

SOCIETY FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN ECOLOGY
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SEMINAR ON RESEARCH ON THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

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Dr. H. G. Wolff, Chairman

MORNING SESSION

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY: It is really a pleasure for the Society to have you here today. We feel that this is a very timely meeting to deal with a problem that has a dramatic interest for all of us.

We are at the point now where our observations and conclusions can perhaps lead into other research efforts which should contribute more to the scientific field and for this purpose a meeting has been called today.

Dr. Harold G. Wolff of the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry at Cornell University, President of our Society is Chairman of the meeting today.

DR. WOLFF: I think I will start by introducing the people at the table.

Dr. Hinkle, as you probably know, is the Associate Professor of Clinical Medicine at Cornell Medical School and has been working for a number of years on the problems of Human Ecology. More recently, he has been particularly interested in the Communist methods, brain-washing and so forth in Americans that have been prisoners of war. He has been engaged at Cornell in the study of the Hungarian Refugees and will be one of the speakers this morning.

Dr. Riley, who is at the other end of the table, is the Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Rutgers and has been for a number of years engaged in intercultural and social studies and has a good deal of field experience. He is interested particularly in the social pressures acting upon the Hungarian population prior to the 1956 uprising.

DR. WOLFF: Mrs Dinnerman, next to me, is the International Research Associates' Deputy Director and has had a broad experience in intercultural research and is currently supervising the activities on three continents.

Dr. Wayne is with the Bureau of Social Science Research Associates and has been engaged for the past few years in a wide variety of research concerned with attitudes and opinions and currently is engaged in the study of Hungarian Refugees.

Dr. Nadany who is with the United States Information Agency has had a good deal of experience in the field with the Hungarians and will bring us the essence of his experience with this group.

Dr. Rowan is with the National Academy of Science.

I think perhaps it would be of interest to everyone to just identify the others. Miss Sheridan, who will help us with all our problems of administration and organization - Dr. Christenson who is with the Cornell group of Human Ecology and is involved with the program work on the Hungarians. Dr. Thetford, a psychologist, who has been dealing with some of the problems.

Dr. Stephenson is from Rutgers and has been engaged with Dr. Riley and Mr. Schulman in the Rutgers program.

Mr. Glietman is from Radio Free Europe - Mr. Nadler, from the United States Information Agency, will also participate in the discussion.

Mr. Williams is from the National Academy of Science and is particularly interested in group activities and group reactions.

From Columbia, we have Dr. Dallin, who is currently engaged in the study, or about to engage in the study of Hungarians - Dr. Krader who has just come back from Europe and will have something to say about

DR. WOLFF: this Eastern European population.

Dr. Roberts is from the Russian Institute, and has had a great deal of experience with this part of the world and the middle European people.

Dr. Hutchinson of the United States Air Force will tell us about their own science program and its relevance to our interests.

Mr. Alpert is from the National Science Foundation.

Dr. Schein from M.I.T is a social scientist.

Mr. Cronin of the State Department - he will certainly have something to say about their experience in the field.

Dr. Brown also with the State Department.

Now, I thought that the first thing we would try to do before we got too far along is to get a general expression of opinion on this question, and it obviously is an opinion question. I think that the way to do this is to answer with "yes" or "no" or whatever modifying brief remarks can be made.

The question that I would like to put to the members of this table around me is "Are the refugees that we are going to consider this morning, who, after all, represent only two percent of the total population of the country that we are going to consider - representative Hungarians in the sense that their reactions to Communist doctrines and methods can be said to hold for the major proportion of the population, and if it is not representative - does it represent an important minority? The question, therefore, is how representative of Hungary are the two percent of the population that we are in a position to consider this morning?"

Dr. Hinkle, can you give us a yes or no on that?

DR. HINKLE: From the point of view of the locality, they are quite representative. It is hard to believe that these attitudes and motivations are not also general to the Hungarian people at large.

MR. NADANY: One part of the population is represented, but they are representative of the people and will reflect their views.

DR. WOLFF: Thank you.

MRS. DINNERMAN: I agree with that. They are not representative, but we could ask them things which they are likely to share.

DR. WOLFF: The second part of my question is whether they represent an important minority?

DR. WAYNE: Yes, I think so. At least, it is an indication since we don't have much better.

DR. WOLFF: They are better to be sure, but can we talk about the Hungarian population in connection with this group?

DR. WAYNE: I think the answer to that is no. I don't think that this is too drastic a statement that Dr. Wolff made. I think it would be actually very dangerous to believe that it is representative, because these people were so eager to get away. This is not the point of view of attitudes toward the regime or dissatisfaction or what have you. I am not talking now about the democratic characteristics of the group.

DR. WOLFF: Then, the point of view is widely different - Are they reacting differently in a very radical way or just what?

DR. WAYNE: I think that should be discussed in more detail because it is very difficult to say. I think that certain groups would obviously be represented among the refugees; that is, those who are very strongly approving of quite a few actions of the Communist party.

DR. WAYNE: We find, for instance, in administering questionnaires that the actions of the government are being approved only by something like six percent of all the people who get asked a question like that. Even then, it is not quite clear what the actions are that they are working on. It is very probable that within the country itself, there must be more people like that. It is not only a quantitative matter. They would go out on a limb to defend them and those we probably don't get at all or we don't get them at least so that we could look at them from all angles.

DR. WOLFF: It is very important, of course, that we have to consider everything in terms of those we have not studied, and I think the basic question, therefore, is that you accept the evidence that we might consider as representative only in a limited way.

DR. RILEY: It is possible that the refugees - the Hungarians who actually got out - you call them refugees - may be representative of that segment of the Hungarian population that wanted to get out, but so far as trying to deal here sympathetically with a sample representing the entire population, I think that is almost impossible.

DR. WOLFF: Well, perhaps I am wrongly oriented, but I suppose in studying these people we are trying to draw some inferences about the people that didn't come.

DR. RILEY: Are we trying to draw inferences about people or about the social system? We now know there are all kinds of ways of studying social systems with representative samplings, but information about the key people and trying to fit these things together to represent a social system is another thing.

MRS. DINNERMAN: I think that in the absence of proof to the contrary, we have to believe that these people represent - that is to say that they are not a representative cross section of the Hungarian population. I think that would be a reasonable thing to believe that everything - everytime you make a statement about a certain aspect, attitude or opinion - they are not one hundred percent representative. Short of that, on this particular kind of attitude or opinion or behavior, how close do they come to being right as to the population.

DR. WOLFF: Well, I hope we can manage that. We know when we are talking about the attitudes of most of the population and when we are not.

I wanted to ask one other general question of Dr. Roberts. Whether he thought that this refugee population, looked at from the point of view of recent immigrant groups was vastly different, or the same, in its viewpoints and attitudes and values; and how typical of an immigrant group can we take this two hundred thousand people. I suppose they would have to date it, let us say, from '35 to '40 and '46 to '56. That is a hard question, Dr. Roberts. Could you give us any help on that?

DR. ROBERTS: That is a question I would examine closely. It would seem to me that this is different with respect to previous groups in the last two decades. One thing is the size. It is a huge explosion of a group, like the movement out of Germany in the thirties, or within a certain limit, equivalent to the movement out of Eastern Europe.

A second difference, I think, is the manner in which they

DR. ROBERTS: left, that is in a sense leaving with flags flying.

The third difference, I think, is the experience that they bring with them which, I think, in a sense is unique with a ten year span of the Soviets, with a typical breakdown and so on which does not duplicate the experience of the early people at the beginning of Communization, nor do I think it is exactly equivalent to the experience of the Russians.

Now, the beginning is quite different, and the latter part of the story is another point. I think three parts of it are quite unique.

Certainly, the refugee group that we have is not representative of the entire population, and it would be quite dangerous to make far reaching assumptions about the attitudes, especially about Hungary. That is to say, I think it would be misleading to have the idea that the critical attitude toward the Communist regime is more or less concentrated in the group which has left and that this group which has this attitude toward the Communist regime is markedly different.

We may say tentatively something like this. People do not have only political motivations and that they decide the course which they will follow. They will be more or less political motives intermingled with non-political motives.

For example, there would be the need to stay with the family, with people who speak the same language, to remain with the familiar touch.

DR. ROBERTS: There are many people in Hungary who simply cannot bring themselves to leave the country for such reasons. They are apparently interested in remaining on the land and continuing with the terrible conditions.

This does not imply that they are satisfied with the conditions under which they have to live, under that Communist regime.

Nevertheless, the final conclusion that we come to is that it is unthinkable for them to go to another environment. In this respect, of course, we have to consider that the younger people, for example, believe that in another society they could live more easily so that they, therefore, do not have any strong coordination with the things that they already have and the investments that they have already made in their lives. They would be more mobile than the others, the older people.

From this, we cannot conclude, however, that the others have made their peace with the regime as it is.

DR. WOLFF: Thank you.

MR. NADANY: That is exactly what I referred to before and what I wanted to bring out.

DR. WOLFF: Now, we will turn to Dr. Hinkle's presentation on the factors motivating individual participants in the Hungarian revolt.

Dr. Hinkle.

DR. HINKLE: I would like to describe to the group briefly some of the findings of the methods and the goals of the study which we have been carrying out at Cornell.

DR. WOLFF: I take it that the speakers at the table here wouldn't mind being interrupted by any member of the panel.

DR. HINKLE: Of course, not. Now, let's start with a statement of our general goal which should be stated. We would like to understand what sort of process must go on within an individual to lead him to revolt against hopeless odds, at danger to his life and then to flee his country. More specifically, to understand what some of the processes are that went on with some of the Hungarians.

Our study, therefore, is aimed at individuals. It is based upon the hypothesis that is common to medicine and psychology at the present time; that the behavior of an individual has complex causes which he himself cannot explain but which can be understood only in the light of his social background, his family background, his early life experiences, his later life experiences, his immediate life situation, his constitution and temperament and his personality structure.

Therefore, this is an intensive study aimed at people, individual people, whom we see over a two day period with an extensive biographical questionnaire and an exploratory biography and then a history of some three hours carried out with special attention^{to} the attitudes and experiences during Communism and during the revolution, and the motives and attitudes of the individual. Three or four hours with the group from Rutgers who will describe their own findings. Then, two hours with the anthropologist and psychoanalyst - four hours of psychological testing, including the Rorschach and the Wechsler Bellevue - observations of the reaction of these individuals in a social situation and observations and comments by their Hungarian colleagues with a final synthesis of the

DR. HINKLE: observations of the entire group.

Now, I will tell you a bit about our sample so that you can judge for yourself whom we have seen. To date, as of last week, we had studies of forty-five in this manner, thirty-six men and nine women. The largest group were in the age group of 20 to 29, and there were fourteen in the 30 to 39 age group and three each in the next two higher decades.

One decade that is not represented is that from 10 to 20 where we have only two. We are trying to increase this. Our sources are varied. Our informants come from such varied places as World University Services, National Academy of Science, Rutgers University School of Language and others. The International Rescue Committee has also suggested some informants.

As far as background is concerned, I can only give their own particular occupations. We have 13 students, 19 professional men, including 5 physicians, 4 teachers, 4 engineers, 2 lawyers and 4 from other professions, 2 technicians, 8 working people, 1 locksmith, mechanic, toolmaker, metal polisher, bookbinder, miner, bus driver, and semi-skilled technical worker, 2 post office officials and 1 army draftee. These are their own occupations.

By their fathers' occupations, which is somewhat different, we have the children of 6 professional men, 10 officials, 6 business men, 2 landowners, 5 farmers, 3 military men and 12 workers, including 2 agricultural workers, 7 craftsmen and 3 clerical workers.

I think that you may be interested to know that among the

DR. HINKLE: children of these farmers and workers, were a number of mobile people, who have reached under the new society higher positions.

By education, 31 of them had been well educated. 26 were Roman Catholics, 7 Lutherans, 4 Jews, 7 Calvinists, all of whom had become christian in 1944. 22 were married, 18 single and a fair proportion of them had children with them. We had 4 married couples.

I think that we have some of the people who have been mobile, who have had opportunities under the new society. We have some people from favored groups, students, intellectuals and skilled workers.

37 of them were Magyars; 2 were Magyar Polish, 1 Magyar Rumanian, 4 Jewish, 1 Hungarian Jewish and one good Hungarian worker who turned out to be a Russian Armenian and a Jewish refugee previously from another revolution.

Areas of origin of Hungafy will be of interest to you - 15 of our informants had been born and reared in and around Budapest. 9 were from various other cities, other than Budapest. 9 were from various towns in the various parts of Hungary, some parts of Hungary that were separated after World War I and 12 from villages. However, in September 1956, some 40 of our informants were in and around Budapest - they were either engaged in studies or in their occupations.

One was near Budapest, and 1 was visiting in Czechoslovakia and only 3 were in other parts of the country. Most of them, in this group, were around Budapest. That was in September 1956. Most interesting to us has been this question in this revolution. Of our informants,

DR. HINKLE: 15 actively participated in the revolution. That is to say they carried a gun and stood behind a barricade or building and, as a matter of fact, 2 or 3 of them were wounded.

Nineteen were directly involved in the sense that they were in the supporting services, 7 were indirectly involved and only 5 had no participation at all.

DR. WOLFF: Dr. Hinkle, is it safe to make a distinction that they are the same people?

DR. HINKLE: They are the same in their dislike of the regime and their dislike of the conditions in Hungary. They are different in their willingness to commit themselves to some line of action. The non-participants are the people who would take it easy and are going to find the way out, the safest way possible. A certain part of the indirectly involved were only nominal participants.

So much for our findings. I went into this at some length so that you could see who the people are.

So that there is a certain generality about this rather small group of people. I will say this. Some of the things we have seen in these people are so regular, so true of all of them and seem to be based upon such fundamental dynamic processes that we find it hard to believe that they aren't representative of the population.

First of all, there was in this group, essentially never any acceptance of the regime or Communists in the ten years of their experience with it. This is not to say that they might not approve isolated acts, but generally there was never any acceptance of this group of this idea.

DR. HINKLE: There was rather, a deeply rooted, long term irrational and emotional hostility to the regime and to the system and to the Russians and as we investigate these people, we find that in most cases this is ^{of} a highly personal origin.

DR. WOLFF: Would you say, Dr. Hinkle, that those who left had suffered more degradation and humiliation than those who were left behind?

DR. HINKLE: Not necessarily. We found that in each of these individuals there was a highly personal basis for this. Unformulated, generally, but, nevertheless, a very real feeling that somehow his life during the past ten years had required him to do things not in keeping with his concept of the type of person he is, or would like to be or had prevented him from doing things which he felt were essential to his own self-fulfillment. Now, he couldn't give it to you in these terms. This is our formulation of it, but I think this is a general business.

I will give you some examples. A hotel keeper, or son of a hotel keeper who expressed the fact that his parents very clearly had no problem about losing their money, or the other physical deprivations they underwent; but he made it very clear that these people were not working people and would never become working people. They could not see themselves as such. The son of a special man who could not see himself, under any circumstances, as being deprived of an education because he was the type of person who was educated.

A rather simple, girl textile worker from a rural area who really had a better job than she had ever had before and was at the

DR. HINKLE: limit of her capacities, nevertheless, felt deprived because of a feeling that she would like to get some other job which she was not allowed to do - formulating this to herself in this manner.

A teacher who had associated with the regime and some of its ideas had really advanced himself in his profession beyond where he would have, probably, had it not been for the new regime. Nevertheless, he was dissatisfied because he could not see himself as a man who had to teach things that he did not believe.

You can ask yourself why we believe this - why these things seem to be so generally true.

The situation, of course, was actually hard and I shan't go into this. We have some further things that we see in these people. One of which is a strong tie to their Hungarian pasts. Some of this group had, indeed, wanted economic reforms prior to World War II, but I think none of these people had formulated in their minds any rejection of Hungarian thoughts as such. They seem to have seen themselves as part of an Island of Magyars as you see in Slavs and in Germans. They were very much tied to this tradition and as a result of this, there is very good communication between parents and children.

The children are prepared to accept the attitudes of the parents and quite generally and unanimously seem to reject the teaching of propaganda. This is true even among the successfully mobile. The interesting thing is that those who had opportunities - the teacher that I mentioned to you a moment ago who had the opportunity to obtain an education and become a University teacher that he probably might not have had

DR. HINKLE: otherwise - the physician - the Hungarian teacher - had not taken these opportunities on the basis of the new Soviet man.

The workers who had the opportunity to go where they would never have before really didn't have the intellectual capacity to go beyond. They, nevertheless, felt resentful because they were being prevented from having the opportunity to obtain further education which would take them into a new class and status of position than the old Hungarian regime.

Those who had an opportunity for mobility seemed to take the picture of where they were going out of the old tradition and not out of the new.

Part of this is, and I don't think I need to tell you, a traditional deep prejudice against the Russians and traditional dislike of imposed governments among the Hungarians.

A few more points we have seen. Until the past year, and certainly up to the summer of 1956, these attitudes of dislike of the regime in our individuals were generally not very well formulated to themselves. There were general attempts at conformity, feelings of isolation, incomplete awareness of one's own resentments. There were vague, sometimes half-formulated, desires to leave Hungary if the opportunity arose but essentially no plans for revolt in any sort of a resistance movement.

In the summer of 1956, there seems to have developed gradually and then with increasing speed an improved communication

DR. HINKLE:

system within the society. People became aware of the generality of their own feelings among not just one or two of the rest of the population but among much of the population. There was an awareness to the possibility of expression which certainly brought to the surface a lot of feelings which they hadn't expressed before.

The revolution, itself, however, as far as our informants were concerned, was spontaneous. It had many of the elements of emotion in it. It was very like a riot - a sort of welling up of deep seated feelings, with some amazement at their own passion. Leaving although expressed in terms of danger seemed to be essentially motivated by a desire to have a better life. Again, this is something that had been in the back of the minds of many people for a long time but it was rather spontaneous in terms of the sudden idea that "Everybody is doing it. So now, let's do it."

Just two general comments - Up to now, in spite of some unusual aspects of the test findings of these people, their natural adaptation seems to be pretty good. The Disaster people, I am sure, will be interested in the fact that as far as this group is concerned participation in this upheaval and removal over here has not, for the time being, adversely affected anyone's health so far as we can tell.

DR. WOLFF: I was going to ask you, from a medical point of view, whether these few show a high incidence of pathology in their test reactions. Are they an average population? Are there more neurosis or psychosis?

DR. HINKLE: In view of the difficult situation these people have gone through, they have done very well. Personalitywise, they were, indeed, very good.

DR. WOLFF: I wanted to raise a question about the caution that must be taken in evaluating the results obtained by United States investigators in assessing Eastern Europeans. Do you think it is safe in drawing inferences about things geared to that kind of population?

DR. HINKLE: I think we all have to be cautioned about these things.

DR. WOLFF: How do you perform under such situations when you are exposed to them and how do you answer questions of people who ask you about these things?

DR. HINKLE: Well, certainly these forty-five performed in an unusual manner. After all, these are people who have been through a revolution and they survived very difficult circumstances. For instance, the reflection of their experiences over the past ten years is related to the fact that certain features of the Hungarian culture are different than ours. One wouldn't know, however, in terms of breakdown - symptomatic breakdown - required hospitalization or otherwise - They seemed to show relatively little of this in view of the circumstances.

DR. WOLFF: Only the less stable leave the country in any circumstance.

DR. HINKLE: Yes, well, I think that is probably true.

I think that the Norwegians feel that practically all the unstable people came over here and made very good citizens.

DR. WOLFF: Dr. Thetford, do you have anything to say about that?

DR. THETFORD: The question is difficult to answer. Of course, there has been a great deal of work done as far as that is concerned particularly with the Rorschach test which has been used extensively on a variety of person - primarily, however, on the American population.

I have been interested in the amount of personality disturbances discovered in most of our psychological test procedures.

A great deal of hostility and destructiveness in their personality features is shown.

One of the primary features is a lack of emotional commitment to others. There is a general pattern of emotional isolation and detachment. There are other pathological features, but a number of the informants are disturbed to a point of showing, what I would consider, a borderline reaction. On most of our projective techniques, we still find a pattern of defense which permits them to function with even this large amount of underlying pathological material.

I think the point that I would like to make is this lack of commitment to others - a sense of emotional insulation with a breakdown in the effectiveness of defense patterns in some informants and with defenses that are still functioning in a large number.

DR. WOLFF: Have you studied uprooted populations or populations considered to have had a catastrophe to compare to this group?

DR. THETFORD: We have not had such a study to refer to. It would certainly be valuable. However, many of the features which I see on these tests, I do not think can be attributed to an immediate traumatic experience. The genesis of them, it seems to me, goes back to a much earlier developmental period.

DR. WOLFF: You mean the last ten years or the first four years of life?

DR. THETFORD: There are many features which I think go back to early childhood experiences, and are related to attitudes toward significant figures in their families or to other developmental experiences.

I would find it very difficult, at this point, to draw a line of demarcation - to say that a certain amount is attributed to early experiences and the rest due to later experiences.

DR. WOLFF: Where does that leave us? Does it mean that we are left with a group that is potentially psychotic or neurotic?

DR. THETFORD: Many of them show a type of pattern found in schizophrenic patients in our own society. However, I would make a distinction between a schizoid pattern and a schizophrenic psychotic reaction.

DR. WOLFF: Is this the natural character of Hungarians?

DR. THETFORD: I wish I could answer that.

DR. WILLIAMS: I would just like to say that in the findings of both wartime and peacetime disasters, psychotic and psycho-neurotic breakdowns from these experiences are quite rare, and when they do occur, they are usually associated with a pre-disposition. That was certainly the experience in London.

DR. SCHEIN: I would like to ask whether there are any systematic differences between them?

DR. WOLFF: That is a very important question.

DR. THETFORD: Unfortunately, we have not been able to analyze that. I hope to do that.

DR. HINKLE: There probably are some differences. There is a complex breakdown - but it is clearly not a matter of age.

DR. WOLFF: So there are different people.

DR. HINKLE: I suspect we have some whose personality features are rather different.

DR. WOLFF: You wouldn't like to say what they are would you?

DR. HINKLE: Well, yes, I can. The people who are more readily mobilized - those who are more interested in participating in "dangerous" and "acting out" situation - are certainly some of our informants, and the "non-participants" among them - cagey, manipulative - the sort of people who are looking for the best way to preserve themselves in the situation are others.

DR. WAYNE: Dr. Hinkle, some of the features that have been mentioned by Dr. Thetford could be attributed to the environment, that is, a defense mechanism that one carries around with oneself.

DR. HINKLE: I don't think that can be ruled out.

DR. WOLFF: You said that this involved the last ten years?

DR. THETFORD: It is extremely difficult to answer that question. I think it is a very pertinent one and I wish I could give unequivocal answer to it. I don't feel that I can at this point.

Among many of the informants there are indications of difficulty in their relationships with other members of their families. I could go into more details if we had time, which lead me to believe that at least

DR. THETFORD: the basis for some of their difficulties are laid down at an earlier period in their lives, rather than precipitated by recent experience.

DR. HINKLE: There is one other thing. When I spoke of the Communist experience, I rather arbitrarily figured ten years, but in the lives of these people, a stable period dates back prior to 1939 which in our other population group is most of their lifetime.

DR. WOLFF: I would like to know what those twenty years or so of experience has to do with the way they are now? Any information on that?

DR. SCHEIN: The Roschach tests on the prisoners of war do look different than the ones for the American soldiers.

These are never exact, however, but the records of the American prisoners of war were very much more constricted and you get significant differences between the people who had collaborated and those who had not.

It is possible that situational factors do influence the way the test operates. How much is hard to say but it is possible.

DR. WOLFF: Can you tell us how long it takes for something like that?

DR. SCHULMAN: I wonder if I could comment for just a moment on the differentiation between fighters and non-fighters. We have observed the difference in disposition to participate in the revolution depending upon one's position in the so-called social structure and that is where the real differences begin to appear.

DR. WOLFF: Dr. Riley, would you like to go into your study now?

DR. RILEY: Yes, I am a sociologist and sociologists, I think by expectations, are interested in many things.

DR. RILEY: being interviewed and tested by the Cornell and Rutgers groups. The Rutgers group, incidentally, was very gratified to have the opportunity to work with the Cornell group in this project. One reason was because we saw in it an excellent path to study certain aspects of a social system in disruption through individuals, we hoped, naturally, to be able to relate some of the sociological findings to the readings of the Cornell group.

I think that Dr. Hinkle, from my point of view, underestimated the significance of their research.

Now, I am not going to say very much about this myself, but I am going to call in just a moment upon Mr. Schulman and Mr. Stephenson, who have been doing most of the actual work with these people.

Let me, before I turn it over to them, say that we are very definitely in mid-stream. We don't really have any findings to report to you. We can give you some clues but our objective is to try to get some insight in a system in the throes of a revolution.

We can do this by taking a look at the people who came out of this situation from the traditional political point of view. They obviously were members of the political system which subjected them to threats and certain deprivations. At the same time, and here I would emphasize the point that was made a moment ago, are subject to political considerations. Obviously, these people are members of other groupings and religious groupings, friendships and so on. Each one of which deprives or rewards or threatens, does not threaten the individuals.

We are trying to put the individual into some kind of a social setting taking some clues from some of the work that Mrs. Dinnerman and the other people who have been breaking new ground in cultural studies in

DR. RILEY: the United States in recent years. What happens to the individual political decision when he is under cross pressures? He is pulled one way by one set of social groups and another way by another. We know quite a bit about that sort of behavior. We are trying in a sense to make use of such insights in this Hungarian situation.

We are sure that there are tremendous variations in the way in which these individuals have been torn out of the Hungarian social structure. Some are more significant than others. Some have left their significant things in Hungary. Some have come in the face of bitter social conflict.

Now, we ought to study these variations and try to classify them into two patterns and with that brief comment, Jay, would you please come up here?

DR. KECSKEMETI: Just a moment, I would like to ask a question of Dr. Hinkle on the earlier topic. The question is this:

You spoke about the study and discovery of certain common feelings which were recognized before the summer of 1956, before, people considered that they had deviant attitudes and later on discovered that they could now communicate with others.

Now, the question is, do you perceive any differences in this respect between members of the groups, say intellectuals or students?

DR. HINKLE: I couldn't analyze on that basis yet. I think it is of importance to the group, but I want to go back and see very carefully whether this is advisable.

I think the picture at present is a fairly general thing and rather than explicit, it is more implicit -- one has to search in interviewing the individual to understand that he is all alone. He is not unhappy about this; but somehow or other is aware of his being alone in a large mass of the population. This general feeling is shared.

DR. HINKLE: I would be interested in going into this in more detail to see how this behavior develops ----. To my mind it is one of the primary questions that comes out of our exploratory set-up.

DR. NADLER: I would just like to mention very briefly that in an interview, or in a series of interviews within the past few days with a very well regarded couple. They were in a sense participants; they were newspaper people. One of the questions asked of them was, "What would you consider the most striking development of the recent events in Hungary? Both agreed without hesitation that the most striking development was the sudden realization of the people of Hungary that they could trust their neighbors.

They said they could not emphasize this point too much. It was the most striking discovery and will remain with them as one of the more beneficial results of the revolution.

DR. CHRISTENSON: This was pointed out by a young girl who was living in an apartment building -- she discovered suddenly that all these people in the apartment felt the same way that she did when they sought shelter together in basements.

DR. SCHULMAN: I feel very much in an awkward position in trying to report the data that we have so far collected. I would like to try to work on the data we have on hand and I would like to emphasize that so much of what we have is still in a very rough and raw state.

I intend to say a very few words about some of the background of contextual orientations that we have come across and that Dr. Stephenson, I think, will say a few words about our understanding of the revolution and some of the responses to the revolution.

The data we have collected reflects of course, the question we have asked and our focus has been, on the whole, on the position of people

DR. SCHULMAN: in the social structure and the differential definitions of the situation which arise out of these differential positions in the Hungarian social system.

I am going to try and focus on some of these factors; that is, some of the factors that seem relevant to the Hungarian experience quite apart from the social psychology of terror which probably many of you are very familiar with.

Let me start by saying that we have identified clear patterns of difference within our sample, first of all, in regards pre-dispositions to support the regime, and also, in terms of what might be described as a differential rate of disillusionment and disenchantment with the regime.

Now, let me just speak for a moment on the class factors that we have gotten to see. One aspect that seems important is the dropping out of key social groups from Hungarian social structure. I refer, for example, to the Hungarian aristocrats, who in the large part, immigrated between 1945 and 1948. It might be very worthwhile to interview some of these people who are in this country, for example; we have not been able to really talk to any Hungarian aristocrat to date.

Also, there was, of course, the initial policy retention of elements of the intelligencia and then, of course, the systematic dropping out of these old intelligencia, when they had, of course, trained a new group. These people dropped out somewhere between 1950 and 1953.

I might mention the initial receptivity of the workers and the successive stages of disenchantment that we have come across and I hope some of you will ask about that later on.

DR. SCHULMAN: Perhaps most important, we have come on to some of the symbolic criteria -- that led various groups in the social structure to either withhold support entirely or to withdraw support after a while and perhaps most crucially in this pattern of symbolic definitions, is the various images of the Russians.

Let me try to differentiate six different attitudes that we have come across. These attitudes are, of course, differentiated in terms of positions in the social structure, but I am not in a position to qualify these attitudes with social structural positions. I just want to throw them out for your information.

The first attitude that we come across, is in reference to the Russians as liberators. This seems to be a bitter sweet response. Most of the Hungarians we have seen were anxious to be liberated from the Germans and they wanted, of course, to be liberated by the Americans.

The second attitude concerns the Russians as occupiers and here, the perception of the Russians is in part dependent upon the prior experience of the Hungarians with the Germans. That is, the German occupation seems to have provided a way of evaluating the Russian occupiers.

The Russians, from our respondents' reports, and from what we know otherwise, behaved quite non-rationally. I think at least three of the wives of our respondents were raped by the Russians, and this, of course, figured very largely in ensuing attitudes toward the Russians.

The third attitude is vis-a-vis the Russians as political policemen in the period from 1945 to 1948, when the Russians were instrumental in bringing the Communist Party to power in Hungary. Here we have come across the certain violation of the nationalistic image, which figures so very largely in all of the Hungarians we have seen, who can be classified

as "Mavgers."

DR. SCHULMAN: Fourthly, there is the attitude to the Russians as political and technical decision-makers. This turned very much on the variable of industrialization. A good many of the respondents we have seen have a very severe attitude toward the rate of industrialization of the country and also to the type of industrialization that the economy and society of Hungary was exposed to under the Communists. I will make mention of that before closing.

The fifth attitude seems to concern the Russians as partially assimilated residents, and here I refer to the ways in which some groups in Hungary were able to actually persuade Russian soldiers to aid the Hungarian rebels; that is, some Russians had some orientation to the Hungarians as people and responded to them as comrades during the revolution period.

The Sixth attitude which can be differentiated is the use of the Mongol and Asiatic troops during the last phase of the revolution and the Hungarians seems to have, ironically enough, forgotten their own Mongolian ancestry.

Let me just also call to your attention some of the ethnic and nationalistic orientations which have something to do with the symbolic criteria by which the Hungarians have, as we have seen, evaluated their situations.

I think it is important to recognize that there are real differences in these orientations. First of all the "Magyar", the patriot, the man who identifies himself essentially with Hungarian culture, Hungarian history is certainly the more disposed to oppose the Russians, than any of the other groups we have seen.

DR. SCHULMAN: The German Hungarians, the Hungarians who have German ancestry, or German origins, are somewhat different in their whole behavioral set. The same holds for the Slavic people whom we have so far seen. I might mention that we have only seen a very few of these. It might be worthwhile concentrating on some of these people in any further research. And then we have the Jewish part of the population. I might say that the Jewish syndrome came very closely into the attitudes that we have so far come to understand.

Let me just comment on this quite briefly. First of all, the Communist leaders were perceived as Jews by almost one hundred percent of the people we have seen and, of course, there is a history of anti-semitism in Hungary; the fact that most of the people we have seen certainly express anti-semitic attitudes, indicates that they are in some sense anti-semitic. This is one condition which led to the withdrawal of support, or withholding of support from the Communist regime.

DR. WOLFF: Is there reason to believe that there is a high incident of Jewish officials --

DR. SCHULMAN: There certainly is some reason to believe that this is so. The next area that seems of interest to us concerns this matter of industrialization as perceived by differently located persons in the social structure.

Let me mention perhaps four dimensions that we have so far been able to discriminate. The first concerns those people in Hungary that had the typically agrarian attitude, who felt that it was a violation of their image of the country's destiny to industrialize at all.

Secondly, there were those people who felt that the rate of industrialization was somehow a violation of their conception.

DR. SCHULMAN: Thirdly, there were those people who saw industrialization, simply speaking, as an ideological pressure which came out of Marxist theory. Fourthly, most of the people we have seen were extremely bitter about the subordination of the Hungarian economy to the Russian war needs and to the Russian economy.

This is, I think, perhaps the most widespread reason for the withdrawal of support among the population as a whole.

Lastly, let me conclude my talk by mentioning some of the differential attitudes to the Communist leadership itself, that we have come across.

Perhaps these attitudes go along -- go some way, at least, to explain why the leadership was rejected by a good part of the people. First of all, the leaders were perceived on the whole as being trained, in Russia or as Russian citizens, they were typically perceived as having some Jewish affiliation, whether or not they renounced their Jewish affiliation. They were perceived oftentimes as having a working class orientation and, under certain conditions, this was viewed as being very decisive to the decision to support in fact, some of the ideas that come up quite often of the kind of leader that should be supported, is a man with many years of his life spent in prison and a man who suffered and a man who knew the types of experiences the workers had had in this type of regime. I refer here especially to the working class group in Hungary.

Other variables that come out is the lack of experience among the Hungarian Communist leaders, their use of political ideology and their lack of any kind of technical knowledge. Perhaps among the university students, the reason for the supportive attitude lent to Imre Nagy and George Lukacs was because each was identified as a professional economist and sociologist; of course, Nagy was identified by almost all of the people in the social structure with the relaxation of pressure that came during the period of 1953.

DR. SCHULMAN: I might just also mention that we have come across certain reference groups that seemed particularly important. One that I would like to bring to your attention is the prisoner of war group which began to return to Hungary in 1947. We have come across some evidence of the prisoner of war group, which was led by ex-army officers, and had something to do with various kinds of resistance organizations which were in a process of becoming and which were acting prior to the revolution and its breakout.

With this, I would like to turn you over to Dr. Stephenson.

DR. WOLFF: Before you go I would like to ask you whether the underground process had anything to do with the revolt when it did occur. Whether or not this was a very elaborately organized group and whether it was prepared to carry out anything when it did break out.

DR. SCHULMAN: Well, there are a number of things to say about this. I am simply reporting here the evidence provided us by one respondent really, who testified before a Senatorial body some days ago. He told of a very well organized resistance group of which he was a member, which was extremely miffed at the outbreak of the revolution. They did not desire the breakout of the revolution at that time. At the same time, the informant claimed that the organization had a real part in the stimulating of the mass.

For example, he claimed that it was a member of their organization, an ex-army officer, who actually made the suggestion at the student meeting of October 22, to include the demand that the Russians leave Hungary.

I have no way of evaluating the authenticity of evidence.

DR. WOLFF: Had they some other way or some other date set for the revolution?

DR. SCHULMAN: They had a future date with the revolution, but they had no precise day for the revolution.

DR. WOLFF: Did they think this was a perfect moment for the revolution?

DR. SCHULMAN: They did not, no.

DR. WOLFF: Why not?

DR. SCHULMAN: From their point of view, the organization had not jelled enough; it had not gotten enough hold in the society at large. There wasn't enough mass support. There wasn't the kind of communication facilities available that they would like to have had.

DR. HINKELE: I would like to clarify this point. This was really a spontaneous thing and unauthorized and there had been no participation in prior resistance groups. Do you agree with that?

DR. SCHULMAN: I wholly agree with that.

DR. WOLFF: Was there an organized underground on this?

DR. SCHULMAN: This man claims that there was.

DR. NADANY: I came across a second very important one besides this and this is the role of Russia as the cultural idea which has been extolled by the Communists and this caused a problem.

DR. SCHULMAN: Very much so.

DR. STEPHENSON: I will cut this short. I will only make a few general remarks, some of which pertain to some of the questions that have been raised already.

Dr. Schulman really has filled you in on some of what one might call the sources of prior alienation, some sources of alienation from the regime which emanated from attitudes existing before the Communist regime came into power. There is, of course, the whole pattern of alienation which is a direct consequence of the regime policy, once it got into power.

DR. STEPHENSON: In general, what we have found, pretty well supports other studies of repressed nations, and for this reason, I would say that we have some reason to believe that this is a representative group. It seems reasonable to infer that our sample is really representative of a very solid opinion in Hungary, since their sources of alienation certainly could be duplicated in a wide range of studies that have been made in other places which have experienced similar regimes.

The same may be said concerning the adaptive and adjustive techniques which people use in order to adjust to the regime. Here, again, I think that one would find the patterns are quite similar, where similar experiences have been encountered in other countries.

I think two generalizations might be made about these adaptive and adjustive measures which will help us to understand them better and one is that whatever a person did, out of the people we have interviewed; whatever kind of adjustment or adaptation they made tended to reinforce their alienation -- adjustive measures were perceived as a satisfactory substitute for whatever their former alienations had been.

Then, secondly, I think one might say that these adaptive and adjustive techniques which people used were perhaps, in their psychological consequences, really a more direct source of deprivation on the part of an individual, than any given series of regime policies which in itself was a deprivation. The techniques they used really bore down harder on them than some of the regime policies per se.

Now, given this kind of general background; that of the sources of alienation as a result of regime policy and some of the prior sources of alienation that Mr. Schulman has mentioned -- you have a pretty clear picture of the conditions which culminated in demonstration and revolution. We have already commented upon the necessity of distinguishing demonstration, revolution and

DR. STEPHENSON: exodus. These are three different things. They don't form any sequence necessarily on the part of any of our respondents.

Certainly one of the chief factors in the demonstrations appears to be the role of relaxation of control that took place with the de-Stalinization program. Much could be said about that. I don't have time to go into it.

However, there are two things that I would like to mention about the demonstrations and this gears into some of the questions that you raised on the floor. That is that before the demonstrations, we have all sorts of evidence that the inter-personal relationships were extremely restricted. That is, individuals related with those whom they knew and trusted and virtually with no one else.

Secondly, there was a general avoidance of collective stimuli. People stayed home. They didn't go out into town. They didn't engage in inter-action with others in the cafe life, theater or other similar recreations. Their whole recreational pattern was changed in this respect.

Thirdly, there is a good deal of evidence that there was tensional manifestations in the crowd, that people were jostling one another and guarding over insignificant things and they did this apparently as a mechanism of relief within the constant tensional situation which they experienced day to day.

Then the psychological data offers strong supportive evidence of this isolation pattern, suggesting that the adjustments that people made to their alienation and deprivation was one of psychological insulation from other people.

Now, it seems to me that the demonstration coming as it did, and I think we have something to say about why it came and perhaps how it came. I won't go into that, but coming as it did, it changed the whole system of inter-personal relations, so that there was with the demonstration, a reemergence of the inter-personal relationships that people had been deprived of for such a long period of time.

DR. STEPHENSON: At the same time and somewhat automatically, there was then an overt display of common orientations which people knew nothing about before. The same thing I might add, took place during the exodus from Hungary. People would get on the train, with considerable fear and apprehension, and suddenly look around and see one another and everybody would suddenly laugh and the whole situation of tension and suspicion would break down because they all knew they were going to the same place. So, I think the same pattern happened in this demonstration and helps to explain why they participated by the tens of thousands without, apparently, any real organization.

Thirdly, one might mention here, the strong support that each individual received from the joint participation of members of his primary groups, his friends, his wife, his children, people that he knew, his neighbors, were all there and if he went out on his own, he very soon met someone he knew and this was also important in terms of people who were quite isolated from many of them, such as soldiers. They supported the crowd because they saw friends and relations in the crowd.

Then, of course, there was an opportunity here for relief of individual psychological tensions. There was such a pattern among these people. Well, the culmination here then, of these events break through these inter-personal relationships and it resulted in, what we would describe as, a very diffuse patriotic feeling and this kind of spirit then, I think, helps further to understand why such acts as Gero's speech seemed to be vital in setting off the revolution.

DR. WOLFF: Mrs. Dinnerman, would you like to continue with the discussion of the attitudes?

MRS. DINNERMAN: Well first, I should say that this is a very different kind of study we have, from the one that has just been reported.

MRS. DINNEMAN: By constant and intensive studies of a small number of individuals, we have taken really, a superficial look at a large number of people. Instead of an interview that lasted two days, ours lasted an hour or two hours.

I think it is unfortunate that the staff members of our organization, we know are responsible for carrying through the project, are not here to tell you about it.

Briefly, the circumstances of the study - personal interviews were conducted on 1,000 refugees who left Hungary in the six weeks after the uprising. This took place between December 6 and December 14 in the 20 refugee camps in Vienna and in the neighboring areas. The interviewers used were Hungarian born, and themselves, refugees of long standing, who spoke both German and Hungarian.

They were trained by Austrian-experienced researchers. Although they had no previous experience at interviewing, they were trained with this project.

The interview took place under the auspices of an Austrian Research Organization.

We were not primarily concerned with the refugees as refugees, but rather as informants about a population. This means that we did not attempt to take a sample of the refugee population. We tried, instead, to get representatives of each of the major parts of the Hungarian population, and match them as closely as possible with the proportions that we took in the total population.

This comes back to the question initially raised. We didn't really believe that we were getting a representative sample, but we thought that we would get more reliable informants by getting people who matched in a

MRS. DINNERMAN: superficial way the characteristics of the Hungarian population as a whole.

Main subjects covered by the interview were: reasons for discontent in Hungary before the uprising, how and why the uprising came about; their attitude toward the West and toward other countries and their reactions to their sources of news.

When we asked about the reasons for discontent in Hungary before the uprising, we found that, according to their responses, the economic factors and the political factors played roughly equal parts. A large majority talked about low wages and high prices, and the type of living, in extreme terms, the impossible economic situation, and the fact that the whole family worked just to eke out a bare existence.

The political factors were talked about in a variety of ways: the activities of the secret police, the Russian terror, Russian oppression, and the restrictions on personal liberties. Practically none made anti-Communist statements in talking about their reasons for discontent before the uprising. Seven percent made anti-Communist statements.

We then asked them to rate --

DR. WOLFF: Will you say that again?

MRS. DINNERMAN: Very few in talking about the reasons for discontent made anti-Communist statements; that is, they made anti-Russian statements, they talked about power; they also talked about the restrictions on personal liberties, but they didn't directly make anti-Communist statements.

DR. WOLFF: Is it the same or not?

MRS. DINNERMAN: I don't know. They did not say, "We were against Communism." They didn't use these words.

DR. WOLFF: If asked whether they were Communists, did they say yes?

MRS. DINNEMAN: In this situation, I doubt that they would say yes. I think it was partly for this reason that we didn't ask the question. In previous studies that we have done, we found that there is an unwillingness to say that they are Communists and unwillingness to say that they are anti-West when they are talked to about this.

DR. NADANY: The regime in Hungary was not Communistic at all, but a People's Democracy, I think it might be possible to explore along these lines. They never said their's was a Communist regime. This was a People's Democracy.

MRS. DINNEMAN: But we didn't ask the question. I am now reporting just their responses to the open question, "What were the reasons for discontent?", and the fact that explicitly anti-Communist statements were not made at that point.

DR. NADANY: When you asked the questions, they didn't have to say that they were discontented with Communism itself.

DR. WAYNE: I think there is probably in the group a fraction that might say in theory, this one might be a good citizen but the people who were in charge were either incompetent or they were brutal, or they were not well trained, or whatever other forms you would assign to them as people, rather than theory and I think there are really three components in this fact. In asking similar questions, the rate of dissatisfaction with actions of the government, with how the government operates, or those who were in charge, we find 90% say they were very dissatisfied.

Whereas, when the question is asked, "How satisfied were you with the theoretical basis of the government?", so to speak. Generally, about 70% of the group would disapprove. These are truly rough figures but they seemed to indicate that there is a group in there that might be saying to

DR. WAYNE: itself, "If only different people were running the show, they might make something with this."

MRS. DINNERMAN: I was bringing out the fact that they don't say they were against Communism and they don't say that the people's democracy was no good. They talk in different terms.

DR. HINKLE: We found certain individuals who felt that Communism as represented by the Russians was a source of tremendous negative feeling.

MRS. DINNERMAN: When we asked why it was that the uprising happened now, we expected some kind of an event to be named, but the largest number of people simply talked about it as a people coming to the end of their patience with frustration, deception and so on. Thirty-five percent of them just actually talked about it as something they couldn't stand anymore.

As far as naming of events was concerned, small numbers also talked about what happened in Poland - about 11% - the denunciation of Stalin about 8%, and Dulles' speech about 6%.

When we presented a check list then of why people were willing to attend this uprising, however, the example of Poland turned out to be the most important factor. 40% named it as the most important factor and the other four or five items we presented to them were named much less frequently.

One of the items in that check list was the encouragement from the West and 11% said this was the most important factor in the uprising.

They were all agreed that the students and workers were the prime groups in the uprising, with minorities also saying that soldiers and intellectuals played an important part.

When we came to their own reasons for flight from Hungary, the one impelling reason seemed to be fear; fear of reprisals for those who participated in the revolution, fear of deportation, fear of being reimprisoned,

MRS. DINNEMAN: always fear in about 80% of the cases.

A fifth talked about economic factors as their own reasons for leaving, a sixth talked about political reasons, but these, while they seemed to be crucial, when they were talking about creating an atmosphere of discontent, did not seem to be the reasons why these refugees left Hungary.

On the questions coming back to the point of Western aid, 96% said, in answer to a direct question, that they did expect the west to come to their support. When we asked why, about half talked in terms of the logic of the situation - for in this kind of a situation who else is there but the west to come to their support - 77% said they actually expected military assistance.

Some did not talk in terms of the logic of the situation but said that they had been promised by the west that they would be supported. Over a third said they had been promised in western broadcasts and 7% singled out the Radio Free Europe as the source of their expectations of help.

Since a third who mentioned western broadcasts did this spontaneously when we asked why they expected aid - we asked whether the western broadcasts did give the impression that they would help Hungary and 50% said, yes, the broadcasts gave this impression. This figure seems to be a magic figure since it comes up a few times. 50% said that the people who remained in Hungary are bitter at the West for not coming to their support.

This aid was universally expected. It can probably be inferred that even the 50% who remained in Hungary are still friendly toward the West. In spite of their disappointment, they were able to find some excuse for the West not coming to Hungary's aid.

MRS. DINNERMAN: In general, among the refugees, you find substantial pro-Western feeling, despite their disappointment, and you find universal hostility toward Russia. This, again, comes up in a lot of ways and I don't know whether I should go into that in any detail.

We asked a battery of things and it turns out that they were completely anti-Russian. There was a good reservoir of feeling toward the United States, toward President Eisenhower, toward Great Britain and toward France, and no friendship toward Satellite countries, very little friendly feeling towards Poland, for example.

The rest of the interview was concerned with the great amount of detail about communication habits and exposure habits, I don't think that I ought to go into those details-like how frequently they listened and in what languages and how they responded to these.

Just quickly, nine out of ten said they had listened to foreign radio after their departure from Hungary. This was also the most relied upon media for at least eight out of ten of them, both for learning about events inside Hungary and for events outside of Hungary. RFE was the most popular station, in terms of size of audience, and in terms of frequency of listening, although SOA and BBC were only slightly behind, but it was also the one that they considered least reliable.

It is not easy to say whether they considered it least reliable because of the promises which were not kept during the uprising, because an earlier study we did in '51 shows that approximately one-fifth of those refugees considered it unreliable.

DR. WOLFF: Would you say that the content of the radio communications to Satellite nations needs to be changed as a result of this experience?

MRS. DINNERMAN: Well, the one thing that strikes me about this is that in their reasons for discontent - the business of false promises plays such a great role - that it seems to me that anything that can be called a false promise over Western radio would also be very important.

DR. WOLFF: We will go into that further in the next report. Now, are there any questions on this?

DR. NADANY: Well, I just wanted to ask the question, were they definite promises, or were they implied promises?

MRS. DINNERMAN: No, they were promises.

DR. WOLFF: Do we have evidence that there were statements made which could be inferred as promises?

MRS. DINNERMAN: We now think that there were statements made that could be called promises. As a feedback, from what I have heard the respondents say, I would think so.

DR. HINKLE: Did you think that you were getting answers which represented what they would say a week or a month later or how did you induce them to talk on this?

MRS. DINNERMAN: They were talking to Hungarians but under the auspices of an Austrian church organization. The interviewers were asked to rate the respondents as to the degree of candor, and we got the idea that they were extremely candid, or appeared so to the interviewer.

DR. HINKLE: I think we are concerned with the fact that the propaganda played a role and its subsequent result is a reflection of guilt on the part of the American people. As one talks to these people later, in an atmosphere which is not concerned and is a little bit more detached.

The role of propaganda and promise fades a little bit into the background, and other things are much more important in determining the

DR. HINKLE: attitudes and behavior.

MRS. DINNERMAN: Well, I don't think that the promises are uppermost in their minds. I meant to say that when we asked them the question of what triggered it now, for example, and they named various things, only 1% named Western broadcast. It was not uppermost in their minds, but it certainly played a role.

I think the fact that universally they expected help and that 50% charged that they got this impression, that 33% said this was why they expected the aid. They named broadcasts.

DR. WOLFF: I think my impression would be that this is a small part of it.

DR. WAYNE: The question should be revived. Whether this is effective propaganda in view of the star role that apparently BBC plays over there? Because it is not called propaganda, if you listen to the respondents. It is called news.

DR. NADANY: Apparently, the unemotional approach of straight-faced reporting greatly impresses the people. Also, it is not only the format of it, but I think that the process is not sticking one's neck out by forecasting events - maybe this has something to do with it.

MRS. DINNERMAN: Again, in the research we did in '51, they were very favorable to the broadcasts precisely because of its emotional content - because it gave them the hope they needed to feed on. This is also an important part of the question you asked about, that should be revived. This has to be taken into consideration. We had a group of three hundred persons.

DR. WOLFF: I would like to ask one question. Is it possible that some of the expectations of Western help were, at least, in part, nourished, not by anything that emanated from the West, but rather by context of the

DR. WOLFF: propaganda itself? All kinds of Western powers are painted as War Mongers and, in particular, Germany.

The German Army and enlistment is vastly overestimated. In their image, the West was built up as ready to start the war.

Let us continue with the findings on the Hungarian Refugees made by Radio Free Europe.

DR. GLEETMAN: We are in the beginning of our investigation and I am afraid that I do not have much in the way of findings, no matter how preliminary.

We would just like to briefly tell you of what we are doing and what our focus is, then make some tentative generalizations.

We are interviewing, intensively, our projected sample size of approximately 150. Subjects who are going to be or presently have been interrogated for two days.

The main object of the first part of our study is attitudinal, concentrating upon the revolution and individual practices, - attitudes to various facets of the system and attitudes and knowledge regarding events and happenings outside of Hungary and general reactions to propaganda, both Hungarian - let us say, internal Communist propaganda and propaganda efforts from the outside will be mentioned.

We are trying to supplement this part of the investigation by interrogating different people for about about half a day each. However, there, we are, concentrating not attitudinal, but institutional features. The first method is, in a sense psychological and the second would be more anthropological. We are trying to find informants better placed within the particular sub-part of the system.

DR. GLIETHAN: We are trying to use people like secretaries to whom a great deal of communication goes.

Thirdly, we want to relate some of the information obtained, particularly attitudinally and perhaps institutionally to the reports of the regime press and radio during the last five years. So that in questions on Satellite policy, like, What did they know about events in Poland? What did they know about events in the West? - We want to compare actual coverage of this kind of material through regime eyes and attitudes by these people.

Thus far, we have interviewed and completed interviewing about 30 or 35 subjects in the first, and some 20 in the second part of this investigation. For the time being, we have primarily concentrated on the student and younger groups, hoping, by the time we are through, to get a reasonable representation though, obviously, by no means representative.

This is the study as outlined for the kind of findings we wish to obtain. I would like to be very tentative. You will realize that we may have to revise our material drastically when we go through it a bit more precisely.

The reactions to the regime and main dissatisfactions -- there, of course, we find the things mentioned - the standard of living and political terror and political intimidation mentioned again and again. Beyond this though, there was something that was only hinted at before and which we think is very interesting.

If this question is pressed further, there is a kind of an answer that goes somewhat like this. "I just hated the grayness of it all! "The Drabness," the innumerable manifestation of the overall political system, 24 hours a day, into the tiniest and pettiest and smallest areas of everyday life. I think this may be of considerably more importance than indicated by

DR. GLIETMAN: the fact that you only get it afterwards.

It is very hard to report someshow. You don't report minor petty things as such when you see them as a violent reflection, or as a reflection of something very drastic and vital in this fashion. A further reaction to the regime -- I would just like to compare this with what has been said -- particularly, in the student and intellectual group that we have -- very, very often they have a strong reaction against the stupidity and not just the ill-will and evil, as it were, toward the people in control.

For instance, a mining student might get terribly upset -- these people are driving the country to ruin and they are so damned stupid about it. -- The mining engineer -- this is reported by a student -- who had to dig for oil and knows that the way of digging is engineering-wise absurd and is forced to, by obvious channels do it their way.

I would like to be very tentative about this. In addition to the loathing, there seems to be a kind of quality of contempt. It is as if to differentiate between the attitude toward Hungarian leadership -- Hungarian Communist leadership, on the one hand, and Russian Communist leadership on the other. Certainly, it is present in both cases. But the Hungarian leadership is contemptible and if it were not such a horrible and drastic matter, it would even be laughable.

There is a weakness -- the weakness that is shown by the fact that they are merely members of a party, following party lines in a completely erratic fashion. The pendulum of constant concessions and reneging on concessions -- let us say, starting sometime in '53 and continuing through the Nagy Premiership -- seems to have undermined any possible faith, in any sense of the term, even the kind of faith one could have in a system one thoroughly disapproves of and resents.

DR. GLIETMAN: These kind of things are our main themes on the regime feelings. The violence of the anti-regime feelings we get is quite severe. We have not found any differentiations.

As for the causes of the revolution, itself, in the sense of not "Why the revolution?", but the "Why the revolution at that particular time?" Very emphatically, we get the same phenomenon that was previously called the reemergence of personal relationships. In a sense, our impression had been that it might be -- if one wanted a catch-phrase for the first days of the revolution, it might be called the romantic revolution.

DR. WOLFF: Isn't that already in the first stages of the revolution? How could that be determined as being precipitative?

DR. GLIETMAN: You are right about that, as to the precipitating factors that is.

DR. HINKLE: I won't take a bit of exception to that. This is not very well formulated, but there was an increasing implicit awareness, especially among the students, I think, that we have seen, of a widespread feeling in the country of a lack of isolation that grew over a period of months.

DR. WOLFF: I think it is very well worth clarifying.

DR. GLIETMAN: If we ask this, we stop it with a direct question and we cannot trust the kind of answers we get. What we are doing instead is to get the person to speak of his activities starting from about two days previously. Literally, "What did you do on the morning of October 20?" We just keep them talking and relating in this fashion.

On that basis, it seems that among the factors that dated roughly backward, the growing intellectual ferment, particularly the discussion of the Petofi Circle is very relevant here.

DR. OLETTMAN: One other thing, which I don't think has been mentioned and, that seems to come out, are the events in Poland. I think finally this can be dated, at least by weeks. The way we asked the questions, we got very positive responses about Poland. If there is any negative feeling, it is to some of the later actions, but a great spirit of friendliness and so on is there.

I think this is something our respondents are very aware of.

With regard to the reaction to propaganda - first of all, let us take the internal propaganda, Communist propaganda - the explicit statement of all respondents is that they did not believe anything. They rejected everything and no newspapers were trustworthy. On a couple of occasions, we threw in the question, "Did you believe anything in the newspapers?" The answers were always the same - and it seems to us that the propaganda, the Communist propaganda, both did and did not have an effect. In all the cases where it did have an effect, it seems that it boomeranged, as far as Communist intentions were concerned.

It clearly did not work and, in fact, did work double in a very negative sense where any reality testing was available to the people. The statements in the press, radio, speeches and so on about wonderful increases in the standard of living had only the effect that the entire regime, press, radio and so on was regarded as absolutely untrustworthy. You get a kind of a spiral of untrustworthiness.

Under these conditions, the unbelievably frequent indoctrination meetings that the students have to attend are probably much worse than anything in any exposure to them under these conditions. It can only hurt from the point of view of the regime. At the very best, they are terribly boring; more likely they are, in a sense, violently insulting and objectionable on these grounds.

DR. GLEITMAN: The regime propaganda, I think, is sometimes accepted should I say, inadvertently, - when the statements that are made by the press fit both the framework and the general desires of the person. So that when the Communists go on a general campaign to depict the West as it does, this can boomerang very definitely, at least judging from our respondents. A great number of the people involved to whom the propaganda is aimed, want such things, and are certainly by no means as violently afraid of Germany as they are afraid of the Soviet Union; so that boomeranged propaganda effects happen very often.

DR. SCHEIN: I am very curious whether you asked them anything about the Korean War.

DR. GLEITMAN: Yes.

DR. SCHEIN: What sort of belief is there about that, and what attitudes?

DR. GLEITMAN: We asked generally speaking, what they know, what they expected, why they thought the war was fought and so on. They knew a good deal about it. They - some of them - and this may be an index of the general anti-regime feelings, and this is a hunch - expected this to rise into a large scale war between the Soviet Union and ourselves.

Our motives never --

DR. SCHEIN: You mean they always assumed correctly that the North Koreans started it?

DR. GLEITMAN: Yes, we asked this in quite a number of questions to find out how imperialistic we are viewed. We are not, at least by thirty-five respondents.

I think there is an atmosphere, in which I would trust the respondents because they are by no means hesitant to express quite strong anti-Western

DR. GLEITMAN: attitudes in connection with, "Why didn't you help?" At the end of the interview, when we finally come to specific questions about radio and leaflet propaganda, they are not particularly inhibited. If they disapprove, they say so.

With regard to the attitudes and knowledge throughout the world, the one thing that is very striking is that there seems to be a function to be fulfilled. There is a good deal of ignorance about a great number of outside things. Unless you are fairly high up on the educational level, quite a number of names, persons, outside events are relatively vague.

The general attitudes to foreign nations are pretty predictable. Within the east European sphere the most popular country is Poland, and those least popular are Roumania and Czechoslovakia, the latter in particular because of recent events.

No fear of West Germany; West Germany is not seen as a re-emerging country. No -- the attitudes toward England and France generally were very positive, except as far as Suez is concerned. The Suez issue -- the only fundamental attitude is horribly misjudged. There is no objection to the action as such, but couldn't they have waited?, is one of the attitudes about it.

England is also not a colonial country in the sense of Russian propaganda.

The attitude toward Yugoslavia varies. I don't see one clear thing. Generally speaking, the most typical attribute given to Tito is crafty, clever, smart. They are not at all friendly to the idea of national Communism. But, it looks as if anybody who is against our enemy is at least tentatively our friend too, except that you can't trust him, you see. This seems to be about it.

DR. NADANY: In speaking to a number of them I found that when the

DR. NADANY: question was asked on what they had to say about national Communism, they said that they don't think that there is such a thing.

DR. WOLFF: Could I ask you whether you have any ideas about better methods of counter-acting techniques of breaking down communications within a society? I think they were successful in the sense that they didn't trust each other, they didn't communicate with each other. Is there anything that you have learned to indicate ways in which this can be prevented, or counter-acted?

DR. GLEITMAN: I think that Western Broadcasting, particularly, has done some of that in the simple communications, in a more general sense of communication, with regard to the inter-personal question that you asked.

DR. WOLFF: You haven't any speculation about this? Nothing came out of this which would help you to deal with that more directly?

DR. GLEITMAN: Nothing right now.

DR. WOLFF: Does anyone on the panel have anything to say about that?

DR. SCHEIN: I think it would be wrong to call short the relations which the people have maintained in the Hungary society. It is true that they would depersonalize in a corrective sense.

DR. WOLFF: Obviously.

DR. SCHULMAN: Well, I think one has to specify the conditions under which these primary groups functioned, and the kind of service they gave to these people under the circumstances.

DR. STEPHENSON: The primary group relationships tended to reinforce, reward and help keep the people alive, but did not have any corrective action.

You could see everywhere that a large number of groups felt that way.

DR. RILEY: You mean, it was in that the revolution failed?

DR. WOLFF: We are trying to bring into focus a series of pieces of information. A great many people realize that they shared certain attitudes.

DR. WOLFF: Some things happened to prevent that. The Communist society, or the people in authority prevented this kind of widely shared belief.

Now, is there anything to be learned that we could use to prevent that kind of disassociation from occurring?

DR. STEPHENSON: One thing is the strategy of power on the part of the regime, the timing, and the loosening of controls.

DR. WOLFF: There is nothing from the outside that hastened this.

DR. CHRISTENSEN: The anatomy of how this works, I am sure everyone here is familiar with. That is, it would be awfully hard to attempt. It was one that everybody must be informative of the government -- bartenders, doormen, even the professional men. Many of these people have told us how they would meet somebody and if they did not know them well, for years, they would not dare to say anything. When you met a strange person, you did not say a thing.

DR. RILEY: The story, of course, is repeated.

DR. HINKLE: I want to go further on this because I think we have hit upon a real crucial point. This goes back to the periods of war and the present situations within these nations which we concerned ourselves with a few years ago. I think Dr. Schein will bear this out.

One thing that you find in these people, contrary to popular belief, are not very good at altering attitudes at all, but they are very effective in preventing the development of resistance. This is because they interfere with communication within the group, so that this is something the police state seems to be able to do.

With the loosening of this thing, it seems to have had something to do with the development of the revolution, as I see it.

DR. WOLFF: It is related to that experience. Now that is the question, "Was it successful in doing this very thing?"

DR. HINKLE: They did not change their attitudes but they did prevent the organization of --

DR. WOLFF: Have we learned anything from all these interrogations which would help us to operate this way from outside?

DR. HINKLE: I think we have to know an awful lot more about our research for that.

DR. NADLER: I was going to say that if the communication had been applied, the revolution would not have been possible. It was not done to the extent that the picture was not communicating. One of the questions asked on one of the boards -- I think it was the I.R.A. -- concerned, "Did you talk to others outside your immediate family about what you heard on foreign broadcasts?"

Well, something like seventy percent answered affirmatively that there were just a few people that they talked to and trusted. It meant that instead of having a few people -- rather, a few million people that communicated, there were fragments of society.

DR. HINKLE: It was not complete, but one gets the picture that the revolution would not have occurred under the controls of 1952, let us say.

DR. KESKEMATI: I think the aspect was pretty complete for a while. I think there were changes in this as time went on and my hunch also is that the breakdown of this isolation went on at different rates and different social groups.

Generally speaking, I would say that we should not overestimate the possibilities which outshine what the agencies have for influencing this pattern. Mostly, these are indigenous and one very important thing was the loosening of the controls. It is not merely the question of whether they

DR. KECSKEMATI: actually arrested everybody -- there are other symptoms which are quite important in that respect.

They certainly did intend to have this thing within one type of group, and it must be distinguished that these friendship groups had much more resistance than the work groups.

I could mention also certain other things in this respect, but the main thing seems to be either a loosening of controls or the change in the police or people in authority, but also, it had to do with the top group itself. It was the emergence of this circle -- there were certain developments within the Communist party which, at one point, became one of demanding certain rather basic changes in the set-up.

This played a very considerable role in the stabilizing situation.

DR. WOLFF: Communications on technological aspects and the Hungarian revolution would be next.

DR. WAYNE: Before we do that I would like to make a short comment on what Dr. Kecskemeti has just said.

I have had the opportunity, other than our study, of having some interviews with members of some Satellite countries and it seems to me that it would be very interesting if one could use something like that in order to make a methodological fulcrum in the direction in which your questions about ten minutes ago were oriented.

You wanted to know whether actually this isolation factor was a result of that. I think it might be very interesting to see what the clues are -- these individuals' views, in respect to - "With this person I cannot communicate and with this person I can." Each one could isolate this out and then one could probably invent some kind of remedy of what the diagnosis would

DR. WAYNE: be. It would be more or less established. To me, it was fascinating to read in some of the little leaflets, for instance, how long it takes until you establish a proper relationship in the balance.

Well, I can't answer the question that way. How many days -- oh no, not days, how many weeks -- in a sense, quite a few weeks. I watched the other persons in various situations. I watched them almost with a critical incident technique that is being used, and I have seen in those situations where it is more or less prescribed that the person talk. Now, if one could systemize observations like these, it would be the same as saying you could see where these people got hit. It perhaps could be inferred from what they would do to counteract it.

DR. WOLFF: Well, would you continue with that please?

DR. WAYNE: The study that I am supposed to report on is being done with Psychological Research Associates which is a corporation out in Virginia. They have done most of the orientations that were mentioned here. We are supposed to be interested in problems of communication, in some of the determinants of leaving the country, with some of the determinants of participation in the revolution and so on.

There are two instruments that we are using here; one being a detailed interview which is about a three hour affair. We have had very few of those so far, about thirty or thirty-five, and they are still being collected. I cannot really talk about these as yet, because we have absolutely no data.

We also have administered about nine hundred questionnaires to people at Camp Kilmer and the interesting thing is that these are self-administered questionnaires. These are not interviews and I would like to simply stress the fact that with the run of the mill at Camp Kilmer a self-administered

DR. WAYNE: questionnaire seems to work very well.

It is an anonymous document and we give the people a chance to sign their names. Quite a few do, and the answers are rather complete. In fact, we have the unusual problem of having very, very many write-ins; apparently, people get very serious and very emotional about filling in this kind of American form.

The questionnaire that I mentioned to you, in addition to a biographical section, has three other sections; one oriented on communications; another dealing with participation in the revolt, and thirdly, sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Since quite a lot of this type of thing was said a while ago, I will simply make a few comparisons between the very preliminary data that we have in that respect, since we are in the midst of actually processing these things now.

We do have a few numbers here which might be of some interest. For instance, in terms of areas of dissatisfaction that presumably were among the many determining, deciding factors for leaving the country, we had one that dealt with the living necessities. To me, it was rather interesting that twice as many people found that they had to give "extremely dissatisfied" as answers to the question of housing, more so than the questions on food and clothing.

Housing played such a tremendous role apparently, that 63% chose the extreme dissatisfaction -- showing the choice of extreme value when it came to the question of housing.

Some of the things that we very often consider a major nuisance in this country, like electricity when we don't have it, or medical care, didn't seem to matter very much to these people. This whole group of services

DR. WAYNE: didn't apparently, bother people too much. I think the Rutgers team was very impressed with the complaint about the work conditions; we have a very similar situation here. Out of the two "B" areas - that is, work conditions on the one hand and political factors on the other. The work itself, the work quota, three quarters of all responses said that the work quotas were such that they had to be extremely dissatisfied with them. That was three quarters of them. Apparently this is a translation of the work norm.

Another thing that the gentleman that spoke before me reported on -- we have a fine confirmation on this, namely on Marxism and Leninism; they get a rather high score of dissatisfaction too, again 75% say that this was just plain awful.

Things that one would expect to find in that same area when one talks about work conditions, like changing one's job, or need for vacation not satisfied, those are considerably lower in terms of dissatisfaction scores. Say, only 40% of the people objected to that. You see the vast difference; 75% giving the dissatisfaction response and here 40% apparently, the --

DR. SCHULMAN: Were there differentiations on that?

DR. WAYNE: We haven't gotten that yet. It is unfortunate, but we just don't have anymore data.

We have a group here that deals with the attitudes toward the Government in general, and as you would expect, those are highly negative throughout. One warning to whoever does similar work on self-administered questionnaires, when it comes to the question of the rights of the Hungarian citizens; one of these apparently, is to go out and vote, but there is only one place and that is another question.

DR. WAYNE: But, apparently, in the Hungarian language there are two verbs that can be used for voting and one, it seems, is to simply deliver a ballot, so to speak, and the other has something to do with making a decision. We are getting some very curious distributions on this particular question because, apparently, this was not clearly differentiated here. Whoever does some research dealing with voting, had better then, be careful to ask the question twice, one time this way and once, another way. Otherwise, you will get a lot of humps in your distribution, and you won't know where they come from.

DR. KECSKEMETI: Of course, there are two ways of voting at an election. However, my impression is that it is a very important thing.

DR. WAYNE: Whether this is very meaningful, I don't think we know, but this is about as far as we can go with the kind of material that we have at this moment.

DR. WOLFF: Do you have anything to say now about the prevailing opinion of the refugees concerning the attitudes of those who remained behind?

DR. WAYNE: No, I don't think we have any information as yet on that. We will have because this is one of the questions that appear in the interview, but I haven't even seen that interview.

DR. WOLFF: Does anyone have anything on that? What is the attitude of the refugees concerning the opinions held by those who remained behind?

DR. HINKLE: What do the people who stayed behind think of the refugees who left?

DR. WOLFF: Yes.

DR. HINKLE: Yes, what do they believe they think?

DR. STEPHENSON: One question that we have asked was, how they felt about earlier leaders who had left Hungary. They did not regard them very

DR. STEPHENSON: highly. Some of the respondents also indicated that they felt that since they, themselves, left, they would not be regarded highly by those who stayed in Hungary. They felt that since they had left, they would have a difficult time if they were to return to Hungary.

DR. WOLFF: They would not be given the same importance if they were to return.

DR. STEPHENSON: Yes.

DR. HINKLE: One of the reasons they believe this is their fear, whereas when you study the cases, you get the strong impression that really most of them left because they felt it would be a better life outside.

DR. WOLFF: Yes, I think we should separate the opinions they believe they have.

DR. NADANY: Some of them -- I spoke to a number of the leaders, and they felt this way.

DR. STEPHENSON: I have evidence about some of them here who had chances to leave before, such as being in Germany at the end of the war and so on. The opinions of those who had these opportunities were that they were darn fools in going back then, once they had left. They actually had it in their hands whether to return home in the 50's or the 40's and they then, obviously, began to realize that they were very foolish.

DR. WOLFF: When they went back, how were they viewed by their friends and neighbors?

DR. CHRISTENSON: Of course, this was conditioned largely on whether or not they had been in Germany with great suspicion.

DR. NADANY: On the other hand, there are some who escaped and they are still very highly regarded. I don't want to mention names but, in other words, you have to differentiate between them.

MR. SCHULMAN: I wonder if I can mention the intensity of nationalistic feelings of group ties, and apparently, the people have this feeling.

DR. WOLFF: Will you repeat that again, please?

MR. SCHULMAN: The intensity of nationalistic feelings that has something to do with the attitudes that they express about feelings concerning the departure from Hungary.

DR. WOLFF: My question has to do with - how do they feel -- how do others feel about them?

MR. SCHULMAN: I pass.

DR. WOLFF: You wouldn't say that they would not be acceptable?

DR. HINKLE: No, but they fear - they have a certain fear that they might not be accepted. I think that they are not at all sure that they would be regarded with favor.

DR. WOLFF: Have you any idea as to why people have that opinion?

DR. KECSKEMETI: I don't know but the fear seems to be there.

DR. BAUERS: I don't know whether this is something which has really occurred. That is one reason why we have gotten in this country such disproportionate few students, because a number of students hoped to remain closer to Hungary. They want to be close to any political change that takes place in Europe.

DR. WAYNE: I think in the study that was done in Vienna, Dr. Wolff, very shortly before the study that was mentioned just a while ago, this particular question was asked - "Do you intend to return home and if so when? If not, why not?" I do not know the details of it, but, apparently, there are a great number of reasons why one would not return home.

DR. GLEITMAN: There is a difference between one group and a large proportion of the people are very young people, who were sort of pushed out.

DR. GLEITMAN: That was the only thing at this moment, on this particular date, that people could get their youngsters out.

DR. WOLFF: They were children or --

DR. GLEITMAN: University students, I think they are all between 20 and 25. That is the children were taken out by the parents. They were pushed out, literally.

DR. WOLFF: I think we can recess now for lunch and we will meet again in just one hour.

(Whereupon a luncheon recess was taken.)

PART II - AFTERNOON SESSION

DR. WOLFF: Now, before beginning the afternoon's work, I would like to welcome Dr. Robert Bauers, whom I did not officially welcome this morning and Dr. Paul Fischelis of Columbia University and Dr. Keckemeti of the Rand Corporation:

I would also like to report on a very profitable conversation I had with Dr. Madary, who said I could report this to you. It has to do with the general question of what have we learned about communications. I gather, if I am not misquoting, that there are one or two lessons.

The news, when set forth, from the United States, should be seen in terms of, or considered in terms of Hungarian or foreign ears and not American ears; that is to say, the Senator or Committee member makes an utterance which Americans can read and understand in the context of American practices and that this is not law, or that this is not to be immediately converted into action, but this will have to be set or planned in such a way as to make it perfectly clear to foreign ears that this is not the beginning of some kind of practice.

The other general inference I gather is that the news about the country itself, Hungary, in this case, even at the height of the revolution, must be given a place or a rating in the importance of world news. So that in Hungary, the Hungarians would appreciate that the West would understand its own problems, Hungarian problems, not as number one, but perhaps as number six, or number five, in the order of world events. So that those behind the Iron Curtain could realize that the whole of the Western world was not

DR. WOLFF: going to rise to its feet in immediate action, of a military sort, or any other sort because they were having a revolution. The aim being to give a proper value to the Satellite countries that are experiencing these troubles in terms of how the West sees it along with other things.

DR. NADANY: Yes.

DR. WOLFF: Dr. Nadany is going to go into his discussion "Research Interests of the United States Information Agency."

DR. NADANY: During the morning session, we discussed briefly the question whether the bitterness against the regime reflects complete rejection of the Communist system, or only a hatred of the present leaders.

Well, I feel that one of the most remarkable aspects of the Hungarian revolution of last October and November, was the complete disintegration of the Hungarian Communist party. Within a few days the party which alone ruled the country for close to twelve years, and had a membership of over eight hundred thousand, withered away.

The fact that well known Communists who originally only strived to eliminate die-hard Stalinists from the leadership, but had no intention to do away with the party itself, actively participated in the revolution of the party.

This gives this aspect the greatest importance and I might add that not only from an ideological point of view, the real and the potential strength of Communism as well as the political power and position of the Soviet union must be re-evaluated in the light of these events.

It is but natural that we have been analyzing every cause which constituted this development. Searchlights have been directed on the psychological, as well as on the political, economic, social and cultural factors which played a role in this upheaval. If you will recall, the Hungarian

DR. NADANY: revolution started with the demonstration of the students, when their request that the Budapest radio publicise their demands, was met with the brutal attack of the secret police. This group was the first to take arms and fight back. The freedom fight of the youth of Hungary now belongs to the epics of history.

Young boys and girls fought with the courage and determination of soldiers. They were joined later by workers and by Hungarian army units. It is not alone the victory they scored in the first phase of the revolution which immediately shook the Soviet empire, but the very fact that the freedom fighters belonged primarily to the three groups - youth, workers and soldiers, who enjoyed the greatest privilege in the Communist faith and were most carefully indoctrinated.

This was, I think, the biggest blow to the Kremlin. The Hungary freedom fight demonstrated the complete failure of Communist indoctrination.

Analyzing the causes of this failure has been one of our main tasks. In connection with this, I would like to point out two more developments of, or are, I believe, historically, significant. One is that after the Soviet army returned to Budapest and crushed the armed resistance and this armed resistance, before the second phase of the revolution, a third phase had started.

This third phase consisted of the general strike of the workers of Hungary. Despite threats of the severest punishment, the workers at Budapest and other cities had defiantly refused to go back to work and their contempt of trade unions and their forceful demands for the recognition of democratically elected workers' councils, evoked great sympathy and admiration.

It was during this phase of the Hungarian revolution, the third

DR. MADANY: phase, that Indian Prime Minister Nehru made his strongest statement condemning Soviet interference. India and other Asiatic nations understood this phase of the revolution.

By the way, about this third phase of the revolution, I have to add something, which I learned just yesterday from this Hungarian couple, the newspaperman who just arrived in the United States, namely, that when the general strike was issued, communications within the country were completely paralyzed. The leaders of the Workers' Councils were unable to communicate to the various factories.

Now the correspondent of the relative's agency was able to communicate with London and five minutes later BBC and BOA and RFE picked it up and broadcast it as legitimate news that this was issued and thus, the people, the workers in Hungary, learned about this call and the general strike was very, very effective.

Now, let me go back to these developments, which I feel are overshadowed by one factor, which, no matter how Soviet propaganda tries to becloud, will stand out forever in the history of Hungary and I am referring to the unity of the Hungarian nation which was forged in the revolution and to the true meaning of this unity.

After centuries of foreign domination, then years of semi-fascists, Nazi and finally, Communist rule, which forced men, women and children to make one compromise after the other in order to survive, it seemed that the backbones of the Hungarian nation was broken. Hungary undoubtedly seemed to be a sick and a morally weak nation until October 23, 1956.

In a few days, however, we saw a slaughter of thousands and thousands of people from every walk of life and the ruthless destruction of countless homes and cities and villages. The Hungarian nation sprang to its feet, like,

DR. NADANY: I would say, the mythical Felix of ancient Egypt. It was this miracle which was greeted with such a genuine and overwhelming applause by the different countries of the world and which stupified the soviet leaders.

It seems to be quite a paradox that as soon as Hungary was reborn in the spirit of unity, the differences in the Communist faith were forcibly suppressed and many of the differences came anew in a revival of various political parties and the publication of newspapers, periodicals representing many shades of opinion.

I understand that no less than thirty newspapers appeared in the last days of October, thirty newspapers representing those shades of opinion. The Hungarian people were most eager to practice democracy, which was denied to them for so many years. They were very awkward about it in a great many ways, but they were, nevertheless, very eager to practice it.

But, while we have been deeply interested in this aspect of the Hungarian revolution, namely how the freeborn nation tried to practice its democracy, we have not forgotten to make the best of the opportunity presented to us by these refugees who came to this country, to examine the structure of the Hungarian Communist party which was officially besought by no other than the present Hungarian Premier at the end of October, when he was a member of the "interim" government. It was not only the various methods that maintained the party, that received our close attention, but also the party's relationship with the broad masses in the give and take of everyday life because the regime established a so-called new Communist party, naturally under a different name, fundamentally this new and alledgedly purified party, which has the same structure as the pre-revolution party had.

The Communist party which was first headed by Rakosi and then later on by Gero, despite the rigid discipline which the leaders tried to maintain,

DR. NADANY: was torn by fractionalists. I think it is sufficient if I refer to the case of the "people at strike" and other deviationists, or to the fact that Janos Kadar himself, was for years imprisoned during the Rakosi dictatorship. But we could also refer to the faith of Imre Nagy who always was a Communist, who never renounced Communism as such.

A few weeks ago an article by Joseph Ravai who was the party's chief ideologist during the Rakosi regime, revealed that the new party is not completely void of factionalism either. We have been watching every side which indicates that struggles between Communism groups would not be eliminated.

But, there are other problems of world-wide importance which require our close study. One of them relates to the integration of the Soviet countries. It has been clear from the very beginning that the various economic agreements between the Soviet Union and the East European Satellite regimes, just as the Warsaw military tactics, have two aims, the first to exploit the natural resources, the technical know-how and the manpower of the East European countries for the benefit of the Soviet Union and to further Moscow's goal for more domination.

The second aim has been to make them all economically dependent on the Soviet Union and militarily a part of the Soviet security system.

The Hungarian revolution proved that neither political nor economic nor military ties forced on an unwilling nation can serve as a solid basis for the kind of integration the Soviet Union tried to create. The Rakosi clique, one which ruled Hungary until the revolution was so secretive regarding things between the Hungarian regime and Moscow, that not even high officials in government departments knew exactly what other government agencies had to deliver to the Soviet Union.

Let me read to you in this respect, a statement which was made on

DR. NADANY: the Budapest radio on November 1, 1956, by Hungary's leading scientist, Professor Janos, who was also the Vice-Chairman of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission.

In reply to a question on the existing state of affairs of the Uranium mines in Hungary, he said, and now I quote: "The Hungarian Uranium ore enterprise is in Hungarian hands, (meaning by November 1st) and the Soviet engineers and their families have left Lovassi, a village near where the mine is situated. The mine is being guarded by soldiers of the revolution, Hungarian soldiers," he added, and then he continues, "The Soviet authorities closely guarded anything connected with Uranium."

"They were reluctant to take in Hungarian scientists, let alone experts, so it was impossible to do any prospecting. The Hungarian experts were left in the dark. I, the Vice-Chairman of the former Atomic Energy Commission, received no information. I know only from the papers of the deposits of Uranium. I do not know the terms of contract with the Soviet Union."

This is a quotation from the statement made by the former Vice-Chairman of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission.

Now one of the demands of the Hungarian people during the revolution was that all the secret deals concluded with the Soviet Union, should receive full publicity, though the exact amount of wealth taken out of Hungary in the last twelve years probably will never be known.

It is interesting to note that Moscow has been able to free themselves completely from the impact of the Hungarian people's demand regarding publicizing these deals.

DR. NADANY: Now, I not only referred to various loans promised now by the Soviet Union to East European countries, but also to the recent communique issue in Moscow at the conclusion of the Hungarian government delegation's talk with the Soviet leaders. The communique discussing Soviet-Hungarian relations devotes pages and pages to agreements from Soviet loans and to atomic research work.

On atomic research work, the communique says, and may I quote again, "The scientists agreed that one of the -- that once the mining of Uranium ore has been organized, Hungary will deliver to the Soviet Union ^{at} an equitable, mutually profitable price for whatever ore will not be needed for Hungary's national economy." Now, the price Hungary received for Uranium ore until now has never been disclosed, not even Janosi knew how much Hungary got for it.

The communique now promises that in the future Hungary will receive equitable and mutually profitable prices.

Among the thousands of Hungarian refugees who were interviewed after their arrival in free countries -- many occupied high positions in Hungary's intellectual and industrial life.

Some -- they are mostly in Europe -- belong to the elite part of the party's intellectuals. They know of no less than fifty Hungarian writers and journalists, prominent members of the former Hungarian Writer's Federation and Journalist Federation, who fled their native land.

On questioning them, and when I say questioning them, I am not only talking about the fact that we questioned them, but also others, we found that the ruthless exploitation of Hungary's economy, which forced the Hungarian people to live on pitifully low standards, was one of the causes of the ferment within the party, even prior to the Communist party.

I think Dr. Schulman discussed this aspect of this situation in his remarks this morning.

DR. MADANY: Now, the extent of this ferment within the Communist party, prior to the revolution, has received the same careful analysis by our research specialists and the effect of Khrushchev's speech on the party machinery. It could be ascertained for a fact that the ideological confusion within the Communist party was quite extensive long before the Twentieth Party Congress and -- which convened in Moscow -- and even before Khrushchev, and Bulganin went to Belgrade in their efforts to make peace with Tito. The Soviet leaders' acknowledgment that different rules could lead to Socialism, was taken at face value by many Hungarian communists.

The Soviets armed interference in the Hungarian revolution completely disillusioned and confused these party members who believed in this and they were primarily those who were demanding the dissolution of the party.

Now, this confusion torments the Communist parties not only in the East European Satellites, but also in the neutral countries and also in the Western -- in Communist parties of the Western countries who could see this -- just recently when the American Communist party met -- different sections were fighting between themselves.

The impact of the Hungarian revolution and the Soviet interference on Communists in every part of the world has been immense. I think it is sufficient if I only refer to such statements on the various writings, or like John Arturs, or like Peter Friar, the British Communist writer and former staff writer of the London Daily Worker, who took a real close look at his party, despite the fact that he didn't resign from the party itself, and he came to the conclusion that what happened in Hungary - that the Soviet propaganda about the Hungarian revolution is absolutely untrue, because of the spontaneous revolt of the people and it was not instigated by the West and so on.

DR. NADANY: Now, the United States Information Agency has paid great attention to all the developments, to this impact which the Hungarian revolution left in every part of the world.

Well, I think that my time is running short and therefore, I can only say a few words about one of the great problems which is of interest to us. I would say to all of us because it primarily concerns those who have to evaluate the military strength of the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian Satellite army turned its guns against the Soviet forces in the Hungarian revolution. Though Hungary was not permitted to get out of the Warsaw pact, the memory of the carefully indoctrinated Hungarian army against its Soviet masses certainly will hound Moscow for a long time.

DR. WOLFF: Assuming that Communist methods of indoctrination and organization have been ineffective in Hungary, -- could you answer this. Are the features of the personality make-up and family and social structure of the Hungarians unique, so that no generalizations concerning effectiveness of military methods and proclamation can be made?

DR. NADANY: No. I would say that the same thing is true for all the other Satellite nations of East Europe. And, I might add to this, that despite the fact that technically the Hungarians do not belong to the Slavic groups, like many other of the East European Satellite countries, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Poles and the Czechs and the Slovaks also believe that they are an integral part of European civilization and when I say European, I mean the West European civilization, just like the Hungarians and therefore I feel that what holds true for Hungary, holds true for these countries too.

DR. WOLFF: Would you care to express an opinion about relative

DR. WOLFF: significance, of family structure, strong Catholic church and so on in Hungary, as compared ---

DR. NADANY: Yes, well I will take the Calvinists first. Despite the fact that Hungary is primarily a Catholic country - I think sixty-five percent of the population is Catholic and only about thirty or thirty-two percent are Calvinists. Nevertheless, Calvinism was always a leading intellectual force in Hungary, ever since the reformation. In fact, I would say that the leading writers and statesmen of Hungary, in the last three hundred years, mostly came from the Protestant groups.

Well, maybe this was because Protestantism gives a much greater latitude to thinking than Catholicism, which after all is dogmatic, in many ways. I think that Calvinism is a very, very great force in Hungary and I think in the intellectual life of the country, it may be greater than Catholics.

Now, about the family structure, well, one gentleman here this morning remarked that the findings of the investigation was that the children listened to their parents and there is a very close family tie between children and parents. I think that this holds true and this is the reason why, despite the fact that there were no religious teachings in school, nevertheless, youth in Hungary today, I think, is more religious than they were in my day.

DR. WOLFF: Would you say that these factors are equally strong in other European countries? And the feeling of nationalism equally as strong?

DR. NADANY: The feeling of nationalism, naturally, the Hungarians are intensely nationalistic. However, they learned a very great lesson after the World War II. Let me go back to World War I. After World War I, when Hungary was - well, Hungary was dismembered because parts of the country were given to Rumania and parts to Czechoslovakia and parts to Yugoslavia and there was a strong movement demanding revision of the water lines and they felt that

DR. NADANY: this was the greatest issue.

However, after World War II, I think that they learned a lesson and they learned that they are in the same boat with the other East European countries and some sort of a federation is the only solution for them. In other words, that they have to live in peace with each other and their nationalistic feelings and not run away to the extent that they should be so hostile to their neighbors.

They are nationalistic, but at the same time they believe that they are part of the European civilization. They are part of Europe and this is one thing which I have to stress so very strongly, namely, I think one gentleman here discussed the fact of the seventh image of Soviet Union in Hungary, namely, that they tried to impose their cultural life on the Hungarian people that this was so very much resented. It was resented because they do not feel they are, and never will be, a part of the Eastern or Russian culture. That is completely strange to them.

Here, I also would like to refer to another remark, which was made during the morning session, namely, I think somebody remarked that the Hungarians, who were also of Mongolian heritage, resented the Mongolian soldiers who were brought in after November 4. Well, don't forget that they came away from that part of the world over a thousand years ago, and they have very, very little mutual contact left with that place of origin, in fact absolutely no contact at all.

DR. WOLFF: Would you lead into Russian behavior since the revolution? Any change in policy or attitude as a result of this experience?

DR. NADANY: The Soviet leaders at this moment are trying to turn back the clock and they are trying to impose the rigid system used in Stalinistic practices and methods which they, themselves, condemned during the Twentieth Party Congress.

DR. MADANY: However, it is a different -- it is another question whether they will be able to do so or not. It is my belief that they will not be able to sustain this.

DR. WOLFF: The east of Hungary has been drained as a result of the revolution so far as leaders are concerned. What about that?

DR. MADANY: Well, I would think that the majority of the intellectual leaders of the country remained in Hungary and though today they are quiet, they are just biding their time. In other words, these forty or fifty thousand Hungarians, learned Hungarian men and women who came to the free world, are just a part of the leaders.

DR. WOLFF: A small part?

DR. MADANY: I wouldn't say a small part, but just a part.

DR. WOLFF: Would you estimate about the proportion of the population that carried weapons during the revolution?

DR. MADANY: No sir, that I don't know. I would also like to make one additional remark as to the knowledge of the Hungarian people of world events. Now, I spoke to many people who -- I spoke to many Hungarian refugees too, but I also discussed this question with many of those who interviewed them at various points in Europe; I also spoke to an American minister, who, during the revolution, went into Hungary and was there for a few days. He was there during the revolution and learning about it. He decided to go to the border to find out what was going on, and was able to get into Hungary to make contact with Hungarian Protestant leaders. He spoke to countless men and women of Hungarian extraction because of his ability to speak the Hungarian language. He was amazed to find out how well aware they were about world events.

When he asked them the question of how they knew about these things, they all answered that they listened to western radios.

DR. NADANY: In other words, he felt, and many of us have too, that the average Hungarian knows more about world events than the average American. Here I also have to correct one more impression which was made in the morning session, namely, that in questioning these Hungarians - I think it was you who mentioned - that they only have sort of a hazy picture of certain people who actually played a part in world events. I don't know who mentioned this.

Well, I am sure that this is so, but ask ten Americans - how many of them will know who is Prime Minister of France today? I am pretty sure that five would not know.

DR. HINKLE: I think that these people were acutely aware of what was going on in the outside world, and not in any general way; and were not at all surprised with what they met with in the United States. It was rather likely that they expected it.

DR. WOLFF: May I ask whether this is a property of eastern European people or whether this is an outgrowth of being a Satellite nation?

DR. NADANY: Well, first of all, the east European people who, for centuries, have been either threatened by foreign domination or aware of that foreign domination, in order to survive, naturally always have to acquaint themselves more with events outside of their immediate order, than people in this country or any other country.

In other words, they knew very well that their faith was so closely tied toward the West that they had to follow it. In this respect, may I tell you this. I found the Hungarians knew very much about the Korean war and about what goes on in the Far East and the Middle East, because they knew that these events are closely tied up to their fates.

DR. WOLFF: Well then, are you saying that they have a natural

DR. WOLFF: appetite for world events which has been sharpened somewhat by their --

DR. NADANY: It has been sharpened.

DR. WAYNE: I would like to say something. I think the statement was made too extreme. All the people of the Satellites cannot be put into one pack and say that they are all alike. There are obviously some differences that have to be stressed, in addition to the common denominators. The Germans are very similar to the Bulgarians because they happen to be Satellites, for instance, and to say this is absurd.

DR. NADANY: I did not mean it that way.

DR. WAYNE: But it did make it sort of sound very odd to say that the Hungarians are representative of all Satellites.

DR. NADANY: I did not mean it that way.

DR. WAYNE: But even in respect to the oppression attitude toward authority; there will be differences because it is obvious.

DR. WOLFF: Do you think they are major enough to be concerned about?

DR. WAYNE: No, but I think one should look at it with great care. For instance, one of the stories that was published in the New York Times, I think, belongs here. The story of the Czech and the Polish architect at the National Conference of Architects, who over a glass of beer, discussed all kinds of events. The architect said to the Czech, "Don't you Czechs believe in a democratic government and freedom, and doing something about it?" and the Czech said, "Well, obviously we do, we have an old democratic tradition, and we would very much like to do something about it." "Well, why don't you?" "Don't you know that that is forbidden?"

Now you see, this is in Czechoslovakia; this is a different attitude toward authority perhaps. This is but one of the components if one

DR. WAYNE: lets the democratic characteristic out of it. The fact that Hungary is considered more agrarian than the western part of Czechoslovakia may have something to do with the attitude toward socialism, toward other things, and what have you.

DR. NADANY: What I meant to say is that all east European countries, probably with the exception of Bulgaria, despite the fact that Poland and the Czechs and the Slovaks are still -- they still belong to the European nations and not into the Russian nation. In other words, despite the fact that there was a slavie movement going on in Europe which was forced by Russia way before the first world war, and which was also taken up later on by Stalin, despite this fact, and this is the common denominator; they all belong to the rest of European civilization. I did not mean to say that they have the same characteristics in every way.

DR. SCHEIN: The Hungarian events represent, more or less, how in-effective Communistic techniques are on a world-wide basis.

I would be very much interested in hearing, if anyone would care to comment, to what extent this might be generalized to Asiatic society.

DR. WOLFF: Does anyone care to comment?

DR. HINKLE: We have had the opportunity the past few years to study^awith/technique similar to the one described here this morning. a group of representatives of China, who had been in this country having come over here as graduate students in 1946 and 1947. There is a very marked difference in certain respects. A very, very striking thing! For example, I mentioned this morning that communication between parent and child in this Hungarian group seems to be quite strong. The children take the parents and their attitudes and value systems as a model. They accept them rather than the words of the regime.

DR. HINKLE: This might seem like a platitude, but this is not at all true of the Chinese who have gone through some fifty or seventy-five years of intense cultural change, in which the intellectual leaders of the country have been rapidly adopting many aspects of the Western culture. Among the Chinese - the modern educated Chinese individual is in many respects related to his father as a second generation immigrant in America is related to his father. He cannot use him as a model.

He is in a great many respects quite prepared to accept the regime and the presentation of the communist point of view as a valid picture of the new and western and modern world, and so he would value this and reject what comes from his own country and his own parents.

Fundamentally, among these Hungarians even though they may have had a feeling there was a need, let's say in 1939, for certain economic changes, certain reorganizations within the regime, there was no rejection of the Hungarian past whatsoever. They are deeply tied to their whole tradition; this is not, for example, true for the Chinese. Perhaps, it is not true of all of the Asiatics.

I won't go into this at great length, but I do say that in comparing European nations and Asiatic nations, one can find very striking differences. An attempt to indoctrinate people with Communism, which hasn't gone over at all well in Hungary has, I suspect, been much more effective in China.

MRS. DINNEMAN: Now, I would like to mention something, if I may. I did not at all mean to suggest a low level of knowledge. I was talking about an absolute level and I think all of us were equally impressed.

MRS. DINNERMAN: I wonder whether some of the attempts of indoctrination have not actually helped in the resistance of indoctrination. I am talking in the terms of the political sophistication that all of these - that every person we have interviewed has, or just about every person, compared to an American college student, let us say. Just at random, let us say, these people we have talked about. The kind of way of thinking that our subjects have shown is much more penetrating and very sophisticated indeed.

If there are some facts missing, it is very understandable why. Is it possible that the very fact that here they were for so many years forced to read economic figures, political analyses, which were wrong, nevertheless, led to an interest in these things?

DR. NADANY: Definitely in many ways.

DR. SCHULMAN: It seems to me it is possible to reject the actual things, but, nevertheless, to accept all these thinking categories that are implied in the propaganda, namely, economic analysis, for instance, as a category of thinking about the world.

All of the figures are lies, but I am learning that it is possible to analyze in those terms, political aspects and so on.

DR. NADANY: Oh sure, I agree with that.

DR. SCHEIN: This was brought on with the prisoners of war, their knowing much more about our own society.

DR. SCHULMAN: My question really follows on what has been said regarding the presence of cultural and structural restraints on terror and propaganda in Satellite countries. I wonder if you could comment, perhaps, on some of these factors.

I wonder why the revolutionary episode occurred in Hungary and not these other societies.

DR. WOLFF: You said you were analyzing the data. Perhaps you could make a preliminary statement.

DR. NADANY: Why did it occur in Hungary and why did it not occur in other countries? Actually, it was, that there are strong historical ties between Hungary and Poland, and the Polish events actually evoked these things in Hungary.

I am quite positive about this. The other thing is that the intellectual life in Hungary for many, many years, has been quite active, so to speak. I am pretty sure that the intellectuals sparked this revolution way back in 1955. I would really compare the writer's revolt of 1955 to the work of the French Encyclopedists, and the others, who twenty, thirty years or fifty years before the French revolution actually sparked the revolution.

The Hungarian revolution actually was sparked by the Communists themselves, who set the need for more freedom in order to do a creative work. Now, in other words, though the Hungarian revolution was in a way -- it is an accident that it actually happened in Hungary because Hungary -- the Hungarians were the first to express sympathy with the Polish people. Nevertheless, in Hungary the situation was maybe a little ahead of the other countries.

There were signs in Czechoslovakia too, but I think this was in the early part of 1956 when their congress met. There was a faint something starting there, but, however, it never went any place. In Hungary it would probably not have, either, if there had not been events in other parts of the world, particularly Poland.

I don't know if I have answered the question.

DR. CHRISTENSON: I just wanted to ask a question along the same line based upon what Dr. Schulman said, and I almost hesitate to bring this up. It would be terribly interesting, and I would like to know if it is just

DR. CHRISTENSON: a use of the imagination, or if there is any possible truth in it, and that is; two of the students that we interviewed made the suggestion that the Secret Police - those who were against Russia themselves, wanted to have the demonstration.

DR. NADANY: I don't believe that.

DR. CHRISTENSON: They didn't say why, but they happened to suggest this.

DR. NADANY: I don't agree with that. The point of view expressed by the same man we were talking of before, who said it was his belief that when the Russians left Hungary at the end of October, they were satisfied that Hungary would be a second Poland; it was not in their interest to provoke such a revolution, and certainly the Hungarian revolution was a blow to them. There was no reason for them to provoke it.

DR. CHRISTENSON: If it were, it went too far, obviously.

DR. NADANY: There might be some members of the Hungarian Secret Police who felt that their positions would be jeopardized, if the system would be less rigid than it was; they wanted to go back to the old Stalinist life. There might have been some. It certainly was not the Soviet's intention to do this.

DR. NADLER: I hope I am wrong, but I have the feeling that this discussion is based very much on logic and reason.

Those polls that have been taken seem to indicate that the major motivation behind the revolution was economic. The type of thing that the Chinese - the 14,000 Chinese who were prisoners of war, took the choice of going to Formosa instead of back to Red China, and they were interviewed rather carefully by an American who spoke both Chinese and Russian, and could talk to them. There was a large sample.

They were given a list of choices, among them the choice to go to Formosa; an overwhelming response was to the effect that they expected a better

DR. NADLER: material deal in Formosa than in Red China. Many of them quoted various things to the effect -- quite on the material and economic side. It may have to do with the motivation that the Hungarians had.

DR. NADANY: This was one of the primary motivations. However, I did not mention the student I had in mind to speak of - she was not satisfied because she was not permitted to go to a school that, probably, she would not have been able to get anywhere, and there was the teacher who was in a very comfortable position, nevertheless, she was dissatisfied because she was unable to teach the subjects she wanted to.

In other words, the want was freedom, and this feeling - this constant feeling of the lack of freedom was one -- also one of the main causes of the revolution and this erupted, this came to a boiling point at that moment when the Secret Police started their attack.

DR. HINKLE: I don't think the facts that we have are any less actual, even though sociologists and psychologists did not obtain, necessarily, documents that the economic discontent is the sole, or even, the primary cause.

DR. NADANY: To go away from this for a moment, surely we cannot ignore such things as the actual demands, made by the student. The students' leagues, and quite a number of them, do not have that much contact with each other. The very first demand that is found in every one of the lists is, Soviet troops must be removed. I think it would be bending backwards to try to say that economic motivations are the only ones. I have no doubt, whatsoever, that it was very strong.

DR. WOLFF: Dr. Roberts, have you any comments on this?

DR. ROBERTS: I am inclined to agree with the last point. It seems to be quite true. My only impression is that there is a certain drive towards the Soviet troops. It seems to me that the economic conditions are also helping them.

DR. WOLFF: Mr. Rowan, would you like to say something to us?

MR. ROWAN: First, I would like to explain that our organization is a little different from that of the social scientists. The process we have that is closest to it is anthropology. I am a little closer to Harry Williams and his study, but I should also like to point out that those of us who are here are staff employees of the National Academy of Science.

As I think you all know, we have an operation going on that can become known, where we have been interviewing professional people. Largely, we were talking to scientists, social scientists and lawyers as well.

The questionnaire that we pulled out of the professional refugees is designed to draw out his professional experience.

It is designed to enable us to find a professional job for him on the premise that he will be happy in his own profession and the only way the United States will benefit from these people is if they are in a position to suitably utilize their talents.

DR. WOLFF: Did you have the impression that these were high level people?

DR. ROWAN: We have talked about that. We think they are pretty good for their age group, but you don't find many of them thirty years of age -- certainly we have seen mostly people under thirty-five years of age.

I think there is a lot of promise there. You certainly have to rule out a lot to find the really good ones.

I might say a word as to how we can possibly help you who are social scientists in your job. We certainly are interested in it.

We have interviewed 750 people. We have these four page questionnaires giving the background of these people to some extent. These files, we feel are certainly available to any group in this community. Anyone who wishes to look through them for statistics and information, why, they are open to them.

DR. ROWAN: I might also point out that the coverage which we will make here, will not be on the scientific basis at all. We have lived with these Hungarian people for the last few months, almost sixteen hours a day, especially Dr. Ferenz, who is living with these students at Rutgers.

So you see, we have had rather close contact with these people, but it has not been a scientific sampling at all. Certainly, our purpose can only be qualitative, and to a large extent, representative of our personal opinions.

Before I introduce Dr. Steller to you, I would like to introduce Dr. Ferenz, who was born in Hungary, who received a medical degree at the University of Canada. She is with the John Hopkins University. She is a Pediatrician and a Cardiologist working on general heart disease.

Dr. Steller, I think you know about, already. Before the war, she was with the League of Nations in 1940, and from 1940 to 1944 she was with the Economic Rehabilitation Group in Hungary. Subsequently, she was on the staff of the American Embassy at Budapest.

Dr. Steller is a Doctor of Political Science, who came here with the Academy team. Dr. Steller works with the American Council of Immigration.

We have had bull sessions, and there are items she can expertly attack here today. We have certainly come to appreciate her background information on the situation in Hungary, and what contacts with some of these things should be had.

With no further comment, I would like to present Dr. Steller, and her observations on the progress we have made.

DR. WOLFF: Dr. Steller, we would appreciate any remarks you would care to make.

DR. STELLER: Mr. Rowan told you of our operation that was not scientific. Our object was quite different.

We were interviewing refugees for the sole purpose of trying to find an adequate test. We found that there are refugees in Camp Kilmer with degrees, and we set up shop in Camp Kilmer to get them adequate jobs.

The operation had four phases. First, we interviewed them to get a preliminary interview which served as a general background; their education and their experience. We wanted to find out what the man or the woman wanted to do in this country.

The second phase, was what we called a professional interview. The professional interview was conducted by Professors of Rutgers, Princeton and M.I.T. who very kindly offered their services.

The object of these professional interviews was to establish the professional language standing of the person, in relation to their place in life, and their place in scientific life.

Then, we had a third item. This was a double phase because first we had to interview the people, both employers and employees, and finally place them.

In connection with these four phases, we encountered certain problems. In the first place, I would summarize that our main problem was communication, communication in the many senses of the word. First, we had to exact a personal contact with these people. You see, when they came to us it was different than when they were interviewed by others. When they were in the scientific group they were alone. Although the National Academy of Science is a scientific group, they thought of it as a government group, so they thought they were facing a government group.

DR. STELLER: This meant that at first, they tried to tell us what they thought we wanted to hear. They tried to defend themselves on why they left the country.

They told us what they had done in Hungary, and so forth. We did this until we could find some point where they believed we understood what they meant, or that we understood their background.

We could just not believe that they thought of these things. Generally, it was so trivial. Sometimes, in knowing the name of a street; recalling a Professor at the University with certain little mannerisms; or mentioning a little point, would make them open up.

There was difficulty in communication. They spoke a different language because the Hungarian language somehow had become distorted after all these years. I don't know whether you might remember, but the Nazis distorted the German language to a certain extent; the same thing applied here with the Hungarian language. New words and expressions were introduced; thus making the language so different that sometimes we were speaking two different languages.

Finally, we understood each other. Then they were defending themselves; trying to explain, not why they left, but how people would think of them in their minds. The quite young are sure it is all right that they left, but the other ones - those between twenty-five and thirty-five -- they were not quite as certain.

There was one question in the questionnaire which was worded something like this: "Do you expect to become an American citizen?" It was really interesting to watch the reaction of these people and what their answers were. Some of them answered, "Yes, of course." The majority asked, "Well,

DR. STELLER: is it necessary?" They were afraid of the repercussions partly, and partly, they were afraid of an adverse opinion, and finally, they just did not know. Some of them genuinely wanted to go back.

What we counted was in connection with the personal interviews. During the last five or six years, the Hungarian Government very extensively, very highly organized the Hungarian education component from the Day School up to the Universities, especially in High Schools and Universities. The main purpose of this re-organization was to tie up the men more strongly and securely in one job, and to tie them down to a job or an area. There isn't any movement from job to job in Hungary, but if a man had a very wide knowledge, realizing that his knowledge was wide enabled him to go on. If, on the other hand, he thought his knowledge so small and could function in only one place, it would tie him down.

With this immigration, it was quite difficult to establish in what category the man belonged and how he compared in education - to the American degree.

DR. WOLFF: That is to say, they are so highly specialized that they fitted only into a very narrow category?

DR. STELLER: The specialization was very great - this is before the war, before the Communist regime. I am speaking mainly of engineering education. There was civil, electrical and mechanical engineering. Those were the categories. Now, they had to divide that up in very small proportions, and electrical engineering has high power and low tension; communications and micro waves, and so forth. There is one who knows nothing except grades; another who knows about machine tools, but has been trained to know about machine tools in the chemical industry; another who knows about machine tools in some other industry, and it is the same thing with the other phases of chemical engineering.

DR. STELLER: They used to have the distinction between organic and in-organic, but now they have divided these two specialities into many, many small groups. This is a matter of placement again, because one may know one thing and not another and the next one is supposed to know something about something else. And so it goes on infinitely.

It is a polytechnic university but the engineering degree is not a general mechanical engineering degree. This mechanical engineering degree is in one little specialty. They have a University which is a new one, which again is more specialized on the chemical degree than the degree in another place. So it is not very easy to evaluate them.

In that particular field they have quite a good basic knowledge. The mathematics that they know is quite good because the high school mathematics is better than our mathematics, and after that, their special training is very inadequate, for those who graduated after 1950.

DR. WOLFF: Is is your impression that this is a factor which is limiting the mobility somewhat, of the Hungarian society?

DR. STELLER: That is one of the main objectives - to tie them more securely to one job.

DR. MADANY: Maybe this is just a characteristic of that society.

DR. STELLER: They don't want them to move, because, if a man moves he meets new people. This is part of the isolation policy; that is, isolation within the country, within the group, and within the family. If the man moves around, --

DR. WOLFF: During the war, the manpower commission in this country had a great deal of trouble, or at least some trouble, in deciding who was fit for what kind of work, because very few persons with PHD's were now working in the field in which they got their PHD's.

(laughter)

DR. STELLER: Since people cannot move around a country, they are stuck to one job by some authority, and the employer group is also governed. They have no choice; they have to accept these people. This lack of freedom also implies a certain false security which the Hungarians are not aware of.

When we are trying to place them - when we arrange job interviews and we send them out, they are interviewed and then they come back to Camp Kilmer. Then they have to wait. Now, the first thing that they do not understand is, why do we send them to various people. They can't understand that. They are accustomed to just telephoning, and the employer would take them.

They have to understand that this is not the way it is done here. This is really a shattering experience to them when they are interviewed, and then industry turns them down. It comes to where we have no place for them in a certain organization, and they wonder what will happen to them. They do not have such experiences in Hungary because they were sent to an organization and the organization had to take them. There was no choice. There was no discussion.

They were also quite shattered when they found that it might happen that they wouldn't get a job, which in Hungary, for an engineer, or for a Doctor, or for anyone of this group, simply does not happen. This is the first time that they realize that here it means competition, but it also means special effort, and it certainly means risks, which they have never experienced, and then sometimes they have been quite difficult and quite bitter about it.

They are quite amazed by what they call the niceness of the people. They never expected the people to be so nice to them, and for them to be so well received, since they came from a Communistic country, and had all sorts of ideas.

DR. STELLER: I meant to bring out another point to you which I think was very interesting in talking to these people, and which came out at the various job interviews and additional interviews besides these.

These people left Hungary. They did not want to be Communists, or they did not like the regime, but the same thing, more or less.

They lived in a society which was, more or less, a class-less one. There was an aristocracy, but still the old class distinctions are non-existing now. They were miserable and everyone was more or less in the same condition, and this distinction disappeared here.

Then they came here, and a few weeks after they left there, entered a normal society - the American society. Although it does not have the same class distinctions as the -- to them, the old European society, nevertheless, there are certain likenesses and these people, for the first time after eight or ten years, were confronted by certain problems which they did not have there.

Just to give you one very extreme example. There was a young man who was the son of --, a very bright young man who is now staying here. In his same village, there was a man who had a young daughter and this young daughter worked in a building industry. I think she had a little wheelbarrow and with this little wheelbarrow, she carted bricks to the brick layers. These two people married. There was absolutely no difference in class or in education. It was a natural and normal thing for these two people to marry.

Now they came here. The young man has a job as a chemical engineer, and the young woman has a job, but they are back in a society where different social values count, and it is some experience to them. This is the extreme.

These difficulties that these people encounter, we see in many of the people.

DR. WOLFF: Are these people moving in a Hungarian world here?

DR. STELLER: Partly, not exactly Hungarian. But with others, they move in American groups, and they see certain differences in behavior and in social class - I don't like the word, but you know what I mean - which they do not see anymore in Hungary, and it makes them confused to a certain extent.

One last thing that I would like to mention, which came out very prominently in talking with educators and very important social scientists and economists. These people - too few of them had taken part in growing up before new economic plans for the organization - the re-organization of Hungary when communism will be completely abolished. When you talk to them, they still think in terms of a planned society, even though they have been exposed to our free economy and competition.

The interesting part of it is that they think this way, because, somehow, in some expressive way, they have the feeling that Communism is a sort of an evil phase of the government, but, nevertheless, it is a phase of development that they have gone through, and they have experienced. They have to progress beyond the democratic countries, and they are more advanced in certain aspects, and feel the same way on social, economic and political areas.

Sometimes they cannot express it very well, but they definitely feel that they have progressed beyond the United States.

DR. WOLFF: That is not in keeping with our experience.

DR. HINKLE: Our experience has been that these Hungarians that we have talked to at considerable length are still very, very much aware of class distinctions and position. For example, I mentioned earlier the complaint of the very strikingly focused complaint of the people who had been hotel keepers. They didn't mind losing their money. They didn't mind the discomfort. ^{But} They wanted to make it very, very clear that they were not working - class people. They didn't use those terms, but they did make it perfectly clear.

DR. HINKLE: This is one of the problems of the feeling of people who are aware of the education and the failure to get it. The awareness, I think, goes from the top to the bottom of this society, at least, psychologically, if I could put it in those terms.

DR. STELLER: I remember a case that you are talking about. Perhaps, I could mention one thing and that is the very extreme statement - there are many variables which have to be considered in a number of groups. Some groups have been taught that they have the right to think that the country is theirs and that they have to have opportunities and possibilities.

There are various groups that enter into it. Another group who have been told for ten years a certain something, a group of class aliens also is a very movable one and then there is a small group -- we have this group. The third group who dictated was a government group and were anxious to dictate to the other groups. These two groups had very different lives. They were so-called class alien groups and tried to maintain a certain dignity.

But, I still want to say that, although they tried to belong to the old force and to the old groups, their thinking has been transformed.

This especially applies to the younger generation. The older people, I think most of them who have been interviewed - I remember a few, are the people over thirty-five. The ones between thirty-five and forty are not so quickly transformed. But the younger group under thirty - when you meet them, have perfect manners - some of them don't have a class alien group. I remember a few.

You think nothing changes, and then, suddenly, they say something when you start talking to them and you realize that this something is very different. This is a new generation.

They come from a classless society, although they kiss your hand, with perfect manners of the old regime; they tell you that they resented the

DR. STELLER: things that were taken away, and eventually when you get through talking to them, you realize that they are a rather typical classless society.

DR. SCHULMAN: I don't think that the two positions are at all in disagreement. I think we are pointing to two different phenomena. One refers to social class differentiation -- the other observes that these people really had a sense of solidarity against the regime and in this sense, experienced a feeling of classlessness.

DR. HINKLE: I will agree with the earlier grounded feelings among the group. Even the more striking thing to me is that among the preferred categories that we have studied - a good deal of their outrage at the regime lies in the fact that the opportunity they thought they were getting for social mobility, they didn't get, and that is why they are so sore. So that they are taking the picture out of the old Hungarian tradition.

DR. WILLIAMS: This is a general conceptual problem which I think has been mentioned and applies to almost everything we have been talking about, that is, what is the town in which you are doing the interviewing and how does this relate to the statements?

Because, if this is ^{at} all like the disaster experience, you will find very important differences among the people immediately after a disaster when social differentiation, for example, has been decreased.

The primary group has the feeling of increase as time goes on and the relations begin to go back to the normal kind of social differentiation.

DR. HINKLE: It also goes into what extent you have gone into this thing. What sort of statements you get. Statements and attitudes are one thing, but if you push ahead a bit, I think, you uncover assumptions that are

DR. HINKLE: different from superficial statements.

DR. KECSKEMETI: I would like to try to reconcile these statements about the classless society. I agree in that respect that we must distinguish between two things. One, which I hear very frequently among the refugees - that Hungary has become much less of a classless society than it was before and in this respect people have the feeling that it became a classless society. This means, particularly, the old methods of difference from the lower classes to the higher classes have vanished to a very great extent, even though they resume the same titles; the lower classes are the peasants.

On the other hand, it has also been brought out that there is a very great awareness of the distinction between manual work and non-manual work. This also puts people into different feelings, but not the same as it was before.

Another characteristic in discussions is the intense desire of people to have higher education which then would permit them into the area of non-manual work, and that was very extensively desired. The boys and girls themselves made a great effort to get into the non-manual work category. In an amazing number of cases they succeeded. They jumped through this artificial barrier through a very interesting technique they applied.

Anyway this difference has existed and has created importance.

DR. STELLER: I would like to add one more thing. I would like to add one word to what has just been said. In education, in order to make this distinction between manual and non-manual work, they have changed education to the extent where before an apprentice was an apprentice, now an apprentice is called a technician and they have organized a new kind of high school where the students go to a so-called school and work in a work shop.

My last remark would be this, discussing sometimes some of the fundamental issues, and asking how they imagine a re-organization of Hungary would be. We ask them directly or indirectly two questions on the most economic

DR. STELLER: issues. One was (iws) and the other was the nationalization of industries.

Mostly, the politician wouldn't dream of any re-organization whereby they would take back the present land reform. Technically, it would have been difficult to divide the hundreds and thousands of pieces or piece them together. It would be very difficult.

I wanted to ask about the other question, about the nationalization of industries. How they feel about it. The answer would be easy because the industry as a whole has been taken up by the state. It hasn't been divided or handed over to one or two individuals. The answer is "No, that just is not possible."

Then you ask the next question. This is all very good. "Well we believe in competition. We believe in private industry." Invariably, you get one answer. You say in nationalized industries you have to allow people to start in private business. You have to re-organize your credit and see what happens, but that ought to go back to what it was before. Let us just consider what happened. Many of the aspects were bad or disastrous but out of all this disaster there is still some advancement which they don't want to lose. They want to keep it and they don't want to go back in anything. They want to go ahead from there.

DR. WOLFF: Are there any other remarks?

DR. STEPHENSON: I would like to make one remark of this problem on status, in that, a good many of these people have made an instrumental use of this specialization in order to adapt to the regime in Hungary and that is that they would want to be one thing, but they would study to be something else in order to get a good position.

DR. STEPHENSON: There is a good attendance of night school while doing manual labor in order to get some kind of specialization that would give them better status.

Some of these people who really did not identify very thoroughly with their occupations, seemed to have some blurr of the whole of their status conception.

Also, they seemed to make it difficult for us to adjust to their occupations in this country, since their specializations were not of the order of specialization in our own society.

DR. WOLFF: I would like to make a few more remarks, or I would like to hear from some people who have not said anything as yet.

DR. DALLIN: We would like to thank you, Dr. Wolff, for inviting us. It certainly has been very helpful to all of us. We at the Columbia Research group on Hungary are in the fortunate position of being able to use the experience of all of you people here, since we are only now really launching into our work and have reached the pre-testing stage, if you want to call it that, of our instruments.

We want to briefly, concentrate on your statements for interviewing and this is something which I believe none of the others have done. We want to do this for two reasons: one because we assumed that there was a certain selectivity in whatever categories - in the admission of refugees to this or any other country and therefore, it would be desirable to maximize the sources of the groups and their responses.

Particularly, this will be true of Communist party members and others in certain special categories.

Secondly, in this fashion, during the three summer months, we hope to take advantage of people in the academic community who combine their knowledge in doing a lot of interviewing and could spend the next seven months in

DR. DALLIN: Europe, as one team, so to speak, with the different countries.

Our approach is more on the political and social side. It is the problem of not focusing so much on the revolt itself, but the whole process of Soviet position over the past decade, and of changes both in institutional and loyalty profiles of the population. That is the tensions and controls in the Hungarian society.

At present we are making interviews pretty much along the same kind of experience which has been described through the other groups here, in a general stratified sample of the usual sociological and social economic categories, but perhaps more than the other groups, because these are specialized interviews by interviewers who are experts in this field.

Finally, conceivably, there will be a written questionnaire which will be the only one of these three types.

In connection with these plans, I would just like to say that under the terms of the Ford Foundation, we can function more broadly and we would be delighted to have others who are interested, suggest to us, areas of specific problems that they are interested in and that they think we would want to pursue. Any person who could take advantage of our recruitment would be most welcome.

Now, our exchange of information - a further exchange of information would seem to me, very desirable all around to continue some sort of a clearing house function which you have undertaken at present. Whether you want to burden yourselves with that or not, that is for you to decide on.

We would be pleased to participate in it, naturally. It seems to me that this sort of exchange could take on several specific facets, one of which might be the exchange of data.

It is simply an exchange and you would get a whole set of ours and

DR. DALLIN: we would get a whole set of yours and we would use it as we see fit. Of course, each would reserve the possibility of use for publication. I think that is the only restriction and I think on the whole, it might be of mutual advantage to just about every group involved.

At a certain point there will be an exchange of names and addresses perhaps, of some of the refugees which would be used by all. The same person who interviewed might have better material for another group, and there, I think, some form of coordination would be more desirable.

As we advance I suppose some of us may want to get together. Then a more substantial sort of exchange which would be to the benefit of all concerned will be undertaken. We, of course, would like to have a copy of these.

DR. WOLFF: I wanted to ask whether anyone else would like to make any remarks?

MR. CRONIN: I represent the Department of State and the Department of Intelligence. I don't have any contribution to make to this group. Our purpose in coming here today was to observe what other people have been doing and to offer our cooperation on the projects which would fall within our interests.

I should certainly like to thank the Society for inviting us here, and for establishing and personally presenting a very interesting discussion.

I would hesitate to make concrete research suggestions for a variety of reasons and one of them is that I am not a scientist and the other is that I am not a Hungarian specialist.

DR. WOLFF: As a human being, have you any special curiosity?

(laughter)

MR. CRONIN: It appears to me that I would like to apply some of the general techniques that the gentlemen were speaking about this morning. It seems to me that a good many people this morning were speaking of the anatomy

MR. CRONIN: of the revolution; this is a thing, which, of course, concerns us. I think we are a little more interested perhaps, in the physiology of this rather than in the anatomy, since I suspect that we have a fairly good idea of what that is.

We are not, I think, quite so sure as to why it took place. There are certain aspects of the whole thing, we could learn a good deal of. The most obvious one, of course, is the one I have mentioned.

DR. WOLFF: What?

MR. CRONIN: Youth. Another interesting fact which it seems to me that no one has talked about, strangely enough, is the function of women in all this.

We seem to feel that this is a significant thing. The emergence of certain women in the whole revolutionary phase, for a variety of reasons, and this has not been brought up.

There is a difference, I understand, between for instance, women who are not married, women who are married to party members, who are good party members, and women who are married to people who are sort of opportunistic party members. We should have a study on that to find out what the function of the influence was, and all of this sort of thing.

Many of these things which you have mentioned today concern us and I think perhaps the most important thing to me is the actual trigger mechanism in all this. I am not satisfied myself, that I know why this revolution occurred on the date it did, rather than three days before, or a month before or six months before or afterward, and I am too much of a political scientist to believe that this could be done entirely without a plan and I would feel that somewhere, somebody will come up with some answers as to that.

The other thing that I think must eventually concern us is whether

MR. CRONIN: the revolution is endemic in all societies which are associated, or whether there was something special in the Hungarian situation which these studies have not brought out.

Is it possible to recreate the same sort of circumstances in other cultures? Is there something which could be isolated and something which we could talk about?

Certainly -- oh, there are various things. The Workers' Councils, for instance, why did they arise as they did? If this is simply a carry-over from the days of 1948, or some other time, something which is again a part of the revolutionary situation? I don't want to go on posing questions for you.

DR. WOLFF: It is very helpful, if you would.

MR. CRONIN: All of you people here know very much more than I do and I am sure that if they turn their minds to, shall I say, political phenomena, or sociological phenomena, then the same questions will occur to them and will create excellent research studies from all of you.

But simply to say that we will be delighted to see them is putting it mildly.

DR. WOLFF: Is there anyone else who would like to make any comments?

DR. HUTCHINSON: I would just like to say a word or two.

First, to identify myself, I am part of the Air Force office of scientific research which does research in basic and exploratory science for the Air Force and is, or rather has a scientific division, which has physiology and biology on the one half and behavioral sciences on the other half.

As I have listened to the discussion today, I have been impressed with the fact of what you folks have been studying in Hungary. As has been pointed out by Harry Williams, some of these things should be studied rather specifically. I suppose I should mention that I am related to a regimented society within our society, the military.

DR. HUTCHINSON: I see certain analogies again, which are probably things that I should not dwell on, but the middle class American value system seems to be making it increasingly less attractive for our youth, to put themselves in the system.

Now, I get the feeling that if we understand human behavior within any given system, or within any given context, we will have a better basis of understanding for others and it is then, with this idea of moving toward generalities of knowledge, that our office tends to make this small contribution. Therefore, while we are not soliciting proposals and would be embarrassed anyway if we got very many of them, we would like to know what is, or what are the basic scientific requirements in the area in which people are dealing.

What are the things which can be studied perhaps in U. S. populations in terms of the characteristics of people which are common human characteristics, rather than distinctively Hungarian characteristics. What is it that makes it possible for us here to talk about Hungary and to emphasize with these people --- this individual might have been there and yet the concepts here seem to be quite meaningful and it seems to me that there is a place for basic research on human behavior, which will make it possible to understand some of the difficult questions of why something has taken place at a given time.

We now use the terms "Historical Accident" or "Unique Set of Circumstances." This perhaps is a cover of the state that we are in and sometime in the future we will be able to do something about it.

I think I have said too much for someone who has nothing to say and I think I will stop right here.

DR. ALPERT: I think I will take the alternative and say nothing. I want to thank the Society for the opportunity to be here.

I came here largely to find out what human ecology is. We have a

DR. ALPERT: program at the National Science Foundation which includes human ecology and I welcomed this opportunity to learn how the concept is utilized on this particular thing.

DR. BAUERS: There is nothing I would like to say beyond what has been said already.

We would like to say though, that we hope that other groups will be able to pursue what is our main object, that is communications research, particularly with such matters as the Hungarian situation.

DR. WOLFF: Have you anything to add?

DR. KRADER: I have been here more as -- an observer than anything else. Possibly, because of my experience behind the Iron Curtain - I was able to observe some rather intimate reflexes of the Hungarian revolution in Moscow and Leningrad and other parts of the Soviet Union and I have been able to clarify in my own mind, some basis of subsequent readings and experience.

Perhaps my heightened understanding of what it was that I saw may be of help to others.

DR. WOLFF: Are there any other general comments?

DR. THETFORD: I would like to make a brief psychological observation on what may be part of the psychology of the revolution of this pattern of emotional insecurity and what was talked about before.

We have found psychological patterns of this type among many Americans who display their hostility at the sight of emotional outbursts and I would think that if this group at all, is representative of the people who did participate in the revolution, that they would be psychologically prepared for generating this hostility when the appropriate moment occurred.

DR. WOLFF: Can I ask you for any recognized earmarks on this, that can be seen outside and also, do you have to sit down with these people to

DR. WOLFF: identify these hostilities? Is there any way of seeing the person in a social sense -- could you extrapolate from your experiences -- tell us about this from your experiences?

DR. THETFORD: Of course, I am not a sociologist and I shouldn't go into someone else's domain, but I think the people who experience a great deal of resentment and are attempting to control an expression of this are apt to withdraw to some extent from active personal participation because the more apt they may be to express directly this hostility in some fashion, I would think that one of the things that one might observe socially would be this pattern of increased self-containment and so on.

DR. SCHULMAN: I would make one comment. We have had only one reaction to this type of psychological experience and certainly our data suggests that some of the people we have seen have been engaged in other kinds of activities which is something that one has to be very curious about.

DR. WOLFF: Is there any experience from the study of this? Anything that would eliminate or open up questions - anybody here that can say anything about that?

DR. WILLIAMS: Thinking about the studies of disasters in peacetime societies, this thought came to me. A factor of this kind is a very different kind of a situation in a very important way.

For one thing a person in a disaster is fighting against nature in his survival, and not against the method in which he is trying to do things in a society -- I think this is a very crucial difference.

Perhaps this suggests that if we would find similarities in the reaction responses to some of the elements of these situations, this might help greatly and the thing that was suggested has to do with this.

DR. WILLIAMS: It seems to me the most useful way in which this really could be studied is what I have already mentioned.

DR. WOLFF: To put it in another way, this would indicate that a revolution is likely to spread rather than burn out.

Is there any other comment?

DR. STEPHENSON: You mentioned riots in prison. One of the interesting things about prison riots is that they do not necessarily occur in prisons where conditions are the worst, but they are apt to occur where prisoners' expectations are set higher than the reality of the prison situation.

I think that perhaps this is why the workers, for example, were the most vehement of the group.

Also, another crucial problem is the informal organization of the prisoners, which is always maintained among the prisoners in opposition to the staff, and it is virtually impossible for the authorities to do anything about it.

This informal organization is continually maintained against the authorities and may have parallel in the situation of the informal relationships among the population in a state dominated by a totalitarian regime.

DR. WOLFF: The better off you are the more you expect and the more likely you are to explode if your expectations are not realized.

DR. STEPHENSON: Yes, and also, there is a pattern of what we call pseudo-alienations. For example, education is opened for the peasants and they may set all sorts of expectations that are unrealistic in terms of their capacities. Even in the United States they couldn't realize them because of lack of capacity. They may aspire to be doctors, but they can't be doctors just because they think they should be doctors.

DR. WOLFF: Is there anyone else who has any information on this?

DR. WOLFF: Anything from the State Department or the other departments? We have very little on that point.

I am not quite sure whether if one action was undertaken, that it went into full operation and then it organized the revolution to the extent that it went.

DR. SCHULMAN: Well, a single respondent stated that members of his group certainly didn't attempt to steer the revolution, of course. This may be simply a plan for the group.

I think it might be wise, as a reminder, for those of us who are continuing interviewing these people, that this was supposed to have developed among the political prisoners of war --

DR. WOLFF: One of the deficiencies in this conference, it seems to me, is that there is a failure to recognize a point to define the differences in the attitude and experience and feelings of those who left and those who stayed behind.

I think that -- at least I haven't come away with a clear idea about that.

DR. SCHULMAN: How would one go ahead on finding out about this? Should we ask our respondents about what they think about that. If we did ask them that, we could also ask them what they think -- what they back home, think of them.

DR. WOLFF: We don't have the answer to that.

DR. STEPHENSON: I think we have had some suggestions that might be fruitful if they were put into effect. That is, we may find that in a large percentage of the leavers there were people who were marginal in one respect or another. They have their roots set less deep. Also, certainly, there are situational things, such as distance from the border, presence of small children in the family, opportunity to leave, conflict within the

DR. STEPHENSON: family, and the like.

DR. RILEY: It is my hope that we will have some work on that. That is certainly one of my objectives.

DR. SCHEIN: I have two general statements.

DR. WOLFF: We have one minute left of this conference.

DR. SCHEIN: I have not heard anyone use the word "follow-up." Are there any plans at all for attempting some of the very distant points raised about potential adjustments, the problem of reorienting class status? There is a whole host of questions it seems to me that one could raise with respect to how these people will adjust in this society.

DR. WOLFF: May I ask you how you expect these people will adjust to this society?

DR. SCHEIN: Well, I am thinking about it but that is about the extent of it.

A second question is simply the opportunity to find out in this group, something in the way the content of Communist propaganda is assimilated, evaluated and rejected?

We know some of the documents, for example, which the Chinese got from American prisoners of war. Some of these found their way to Hungary and were used by the Communists there, they were evaluated and rejected. I think we need to know more about the mechanisms by which the Hungarians evaluated materials of this sort.

DR. WOLFF: Are there any other questions or general comments?

MR. MASSING: My name is Massing and I belong to Rutgers and I just came from Germany.

I would like to make one remark and it is modulated by the fact that it seems to me that we have always investigations on events that have occurred.

MR. MASSING: In other words, all this investigating so far, has been rather weak, shall we say on the prediction side.

Nobody predicted the uprising in Hungary or in Berlin and it occurs to me that since we find ourselves now in the reverse situation, that we might look at what they have used as a means of assessing the revolutionary situation.

Of course, we have to reinforce and elaborate it. This is actually the problem of revolutionary leadership - the industrial workers, the rise to various levels of class consciousness. There is the party that must have the reservoir of leadership and experience.

However, if you look more closely at this scheme, it brings then the same difficulties we are faced with. Or, let us say, the question of what is a revolutionary situation and how can the party work with the masses? This problem comes up repeatedly today and the only instances that I know of, of revolutionary organizations, were that they are the only ones of the central committee who pleaded that the revolution had to take place and it had to take place within the next twenty four hours.

This, this one exception, I know of none other which would have the organized revolutionary forces in the masses and this has always the problem of Communist revolution strategy. Are we ahead or are we back of the masses?

Such controversies have been in back of the regimentation of the revolution of the masses of let us say intellectuals, deviationists and so on. They all have the same problem.

The timing, linking together with the so-called revolutionary masses. Now in Hungary too, there was organized resistance and it was really kind of embarrassing when the thing really started.

I think it has been called a mystery. What is the X in this situation that we are certainly all interested in?

MR. MASSING: Undoubtedly, the sudden awareness that you are no longer and that you are no longer an isolationist and that you are with everybody else, gives an enormous release to pent up frustrations. However, if you look more closely you would always find that those who actually initiated revolutionary actions did not mean to do so.

The workers that went on strike in Berlin in June of '53 had no idea of the repercussions of their actions. I think the workers did not know what it meant to their regime and I just am very much intrigued with the Hungarians who participated, whether they were aware of the consequence of their reactions. They probably were not.

So, one difficulty - and I have no answer to that - is this, that the people whom we could interview today are different from those who were in the revolutionary situation. I have seen this in Germany time and again.

It is not cowardice or fear. When we talk about the experience of the Nazis, they cannot explain why they became Nazis. It is on the level, a very thin rationalization and if we could probe it, with this dimension or into this dimension where a man does a thing in a certain situation and becomes re-enforced by those around him, we would come closer to our objective.

DR. WOLFF: I want to tell you that you have cocktails waiting for you and also to express my great gratitude to you all for coming and saying what you did.

This meeting is closed.

(Whereupon this meeting closed.)