will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The natural outlet for Hungary's agricultural products as well as for her industrial products with an agricultural base would be Europe, or the highly developed industrial & states in general.

Agricultural industry (mezőgazdasági ipar) has a practically unlimited possibility of expansion in Hungary. Over and above the agricultural industry Hungary also has the necessary conditions and pre-requisites for the expansion of certain branches of light industry; I have in mind here primarily factories producing fine-mechanical products (electrical motors, precision instruments, gadgets, etc.). These industries would be profitable in Hungary even though some of the raw materials and semi-finished products would necessarily have to be imported. Hungary does have a great number of technicians and skilled workers whose technical abilities would assure these products excellent marketing possibilities even in the highly competitive international markets.

This, then, would have been a proper industrial development in Hungary. Such a development would have assured Hungary the ability to trade not only with Western Europe and with other highly industrialized countries, but also with Eastern Europe, - with countries of predominantly agricultural character. Our primary export to the West would have been agricultural products while the products of ~~of~~ our light industry would have easily found ready markets in

Eastern Europe.

- (16) This question is closely connected with the question of social ownership of the means of production. (See question (6) and (7)). I favor social ownership because the Revolution selected and tried this method, and because I think that the majority of Hungary's population would ~~favor~~ favor the introduction of this method if it had the opportunity to do so. From this it naturally follows that all industrial establishments, large and small, should be owned by the industrial laborers working in those plants. The workers - the small man, should own the factory, each according to his ability.

The workers should definitely be given the right to express their opinion in deciding what direction the factory's development should take; they should have a voice in the exact determination of production as well as in questions dealing with investments. This does not mean, of course, that the owners of the plant, - the workers - should have the right to force their will in all minute and insignificant questions, on the plant management. The problems of the direction and of the development of the socially owned factories should be solved in the same democratic manner as is generally customary in democratic countries, i.e., majority opinion should prevail.

- (16a) Trade unions in Hungary always played an important role in industry. Though the Hungarian labor movement got started much later than in Western countries, they quickly gained an important ~~and~~ voice.

Now experience shows that labor unions were strong in those days when membership in them was not compulsory and when the unions were not dependent on the state, were not executive arms of the state.

The Kádár regime time and again voiced its dissatisfaction over the fact that the unions are not sufficiently politicized. This is the best proof that the impact of the Revolution on the unions has not yet died out. (The unions made an attempt to deal with union problems during the revolt.)

(16b) I disapprove of the government interfering in labor union affairs, or in the affairs of any social group or movement in a manner decisive for the life of such organization. The disadvantages of a situation where the state interferes in the life of organizations is clearly evident in the case of the labor unions. The unions today are either executors of the state's will, or the defenders of the state's policies and actions, or both. The consequence of this is that though the labor union in Hungary is a very large mass organization, there is no community of interest between it and its members, and the union is generally regarded as a state organization whose main function it is to collect dues.

(16d) This boils down to a question whether one, or more than one, person should manage a factory, - a problem which existed in Hungary under the Communists also. This was also one of the central problems when the Workers' Councils were established. It was decided during the

Revolution that the central direction and management of a factory be exercised by the labor unions, a body consisting of eight, twelve, sixteen or twenty-four members.

I personally am in favor of one-man management and personal responsibility, because very often the problem of a factory cannot be solved by eight, ten, or twenty people getting together and discussing the issues. You need one man who is fully ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ competent and responsible, to make decisions and to implement policy.

I would, therefore, combine Workers' Councils with a single manager. There would be a Workers' Council in each factory and a manager, responsible to the Councils, would submit periodically reports to them. The manager would serve as an appointed executive. The manager would either act independently, and on his own responsibility in all matters pertaining to the plant or else would, if this solution be preferred, seek the advice and consent of the Council before major decisions or changes are made.

(16e) The manager would naturally be responsible to the Worker's Council. Should the system of social ownership come about, the status of the Workers' Councils would be analogous to the status of the board of directors of a cooperative or of a ^{corporation} ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~. Within this framework, the direction of the plant by one man would proceed according to the well known principles of business administration; the board of directors would either name one of its members or an outsider as the plant executive, with the board deciding on major

issues from time to time.

- (17) The ~~the~~ question of collective farms (kolkhozs) was always a thorny one in Hungary. The peasantry instinctively and jealously protects the principle of private property. This sentiment was particularly developed between 1948-~~al~~1956, at the time when the Communists used every means at their disposal to ~~force~~ ^{force} increase the number of collective farms.

Farm cooperatives (^ttermelőszövetkezetek) otherwise are very often justifiable and necessary and proper. In this era of modern agriculture one could not deny the great advantages of ~~such~~ mechanization. Nor could one deny the advantages of large scale production; large scale farming undoubtedly is better equipped and more able to accommodate itself to the ever^g changing market's requirements. Here again, however, we must go back to previous developments in Hungary, and state that the peasantry was not afraid of the idea of cooperatives as such. We find a large number, and a ~~many~~ variety of forms of farmers' cooperatives in Hungary already between the two world wars; you had machine cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, purchasing and investment cooperatives, and a host of similar others. None of these cooperatives touched upon the question of land ownership. I am not at all convinced of the propriety and expediency of ever raising the question of land-ownership in Hungary in a manner where you categorically show the way, or lead, or direct the peasantry into a certain path, or force them to accept a solution

or the solution. I am convinced that the peasantry would be forced by the sheer force of circumstances to change its face; agricultural competition would be bound to teach the peasantry that in order to better protect its interests it is necessary to adopt some forms of cooperatives. I can very well imagine that some cooperatives would persist in their present form even if you ~~that~~ did not have the Communists in power. The number of such cooperatives would ~~some~~, of course, be very small.

The important thing here is that force and ~~the~~ direction from above must never be used; the peasantry itself must come to the realization that in certain situations, in certain branches of agricultural production, cooperatives and cooperation have great advantages.

- (17b) The institution of state farms, at least in their present form, is completely untenable and improper, and must be abolished. Some of the state farms owe their existence to the fact that certain peasants, wishing to get rid of their holdings, offered their land to the state. The state, accepting these lands, created the state farms in order to secure at least part of the forced delivery quota thereby. The system of the state farms, therefore, is the exclusive creature of the 1948-1953x period, and their creation had political reasons, lacking any economic justification. Some attempts were made from 1945 to 1948 to establish model farms in the various regions of the country. These model farms were to serve as experi-

men^{tal} stations, places where specific ~~experimental~~ conditions necessary for modern farming ~~can~~ could be discovered, new production methods could be tried out, and the feasibility of introducing new grains or plants ⁺ could be tested. These and similar objectives are very worthwhile, and experimental stations in this sense, were, and still are, fully justifiable. Such model farms would be under the immediate supervision and direction of the Ministry of Agriculture and would serve as examples to the peasant, showing him the way to prosperous and rational agriculture. I can accept the idea of a state farm only in this specific and limited sense.

- (17c) The vast majority of the collective farms will disband, or ought to disband, in Hungary, for two reasons; a) as an economic unit, the collective has either no vitality (~~is~~ nem életképes, not viable) or, b) most of its members are desirous of becoming independent farmers again, not having ~~wanted~~ entered the collectives voluntarily in the first place.

As to the future of the collective farms, i.e., what should be done with them generally, I ~~would~~ leave this decision to the affected farmers themselves. The state should permit the members of the ~~state~~ collectives to decide for themselves what they ~~want~~ want to do with them.

- (17e) Since the members themselves are to decide what the future of the collectives should be, it follows that the land, in case of dissolu

would revert to their former owners. By the term "former owners" I mean last owners, people who owned the land after the land reform.

The land reform of 1945, affected about 38 percent of the country's arable land. (The percentage may have been even higher.) The land reform affected large estates of over one ~~ix~~ thousand holds, peasant holdings over two hundred holds and, at a later time (beginning of 1947), non-peasant holdings of over one hundred holds. These lands were distributed. Both from the point of view of economics, and from the point of view of the interests of Hungary's agricultural population, the land reform was necessary, and the new conditions it created must definitely be maintained.

Now the question of what the peasants want to do with their land, what solution they decide on as regards land ownership on the one hand, and as regards the future disposition of the collective's present buildings and equipment, tractors and machine stations, etc., on the other - this is a specific, particular question. It goes without saying that it would be quite improper for a member to carry away one-half, or one-quarter of a tractor; or to dismantle the buildings and distribute the building materials; such absurd solutions would serve no useful purpose and would only disrupt the process of rehabilitation. It is obvious that these properties (i.e. buildings, equipment, machines, etc.) would have to be placed at

the disposal of all, by means of a system of co-operatives, or collective ownership. This arrangement would be quite acceptable since co-operatives of this sort flourished in Hungary already in the inter-bellum period.

(17h) Let us start out by saying that the term "Smallholder" is not at all precise in this connection. Generally speaking, the term "Smallholder" in Hungary signified a farmer who owned less than one hundred holds of land, and even this category varied in the different parts of the country, depending on the land's quality and yield. These so-called Smallholders were not affected by the land reform. After the Communists' advent to power in 1948, decrees were issued which brought about a situation where these Smallholders were very anxious to get rid of their holdings; the regime introduced a system of taxation, i.e., it raised the forced delivery quotas, the land tax, and income tax, to a degree where the farmers' income was not sufficient to cover these obligations. As a result, at first the junior members of the Smallholders' family gravitated towards the ~~six~~ cities, and became factory workers. Later, the head of the family ~~him~~ himself was forced to give up his land, (asking the state to take it away from him) and to find himself another occupation. These ~~him~~ abandoned holdings constituted the nucleus of the emerging state farms, appearing in large numbers from 1948 to 1953.

If you have in mind here, a settlement and regularization of

land ownership in Hungary, that is a very complicated question; first of all, you had a settlement, a situation, as created by the land reform of 1945. The situation thus created was by no means stable, however, and land ownership and structure was exposed to recurring ^{disturbances} ~~differences~~ ever since 1948, and up to 1956.

The immediate ^{cause} of this recurring disturbance was the drive for consolidation (tagosítás). In connection with the emergence of state farms and collectives, the government decreed that these be consolidated.

To remain for a moment with the state farms; various Smallholders gave up their land to the state for reasons already explained. These holdings were situated in different sections of a village territory, often very far apart. The government, when creating the state farms, decreed that these several holdings be brought together, and be consolidated into one piece. On this one piece of land the government wanted to introduce machines and large-scale farming methods, to intensify production, and to raise the yields. The result of this was that the ownership of one particular strip of land was constantly changed; a middle peasant, who from 1945 to 1956 always cultivated his own land, and never joined a collective, saw his property change sites three or four times during this period. His original holdings were taken away from him in the process of consolidation, and he received another strip somewhere else. His new strip was again "consolidated" and he received still another

territory. Then came the establishment of the TszCs's and our farmer again had to move, etc. This constant change of land sites had disastrous consequences, and resulted in a deterioration of production and in falling of yields in both private holdings and state farms. A person was never certain of the geographical location of his property, and he considered it rather unwise to invest in that land, to affect some improvements on it. One of the most important of these investments both from the point of view of upkeep and yield was manuring and the use of chemical fertilizers. Private owners simply refused to manure their lands, and these holdings, as well as the garden plots or small homesteads of TszCs members on a collective were completely neglected. † (teljesen kisoványodtak).

You can see from this sketchy exposition some of the complications and the difficulty anyone would have in re-arranging land ownership with some degree of fairness and justice. It is obvious that in any future settlement, the 1945 land reform would have to be taken ~~as~~ as a basis and point of departure. But even so you would have countless cases where an exception would have to be made; you would have cases where the present owner made substantial investments and effected improvements on a land strip which was not his after the land reform. You would have cases where people planted vineyards or orchards just a few years ago, where the fruits of labor and investment would only begin to show.

It would run against the principle of equity if such labors and investments were disregarded.

(171) It all depends on who the "former owners" are. If these be the pre-1945 owners, then my answer is no.

(171) If we accept, as I do, the proposition, that one of the functions of the state is to define the country's economic development and ~~progress~~ progress, or if, applying this thesis to Hungary, the state is to raise as fast as practicable Hungary's economic standard to the European niveau, - and if I therefore accept that the state is to support and protect certain industries and to subsidize others, then I also necessarily accept the proposition that the agriculture, too, be accorded similar qualitative and quantitative treatment.

The development of agriculture in Hungary is a central and decisive problem. Closely connected with the development of agriculture is the question of developing the agricultural industry, since this industry ought to become our basic industry, the center around which other industries ought to be developed.

The development of agriculture itself may be many-sided, and there are numerous areas where state help may be applied effectively and where such help would stimulate progress and development. I have in mind here primarily capital investments; the purchase of needed machinery, the securing of capital necessary for regular manuring and effective use of fertilizer. All these things could

be arranged in the form of a loan, or in the form of a guarantee whereby the state would guarantee that purchases made by individuals or by cooperatives would be paid for within a stated number of years.

(17m) Machine-tractor stations should not be divided among its present users but ^c co-operatives should be established assuring their common and economical use. In this respect the long ago established practice of forming machine-cooperatives clearly shows the path. In olden days ^{me} members of such co-operatives put up the capital and purchased the machines. In the present instance the state should simply transfer its ownership rights to co-operatives formed expressly for the upkeep and operation of these machines.

(18) I am for the full independence of the church (ES) ~~is~~ and I don't think state assistance to them is either necessary or called for. This should apply to all churches without exception. Experience in Europe as well as here in the United States clearly shows that churches are able to exist without support from the state and are able to exercise those functions which clearly are within their ~~own~~ sphere.

State assistance to the church only ^e enhances the churches economic power, and together with this increases the political power of the church, - something which is not always necessary.

There is another consideration which further underlines my stand. If we consider the real reason of the churches' existence,

which^{is} the propagation of God's word, & the conversion of people, and the saving of souls - the ~~church~~ church can much more effectively exercise these functions if it is completely free of the state, and is not bound to it, or dependent on it, in any way.

- (18d) The church in Hungary maintained certain schools with the state's assistance which were church schools. In these schools the church taught according to its own characteristic conceptions. ¶ We cannot even say that this teaching was bad or inferior, because highly trained teachers were employed in these schools.

Now if the believers desire that a church school be established they certainly are able to provide for one out of their own generosity, and I think it proper if the situation is thus solved.

In a word, then, the church shall play such part in education as she is capable to effect through her own schools, supported by her own means. Freedom of education should be guaranteed by the state, and if the church wishes to establish schools and educational institutions of her own, so let it be, let the church bring up and educate students in a spirit she considers proper or expedient as long as she is willing and able to provide for the upkeep of such schools.

- (18c) Compulsory teaching of religion in schools is an untenable proposition, I think. I was, and still am, all for religion to be regarded as an elective subject. I maintain this view not because the Communists demonstrated the degree to which religion may be subjugated

and abused under such a system, but because I believe that people should have the right to determine what sort of education their children are to get. This is another of those fundamental human rights whereby parents are entitled to themselves give an education to their children. If, therefore, I want my children to be brought up without religion and without God, this is a question of my own conscience. I regard, therefore, compulsory religious instruction in schools to be an interference with the ~~ft~~ fundamental human rights.

(18f) I would send my children to a good school, to a school where they would receive all that instruction - and in the most modern form - which I consider a necessary basis for their later life and development. Whether or not this would be a public school or a church school, I cannot decide now. Our experience in Hungary showed that church schools gave a better education. Their teachers were more cultured and were more up to date, both in their training and methods than the public school teachers. If I had to make a decision, I would naturally want the best and most - like any parent, for my children, whether this be in ~~the~~ public ~~the~~ school, church school, or private school would really make no difference.

(18g) The 1945 land reform is just as applicable to church lands as it is to lands of private proprietors. Since church lands fell in that category which was ordered distributed in 1945, there is no reason whatsoever to treat the church differently in this respect

then would one treat anybody else in Hungary. This is one aspect of the question.

As far as church buildings are concerned, - and I have school buildings in mind here - I would permit the church to administer these buildings, in conjunction with school instruction, insofar as the church would financially be capable of maintaining them. In cases where the church would be unable to maintain these buildings, such buildings should be sold, and the church equitably compensated.

(19) There were a few, traditional and well-known, church institutions in Hungary, both Catholic and other. These schools had a national reputation and a well developed, long standing tradition. These schools ought to be maintained, perhaps even if their continued existence were not possible without state assistance. These were, after all, outstanding values of the Hungarian culture. I don't know what is the number of Party members in Hungary today, - if it is three hundred thousand or four hundred thousand. The membership of the MDP (Hungarian Workers' Party) exceeded, I think, one million. I don't think it would be wise and expedient to call such a huge number of people to account, to drag them to court, especially if we consider that a substantial number of these are not convinced Communists, but became members as a result of economic necessity and pressure. From this it obviously follows that a differentiation must be made in evaluating these people. This categorisation would have to be made by the Hungary of the future. There are

people among these Party members, no doubt, whose trial in court for crimes committed is inevitable. Such people naturally would have to be tried; they knew full~~ly~~ well what they were doing when they committed their inhuman acts, when they proceeded according to their own particular interests, flagrantly disregarding and violating the interests of the nation. This would be a limited group. I would not apply this method to the broad masses of the rank and file. At most, the rank and file could be used in the economic reconstruction of the country to which they certainly should contribute with their labors.

(19e)

I should like to answer your question by beginning with the other end of the issue; we should start out by saying that in 1953, a very substantial change occurred in the life of the Hungarian nation. In the wake of Imre Nagy's ascendancy a development of liberalization got underway and parallel with this a struggle against the Stalinists began. During the struggle the question of what ~~constituted~~ constituted the real interests of the Hungarian people was fully discussed and determined; all this came to light as it was shown what mistakes the pre-1953 regime had made, what great losses to the nation and to the citizens it had caused, how it denied to the people the exercise of fundamental human rights.

This period serves^d as a water shed, as a dividing line; some people took up their~~re~~ positions on the one side, some others on the other. The role of those Communists who definitely opposed Stalin^{ist}

and who clearly saw the magnitude of the mistakes of the past was considerable. When judging Communists these people must clearly be ~~not~~ distinguished from the rest. A Biblical example comes to my mind, the example of Paul, a Roman soldier who recognized his mistakes and those of his camp, and ~~drastically~~ changed sides to become an apostle of an entirely different development. We cannot ~~not~~ refuse recognition of a similar role played by a Tibor Déry, by a Gyula Hays and by very many others, less known, but not less significant.

I am firmly convinced that these people have become just as ~~rightful~~ and full-fledged citizens of a future democracy as anybody else. After the tremendous trials and tests to which these people were exposed, with many of them paying dearly for their convictions by loss of health, loss of freedom, and of life, - after all these tribulations the mere fact that they were Communists or even the fact that they catered to the regime, cannot be laid to their account. This, then, must be the basic human consideration in judging the Communists.

I don't consider it a task of a future democratic Hungary to combat Communists with all weapons (tüzzel-vizzel); I don't think it should employ the methods of the Horthy regime, so extensively and brutally used after 1919 when countless people were imprisoned and executed. I don't consider it wise to settle an ideological question by liquidating the exponents of a political

movement.

The guilty ones should be punished, yes. But the public must feel, and must be thoroughly convinced that there is a guilt, that the punishment ~~is~~ is proper, and just, and legal. People may be condemned for long years in prison, people may even be hanged, but the public must have the certainty that the judgment was proper and the sentence just.

These are the basic considerations which I wanted to mention. This must be the framework when we consider the Disz.

The Disz is, over and above this, a separate and distinct problem. After all, ~~the Disz~~ it is ^{the} the organization of the Hungarian youth. It has ca 180,000 members today, and includes all ~~the~~ university students ^{and} and even secondary school students who hope to attend the university. The last group is ^{of} course keenly aware of the importance Disz membership plays when it comes to admission to institutions of higher learning; those who are not members cannot hope to continue their studies.

When considering this entire question, you must take into account that a man lives only once, and that a man's years of youth do not return. A young man in Hungary today is hardly responsible for the fact that he is 18 or 20 or 24 years old. He was born into a situation which he neither foresaw nor necessarily desired. Yet, a young man, if bright, wants to get ahead in life. One would like to become a physician, the other an engineer, the

third an economist, etc., and circumstances beyond his control limit him so that he may become a doctor, an engineer, or an economist in Hungary only. Obviously he will have to accommodate himself to the existing framework, if he is to get ahead at all. The fact that a person was, or is, a member of the Madiss, or of the Disz, cannot under any circumstances be held against him, nor be taken as a yardstick in passing judgment over his character or worth. What should be considered is a Disz member's attitude and actions, - and here again ~~xx~~ ^{the} already outlined principles should be operative.

- (19f) The judging of the AVH is an entirely different question. Here, too it must be strongly emphasized that only just sentences, and only lawful punishments should be rendered. It must be said, nonetheless, that the AVH came into being as early as 1945, and that people who did not approve of subsequent developments did not become members of this organization. Thus, while in the case of the other organizations, such as the Communist Party, or of the Disz, only the striking (kiugró) cases should be examined, the AVH as a whole, and every member of it, should be subjected to a through examination.
- (19g) The problem of the police is a much milder one than ^a that of the AVH. Relations between these two always were, and still are, very strained. The police always did look upon the AVH with a feeling of enmity and fear. All this does not mean that the police should not be subjected to a close scrutiny.

(20) The history of Hungary abounds in significant events. We need consider here only Hungary's role which is not limited to a single historical event but is closely connected with a general historical development, namely her endless and ever recurring battles and struggles in her defense against attacks and invasions from the East. While defending herself, Hungary held up these forces from the East and served as a defense outpost ~~közvetlen~~ (végvári vitése) of Europe and of European culture.

Hungarian cultural life generally, and outstanding exponents of this culture in particular, always did try to maintain a cultural niveau similar to the standards of their contemporaries. During the Middle Ages, as well as at the beginning of the modern era, countless Hungarian students studied abroad. They went to foreign lands to learn what was new and interesting, and to make these their own. While these students of an often embattled and economically poor country did their best to understand Europe and to absorb European culture, we must not lose sight of genuine Hungarian cultural developments and contributions which rightfully belong to, and form an integral and valuable part of, what is known as European culture. I am not restricting myself here to the creations of Hungarian painters and other forms of art which more or less have an international character; perhaps even more important than these are the less cosmopolitan, but typically Hungarian cultural creations such as the poems of poets, the novels of writers, the writings of

statesmen, the politics of politicians, etc.

(21)

^{We}~~They~~ would, first of all, have to clarify what we mean by "Hungarian national character". If we consider this question from the point of view of biology, ~~is~~ i.e., that the position of a Hungarian's eye, the quality of his hair, etc., are different from those of a German, ^{or} ~~or~~ a Frenchman, then we must say that such differences did ^{of} exist a thousand years ago, rudiments of which are still apparent here and there.

It is very difficult to answer this question with a definite yes or no, since a person's customs, dressing or Weltanschauung (world view) depend, among other things, on his culture. Europeans, be they Germans, Frenchmen, Italians, or Hungarians, cannot be easily distinguished from each other unless you sit next to them and hear them speak.

If we now accept the view that an individual is to a certain extent determined by his environment, - (by environment I don't mean physical environment only, though this, too, is included. What I have in mind is the degree of a person's cultural development, that horizon within which he is able to see and to register the various phenomena) - then we may say that the more primitive life is, the more typical and characteristic (sa^{ft}ja^{ft}pos) it must be, the more it has retained from those original elements which at one time fully determined a people's world view, customs, dressing, mode of life, beliefs (hiedelmait) and everything else. Superstition,

for example, is still very much alive with the most primitive people, and has adherents even today ~~even now~~ among those in Hungary who are ^{at} the very lowest degree of development on the Hungarian cultural scale. These individuals still continue to believe in certain things as did our ancestors twelve or more generations ago. A fact like this alone definitely leaves its imprint on the individual. In this sense, then, there certainly is a difference between those Hungarians and Germans, for instance, who occupy the lowest ~~low~~ niveau or stratum on their respective cultural scales. Cultural development, or more precisely, the process where

A by individuals are becoming more and more cultured (kultúrálódás) tends to minimize and to wash away these differences entirely.

(21e) Since my reply to your previous question (question 21), though indefinite, was in the negative, here also I can only give you an indefinite "perhaps yes" - "perhaps no" answer.

B The Hungarian peasantry, the oldest social stratum of the country, definitely did have a peculiar, if not unique, character of its own, exemplified by its own peculiar culture, folk songs, folk dances, ^{customs} ~~costumes~~, ~~clothing~~ dressing, etc. This character, which set the peasantry apart, and made it different from the rest of the population, began to decay towards the end of the last century. This decomposition has reached such proportions that today it is practically impossible to speak of a ~~a~~ peculiar and typical character.

The urban culture in Hungary, the first to accept, and to

assimilate Western and other foreign culture/influences, began to penetrate the village as early as the beginning of the last century. This penetration continued and still continues to this day with a steadily growing intensity, so that the urban culture was, and is breaking up the culture of the village, the village customs, and other village characteristics.

One of the characteristics of the twentieth century, not only as regards Hungary, but respecting other countries as well, is the phenomenon where intellectuals are beginning to try to re-discover their nation's culture, - a culture already doomed, a culture which, unlike in previous centuries when it was transplanted from father to son, is no longer transmitted from generation to generation, a culture which is dying out, a culture forced out of existence by its urban counterpart. These intellectuals have recognized the urgent need of collecting the remaining ruins, in order to save for posterity the characteristic colors of their peasant people.

If we consider your question from this point of view, then we ~~we~~ must say that the peasantry undoubtedly possessed characteristic features of its own, some of which I already enumerated, which did set it apart from any and all groups or classes living in Hungary. Today, however, the folk songs are sung, and the folk dances are danced, not so much by the peasant youth, certainly not by the village folk primarily, - these peasant characteristics

having become the almost exclusive domain and preoccupation of young intellectuals who, searching for solutions to present day problems go back in a sense to the past for lessons and instructions. These young intellectuals hope to effect a cultural regeneration also through the instrumentality of native, peasant culture.

To return to the peasants; mechanization and other phenomena^a of urban culture and civilization have completely conquered the villages and there, too, you will find replicas of what obtains in the cities; this superimposed urban culture is diluted, modified, and, generally speaking, of a lower niveau in the villages than in the cities, but it is essentially the same.

Speaking now of the industrial laborers, I should mention at the outset that in Hungary you did not have as sharp a class distinction between this group and the peasants as say in Germany or even in France~~s~~, countries whose industrial development occurred at a much earlier date than that of Hungary.

Industrial laborers everywhere were recruited from the surplus peasant population. Technical developments in agriculture having dislocated and transformed former production practices, less and less people were needed for the performance of traditional tasks, and peasants flocked to the cities and found their livelihood in the developing industries. This transformation and the resultant wandering of people from agriculture to industry began in Hungary

only after the ¹First World War. If we look at Hungarian statistics, we see that the number of industrial laborers had doubled in the period 1920-1940. The population of the larger cities where the new industries sprang up swelled at the same time, showing an increase of from 50 to 100 percent. A classical example would be Budapest in this respect.

These industrial laborers, coming as they did from the villages brought with them the villages' customs, the village world view, etc. This separation from the village did not come about in an abrupt and final manner, and significant connections between new and old persisted long after the initial separation; we saw throughout the inter-bellum period how large numbers of the urbanized laborers flocked back to their native villages during the summer to help their brothers or parents perform the tasks of harvesting and threshing during the peak of the agricultural season. This ~~was~~ dual residence (kétlaki élet) and the obvious duality that goes with it persisted in steadily diminishing proportions throughout the inter war years, and is a factor even today. The present regime is conducting a vigorous campaign against this practice, especially as it relates to those industrial workers who reside in nearby suburbs and villages. These people still have their own houses and their little vegetable gardens, or orchards, or vineyards, and it is still their standard custom to devote their vacations, or even longer periods ~~■~~ to the ^{en} maintenance of their gardens, to the cultivation of their trees, etc.

The relations between industrial laborers and the village are

rather close even today. This means, of course, that the ^village customs also persisted for a very long time among the workers, and are in evidence to this day. Had these connecting links been severed at an early date, a very great and sharp difference, and conscious class distinction might have developed in both ways of life, thinking, and other respects, between the workers and the peasants. This did not come about and therefore a clear cut distinction between the peasants and the industrial laborers of Hungary cannot be made in the sense of differences and distinctions as evident in the West. These two groups constitute two classes, to be sure, whose interests are not always identical, but in their customs and in their family relations they are so interwoven and essentially so similar that the workers were unable thus far to create a culture of their own which would distinguish them from their ~~some~~ ancestors, the peasants.

There is a characteristic and so-called urban culture in Hungary which has been in existence for a number of centuries. The predecessor of this urban culture was the so-called gentry (nemesi) culture. This gentry culture did not have its home in the cities originally -- it actually centered in the provincial gentry strongholds. However, nineteenth-century developments changed all this; the so-called village gentry (a falusi nemesség) lost its traditional status, and with it also its characteristics. Some of the ^{of} withered away (elsorvadtak), some others saw themselves

forced to take up residence in the cities, or to accept that culture which was already established and flourished in the cities. This culture, originally under Latin, and later under French influence, had very little in common with the native Hungarian culture. Ever since their emergence (i.e., urban culture, village culture) and throughout their development, these two categories or cultures are clearly recognizable and distinct; the former was originally called gentry culture, which later merged into a new development and became the urban culture. The latter was the native culture, existing in the villages among the peasants. Between these two cultures there is a substantial difference even today, and these two cultures opposed each other (szembeállottak egymással) in the last few decades, particularly in the interbellum period.

After the second World War the native, or so-called populist (népi) culture became predominant, and after the Communists assumed power, the culture of the cities, or urban culture, was definitely regarded as unwelcome. I must of course add that the Communists also tampered with the populist culture, adjusting, transforming, and changing it whenever and wherever they could, in an attempt to relate it to the marxist-leninist ideology. It is noteworthy in this connection that only those of the populist writers who were willing to effect the compromises with the marxist-leninist ideology were able to make themselves a career.

If we consider this issue today and view the present-day

categories in Hungary, then we must say that there is a village culture which has been pretty much confused and mixed up and tainted and infected by the urban culture. When I say that the urban culture has infected the village culture, I mean that it upset and undid those sure judgments and those precisely defined categories which were once the possession of the people and with which the peasant was once able to judge precisely, i.e., if an object, or thing was beautiful, good, or not. The urban culture has cut wide open the precise boundaries of these categories and has rendered the people's judgment quite uncertain. The people in the villages did not have an education, a training, necessary to judge and to appreciate the influences of the urban culture. They were not able to absorb, ^{it} or to create something new out of it. Instead a ~~chaos~~, and a loss of ^{the} ability of certain judgment was the result.

This, then, is the situation in the villages today. This characterization is also applicable to the workers, though the workers were much more exposed to the decaying influences of the city than were the peasants. The peasant and village mode of life, the loneliness and solitariness imposed by their profession, made the peasants more immune and safe.

(21 f) See answer to Question 21 e.

(22) Speaking of Hungarian governments in the XXth Century, a natural line of division suggests itself; the dividing line is always a great war, and governments may be grouped in three categories. Before and during the first World War you had the royal and imperial

governments, whose task it was to lead and to administer both Hungary and Austria. After the first World War, Hungary was a kingdom without a king, with a regent at the head of the ^{state} government. We must say a few words, I think, about these forms of government, before we can arrive at a satisfactory answer to your question. We ~~didn't~~ ^{need not} say much about the Austro-Hungarian governments because post-World War II developments make this period a faraway and anachronistic era. The distance between us and that era is far greater than the actual number of years would indicate. It was an era whose form or content ~~is~~ ^{are} simply inconceivable as actualities today. Before the first World War, Hungary was a feudal state. Not only was the land in the hands of a few hundred aristocratic families, but with and through the land they also had the state power.

This characteristic feature continued after the first World War also. When I stated that Hungary was a kingdom without a king in the interbellum period, I also meant that the state did not change, did not alter its feudal base. Feudalism as such weakened naturally, since almost two-thirds of the country's territory was lost and with this a substantial number of the large landed estates were also detached from Hungary. One of the immediate results of all this was that a large number of formerly rich and powerful landed magnates became impoverished. Thus after the first World War these dispossessed magnates and gentry concentrated all their effort

in securing the continued maintenance of their old rights and privileges. Also, aristocratic and gentry families became more and more interested in securing positions in government offices and other public places.

The cabinets and the government offices were obliged to accept this changing trend, the Hungarian constitution and the all-pervading influence of aristocrats and of the gentry both within and outside of the two Houses of Parliament making this acceptance inevitable. To ~~the~~^{what} extent this situation persisted, how truly Hungary remained the almost only feudal state in Europe is clearly brought out by the determined struggle of the populist writers, who attempted to show how much better it would be if Hungary were a democracy, where all citizens would enjoy equal rights, ^{if} were all people would participate in the state affairs, instead of only a small group of oligarchs who jealously guarded their ancient privileges. This question has a very extensive literature in Hungary and even today much is written about it.

The governments of the interbellum period tried to resist and to combat the growing influence of the populist writers, but the naked facts, the gross social injustice, and the downright misery of a substantial part of the population were all too well known to be concealed or to be treated lightly. The governments were well aware of these conditions and therefore a direct assault against the populist writers was never undertaken. The governments

limited themselves to preventing only such developments which tended to directly undermine them, or which were injurious either to them personally or to their class. This is the explanation why and how it was possible that the populist literature and the struggle for social justice for the peasants and the workers -- the majority of the population -- could assume such proportions, could fight on such a wide front, could be popularized; books were permitted to be published on the subject, meetings could be organized, conferences could be held, etc. The question was brought up for discussion even in Parliament, especially in the late 'thirties, when the government, to mitigate and to pacify this steadily growing discontent, was forced to offer several minor concessions. The government tried, among other things, to improve the extremely unhealthy and poor housing conditions in the villages through the ONCSA; the government did not prevent the opposition from periodically lodging a protest in Parliament, etc. In a word, the government tried to maintain an appearance, a façade, of constitutionality in the interbellum period and the forces fighting for social justice were using this desire on the part of the government to maintain the façade of constitutionality as a sanctuary, as a bridgehead, from behind which they led their attack.

In the 1930's, the Hungarian governments were gradually going to the right. This tendency had political, geographical, and other causes; the close proximity of Germany and the ^{appearance} ~~appearance~~

there of Hitlerism; the sizeable German minority in Hungary; the officials in the state and in the local administrations, who were either of German origin or were related to Germans through marriage, or were simply people who sympathized with national socialism; that drill, those forms ^{and} ~~XX~~ mentality of officialism which were characteristically German in nature (translations or copies of the German original), -- all these factors tended to make the bureaucracy German-oriented and this bureaucracy pressurized the cabinet at the same time when a German political and diplomatic pressure on the part of Hitlerite Germany was also acutely felt. This double ^R pressure, coming both from without and within, made it practically impossible ~~XX~~ for the government in those days -- ^{given} even the cultural principles and mentality of government leaders themselves -- to assume an orientation other than gravitation towards Germany.

This policy of the interbellum governments was obviously fallacious and wrong, proved sufficiently so by later developments to make it superfluous for me here to substantiate them.

With these observations I have essentially passed judgment on the inter-war governments, convicting (elmarasztaltam) them of having chosen fascism instead of ~~XX~~ democracy; instead of allowing the people to come within the framework of the constitution, instead of building an economically strong and culturally well developed nation, they chose to protect their own narrow little rights.

A decisive change occurred after 1945 when, after the termination of the war which changed the destiny of Europe and of the world,

Hungary arrived at the threshold of a new development and carried through the land reform, while those forces which already in the interbellum period had fought for social justice and social equality have set themselves to the task of establishing ^{democracy} in Hungary.

This, in a nutshell, is what I wanted to say. I am now in the position to vote; I consider democracy to be the proper and the best suited social form for a people to live under, and therefore I affirm a democratic form of government to be my ideal; with all their faults and mistakes, the 1945-1948 governments were Hungary's best governments of this century, because they best served the interests of the entire population or, if you prefer, the interests of the Hungarian nation.

Question: Do you consider the 1945-48 period as an uninterrupted whole, a continuity, a unit? Answer: Yes, there was definitely a continuity. The concepts were the same, and while insignificant changes did occur in the cabinets, the governments' basic concepts -- the fundamental endeavor, remained identical. When you look at this period, the fact that Zoltan Tildy or Ferenc Nagy was the Prime Minister is not important. What is important is that Hungary had a Parliament in this period which under the given circumstances -- and these circumstances account for the mistakes and errors -- did attempt to create a state characterized by social equality, where the distribution of wealth and of goods approached that optimum when each and every one was able to bring its hopes to fruition and

to prosper. The ingredient necessary for such a development, the intellectual^{tual} freedom, the freedom of speech, was also fully guaranteed.

(22 b)

Mass emigration from Hungary occurred in the 'nineties of the last century and continued roughly up until the outbreak of the first World War. During this time more than a million people emigrated from Hungary, -- a very impressive figure even if we consider that Hungary in those days had a population of 20 million.

If we look for the causes of this mass emigration we may explain it in several ways; these explanation are particular in that they vary according to the point of view, and according to the understanding of the viewer. I don't consider it my taks to tell you the opinions of others in this question. My own opinion is that the emigration had primarily economic and social causes. The economic causes are to be found in the then prevailing feudalistic society, the system of large landed estates, on which extremely unfair wages and decidedly inhuman treatment combined with a practically inconceivable poverty were the rule.

The village folk and especially the farm laborers living on the large estates not only were not familiar with principles of birth control at the time, but were also utterly ignorant of even the rudiments of hygienic practices; people were dying just as did animals on these estates. In those days the traditions of serfdom were still strongly present generally in Hungary, and

particularly on the magnates' estates. Both aristocratic and gentry landowners combined to preserve even at the turn of the XIXth Century the medieval idea that serfs -- now called agricultural laborers -- constituted but another kind of good, another sort of property that belonged to the landowner.

These agricultural laborers (cselédék -- servants) usually had very large families, and until such time when their children themselves began to work, -- at a rather young age -- they lived under rather miserable conditions.

Developments taking place at the turn of the century, the introduction of machines not only in the industry but to a certain extent also in agriculture, brought about an agricultural labor surplus, a circumstance which tended to further reduce the already miserable wages of the modern "serfs"; the more Hungarian industry developed, the more miserable did the agricultural workers' situation become.

This explains that a state of utter despair in which these simple people, otherwise so tenaciously clinging to their village, to their relatives and friends, people scared of distances, -- most of whom had never left the physical confines of their native village -- these people got up and traveled thousands of miles in quest of better opportunities, in the search of a new home. The prime motive behind the large-scale Hungarian emigration to the United States was therefore economic. Another force, also stemming from the

economic situation, was the social factor; the roots of this latter are to be found in that decidedly inhuman treatment customarily accorded Hungarian agricultural workers at the time. These people were beaten and punished for a variety of offenses; the landowner continued ~~to~~ to retain his feudal judicial right (palesjog), and though he no longer could order his "serfs" head or hand or nose to be cut off, he could still punish him, he could still bring him to face difficult situations, and he had ~~the~~ the connections and the power needed to have his servants imprisoned, even though he himself no longer had the right to imprison them on his own domain. The state and local administration was at the landowner's disposal and did whatever he desired.

(22 c) ~~the~~ Hungary had essentially a feudal society and it persisted till 1945.

(22 e 1) It is very difficult to judge Károlyi, difficult even now, after the Revolution of 1956, primarily because Károlyi's endeavors have been left far behind by subsequent events.

I don't doubt for a single moment that Károlyi's endeavors in his own time were modern, proper, and just. ~~the~~ The stand he took in connection with the land distribution was a worthy example of how a responsible statesman, a consistent preacher of a principle, ought to behave when it came to the practical implementation of his principle.

Question: Do you have in mind Károlyi's decision to offer one of his own estates for free distribution? Answer: Yes, that is

precisely what I have in mind; when he ordered that large estates be broken up and distributed, he started it with his own property.

Károlyi fought for social justice and for the establishment of democracy in Hungary. But Károlyi, too, had his errors; he proved to be too weak towards the Communists, ~~and~~ he proved to be incapable of defending himself in the face of Communist agitation, he permitted a bourgeois revolution to turn into a Communist revolution. I must, of course, add that Károlyi's position was a rather difficult one. It is easy to criticize him now, forty years after the events, and it would have been extremely hard ~~to~~ to make decisions if one had been in his shoes. Nevertheless, if we accept that a statesman's or a politician's actions must be judged in the light of subsequent events, then we must say that history did not justify Károlyi's these steps.

Question: What do you think of Károlyi's foreign and national policy? Answer: Károlyi did not have an independent nationality policy. As to his foreign policy, his possibilities were rather limited and determined, there was not much room for him to pick and choose from. You had a lost war, ~~and~~ with Hungary one of the losers, and you had to find a way out; Obviously, ^{he} ~~he~~ had to seek understanding in the camp of the victors. Károlyi tried to seek this understanding with the French. How far did he succeed is, of course another question, but I must emphasize again that Károlyi just did not have any other choice.

Károlyi's nationality policy was a characteristic political species, but it was Oscar Jászi's nationality policy, not Károlyi's. Jászi's nationality policy was a continuation in modernized form, in my opinion, of that political concept which Louis Kossuth first developed in the years of his exile, in his later years, a concept which I think was proper and humane if considered in the context of those times. We must not lose sight of the fact that with both Kossuth and Jászi we have a Hungary of 20 million inhabitants in mind, a state of 63 counties whose border regions contain sizeable Rumanian, Slovak, Serbian, Croatian, and other minorities. Today the situation is entirely different. If we take Hungary's present borders as our framework, our nationality policy today is no longer the same.

The Kossuth-Jászi concept, however, taking as it does the premise that the Danubian peoples form an economic unit -- this concept continues to be valid and desirable, and a nation which is part of this economic unit obviously must live on very good and friendly terms with its immediate neighbors. After all, not only the other nations of this "unit," but Hungary also is dependent on the others, not only economically, but politically as well, and the cultural interaction among them is unavoidable.

Economic connection and coherence, and the mutual indispensability of the countries of this "unit" makes mutual friendship and cooperation--both political and economic--an indispensable

necessity.

I am very close to the United Europe concept, and sympathize with this endeavor. This sympathy of mine is a natural consequence of my hearty approval of the idea of a regional political and economic cooperation.

If we then speak of the political question of the minorities, and if we want to treat it within the above outlined framework, i.e., the close interdependence, both economic and political, of the peoples of the Danube Basin, the close interaction and common growth of their culture, -- if this be out framework, then I, too, do profess the Kossuth-Jászi political principles with respect to the nationalities.

(22 e 2) If I am to answer this question succinctly, then I must say that the Communist rule of 1919 gave an ideal opportunity to the later governments to prevent and to frustrate all attempts to bring about social justice. Between 1920 and 1945 all attempts at social reform faltered and failed; the government and the ruling classes successfully opposed, and blocked, any and all innovations, declaring that any social reform necessarily meant a strengthening of the Communist cause. The cabinets and the ruling classes have created a bogey (mimus) out of communism, out of the Communist danger, using it as a means of defense for the protection of their own narrow interests.

The 1919 Communist revolution had no other effect between the wars. The 1919 revolution itself was carried by the urban

population and by parts of the industrial workers of Budapest. The village remained passive through it all. Thus the newly-emerging intellectual stratum which was recruited primarily from the ranks of educated sons of peasants during the interbellum period -- this new generation of intellectuals had no family memories or recollections whatsoever which would tie it to the 1919 events. Take for instance my case; my father was a red soldier. All I know about this question was that my father could not get a job for a very long time. My grandfather was a landless peasant. My father continued in his steps. He pursued fruitgrowing as a hobby. Now after the first World War there was a limited land-distribution, but my father could not get any, because he was part of a category which was excluded: he had been a red soldier. He would have liked to take a job as a gardener, but only trustworthy people could aspire to such a position.

My father was a red soldier; not because he was a convinced Communist. He was brought back from the front and a group of soldiers were simply given new uniforms and became red soldiers. This is all I know about the 1919 ~~XXXXXXXX~~ events; and this is about the only legacy, the only connection between events of 1919 and later political endeavors. In my case, for instance, all I know is that my father lost ten of his best years; he would have been able to get what he wanted ten years earlier, had he lived in luckier circumstances. My experience permits a safe generalizati

so that we can truthfully say that the village population had similar, or milder connections to the 1919 events. If the peasant-stock intelligentsia did not have significant, if any, connections, legacies, or experiences regarding the Béla Kun regime, Károlyi's ideas and political endeavors were even less important or enduring; the Károlyi experience was even more limited in its scope, and was based on an even more narrow stratum, namely on parts of the urban intellectual class.

(22 f)

It would be difficult to answer this question with a definite "yes" or "no." ^{The} Social and economic status in Hungary constantly changed after 1920. If we want to be more specific then we also must say that significant changes took place in Hungary in the XXth Century. These were sometimes factual changes and, equally important, people thought there were changes.

If we look at the country's political and economic structure before 1945, we must affirm that what we see is a feudal state; the economic structure, the system of land ownership, the possession of political power, -- all these factors contain in themselves those identifying notes which are considered characteristic landmarks of a feudal society. However, by 1945, the ruling stratum, the group which directed the country's economic life, was essentially much smaller than it had been ten, or twenty, or thirty years before. A development was under way which started right after the first World War and which, if we look for its concrete starting point, (an intellectual movement can hardly be reduced to just one source,

but in this case it was the most important and determining source) we find that Dezső Szabó's literary activity was the chief driving force behind it. (Interviewer's note: Dezső Szabó was an outstanding Hungarian novelist of the postwar era, his best known work being the monumental novel Az elsodort falu -- *The swept-off village*)

Dezső Szabó came up with a concept after the first World War, saying that the basis of the country's ~~XXXXXXXX~~ political and economic life is the peasantry; if Hungary is to achieve a renaissance, if Hungary is to prosper within the framework of the Treaty of Trianon; if Hungary is to assure her long-range healthy development, then the peasantry must be strengthened, and an increasingly important role ~~XXXXX~~ ^{must} be assigned to upcoming intellectuals of peasant stock. This was the only way out according to Dezső Szabó. This was the beginning of that intellectual movement which, the more we approach the year of change, 1945, became broader and broader. First the writers were the only participants, the writers had a very interesting and very important role in Hungary's history in the last two centuries. During the middle of the 'thirties the writers started the "village explorer" movement, with the aim of ~~XXXXXXXX~~ ^{re-} discovering Hungary. They wanted to present a sociology and sociography of Hungary: what really is what is called Hungary, and how does it look like. How does the peasantry live in the villages; what is the position of the workers who controls the economic life and the political life; what is the

number of the "rulers"; whom do they represent, etc. This was the aim. ^{Not} All the parts of this ambitious project were completed. This, then, was the way how the sociographic literature began, a literature which was primarily ~~concerned with~~ concerned with the conditions of the village peasants, of the landless peasants, and of the agricultural servants.

The picture they presented was an authentic picture, but at the same time an alarming picture. It was discovered that while industrialization went ^{on} at a rapid pace, while in the cities culture and civilization became more and more universal, at the same time ^{and} in the villages, among the agricultural servants, on the large estates, cultural and social life were those of the early years of the XIXth Century. This was the picture of the peasants and of the agricultural servants. On the basis of an examination of these findings, and on the basis of a similar research into the life patterns of ~~the~~ the industrial workers, I can certainly affirm that the differences and inequalities were very great among the several classes in Hungary. The industrial workers were definitely better off than the peasants, especially if we compare their status to those peasants who had only a few holds of land, or landless peasants, or agricultural servants. Nevertheless, even among the workers, the number of those whose cultural niveau was very low, who were illiterate, was relatively great. The growing industry developed a stratum of unskilled laborers whose wages amounted to little more than the income of the two-three-hold-peasants. Neither

group could hope to go beyond the basic needs of life, there was no money left for their cultural betterment, and they had no possibility of sending their more promising offspring to schools of higher learning.

- (22 g) I think I already gave you a hint here and there as to what I think of the Horthy regime. To summarize here, the Horthy regime was characterized by a series of men of low calibre who tried desperately to defend their positions.
- (22 h) My answer to this question is a definite no. If I have to elaborate I should like to say that already during the middle 1930s, at a time, therefore, when there was a feverish preparation for war, already in those years it was clearly evident that in the pursuit of that concept which Germany set for herself, she would necessarily reach the state of complete isolation (she would remain alone). Being alone in a world-wide struggle which the Germans precipitated by their aggressive demand for power, necessarily results in defeat. Hungary's leaders, and cabinets, should have thought at least on those historical experiences of expansive European nations who have tried to dominate the continent. These nations finally remained alone, were isolated, and defeated. I have in mind Napoleon at the moment, to cite but one of a series of nations and individuals. Hungary's leaders did not take into account this point of view, and in an unexplainable manner continued to believe that Germany's efforts would be crowned with success. If the danger could not be seen ~~in Hungary~~ in 1933 or in 1935, it certainly could have been

detected in 1942 and later, when Germany fought on two, and sometimes on three, different fronts at the same time. One could certainly have seen the handwriting on the wall when in Italy the first unmistakable signs of political and military uncertainty became evident. In the face of all this, Hungary's supreme leadership -- I mean Horthy and his circle -- continued to maintain that there was no alternative for Hungary but the continuation of the struggle on the side of the Germans. This concept was somewhat modified later, when it was thought that Hungary should minimize her own efforts as much as possible and should refrain from actual participation whenever practicable. This was the time-serving and double-dealing policy of Kállay, which continued till the 19th of March, 1944. This policy had no perspective. From 1935 on this became more and more apparant. It was no more than an aimless and an irrational persistence and devotion to the internal Hungarian status quo which was established in 1920 and continued till 1945.

(22 1) I would devote a separate chapter to the 1945-1948 period in such a study as you are here undertaking. These few years, -- in my opinion at least -- have a very great significance. The 1945-1948 period, in its endeavors, in its structure, in its political content, and in its mechanism differed completely both from earlier and from later years.

The 1945-1948 period also had its characteristic features, lent to it by the Yalta agreement, where the Big Three agreed and

divided up the world among themselves, -- in my opinion completely illegally (jogtalanul) and inhumanly, if we accept the premise that every nation has the right to determine its own development and political alignment.

Every nation has the right to select its own style and way of life according to the rules of democracy, and for this very reason the Yalta conference is a very severe indictment of the democratic nations who entered into and concluded the Yalta agreement and accepted its consequences.

But this is not the topic we want to discuss. What we have to say is that the Yalta agreement set the direction of Hungary's development, and delineated that framework within which -- and within which only -- Hungary could move about. This framework, in essence, was that we belong to Russia, and that therefore we must expect the solutions of our questions from the Soviet Union, -- questions, whose solution does not primarily depend on the will of the population. International questions affecting Hungary, therefore, were to be solved by the Soviet Union, we were to petition them with our problems, and we were to entrust ourselves to the desires and wishes of the Soviet Union.

The characteristic feature of 1945 was that those forces assembled in the coalition which, being in the opposition in the interwar period, fought for political, social, and economic development and progress. This former opposition group was much broader

~~XXXX~~ in 1945 than in the interbellum period because it encompassed all those who opposed the Horthy regime, irrespective of ~~q~~ whether they were ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{actually} represented by opposition political parties or not. There was in Hungary in the interwar period an intellectual opposition which did not strictly belong to political parties, so that the few pre-war opposition parties do not necessarily represent or delineate the actual, total opposition. The opposition was much broader, much stronger, and much younger, than the opposition parties themselves.

~~XXXXXXXX~~

These intellectual forces assembled in 1945, whose concept in the political sphere was democracy with its modern economic and social content. Essentially it signified a just distribution of wealth, and a system of social equality.

These intellectual forces began the laborious task of building up a democratic Hungary. In doing so they had to take into account at the very outset the situation created at Yalta. They had no other alternative but to choose those ways and means which, under the circumstances, were least laden with bad features, and promised the most good.

Under such circumstances made the democracy its first steps. In spite of these very severe limitations, which were acutely felt in Hungary, and which forced upon the nation a change in, and postponement and sometimes abandonment of, its economic plans or tendencies, -- in spite of all these limitations, whatever developmen

took place between 1945-1948 has ~~been~~ met the unanimous approval of the population. No better proof of this is necessary here than the fact that the 1956 Revolution accepted and approved precisely those economic concepts (economic concepts played a predominant role in the Revolution) which the government tried to put into practice in the 1945-48 period.

This is the explanation of the fact that in 1956 in its economic blueprints the Revolution did not revert back to another system, but envisaged instead a social ownership of the means of production, securing at the same time opportunities, within limits, for individual initiative and individual undertakings. This was essentially the economic concept of the Revolution, and this was the fundamental concept of the 1945-48 period also. This was the 1945-48 concept in that the large industries were nationalized, in that a process already begun ^{before} in the second World War was brought to a logical conclusion. (Long before the war the electric power industry was either state or municipally owned. So was the bauxite industry, the railroads, the post, telephone and telegraph, and one could enumerate a host of others.) While the 1945-48 governments favored a large-scale nationalization, they at the ~~same~~ same time favored free commerce, -- the gist of the whole concept was to bring about such a system of directed economy which in its content and in its aims best corresponded to the opinions, aims, and interests of the population.

(23) Political boundaries always had great significance. If you look at history, it was essentially boundaries and territories on account of which battles were always fought. Boundaries signify the unit within which governments have authority and power, and within which the inhabitants enjoy rights and privileges, freedom of movement, economic well-being, etc.

In Hungary, indeed, very much was said, especially before the second World War, about the question of Hungary's boundaries. Boundaries were the excuse of governments under Horthy, advanced in opposition to all attempts at bringing about a more proper economic order. All such endeavors were rejected as impracticable, as capable of accomplishment only after a prior correction of Trianon. There was ⁱⁿ Hungary a government-supported irredentism in the inter-war period, an irredentism which was partly unjust and partly stupid, and in a part definitely insulting. This explains, of course, the unfriendly relations between Hungary and her immediate neighbors.

If I must answer your question as to whether political boundaries are important or not, then I should say that in the final analysis they are ~~not~~ not important. They are not important in the sense that the mutual economic dependence, mutual cultural interaction among peoples cannot be limited by political or state boundaries. They develop independantly of state boundaries, and adjust themselves rather to natural units and ~~given~~ ^{naturally} given conditions.

Your question is very tempting and enticing for an irredentist, -- and it is indeed difficult to answer it. He who knows Hungarian

history will find answering this question a difficult task, even if he himself is not a Hungarian, and is not bound sentimentally to a characteristic viewpoint of a people, as I am so bound, no doubt.

If I look upon this question from the viewpoint that Hungary's territory is 93,000 km²s, and if I affirm that a just political boundary for a nation must coincide with that nation's ethnographic boundary, -- if we think of Hungary's boundary^{ies} not as political but rather as ethnographical dividing lines, then such boundaries no doubt encompass such territories which at the moment are outside of Hungary's territory. To start my enumeration with Czechoslovakia I have in mind here primarily the Kisalföld, or a part of it; also a significant portion of Transylvania, and a certain portion of the Bácska. (Szabadka and surrounding area.)

The political side of this question is, of course, a different matter. Here the answer is fairly difficult. I would certainly not be prepared to say that the only justice is Transylvania's re-annexation and/or the re-incorporation of those territories into Hungary where Hungarians live at the present time. The final solution of this question can definitely not be imagined on this plane. If a nation is chauvinistically inclined, it only ~~provokes~~ provokes similar attitudes in the ranks of the other, and a state like that could only bring about such results as obtained between the two world wars, when mutual chauvinism impeded and prevented what promised to be fruitful economic developments. For this very

reason, to me the idea of a united Europe is a very welcome one.

(23 c)

I don't know of any concrete threats. There were such endeavors in the recent past. I have in mind here German expansionism and threat to Hungary's territory. The Germans were always tempted by the fertility of the Ukrainian soil and by the excellent agricultural opportunities there, which were lacking in Germany. Having realized the impossibility of re-creating their colonial empire, the Germans determined to channel their expansionist tendencies towards the East. In their scheme of Drang nach Osten Hungary, which for centuries was part of the Hapsburg empire, appeared to the Germans as a strategic and convenient springboard; Germany was keenly interested in having Hungary one of her allies and associates in a looser or tighter form. This was a threat to Hungary's territory. At the moment I know of no such threats.

(23 d)

This question tends to emphasize Hungary's ethnographic loneliness in East Central Europe. Hungary indeed is a unique and lonely nation, surrounded by peoples belonging to unrelated linguistic families; there are the Slavs and the Rumanians, the latter trying to propagate herself as being a sister-nation of Western Latin nations. Hungary being alone, if we assign great value to linguistic relation and affinity, if we treat linguistic and racial relationship as true and potent realities, -- and Pan-Slavism indeed had great significance in the past -- then there undoubtedly is a natural conflict between Magyar and the surrounding peoples.

I personally consider this conflict an artificial one because

friendship or enmity among peoples is based not on linguistics and ancestry, but is rather determined by economic and social identities or similarities, and by mutual interdependence, economic and other.

- (23 e) This question is not an important question today for the simple reason that there are very few Slovaks in Hungary today. Similarly, there are not too many Hungarians in Czechoslovakia today either. It is common knowledge that after 1945, ~~there~~ a large-scale population exchange took place, an exchange based on an agreement of the Big Three. In respect of the Kisalföld in Czechoslovakia, several hundred thousand Hungarians were uprooted and sent to Hungary, while at the same time similar numbers of Slovaks from the interior of Hungary were sent to Czechoslovakia. Hungarian Germans were at the same time transported into Germany.

In a word, an ordering of the national minorities took place, -- and it is of no significance whether we approve or disapprove of such actions now. Usually it was not up to the affected individuals to decide for themselves whether they wanted to participate in this population exchange or not, the decision was made for them, and independently of them, by others, -- to my mind a decidedly improper and inhuman procedure. All these events have taken place, however, more than a decade ago, and it will be many more years before we can objectively discuss the correctness or incorrectness, the propriety or impropriety of such a large-scale and involuntary exchange. By that time the results^{ant} changes and developments will

undoubtedly sanction these decisions, -- these, I must emphasize, inhuman decisions. In Hungary, therefore, this whole question will be bound to lose its importance and significance, since the number of those directly affected is proportionately insignificant.

- (23 f) This is a similar question, except that no population exchange ever took place between Hungary and Rumania. The reason for this is rather obvious; given Hungary's post-Trianon boundaries, only a very small and insignificant number of Rumanians lived in Hungary, scattered in villages and cities immediately adjoining the Rumanian border, while very many Hungarians continued to live both in Transylvania and in Rumania. Bucharest, given the ratio of Hungarians and Rumanians living in that city, is, after all, a significant Hungarian city. In Transylvania you have extensive territories where the population is almost entirely Hungarian.

The lot of Hungarians in Transylvania underwent significant changes, -- and though I have no authentic or reliable information regarding their present status, -- the official Communist policy is to grant to each minority autonomy, the right to decide its own questions and issues. To what extent is this an actuality in Transylvania at the moment, I do not know. They do have a periodical, schools, they have their own university in Kolozsvár, etc. What is the degree of intellectual freedom, and to what extent do Hungarians have the right to make decisions in their own affairs, I unfortunately do not know.

- (23 g) Questions of principle, equally applicable to this question, I have already touched upon before. ~~MM~~ Austro-Hungarian minority problems are quite insignificant; only a very few Austrians lived within Hungary, along the border, ~~at~~ ^{after} the border rectification following the second World War. These few Austrians were either uprooted and scattered throughout Hungary, or, the luckier ones at any rate, escaped and crossed the border into Austria.
- (24) If I am to answer this question now, and if I am to limit myself to the situation now existing, then the answer is not easy; I don't know how can a Communist state solve these peculiar problems of a small state. Certain tendencies may be seen from reports coming from Hungary; those definite disadvantages which stem from the fact that Hungary is a small nation, ~~is~~ ^{her} limited territory being both insufficient and unsuited to satisfy the requirements of an expanding economy and population, are largely offset by ~~MM~~ attempts to bring about larger economic units. This consideration is the driving force behind the commercial agreements which Hungary concluded with her neighbor satellite countries. At the moment there is talk in Hungary about a broader economic cooperation among the satellites, envisaging a 15-20 year common economic plan. The significance of the plan, in which the Soviet Union also would be partner, lies in its long-range character, permitting ^{ful} ~~meaningless~~ coordination and utilization by all countries of advantageous positions of the several participants.

The basic idea underlying this projected cooperation is not bad, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ⁱⁿ my opinion. If Hungary were in more free circumstances, though in a different context, under a different formula, but basically the same methods of orientation would have to be employed, and attempts were made already before 1945 in this direction, though generally unsuccessfully.

- (24 a) I am in favor of regional cooperation.
- (24 b) The most natural unit would appear to be the one encompassing the countries of the Danube Valley. This is a geographic unit, the states are easily reachable, the raw materials available in these countries generally suffice and can satisfy the requirements of all, thus each nation would be able to develop a special industrial and agricultural form, useful not only to itself but also to the other participating countries. The unit would include besides Hungary Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Austria's inclusion is by no means a necessity, though it might be possible to include Austria as well. Austria would certainly be the best market for agricultural products, and the transportation routes to Austria are readily available from all of the above-named countries. Austria's industrial contribution to the other states, especially in a later stage of development, would on the other hand be necessarily limited.

Whatever solution we decide on, there are two bases of evaluation; the one is a tight-knit economic cooperation providing an economic autarky or self-sufficiency as in ^a the federation, with the

economic needs of all well satisfied,. The other base would be the political formula where the establishment of a larger unit would appear to be more proper and useful. The unit I have in mind would be Europe, with Poland representing its easternmost part. Russia would be not included, since Russia is primarily an Asiatic state territorially, and since Russia -- whatever combination you may have in mind -- is a political and economic unit unto itself.

- (24 c) Hungary's part in either a Danubian economic, or European political, federation would have to be commensurate to Hungary's past historic and cultural role, a substantial (hangsúlyos -- accented) role, to be sure.
- (25) Let's clarify first what we mean by a Russian. If I think of a Russian as just another man, then, even if I do not accept as binding Christ's command, Who created and evaluated all men as equals, but if I vindicate to myself the right of evaluating others, or of considering myself equal to others, I can do this only if I am prepared to accept this very same thing in others.
- (25 a) If we look at Russia's territory of today, it is obvious that several peoples inhabit that area. If we accept that in France there are several nationality groups differing from one another, then these differences are much more apparent in Russia.
- (25 b) Which one of these do I consider good and valuable, and which one is bad is a markedly subjective evaluation. I must confess I do not see any difference of value between an intelligent Russian or an intelligent Tartar, with both of whom one can chatter reasonably well.

It is a fact, however, that it was the Russians, in their long history, who organized the various nations of the area, who held them together, and served as their leaders. It was the Russians who emerged in literature as representatives of this region. In the course of history, it was these pure Russians, though numerically inferior, who gave the most quality. They obviously must possess intellectual and other powers and abilities to accomplish a thing like that.

Actually, you can never be certain in this respect. There may be other nations, suppressed and silenced, whose sons may be even more talented, whom we do not know and, if we knew them, our opinion of the Russians might change.

(25 c) No, they are not.

(25 e) The Russian troops were not liberators in Hungary, as they indeed were in Bulgaria, where the population received them with joy and obvious sympathy. A great suspicion was felt in Hungary both as regards Soviet troops and Communists, a suspicion kept alive and supported by the 20-years old Horthy propaganda, which steadily emphasized how terrible communism, the Soviet Union, and the Soviet people are. This propaganda, needless to say, was quite misleading, unjust, and malicious. At any rate, the invasion of the Russians was preceded by a widespread fear and anxiety. When the Russians finally arrived in 1945, the erroneousness of the Horthy-propaganda

became clear, though it was also immediately evident that at least those Russians who were in Hungary at the time were culturally far inferior to the average Hungarian. The Horthy-propaganda appeared to be underscored by the many irregular actions and strange behavior of the Soviet troops, actions and behavior which I think are no different with any other invading force of any other nation, i.e., raping of women, confiscating of property, etc.

(26)

I am an economist and when it comes to marxism, I look primarily for that economic theory in it whose aim it is to establish such an economic system or mechanism under which people may reach their goals, where the economy may develop under prescribed rules, and with which the various economic phenomena may be explained.

Marxism, though it does explain many economic phenomena in its characteristic fashion, nevertheless is not a unitary (egységes) economic system. Marxism is rather a criticism of the developing English capitalistic system of the early XIXth Century, and in this category it is a ~~very~~ well written, good, and coherent work. That beginning capitalism was, in final analysis, an unjust economic system, laden with innumerable contradictions. It made all those mistakes and errors which a rapidly developing expanding economy ^{OR} ~~is~~ policy usually makes. I consider it on the other hand a gross exaggeration to build an economic or political system solely on the criticism of early capitalism. In my opinion, marxism did not come up with either a better or a more coherent economic or social system

than provided by democracy which, after all, is one of the oldest forms of government of humankind, and which appears most capable of satisfying those human endeavors which are, so to speak, innate and represent a vital necessity.

Marxism did not give us something else indeed. If a system claims for itself the right to explain everything, and to answer every question, to serve as a substituted new for the old to be discarded, then such a system must of necessity be a whole, unassailable and capable of answering, explaining, and solving every problem. The Bible is capable of such a feat, even if laden with contradictions. Marxism, however, is incapable of achieving a similar result, even in the economic sphere, without encountering gross contradictions, and without ~~exposing~~ exposing itself to clear and easy refutations and denials.

- (26 e) I can hardly answer your question, since my knowledge of Tito, and of Tito's knowledge of, and compliance with, marxian tenets is insufficient. I myself am not a marxist, so how could I possibly say if Tito is a good one? My opinion is that Tito is more than a marxist, even in contemporary interpretation; he has passed the stage, the category of marxism, if we take marxism to signify the theory of Marx as corrected by Lenin, with respect to capitalism, imperialism, or respecting the economic order of the state. Tito has tried to do something more in Yugoslavia.

(26 h) The Social Democrats were trying to live up to this ideal, to be marxists and democrats at the same time. I have the feeling that one has to do either the one or the other. Marxism, in the sense as Marx wrote and defined it, or in the sense of later interpretations, be it on the part of the Social Democrats, -- Kautsky and others -- or be it on the part of the Bolsheviks, -- Lenin and company, -- the basis and the foundation of a marxian society, of marxian political power, is the dictatorship of the proletariat. Now the dictatorship of the proletariat ^{as} is a system is not a democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat denies democracy's basic tenet that each man is equal, it categorizes people and declares that society has a first class and second class subjects; the first class encompasses marxists, those whose ancestry is in accord with arbitrary requirements etc., etc. The second class is the rest of the population, with possibly several sub-groups and sub-categories. This runs counter democracy, and denies the very basis of democracy, namely the belief that a person is entitled to his opinion and though differing in his opinions, continues to be an equal member of society. Obviously, therefore, one either chooses marxism or democracy, but not both at the same time. The Social Democrats tried to fuse these two differing things, and unsuccessfully, I think. The more intelligent Social Democrats are more democrats than marxists, I think.

(26 i) Hungary was a democracy from 1945 to 1948.

(26 j) To be a democrat means to accept those fundamental tenets which

democracy considers the chief pillars of human life. Between two limits, life and death, people live one next to the other, and from this living-together mutual interactions and relations come about. This is the basis of society. The life of the society is governed by certain principles, and the society's inner order and mechanism is regulated by those laws which we consider to be the laws of democracy.

If we look at the origin of democracy, democracy means, etymologically, "rule by the people." Rule by the people, therefore, majority rule, therefore vindication of the will of the majority. People, in one stage of their development, deciding to accept this term, and deciding to apply its content and meaning, obviously ^{entered} ~~entered~~ into a contract according to which the contracting parties, mindful of the imperative necessity of interdependence, decided to live in common, as a unit, agreeing at the same time to abide by the decisions of the majority in all matters affecting the whole. This majority rule continues to be the basic prerequisite and rule of living-together today. To be a democrat, therefore, means to abide by this fundamental rule, and to abide by whatever proceeds from it; if the human society, or a nation, or a tribe, or a city, or a smaller community which is interdependent, which lives in common during a shorter or longer period of time -- if such a unit, in making decisions, takes into account the majority's rules and abides by it, such a unit manifestly leaves it ~~up~~ up to its members to form their

own opinions, and to take whatever stand they see fit, to vote for whatever proposal they like when it comes to deciding a certain issue. It is manifestly clear, therefore, that acceptance of the majority rule presupposes an absolute freedom on the part of the individual; freedom to determine his own life within the framework of the community, according to the possibilities the community has at its disposal, and according to the ethical concepts and standards of that community. Democracy, therefore, while it does mean compliance and accommodation on the part of the individual to the community, it also means complete personal freedom at the same time. To be a democrat, then, means to abide by this dual law. Such a person is a democrat, he behaves democratically, his community is a democracy, etc. This naturally follows from the fact that the two fundamental rules, i.e., majority rule and personal freedom, are the sources of every particular law, be they of a social, political, or economic nature.

- (27) The term "national communism" is a concept of Western origin. It had its inception in the West and only later did it arrive to the satellite countries. It is a propaganda phrase, used to denote a difference which, viewed from the West, appears to be existing between two Communist concepts or viewpoints.

In reality there is essentially no such thing, more precisely, there are certain reform efforts, a search for a new way, for new manners (módozatok), which in the West are identified by the term

"national communism."

When Tito attempted to build his own communist state independently of the Soviet Union, he did not have the intention of creating national communism, ~~or~~ a Serbian communism, or a ~~or~~ Croatian, or a Yugoslav communism if you like, -- what he attempted to do was to organize his state according to the given conditions of his state -- whether considering the people's interests ~~or~~ or not is not an issue here -- he tried to organize in a typical fashion (sajátos módon) Yugoslavia's social and economic life according to his own point of view.

This form is not new to Tito, nor was it decided on in Yugoslavia, just as in Poland it was not Gomulka who invented national communism, but the circumstances formed, moulded, and brought ^{it} about. Gomulka was but a tool, a flag, a symbol for certain efforts, for certain spontaneous efforts which, in certain circumstances, pushed him to the fore. The same holds true, of course, of Tito, and Imre Nagy is also in the same category.

- (27 a) If we accept the term "national communism" -- which I personally don't like -- then we must say that those people who were on the side of the Revolution while being Communists, these Communists were ~~not~~ national communists. This was the Imre Nagy group in Hungary.
- (27 c) Gomulka, as he came to the fore at the time of the process of liberalization, ^{chose} ~~shows~~ from among the many possibilities what I think was best under the given circumstances, a solution which promised to

do the most good for the Poles.

If we now relate for a moment Gomulka to the national communist movement -- as is customary in the West to treat Gomulka, Imre Nagy, Tito, and others, under the same common heading -- then we must say that similar efforts exist in every satellite country, in some less developed, in others triumphant. But efforts of this sort everywhere have a common source, the XXth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, when the Soviet Union gave the opportunity to these countries to embark on a limited process of liberalization. This was the process which produced Gomulka and Nagy and a host of lesser individuals in the other countries, who continued to fight in small obscure battles for a freer life. It was this process, this development, which carried on its waves the "leaders," not the other way round.

As to the process of liberalization itself, it is no more than a recognition of the results of past mistakes. Recognizing and acknowledging these, the Communists tried to build up such a Communist state in which the people intensively participate in the various social and political moves and developments. Liberalization is this and no more.

- (27 d) If I consider this question from a theoretical point of view, my answer is a definite yes.
- (27 e) Every theory -- of whatever kind, is compatible, theoretically, with Hungarian patriotism. Whosoever may subscribe to whatever theory

and yet, within the framework of that theory, he may desire to find those possibilities and solutions which, in that category, are best for the entire population. A man may believe in communism, in the beauties of the Communist idea, in its goodness, in its applicability, and therefore he may still be a Hungarian patriot.

The question, of course, has a practical side, amply demonstrated by past experiences of Hungarian Communists, when each and every one had reached the point when he realized that he no longer was a Communist or, to be more precise, if he was a Communist, he was a Communist in the then prevailing and accepted category of communism, and therefore no longer a Hungarian patriot, because no longer representing the true interests of the people. Take Tibor Déry and Gyula Hay and countless others. They all clearly reached this point.

(28) The victory of the Revolution could not have been identified and equated exclusively with Imre Nagy. Already at the very outset of the Revolution, other forces came to the fore besides the Communists. If we go back a little further we see that the Communists were only the leaders in the pre-revolutionary movement, the rank and file everywhere was made up of non-Communists (pártonkivüliek). This situation would have manifestly had its consequences, had the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Revolution been successful to the end. In the very beginning, the idea of a coalition government would have been in the forefront. This, in turn, would have had its effect on practically every sphere of life; a coalition government would have meant in

practice that in the various offices, factories, and institutions, in the various parts of the economic and social life, the non-Communist people would have played their role. If we take these changes into account, we must see clearly that under such circumstances the country's life would have been directed from a many-sided point of view. This would have been the formula at the beginning.

What direction this development would have taken is an entirely different question. This direction depends on a person's viewpoint; on where do I sit, and from what vantage point do I view this whole problem. If, assuming that I am a national Communist, my viewpoint is fixed, and what I consider good and proper will be definitely different from what a Christian Democrat might be thinking, who evaluates life's phenomena differently and who ^{thinks} ~~speaks~~ in an entirely different category. Manifestly, a democratic struggle would have been the result, a ^{contest} ~~result~~ for the determination ^{for the} ~~the~~ direction the country's economic, political, and social life. From the interaction of the various forces, ^a ~~the~~ synthesis would have come about which, with its leaders, would have ~~be~~ represented Hungary for an indeterminate period.

- (28 a) All we have to do here is to refer to Imre Nagy's speeches, which provide a clear answer to this question. Imre Nagy committed himself to the idea of a coalition government, he was committed to holding free elections, and with this he essentially accepted that viewpoint which would have represented the majority of the population in a

given situation.

- (28 b) I can very well imagine that he would have remained at the head of the government, and for two reasons: ~~XXXX~~ a.) Imre Nagy was an extremely popular figure in Hungary during the Revolution; b.) He had a decisive role in those events which brought about the Revolution. It is almost probable that Imre Nagy would have remained at the head of the government until elections were held. What would have been the results of the free elections, I of course do not know, nor am I prepared to enter into predictions. But until the elections the revolutionary ~~XX~~ principles would have been decisive.
- (29 a) Good.
- (29 b) Bad.
- (29 c) Bad.
- (29 d) Good.
- (29 e) Bad.
- (29 g) Bad.
- (29 h) Bad.
- (29 i) When it comes to personalities, I find it impossible to state just in one word whether a person, and all that he represents, is good or bad.
- (29 j) The same as "i."
- (29 k) The same as above.
- (29 m) The same as above.
- (29 n) The same as above.

(30) I was a member of the Smallholders' Party some time ago, and am a Smallholder today. Though.... This "though" is not intended as a qualification, though I certainly could correct or criticize my own party as well, let alone the other parties, who would necessarily participate in a free election.

I speak here about "corrections" because there were parties in the coalition of 1945 which were all destroyed ~~in~~ in 1948 by the Communists. Most of these parties re-emerged again in 1956, but I cannot tell for sure whether, -- had the population or ~~the~~ individuals duals to decide in 1956 what to demand of these political parties, -- these demands would have corresponded to those platforms which these parties accepted in 1945. You did have a development in Hungary, a change in the people's attitudes, without a corresponding development in the parties, at least in their programs. The parties, after all, could not develop in the last ten years. The only noticeable changes occurred in the views and attitudes of party leaders, changes brought about by their experiences gained in the last decade. How and to what extent would these changes have been reflected in the ~~parties'~~ parties' programs is impossible to tell, nor is it possible to say what the results would have been. At any rate, one can say that such a party would have been victorious, or would have secured a relative majority, which was not a Communist, or a marxist, party. ~~If~~ If we want to be more concrete, we can say that a bourgeois party would have been victorious. The only question

in doubt is the program; namely what program would this party have had to adopt in order to secure the voters' trust. This bourgeois party could not possibly have come up with a bourgeois program in the sense of a property-based democratic program. The workers, who were ~~not~~ not Communists, who most vehemently opposed communism during the Revolution, gravitated politically, in a very interesting fashion, both in Budapest and in the other large cities, towards the idea of a bourgeois party. Their orientation was not even in the direction of the Social Democrats.

These workers, while definitely favoring a bourgeois party, would not have voted ~~I~~ under any circumstances for a bourgeois party program. The workers would ~~not~~ never have accepted a correction of the land reform (a correction, I don't have to emphasize, would never have been accepted by the peasants either). Nor would the workers have accepted a program which, in the question of the factories, would have proposed a solution even remotely resembling the pre-World War II patterns. Both ~~the~~ workers and peasants would undoubtedly have favored a correction, they would have favored a fair and reasonable settlement, perhaps a constitutional settlement, of this question. They would have voted for a corrected, modified system, for a proposition ~~which~~ which would have given the workers the right to partake in the ownership of, and to participate in the direction of, the factories.

This is the hypothesis which, in my opinion, would have secured a majority, or at least a large percentage, of the voters' sympathies

(31 a) Less.

(31 b) Less.

(31 c) Less.

(31 d) Less.

(31 e) Some more, some less.

(31 f) Those who supported the regime, more.

(31 g) Some more, some less.

(31 h) There weren't any.

(31 i) Less.

(32) In line with the political and economic tendencies, the well-being of individuals was directly proportional with their association with, and active support of, the state power, or of the party power, which directed the state. The closer people were to these, the better off they were. If we compare the situation of AVH members and, say, of the small artisans, then it is obvious that the situation of the AVH has improved to such a degree that it cannot even be compared to whatever ~~EX~~ relative improvements there may have been in the lot of the artisans.

If we consider that after 1945 the country was in a desperate^e economic state, and that because of this the intellectual workers were not always properly compensated immediately after the war, then it will be apparent that such workers as writers, scholars, and artists also experienced a substantial improvement in their economic position

after 1948. We should add, naturally, that this category embraced only those who surrendered to, and served the regime, or those whom the regime considered indispensable for whatever reason, irrespective of their political affiliation.

Otherwise a general improvement was noticeable in the life of every member of whatever social group after 1948, as compared to 1945, which is attributable to the very nature of post-war recovery. We should also add that this general relative betterment lasted only until 1950, when the country decided to build a modern heavy industry and the heavy investments began (i.e., Sztalinváros iron works, Budapest subway, etc.)

- (33 b) If we assume a democracy, and we accept the definition that the direction or tendency of such a democracy is a compromise of the interests and interaction of its component parts, then the compromise always presupposes the giving up of certain particular interests, in the interests of a large unitary whole. If we accept this, then we must assume that there are certain conflicts of interests among the constituent parts of a society, of any society. It is not in the interests of a man on a Sunday excursion that there should be a rain, when the peasant is probably ardently praying for it.

If we consider that in the evolution of a country's price structure several factors are at work, the resultant price level represents a curtailment of every group's interests. If we considered only the farmers' interests when determining the price

of an agricultural product, then we would manifestly ~~be~~ ^{assign it a} much higher price than is the case in practice. In a free country the basic consideration underlying such a price-determination is the principle that a product's price represents that product's total cost. Here you have again at least an apparent conflict of interests, since people in different occupations may evaluate differently the various cost-factors. The value of a service \bar{I} represents one thing to the person rendering it, but is something else to another person, to an observer from another profession. These certainly are conflicts of interest, both between classes and between social groups, which is only natural. If we did not have this, we would not have vital competition, but stagnation. We would not have progress if everyone were satisfied with his present status.

Question: This conflict being a natural phenomenon, was there in Hungary a conflict of interest among the groups I enumerated, which went over and above this natural phenomenon, or not? Answer: Basic conflicts of interest do not develop in a natural way, they do not ~~not~~ abide by the laws of natural development, but are influenced by various attitudes and ruling tendencies, which characterize an era or a country. This was so in Hungary also, a formerly feudal country which, after the first World War was transformed into a state that continued to defend feudalism under the guise of a façade of constitutionality. The relatively small ruling class considered it necessary to ^{induce} ~~(not)~~ the several classes under it to oppose each other.

peasants against the industrial workers, and industrial workers against the intelligentsia.

In the latter combination they were more successful, so that the industrial worker viewed the white-collar person as his personal enemy. This feeling and this attitude or view was a sign of an abnormality which continued to persist, however, even after 1945, becoming very potent again after 1948 when the Communists, reviving and enlarging this semi-dormant feeling of class enmity, attempted to divide ^{the} country as a means of securing for themselves the power. After 1948, not only did the industrial workers view the peasants as their enemies, but the several strata of the peasantry were likewise made to face each other. The same was true of the industrial sector; there were the so-called industrial aristocrats, pictured as the friends of capitalism and as enemies of the workers and of the people's democracy. Enmity was also fostered between the workers and the intelligentsia. ~~There were~~ There were the so-called intellectuals loyal to the people (néphez hű -- Volkstreu), an intelligentsia loyal to the workers, while others were branded enemies of the people, enemies of the workers. The post-1948 period may be characterized by an attempt to lift out, to emphasize, the workers, and to govern in their name.

(33 g) I consider it necessary to define the terms "aristocracy" and "intelligentsia" before I can answer the question.

The two groups were very often one in Hungary's history, very often they went in different directions, and on occasions they even

opposed each other. Opposition was the rule in the later stages of development.

During the beginning stages of Hungary's history, the aristocracy was the intelligentsia. A distinct group of the intelligentsia appears only as a result of the impoverishment of the lesser nobility (gentry), when a very great difference of wealth separated the leading nobility (magnates) from the gentry. At this time you have the emergence of the so-called gentry intelligentsia (nemesi értelmiség), a group clearly distinct from the aristocracy; the aristocracy, for reasons of wealth, not admitting members of the gentry to its ranks, and not recognizing it as full partners.

This gentry intelligentsia got thoroughly mixed in the XIXth Century with the upcoming members of the bourgeois intelligentsia (this mixing went on even much earlier, but reached large proportions only in the XIXth Century), and the gentry culture was gradually displaced or absorbed by the new bourgeois culture.

At this stage of the development, aristocracy and intelligentsia ~~had~~ were two characteristically differing social groups, no longer bound to each other by those secret ties which persisted at an earlier period between the aristocracy and the gentry.

At this stage the intelligentsia was already demanding, claiming the right to direct things and, as a result, found itself face to face with the aristocracy, which considered government ^{to be} its exclusive domain. This struggle became more evident at the beginning of the

XXth Century, when the aristocracy was already on the defensive, its intellectual influence suffering a marked decline.

Now after 1920, and throughout the interbellum period, workers' and peasants' sons swelled the ranks of the intelligentsia in steadily growing numbers, giving it new life and new impetus, and moulding and transforming it at the same time. The numerical ratio and structure of the intelligentsia changed, which meant in practice that the intelligentsia, as a group, began more and more to represent the force of progress.

Now we cannot deny the aristocracy's right to be considered an intelligentsia, a group which, on account of its wealth and political influence commands a distinct position in a country and which, by the very nature of its exclusiveness, represents a distinct, closed stratum in a country.

The numerical and structural changes in the intelligentsia resulted in a direct conflict between the progressive wing of the intelligentsia and the aristocratic intelligentsia, the latter using every means at its disposal to defend both its ancient privileges and positions. This conflict and dispute, prior to 1945, was no longer a dispute between two factions of the same class, nor was it a quarrel between just two classes, but represented, rather, a struggle between proponents of progress on the one hand, and defenders of reaction on the other.

~~SECRET~~

- (33 1) The conflicts between landed magnates and smallholders were primarily of an economic nature and not of a social character. This was a direct result of the fact that about 50 percent of the country's land was in the hands of the magnates, a group representing only about one and a half ~~or~~ two percents of the population, while the other fifty percent of the land was in the possession of some eighty percent of the population. Now if we consider but one factor, namely the natural growth or increase of these two groups, it immediately becomes evident that the proportion of the land falling on any given smallholder was getting less and less.

If we now assume that these smallholders were rational cultivators of their land, and that they were successful in effecting some savings in the course of time, ~~which~~ ^{it should} also not ^{be} too difficult to comprehend that, because of the steadily decreasing amounts of land falling on any one cultivator, the smallholders would have liked to invest their savings into the purchase of additional strips of land, -- if this had been possible. Purchase of land was not possible, however, the available land on sale being far less than the demand. The smallholders therefore regarded the entire social system as some sort of a squeeze ~~szorító~~ (szorító), feeling about the same way as you do when you wear very tight shoes. They regarded those who prevented them from purchasing land as more or less personal enemies. This was the economic foundation of the conflict between these two social groups and all other conflicts or conflict categories stemmed from it.

- (33 j) There were serious conflicts between these two classes, and of course you will never find a situation where employers and employees

would have identical interests.

The magnates' workers were the agricultural servants. The picture was a very dismal one, since you can hardly call these servants' ~~the~~ pre-1945 conditions human. I don't remember exactly if it was a statistical report of 1935 or 1937 which gave 25 fillers as the daily compensation of a five-member family of such a servant. This meant that a five-member family's daily wage was ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ 10-12 cents. This was the condition of the agricultural servants and this explains the obvious conflict between him and his master.

(34) If I had any such concerns, I certainly would not have come to the United States. I have not done any research into this question, so I cannot tell how other Hungarians felt about this. One thing is certain; neither the Revolution, nor the post-1945 leadership of Hungary did every contemplate an importation or copying of those economic forms which characterize the United States and other Western capitalistic countries. The opinion was generally held that Hungary must maintain a middle stand between two extremes and that the so-called post-1945 achievements (víványok) must be maintained and preserved. This does not mean, naturally, any opposition to the United States, nor does it mean an opposition to the Soviet Union, if we view them from an economic point of view.

Hungary would have retained a great many features of the capitalistic economy, borrowing, at the same time, what was thought as good and useful economic patterns from the Soviet Union. In the

political sphere, my own view and, I can truthfully say, the view of the majority, was based on the principles of Western democracy, both as regards political and social structure. This, I hope, answers your question.

- (35) It all depends on the circumstances of such a war. In a war between the Soviet Union and the West, Hungary would obviously play a significant role in the Soviet plans. Hungary would not only be occupied by Soviet troops, but the Soviet government and military would no doubt make sure, with or without the consent of the Hungarian government, to safeguard the safe passage of Russian troops through Hungary towards the West. The ~~own~~ opinion or sympathies of the population would have very little play in this question and perhaps only at an advanced stage would there be some opportunity to act. If the Russians were to draft Hungarian regiments into the struggle, some people no ~~undoubtedly~~ doubt would try to go over to the other side. All this, however, would hardly be considered as a decisive ^{of} importance.

- (35 a) It is almost impossible to answer this question, especially to enter into numerical calculations.

In case of a war, the entire nation would be hostile to the regime. The practical implementation of this hostility, however, would not be an easy matter. The Soviet Union, because of strategic reasons, would lend a powerful arm to the regime for the maintenance of an ~~inner~~ inner stability.

The situation would be similar to that during the second World War, when, toward the end of that war, very few people indeed favored the continuation of the struggle on Germany's side. Germany, in spite of all this, intervened directly into Hungarian affairs on March 19, ~~1944~~ 1944, and after, and effectively maintained the strategic lines of communication between Germany and the fronts.

In the case of a future Russian-Western conflict, the same might be true. At a certain stage of the war, if the international situation permitted this, resistance pockets would no doubt spring up throughout Hungary, fighting both the regime and Russia much more effectively and with much more vigor, I think, than was the case of the resistance against the Germans.

(36) I should like to stress here just one point; my opinion has changed markedly with respect to the policy of the Western nations.

We in Hungary believed, before and after the Revolution, in effective Western political help, if not in the sense and if not to such a degree as Radio Free Europe was trying to persuade us was forthcoming, we at any rate continued to believe that there was such a thing as a "Western foreign policy." A foreign policy encompassing the opinions of the Western powers, a unitary foreign policy, a foreign policy the objects and goals of which are clear and determined (tisztázottak).

We thought that, just as the Soviet Union possesses a ready plan, a ready answer to whatever eventuality, the West likewise has

~~EXWIE~~ a workable instrument, perhaps not as dogmatic, and somewhat more loose, nevertheless, capable of dealing with ordinary and extraordinary questions which may arise at any moment.

Traveling from one end of Europe to the other, and finally arriving to the United States, I was nowhere able to find this Western foreign policy, and I am rather uneasy and alarmed because of its absence.

I don't have in mind a cold-war concept, nor do I urge such a concept, believing that we are past that stage when such a concept could be effectively and fruitfully applied.

What I have in mind is a global concept, a set of views, a plan, an instrument, capable of giving a ready answer to whatever phenomenon may arise anywhere in the world, -- since politics, just like religion or philosophy, ought to be able to deal with whatever problem.

What we see instead in the free world is that one big nation takes this stand, and the other power takes that stand, and the stand thus taken is mostly determined by short-range considerations, with a view of one country only. This policy, which has to be fought out first in the ~~E~~ Western camp, which has to combat the several national interests first, which has to combat on many occasions the narrow viewpoints, often selfish viewpoints, of the many officials sitting in the various offices and of the administration, this policy,

if compared with the policy of the Soviet Union, which of course is not democratic, but that much more definite, firm, and resolute, a policy compulsory on all, so to speak, -- this Western policy, we feel, is hardly capable of competing (nem nagyon versenyezés) with that of the Soviet Union. The absence of such a policy in the West disturbs me greatly, and the development of such a policy is urgently needed, I feel.

(1) I have no questions to ask you.

(1 a) The interview method seems to be the only ^{possible} ~~passable~~ and meaningful way for the researches probing into the essence of the Hungarian Revolution. I don't know what data you have at your disposal, how many people did you ask for their opinions, nor do I think that the opinions thus solicited will be in agreement, or will be unitary. People, after all, do absorb new ideas quickly and their original Hungarian opinions are bound to suffer at least certain minute deviations, ~~and~~ without the individuals being aware of the changes themselves.

People arrive in the free world, come under the influence of others who have been here for a long period, and under the impact of ~~these~~ these personalities, under the impact of their ideas, change their opinions if ever so ~~slightly~~ slightly, and come to believe that what their present opinion is now, has been their original viewpoint all the time, even while still in Hungary. I don't suppose bad faith or malevolency here, there probably isn't any, but the phenomenon of change is difficult to notice and hard to register.

I made a consistent effort -- and I only hope others did likewise -- to give you the taste of the times under review, to convey the meaning of words, of concepts, which were then authentic. The meaning of concepts today is no longer the same, whether they are related to the entire period under review, or to the Revolution.

It would be best, I think, if those people who will ultimately

use the material thus collected, who will try to arrive at scientific conclusions, would follow the same principle; they ought to go beyond the mere meaning of words, beyond the superficial significance of concepts, and try to see them, and to weigh them, in their contemporary setting, in their authentic context, since separation must lead to distortion.

For this very reason I consciously tried throughout to project my answers into the various periods with which they were concerned, so as to provide a ~~KINE~~ fixed point and a background, -- to make you feel as much as possible the contemporary interpretation, the contemporary air, and the importance and significance contemporarily attached to the various issues, movements, and solutions.

Very many books and articles appeared already on the Revolution, most of them describing and analyzing it with praise, in terms of superlatives only. Most of these books and articles contain very few facts and few objective analyses. I am convinced that the true significance of the Revolution will be brought out by this objective analysis for the benefit of those people, -- I should add, who try to deduct from revolutions and freedom aspirations of peoples universally valid pronouncements, or to draw a picture characteristic of an era.

- (1 c) I don't think it is my task to advise you, or that such advice is necessary, -- you see your task and aims very clearly and you have a clear view, I am sure, of the concrete limits and limitations of

these aims.

My task ~~is~~ was to answer questions, to the best of my ability and recollection. The task of the interview is to give a true picture of an event, of an era, and of the forces which make them and keep them going. But you are just as aware of this as I am, if not even more so.

- (1 d) A certain amount of precaution, and a certain percentage of correction is definitely necessary in a project of this kind. The great majority of the answers you get, however, will definitely be in accordance with facts. The questions were either concerned with concrete situations, where concrete data were required, and the other part of the questions was designed to elicit not information, but opinion. With respect to the opinions a certain degree of corrections will be necessary, as I already explained elsewhere. A person's opinion may be influenced by the fact that, living as he does in the United States, he may not wish to say anything which, though is his opinion, may be injurious or insulting to the United States. I may have uttered repeatedly such things, statements which cannot be regarded as all too pleasant or flattering from the American point of view. I did this in an attempt to preserve that validity and force in my statements which they would have had, had I made them in Hungary in response to the same questions. This is, of course, to a certain extent dependent on the interviewee's intellectual ability.
- (2 a) I would like to go back to Hungary, of course. But I am a realist, and am fully aware that this is not an easy task for me. The task

of returning is much easier for most people. I come from a social stratum which -- at least in the present government's interpretation -- is one of those classes which possess the power in Hungary today (workers, poor peasants). For this very reason my past behavior, and my present attitude and activities, are bound to be weighed more precisely and would be judged with greater scrutiny. This renders the road leading back to Hungary now, or later, rather hazardous until such a time, or such a change, in Hungary, which eliminates this roadblock.

I have a long experience of prisons. If one is imprisoned, -- and I don't mean to compare the two situations in any way -- one sooner or later realizes that the best and most sensible thing to do is to settle down in the expectation of a long stay, and to project both his needs and his activities on the basis of a long-range consideration. This is precisely what I am doing now.

(3) All I can say is that a nation's life is a continuous movement, a development which got under way a long time ago, and is not terminated with an event, however important that event may be, be it even as important as the Hungarian Revolution. The Hungarian nation continues to live in Hungary at this moment.

Now in order to fully understand an historical event, in order to clearly see the intentions of a nation, the stand a nation takes, a full knowledge of the continuous development is necessary. If I may suggest anything to you, I should like to advise you not to

disregard this continuity.

You are now analyzing the Revolution and the periods immediately preceding it. But as we have seen with many of these questions, the correct answering, or an approximately balanced answering, made an excursion back to previous times very often necessary. The dynamic forces of a present event are very often buried deep in the past, but they are there, potent and real, nonetheless.

Now there are links not only to the past, but also to the future. If the Hungarian Revolution cannot, and ought not, be separated from the period preceding it, it cannot be separated from the years after it either.

- (3 a) The Revolution has a very extensive literature, even abroad, written before, during, and after the event itself. I personally have practically no evidence at all in my possession, due to my hasty departure,. Attempts are being made in Europe, however, to collect whatever unpublished materials may be available.
- (3 b) I do plan to write, but have no time at the moment. I do have a large collection of notes, not a real diary, but sketches and annotations which, not being able to relate them to anybody, I nonetheless considered important enough to record and to preserve. From these a book may emerge some day. At the moment I have more serious business to attend to. After all, there are already numerous books on the subject on the market, some of them quite good.

I have a pet project which I want to do. I ~~am~~ intend to analyze the 1945-1948 economic development in Hungary, a development

of a democratic country at times in cooperation with, and at times in opposition to, the Communists, which, in its tendencies and accomplished parts is extremely interesting and modern, later adopted and sanctioned by the Revolution also. These were economic experiments of a democratic country, which were not, ~~however~~, ~~EX~~ along the lines of capitalistic economy.

The question I want to treat is specifically an economic question. It is related to both capitalistic theory and ~~practice~~ practice, as well as to a democratic way of life and democratic form of government.

This economic system was influenced by the pre-World War II Hungarian economy, which was a typically capitalistic economy. This capitalistic system and the (Hungarian) industrialization was identified in Hungary with that social stratum which was steadily losing ground in the country.

The upsurging democratic forces, when opposing these obstructivist elements who hindered and impeded social progress, (they) saw themselves forced to oppose the capitalistic system as well.

So developed in Hungary an economic system which, if we are to label it correctly, is a mixed economic system.

I am firmly convinced -- and this is why I consider this question so important -- that this mixed system will have distinctive bearings for the future. It is already now being emulated and its principles are being ^{accepted} extracted, in greater or lesser degree, by the countries in Asia. In this dialectical economic development in which

we live, at a time when two great economic concepts, capitalism and socialism, compete with and play against one another, in the oppressed nations and the nations on the threshold of their economic development, a new economic synthesis is developing, which, in the period 1945-1948 has reached a very definitely delineated outline in Hungary, and which, though interrupted and therefore incomplete, is nevertheless gaugeable.

E N D