The Political Reliability of the US

Most of these respondents discuss the reliability of the United States in terms of adherence to a policy of active opposition to Communism. For these refugees, the real measure of American dependability is whether or not the US can be relied upon to liberate the satellite countries and destroy the power of the Communists once and for all.

From this point of view, almost all of the respondents consider the United States trustworthy. As the table below indicates, only a very few individuals feel they cannot count upon the United States to liberate Hungary. For the rest, most of those who expressed an opinion on this question are fairly sure that the US will not waver in its determination to wipe Communism from the face of the earth (Hungary, by implication, included). They do not necessarily believe, however, that US interest in defeating Communism springs from altruistic or disinterested motives. On the contrary, a number of people feel that self-interest plays an important part in shaping American policy in this direction, and that the liberation of countries under the thumb of the Communists would be for them a fortunate by-product of the working-out of this self-interest. Needless to say, their own hopes for liberation via the intervention of the US are involved in this estimate of America's reliability.
The US can be relied on: she is intrinsically trustworthy. 
37%
The US can be relied on: the threat of Communism compels her to act against Russia. 
17
The US must be relied on: she is the last hope of Hungary. 
9
The US cannot be relied on: she seeks only her own self-interest. 
3
Other. 
10
No opinion. 
16
Not ascertainable
8
Total Cases (100%) = (100)

* Originally, the question on reliability was worded as follows: "Among whom do you think loyalty to one's friends is more admired, among the Hungarians or among the Americans?" The follow-up questions for probing were: "Do you think that on the whole Hungarians tend to be more firm and steadfast than Americans? That once they make up their minds about something they are more likely to stick to that course?" The purpose of this question was to investigate attitudes regarding the constancy of Americans as a national group — the possibility that Americans might be the friends of the Hungarians one day and of the Russians the next. The formulation had been adopted in the thought that a more direct wording about American reliability would elicit responses aimed at pleasing the interviewer and would not accurately reflect the respondents' real attitudes on this point.

After the first 5 or 10 interviews were completed, however, it was found that respondents tended to answer the question entirely in terms of their conception regarding relations between and among individual Americans as compared with interpersonal relations among Hungarians, by-passing entirely the question of American foreign policy. For this reason, the question was reformulated and respondents were asked whether they had heard it said that "we (Hungarians) can't depend upon the Americans," and how they themselves felt about that idea. This phrasing was much more felicitous in terms of elicitng responses regarding US policy.

Most of the responses in the "Not ascertainable" category represent cases where the question was asked in its original form.
In all, 63 of these respondents were firmly convinced that the US can be counted on to follow through on its anti-Communist policy and bring about the liberation of Hungary. They differ, however, as to their reasons for relying on the US to this extent.

More than half of this group (37 per cent of the entire sample) base their faith in the dependability of the US as an opponent of Communism on the ground that the US is intrinsically trustworthy. In this connection they point to the fact that the United States traditionally stands for freedom and respect of the individual; they claim that the US has always shown an interest in helping less fortunate peoples; and they say that her whole history is proof of America's adherence to a combination of these attitudes -- that America could never have progressed with such amazing strides without these values as guiding principles. Not every single one of the respondents in this group mentioned each of these points of course; some selected one, some another. In every case, however, there was a clearly stated belief in the good intentions of the US -- intentions which exceeded mere self-interest and which were solidly built into the structure of American foreign policy.

Americans not only assist their own countrymen, but they feel obliged to help the members of other nations, in accordance with the American tradition (the idea of freedom and responsibility for other human beings). This is also the basic idea of US (foreign) policy. Their policy is also characterised by persistence and unobtrusiveness. History shows the same thing in the fields of technical development, economics and culture. If the USA had missed all that, they would never have been able to accomplish the tremendous development.

(07/315)

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I never heard this about the Americans or about the US either (that they are undependable). I can explain the great progress America has made as being due to the fact that people helped one another and all moved in a direction which led to a golden age that has made life for people in the US more and more fascinating. I never heard, and I cannot imagine, that the US would not apply in its international life and dealings with other nations the same principles which brought it prosperity. (03/10)

A few of the people in this group point out that along with her traditional interest in freedom, the US has an economic interest in a free Europe:

In the past, Hungarians viewed the friendship of the US and Russia not without bitterness. The obvious explanation was that the Americans at that time were not sufficiently acquainted with Bolshevism. Now they know what it is and it is inconceivable that after recognising its nature, they should sidestep the persistent, unyielding fight against it. Along with devotion to the traditional ideal of freedom, the US in this (fight) is also led by a healthy business interest which considers it impossible for Bolshevism constantly to threaten the material welfare of Americans, making the results of their work uncertain; in fact, entirely destroying them. (03/6/11)

As the respondent quoted above intimates, the alliance of the United States with the Soviet Union during World War II puts an obstacle in the way of cut-and-dry trust of the United States. Face to face with this fact, however, respondents tend to rationalise it in one of two ways. Either they say that such an alliance was politically and/or militarily expedient for the US during World War II, or they charge it up to political naivete on the part of the United States. In both cases, however, the belief that the US has its heart in the right place is the conviction which enables the respondents to dismiss America's previous deviation.

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from the path of anti-Communism. These patterns of rationalization are illustrated by what the following respondents said:

American policy and the individual American adhere firmly to the three pillars I mentioned (freedom, respect for the individual and self-interest). The apparent contradictions in American policy are due to the modifications and other changes in external circumstances which make them (the Americans) see the basic structure of American policy threatened at a given moment. That explains the fact that in World War II, the US regarded the Soviet Union as an ally in the mortal struggle for the freedom of the world and the dignity and self-respect of all men, while now it regards the Soviet Union as an enemy and recognizes the Soviet Union means a mortal threat to those same values. (093/26)

In World War II, the US wanted to crush the Hitler dictatorship, together with the Russians. It (America) did not know the Russians well enough, and it hoped that with the victory over the Germans, the freedom of small nations could be restored. They did not expect the Russians would stretch out their arms, like an octopus, to crush the freedom of the peoples. Now it (the US) recognizes the real face of the Bolsheviks, and is fighting against them for the freedom of the peoples. Accordingly, there is no inconsistency in their attitude. President Roosevelt especially believed in the Russians. His son wrote in the book The Way My Father Saw It (As He Saw It by Elliot Roosevelt) that his father planned to establish a huge, flourishing distilling enterprise himself in the Soviet Union after the war. Today, every American would think that such a possibility could not even be imagined. (054/20)

A number of the people who evince unconditional faith in the reliability of America find confirmation for their position in the behavior of the US in the Cold War. They refer to things which the US has done to assist Hungary and other nations similarly situated. One respondent, for example, said that if the Americans were dependable,
then "the great number of people who escape wouldn't be accepted in
the American Zone." (051/9) Another mentioned "the gift parcels sent
to Hungarians and other European peoples, the sending of which was
stopped by the Communists . . . (which) proved that the Americans were
persistent in aiding people who, in their opinion, need it. It was not
their (the Americans') fault that they could not continue the aid."
(100/7) And still others spoke more generally of US behavior on the
world scene:

I did not hear about this (that Hungary cannot
depend upon the Americans), and what is generally
known is exactly the opposite of this. I did not
ever hear that this was suspected. Everybody waits
for aid for liberation primarily from America.
. . . Everybody sincerely believes she would really
help us. You can draw this conclusion from the tone
of the radio broadcasts. They used firm language
with the Russians, they protested against the de-
portations, they sent material aid in the first
(post-war) years, and they offered a loan. (051/11)

In my opinion, the US is sticking steadfastly to
its aims. Accordingly, it is fighting consistently
under the Atlantic Pact to stop Communism. The
Marshall Plan also shows the consistency of
American generosity, in trying to further humane
living conditions. (087/16)

A considerably smaller group of people (17 per cent of the sample)
believe that the US will remain uncompromising in its anti-Communist stand,
not out of any idealistic desire to liberate oppressed people, but simply
because Communism represents a tangible threat to its own welfare. Thus,
they state that Communism is just as much a menace to the US as it
has been to other nations, or that the conflicting interests and values
of the US and the USSR are too great ever to be reconciled, and they be-
lieve or hope that the views of the US coincide with their own on this
point.
I haven't heard anything like this (that Hungarians cannot depend upon America). The Hungarians know that America likes freedom and will make it secure in distant lands to protect her own country. America will not wait until the Soviet danger reaches her own shores. This is the right policy from the American point of view, and if they proceed farther along these lines, they would also help the Hungarians by it. Because if the Americans made their own freedom secure in countries outside the American area, they would restore the freedom of the peoples who live in these countries. America could not allow herself to make modifications in this policy because if she did, she would ruin herself. It's out of the question that America should share the world with the Soviet Union. This would be impossible because the Soviet Union wants to rule the world alone. Even if it agreed momentarily, later on the Soviet Union would also attack America. (076/19)

Unlike the people who sought for ways in which to support their belief that the US would remain upholding in its anti-Communist position, a small group of respondents (9 per cent) attest to the reliability of the US simply because they cannot imagine any other way out for themselves except American intervention and refuse to accept the bleak alternative that the US will fail to respond to their need. They seem to hang their hopes on nothing more concrete than their own deep-felt need and the knowledge that America represents the only earthly power which can effectively oppose Soviet might. They appear not even to have considered at any time the possibility that the US might let them down:

People wouldn't even dare to say this back home because they have all their hopes in America. And they also trust her (America) to the end. (01/3/12)

The simple people in Hungary never said that (that Americans are not dependable). They expect their liberation from the Americans: whom else could they trust when they got to know the Russians so well? (076/15)
It is perhaps understandable that the individuals in this group were all people with little education. None of them had advanced beyond elementary school.

Only 3 of the 100 Hungarians in the sample agreed with the statement "We cannot depend upon the Americans." It is not that the United States is not steadfast in its principles that troubles these people. Rather, they believe that the United States is only too true to the single principle of self-interest. As they see it, America is out for itself, and as long as that is so, Hungary cannot look to America for liberation.

This point of view was stated quite explicitly by a 32 year-old skilled worker with commercial school training whose preferred foreign station is Radio Paris. He made it clear that he thought the US was motivated only by self-interest and that this self-interest did not encompass concern with the fate of Hungary:

If I designed . . . a new coat of arms for the US, I would put a merchant's scales on top of the star-spangled banner. By this I mean that the Americans in one word are businessmen. When their own interest is not involved, they are lukewarm, as you can see by the example of Hungary. They needed Greece, so they solved the problem there. They needed the country for strategic reasons, therefore they defeated the Communists. Take, for example, Albania. Mussolini's troops occupied it in one day. The Italian is the worst soldier on earth, therefore it would be child's play for the Americans to do the same. But they leave Albania to her own fate because they have no need for her. (095/1h)

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A 25-year-old clerk who never listened to foreign broadcasts while in Hungary, was less emphatic. His thinking on the subject of US motives is indeed rather confused. He himself can see no reason why the Americans should concern themselves with Hungary from the point of view of their own self-interest; yet he mentions that the US has attempted to help the satellite countries in the past few years. What seems to clinch his doubts about US reliability is the fact that the US has not already marched against the Communists in Europe. In the course of the interview, he raised this problem a number of times. In part, what he said on the subject was:

I don't understand why the West should bother with the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It's obvious that the US gives a good deal of consideration to these countries; nevertheless, you can't be sure what the reason for it is. Is it mercenary interest, or interest in the liberation of the oppressed people? . . . The main question is, whether they want to liberate the countries behind the Iron Curtain, or not. If yes, then in what way? You cannot ask when, but you can ask whether they really want the liberation. Or do they want to see these countries definitely perish? . . . People said . . . that we have had only promises up to now. . . . It is possible that if things go on as they are now, Hungarians will stop thinking about liberation and resign themselves to their fate. . . . America won't start a war because of Hungary. She won't even do it in the interest of other countries behind the Iron Curtain. If America wanted this, she ought to have started a war 3 years ago. America would begin a war if it were also in her interest. But the danger has not reached the US for the time being. (060/6, 7, 14)

The third member of this group, a 33-year-old man with university training in economics whose favorite foreign station is HFE, also maintains that the US acts only with its own interests in mind, but goes on to point out that America's conception of its self-interest is too

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narrow; that its failure to regard Hungary as important reflects a mistaken evaluation and oversimplified analysis of the world situation:

History proves that America is steadfast, egoistically. Her intervention in both world wars was aimed at securing economic and political advantages. From this point of view, the US has always chosen and evaluated its allies correctly. The US never changes its direction, but on the road towards achieving its unchanged goals, it is able to make a complete turn. That was proved recently by the American policy towards France. No favorable effects for Hungary can be expected from this because America is not familiar with the Central European problem. . . . On the Western peripheries of its sphere of power the Soviet Union was able to localize every political action aimed against it. . . . This (America's lack of understanding) is also proved by the present status of the Polish problem, by the abandonment of the Baltic States, and by the failure to devote interest to Ukrainian nationalist strivings. The US also does not comprehend that the Iranian oil fields have something to do with the political structure of Europe, and vice versa. (092/26)

It is difficult to determine precisely what factors in their backgrounds or personalities account for the fact that these 3 people, unlike the other Hungarians interviewed, feel that the US is more or less indifferent to the fate of Hungary. Their statements are significant, however, from several points of view: they indicate (a) the grounds on which distrust of US reliability takes root; (b) the type of behavior on the part of the US which supports this view; and, as a consequence, (c) the arguments which might be used to combat the resulting defeatism.

While these 3 cases have been discussed at considerable length for what light they might throw on negative attitudes regarding the trustworthiness of the US, it should be kept in mind that most respondents were not troubled by the misgivings that beset this tiny minority. On the contrary, the majority of the respondents were confident that the US
will not waver from its opposition to Communism wherever Communism may occur. The fact that the US can be depended upon to be firmly anti-Communist, however, is not entirely the same thing as depending upon the American armies to take up the march in the near future, and some respondents appear to make this distinction, although in different contexts.

It has already been pointed out in the sections dealing with the hope contained in the VOA broadcasts and the credibility of these broadcasts that some respondents stated that they were losing hope because they had been promised liberation too long without being given any concrete signs of this liberation's near approach. Loss of hope of this kind appears to have led to discouragement and to some distrust of the VOA's messages of hope, but it has apparently not yet led to distrust of the ultimate dependability of the United States. That so little of the latter feeling was evident in the responses discussed in the present section may be due to the fact that, although respondents may from time to time have felt that the US was not moving swiftly enough against the Russians, they cannot afford to relinquish their hopes in the US as the liberator.

However, since the interviews indicate that when hopes are shaken, some disillusionment does creep in, the possibility exists that if this process continues without check over a long period of time, the loss of hope may become great enough to arouse doubts about the real intentions of the United States.*

* A further discussion of the process of disillusionment is contained in the next chapter.
Is America Seeking to Dominate the World?

Few respondents believe that America is actively seeking to extend her political dominion throughout the world, yet there is little question in their minds that the US is inexorably approaching a position of world dominance. In the general anticipation of the downfall of Soviet power, it is assumed that the US will eventually take over or have thrust upon her the leadership of the world. What is more, the prospect of a world dominated by the US is considered extremely attractive by almost all of these respondents.

The table below summarizes the reaction of the respondents to the statement: "The Americans are seeking world domination; they have ambitions to rule the world." As is readily visible, very few of these Hungarians accept the idea that the United States actively wants to become the dominant power of the world. Most of those who expressed an opinion on this point believe that the US, whatever else she may be seeking, is not out to rule the earth.

**Table 11**

**AMERICAN DESIRE TO DOMINATE THE WORLD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US seeks neither economic nor political domination</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US seeks economic advantages, but does not seek political domination</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US seeks to dominate the world both economically and politically</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 21 people in this group are classified "No opinion" for rather different reasons, which are enumerated below.* (Footnote continued on following page)

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The largest number of respondents (3 out of 5) completely reject the idea that the US seeks to dominate the world either politically or economically. According to these refugees, the US is interested primarily in one thing: that is, in ridding the world of Communism so that people everywhere may live in freedom. This theme appeared over and over again in the remarks of the respondents; it came from men and women in all walks of life and from all educational backgrounds. Here, for example, is the comment of a young woman high-school graduate who had worked as a researcher in an experimental laboratory:

I didn’t hear this (that the Americans are seeking to dominate the world), and it isn’t true either. America strives only for the liberation of the countries which are under Communist occupation. She also wants to liberate the Russian people themselves. But this doesn’t mean that America wants to rule them. (079/12)

and a young waiter and farm helper with very little formal education had this to say:

The Communists say this (that the Americans are seeking world domination). The truth is that the US does not want to gain world domination, but wants to crush Communism and liberate the peoples under Communist rule. (059/13)

*(Footnote continued from preceding page)*

12 people were not asked the question on US world ambitions because this question did not appear in the early version of the questionnaire;

4 people said they did not know whether or not the US wants to dominate the world; 2 of them, however, said they looked forward to an American occupation of Hungary;

5 people did not react at all to the statement regarding American desire for world domination, but all of them thought that it would be a good thing if the US did rule the world or occupied Hungary.

21 Total
Most of the people in this group gave no indication of what it is that the US has done or is doing that leads them to believe she is not interested in dominating the world. About one-third of them, however, did spontaneously mention evidence in support of their opinion. One thing which apparently serves to reassure them about the intentions of the US is that America made no moves in the direction of extending her power immediately after World War II when, according to these respondents, she was in an excellent position to do so:

I heard about this (that the Americans are seeking world domination) at a Communist meeting. I don’t believe it is true. If Americans had tried it, they wouldn’t have stopped the war after the defeat of Germany. At that time America was strong enough to realize world power ambitions if it had had any. (011/17)

Some respondents believe that America even now could easily succeed in an armed imperialist campaign, and the fact that she does not attempt one is taken as proof that she has no imperialist aims:

The US recognizes Soviet oppression very well. Against this oppression they will help people, but the US does not wish to oppress any country. If the US had world ambitions, it would not be a great problem for them to conquer the whole world with their planes and their mechanized army. (069/9)

A few other people mentioned in this connection what they had heard about US treatment of Occupied Germany. The contrast was drawn between the regulation of life in this country and that in the Russian Zone. The difference was considered symptomatic of the benevolent intentions of the US:

This (that the Americans are seeking world domination) is only a Communist slogan. They say this without any explanation and they are not able to support this statement. . . . We
do not see any sign of this in Western Germany where the Americans could be the masters. The American attitude in Germany should be compared with (the situation in) the Soviet Zone. (051/11)

The respondent just quoted as well as a number of others took as another sign of the altruistic intentions of the US, insofar as the future of Europe is concerned, American interest in seeing the development of a United States of Europe. To them, this indicates a sincere desire to help Europe become independent and strong, rather than to exploit it in any way.

If the Americans had such ideas (i.e., wanted to dominate the world), they would not try to persuade Europe to gather into a strong and independent European Union. (051/11)

In my estimation, America does not strive for world domination like Soviet Russia (does). If America wanted that, then it would not have stopped in the last war. In the second place, it would not urge Europe to unite. I heard it on the radio that America does not want to rule in Europe; all it wants is a United States of Europe. (075/11)

The implicit trust which these respondents have in the intentions of the US is even more strikingly demonstrated by the fact that many of them went on to express the hope that the US would occupy Hungary after the war of liberation and by what they said about this projected occupation. Their expectations along these lines indicate that they feel there is nothing to fear and everything to gain from an American occupation and from American ascendancy on the world scene generally.

Briefly, most of these respondents visualize the American occupation of Hungary as a temporary measure, necessary to restore order, to stamp out the last remnants of the Communist regime, and to guide the
Hungarians through the transition period of establishing a democratic government. There is not the shadow of a doubt regarding the possibility of ulterior motives on the part of the US, and the respondents look forward with complete assurance to the eventual withdrawal of US forces once Hungary is on her feet again.

Actually, respondents had a good deal to say about the relationship between Hungary and the United States in the post-liberation period. It is not necessary to reproduce here all the variations in emphasis and detail that were expressed in this connection. The few comments presented below suffice to give the flavor of their remarks, and to bring home to the reader the point that there is no trace of fear that the US wants to take over Hungary on a permanent basis, or exploit her in any fashion whatsoever:

This (that the Americans are seeking world domination) is a Communist charge, too. The US wants real democracy and freedom to prevail everywhere, and if it cannot achieve this goal at the conference table, then it will be ready to settle the account with Bolshevism through war. It does not want, however, to force its way of life either on nations outside the Iron Curtain or on those that are to be liberated. Even less does the US want to bring them under its rule. Should the Peoples' Democracies of Central or Eastern Europe come under American occupation after their liberation from Bolshevism, this would be regarded with joy by everybody in those countries, except the Communists. US intervention would be necessary for some time to combat the lurking Communist resistance, but as soon as free government becomes consolidated, the US should leave the liberated countries to succeed on their own. These (free governments) would probably strive for free life based on mutual understanding within the framework of some sort of European union. According to my experience, the vast masses of people back home are yearning for this. I am convinced that the US considers its task in the same light. (03/21)
It is the Soviet Union that strives for world domination, regardless of similar Communist accusations against the US. The nations of Europe themselves want a United Europe, (a union) like the US, without any pressure being exerted on them by the US. The role of the US in this connection is only advisory and propagandistic (i.e., conducting propaganda for a United Europe) and, in my opinion, it is not striving for anything else. It wants to let the European government be free. The Hungarians want American, rather than Russian, occupation. The Hungarians need help to get on their feet after the fall of the Communist regime. It would be necessary for the US to grant that help. American leadership should prevail even in the formation of a Hungarian government, as well as in the maintenance of order in the early part of the post-Communist period. The Hungarians would like to live an independent life, however, as soon as the situation becomes orderly and secure enough. That is the general wish of all peoples (behind the Iron Curtain). I don't think the US would want anything different. (06/6/13)

The US doesn't interfere with the internal affairs of other nations. . . . The colonial age is past history and nations with cultural and historical tradition cannot be exploited. The US knows this and it doesn't want to exploit other nations. . . . I think the US will have a great share in breaking Communist rule in Hungary. It will occupy the country. The Hungarians want American occupation to last until peace and order are restored throughout the country. Afterwards, the Hungarians should be free to choose their own government. I am sure that American capital will flow into Hungary and will draw good profits from Hungarian production. This will be good for Hungary because a war-damaged nation cannot stand on its own feet without foreign help. The economic boom called forth by American capital investments will secure a high standard of living for many a Hungarian. American economic influence will be felt even if the country remains sovereign. (08/5/10-11)

Thus, the majority of these Hungarians have no trepidations about US intervention in their domestic affairs. Even those who anticipate American intervention in the economic life of Hungary are inclined to see
the resulting profits as mutually beneficial. As far as these people are concerned, then, the US has no imperialistic aims, no desire to exploit other nations, and they believe that whatever she does to help other nations will be done not for self-interested motives, but for humanitarian and idealistic reasons.

In contrast to this majority view of US aims, there is a minority of 10 per cent who, while explicitly denying that the US desires to dominate the world politically, do feel that the US seeks economic advantages for herself. A few of these people indicate that they think the US wants to control world markets, but most of them think that all the US really wants is to be able to trade freely with other countries, and to be assured of markets for her products. The remarks quoted below illustrate these two points of view:

I heard this from Communists and non-Communists (that the Americans are seeking world domination). In my opinion, America does not strive for world power. She doesn't force her politics and internal political system on other countries. America's ambition is to have the world market in her control.

(095/16)

... The US has no such purpose. The Soviet Union would like to conquer the world. They want to spread their own ideology, Communism, all over the world. The Americans don't want anything like this. They don't want to spread the capitalist ideas all over the world. They only would like economic life to be free within and among all the nations of the world. America wants to be able to trade freely and in a friendly way with all nations of the world.

(089/15)

As indicated in the comments just presented, these respondents feel that the economic goals of the US do not threaten the liberty of other nations. More than that, respondents see positive values accruing to other countries from the economic activities of the US. They feel that
wherever the US trades, living standards are raised, and that Hungary, and Europe generally, stand only to profit from such economic domination as the US might enjoy:

I heard about this (that the Americans are seeking world domination). I think that world rule by the US is good for other nations too because it means that American goods can get everywhere and, in exchange, the surplus is sent to the US from other places through free trading. This improves life in every country. People get the things they are missing, and many workers can be employed by having them work for exports. Hungary would only profit from it too. The US is not striving for the occupation of other countries. It does not want kolkhozes, but a healthy relationship with these countries. (065/10)

The distinction, then, between these 10 respondents and the majority previously discussed is that they assume economic self-interest to be the dominant motive behind US activities on the world scene. No more than other respondents, however, do these people feel they have anything to fear from the US. In their opinion, the US will never interfere with the rights of small nations.

Only 1 respondent appeared to agree with the statement that the US is seeking world domination. But only 1 of these people, a university-educated man in his thirties, indicated he thought the US is actively seeking domination. He said that "US strivings toward political domination of the world can indubitably be recognized in its present political and economic position." (092/26) The others -- a chimney-sweep, a housewife and a textile worker -- all merely assumed that domination of the world by either the US or the USSR was inevitable, and proceeded to say how much they looked forward to the day when the Americans come to power. In the words of the chimney-sweep:

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I heard this (that the Americans are seeking world domination). People in the village spoke about it. In my opinion, this is a good thing. Not only for me, but for everybody. The people are looking forward with impatience for the Americans to be masters all over the world. It is clear they don't want the Russians (to be). (091/9)

Not one of these respondents anticipates difficulties for Hungary in a world dominated by the US. All of them regard the prospect with high hopes. The housewife and the textile worker even go so far as to concede that it may be necessary for Hungary to give up her sovereignty, but they are confident that such an arrangement would be in the best interests of the Hungarian people. As the latter put it:

The Hungarian people wouldn't mind if the Americans ordered them around when the Russians had been driven out of Hungary. There is but one thing that interests them: to be able to live on their earnings like human beings should live. Nobody would care whether it's the Hungarians who give the orders or not. Before the war, Hungarians gave the orders and look where we got... A strict American Government for the initial 2 to 3 years would be the best solution. I think the population wouldn't have any objections to this... It would be up to the occupying authorities to decide whether the power should be given back to the Hungarians or not. All that will depend upon how the Hungarians behave. If the decision is yes, the power would in any case be given to those who deserve it. If not, then it will really be better not to restore the power to the Hungarians because the people don't want trouble. They just wish for a peaceful, quiet and good life. (090/13)

Even in this extreme case, there is no indication that the respondent believes the US would seek profit from such an arrangement. The implication, indeed, is that the US would take such steps only in the interest of the Hungarian people and not from a desire to exploit the population for its own selfish ends.

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It is obvious, therefore, that the sentiment among these
Hungarians goes in the opposite direction from that propounded by
Communist propaganda. There is no indication that the respondents have
absorbed the idea put forth by the Communists that the US is engaged in
an imperialistic campaign to dominate the world.

At the same time, however, it is equally clear that most re-
spondents assume that the US will achieve a position of preeminence on
the world scene. They believe that there will sooner or later be a
showdown between the US and the USSR and that the victor, preferably
of course the US, will then be all-powerful. They see this happening
to the United States, but they do not believe that the US will abuse that
power. As one of the respondents put it, the US will bear the torch for
freedom and prosperity for the world:

... The USA became a world power in the course
of its development. This power is not abused to
oppress other people, but rather to help them
and to secure freedom for nations and individuals.
Accordingly, the US is fighting a consistent and
persistent war against Communism with other nations
that also see the danger. The USA is destined to
rule the world and to be the torchbearer of culture.
The USA must lead the other nations because of its
cultural superiority. It must teach them and set
an example for them. All this must not be done with
force or terror. It is evident from my explanation
that this will never happen but that they must and
will always respect the freedom of other nations.
Economically, the USA must also lead the other
nations. That means that they must sell their
products everywhere. If this means that some na-
tion will become a colony of the USA, it does not
matter because its economy will be improved. It
would not be necessary to enforce this in Hungary
because most people wish for it. (072/15)

So it is that these respondents come to see the US as their
liberator and their benefactor. They may differ in their views as to
whether purely altruistic motives or economic self-interest will lead the US to liberate the nations under Communist control; but all look forward to the time when Hungary will be under the influence of the United States.

To some extent at least, the expressed enthusiasm for domination by the Americans is consistent with the belief that the world of the future will inevitably be dominated either by the Americans or the Russians. Assuming such a choice, and given their experience under Communist domination, plus their image of America, it is not surprising that the respondents regard the possibility of dominance by the US as a change for the better.

At the same time, however, there is evidence in these interviews that respondents are not merely choosing the lesser of two evils, but that they actively want to find themselves included in the US sphere of influence.

A number of respondents did in fact indicate a reluctance to see the US leave Hungary completely on her own. They tend to look upon the US as a sort of protective big brother. Some of the respondents already quoted evidenced this opinion, and it was clearly the feeling of the 69-year-old laborer who stated:

I never heard that (that the Americans are seeking world domination), only that the Russians want to have the whole of Europe. If the Americans were to occupy Hungary, then we would return to the old conditions as they were before. That would be very good. Hungary is not able to do that. The Hungarians alone are not able to change the situation — they are not capable of doing it. Russia is such a large country and everything is in her hands. Only America is able to change it. If America were not necessary to carry it out, then Tito would long since have overrun Hungary. Tito is not a coward, but he cannot attack Russia alone. I would not care if the Americans stayed
in Hungary for my whole life, honest people, we
could not have any trouble with them. If the
Russians started again, then America would be
the protector of Hungary. (O10/12)

The need for some sort of benevolent guardian was also expressed by a 36-
year-old man who had been trained as a mechanic and who had had rather more
education than the previous respondent. He described the US as having the
single goal of freeing countries from Bolshevism; he believed that “the
American occupation of Hungary would be desirable until tempers have settled”
but thought any sort of occupation beyond that point would be “a
contradiction of the democratic spirit.” In his opinion, “the Hungarian
people are setting on establishing an independent national existence for
themselves after the fall of Communism.” Following immediately on the
heels of the statement just quoted, however, come the admissions “However,
there is a certain feeling of inferiority in the Hungarians. They like to
belong somewhere, despite the existence of well-known chauvinistic slogans
emphasizing Hungarian strivings for independence.” (O60/19) The statement
of a young theological student who expressed a similar view indicates an
historical basis for this attitude. He referred to Hungary’s ideology in
justifying the need for a protective figure in the future:

The role of Hungary in the Danube Basin was always
counterbalancing one. She had to live between
the Slavs and the Germans. The Hungarian people
and Hungarian nation could best assure independent
by not joining either with the Slavs or with the
Germans, but by turning to a power which is not
directly involved in the political life of the
Danube Basin. At the same time they may expect
of this power the extension of effective aid to
the whole area, keeping this either from the Slav
or from the German side would mean a state of embarrassment
for Hungary. This has proved by the past series
of events which may occur to-day in Egypt. In the
event of help to Hungary by the USA, such a thing would not come into consideration. To think this would be an absurdity from the geographic stand-
point too — not to mention the great significance of the traditional American principle of liberty.
(021/35)

In addition to Hungary’s need for protection against the neighbors she has learned to distrust, respondents occasionally expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of the Hungarian people to lead themselves. Thus, one respondent spoke of the need for a guiding hand in the establishment of a democratic government in Hungary:

Great masses of children in Hungary have been corrupted by Bolshevist education; and the misery caused by Communist economic exploitation combined with the drive against private property has corrupted very many of the workers. Thus it will be an extremely difficult task after liberation to lead the country in a healthy direction towards true freedom. The great majority of Hungarians would in no sense regard it as oppression if, after the vanquishing of Bolshevism, the US would continue to occupy Hungary until this aim could be realized. In this field, the US should help Hungarian public life by direct intervention. The same is true of other nations behind the Iron Curtain, including the Soviet Union itself. (036/12)

It might here be mentioned that democracy as such is essentially unfamiliar to the Hungarian people, whose past includes only monarchical and dictatorial forms of government.

In sum, there is in the comments of the respondents something to suggest that much as these Hungarians look forward to freedom from Communism, they do not look forward to an unprotected independence. Practically all of them anticipate to some degree the need for active intervention by the US in the period immediately following liberation; but there are indications that they would not be averse to a more long-run arrangement whereby they would enjoy freedom domestically, under the aegis of the United States.

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Summary

The reaction of these refugees to the statement, "We can't depend upon the Americans," can be summarized as follows: Three out of five profess faith in the reliability of America either because they consider the USA to be altruistically motivated and not likely to turn back on her commitments, or because the pressure of Soviet expansion forces America to move against Russia, or simply because of a need to believe in the power they feel represents their only hope of liberation. The simple urgency of their desire for liberation appears to make it difficult for some to admit the possibility that the US might abandon them indefinitely to Soviet domination.

Even most of those who see US policy as dominated by self-interest have little doubt that their country will eventually find freedom through the assistance of the US. These respondents point out that their own aspirations for liberation coincide with the economic and political goals of America. Only 3 of the 20 people who so characterized US policy felt that from the US point of view self-interest does not demand a free Hungary.

When confronted with the statement "the Americans are seeking world domination; they have ambitions to rule the world," most respondents express disagreement. The majority (61 per cent) insist that the goal of the US is primarily that of ridding the world of Communism, liberating the nations now under Russian control and allowing them to live according to their own inclinations. Ten per cent say that the US may be self-seeking from an economic point of view, but deny flatly that she has any desire to impose her political system on other nations. Only 4 people go along with
the idea that the US seeks to dominate the world both economically and politically, and even they hesitate to say that the US actively wants to become the dominant power of the world.

Furthermore, almost all the respondents anticipate only good from whatever position of dominance they foresee for the United States. Though they look forward to independence after liberation, most of them express the hope that the US will occupy Hungary in the period immediately following that liberation. And there is some indication that it would not be looked upon askance if the US offered herself as the protector of Hungary beyond the immediate post-liberation period.
CHAPTER IV

SOURCES OF IMAGES OF AMERICA

Personal Communication

The disposition to think of America as a country of wealth and opportunity is a long standing one among Hungarians. It dates back to the turn of the century and the great wave of immigration from eastern and southern Europe to the United States. The conception of America that brought these immigrants to this country and the news of their careers in America that they sent to the folks back home is the original and still the primary source of the Hungarians' images of the US. Parents have handed the success stories of relatives and friends on to their children; Hungarians have remained in contact with branches of their families established in America; and mail from more recent emigrants to the US has added to the cumulative effect of this massive flow of interpersonal communication. Thus 81 per cent of the Hungarian respondents mentioned having been exposed to the American dream through this channel, and it is likely that practically all the rest were so exposed.

So pervasive is the belief in a free and abundant America that many respondents cannot put their finger on where they first acquired it. They only know that they have "always heard it this way." As one respondent put it:

What I said about freedom (in America) I didn't learn from VOA but I had always pictured it to myself this way before (I listened to foreign broadcasts). This is the way I always heard about it long ago. (058/12)

IPOR, Inc.
Some respondents mentioned hearing tales from their elders of wealth to be acquired overnight in America. Although they did not necessarily believe that such overwhelming opportunities were still existent, it is clear that the idyllic conception of America as the "land of opportunity" is something that has been with them from childhood.

Older people... said that if a young man like myself went to America, he would go and look for gold, and once he found it he would become rich. I know that this was possible only hundreds of years ago, when there were not so many people and everybody could roam around wherever he wanted to. There must be gold mines now, too, but they are being exploited regularly and peacefully. There is no gold rush anywhere where people would kill each other for it. (02/13)

One Hungarian illustrated the taken-for-grantedness of the American high standard of living with an anecdote about a Communist speaker who, when he wanted to emphasize the economic progress which Hungary would make under the Communists' three-year plan, drew a parallel—unthinkingly and to his own chagrin— with America.

In 1948 or 1949, 55 members of the Jehovah's Witnesses organization held a religious meeting in I*. I attended, too. A Communist agitator had come to the meeting and he urged those present to participate in the elections. He spoke about the 3-year Plan, then in progress. He told us how many new factories would be built, how the entire economic life would progress and the standard of living rise. He concluded his detailed lecture by saying that by the end of the 3-year Plan Hungary would be a little America. We could see that he wanted to take that back. But he had said it and he proved that the Communists were forced to acknowledge the advanced development of America, after all. (08/7/44)

In many instances, respondents had friends or relatives who had emigrated to the United States and with whom they still corresponded.

FPOR, Inc.
Others had shared the bounty of the US through mail and parcels received by their neighbors. A few quotations will illustrate the impact of this flow of mails.

People see a clear denial of the supposed American misery in the letters and parcels they receive from friends and relatives in the US. The parson in our village received parcels from his aunt and uncle in the US almost every two weeks, even recently. They sent him a winter coat and another overcoat, excellent material for a cassock, and they also sent a lot of clothes for his sister’s daughter. The parson was even able to give away a lot of presents from the American parcels. I got some of it myself. A gardener who had many children and others also often received parcels recently. Most of the time the letters which came to the village from America had money in them. People always used to talk in the village about these valuable parcels and said that there people could afford them they could not be living in misery, and the working man does not have to live off a dung heap.

(056/10-11)

... My uncle sent me a couple of letters from the US that revealed how he was living over there; clever people can get along and live in happiness. The people who were unable in Hungary to appreciate money will remain poor in the States, too. In his letters he described two families which left 1840 years ago, and how they got on in the US. The first one saved and is now well off, the second family is wasteful. They live an unsettled life in the States, too. My uncle wrote that a man like me who can save money and isn’t afraid of working will get along much better in the US than in Hungary. That’s what I think, too. The only thing I want to know is that work done will be paid for. Other people also received letters coming from abroad. So I am sure that diligent people get along easily in the Western countries. (01/14)

One could get some information also from letters. The relatives or friends living in America or who just emigrated to America, when writing home, told about the things they were buying, things which in
Hungary couldn't be bought even if you worked for
them for years. Thus the comparison could be made
with countries where people are not forced into
work competitions, but the workers have their own
free will. At three homes of my acquaintances
letters or parcels from America arrived from time
to time. They also sent snapshots which told us a
lot, too: they were well dressed and had cars. One
could see from the photographs that they have free-
dom there, one could feel it somehow. One of them
wrote that they go from New York to California to
spend their vacation, which lasts a month. They also
have money and can go wherever they please. It is
not the Party that tells them where to go. This lat-
ter reasoning was naturally not written in the let-
ter, it was we who thought of it. (058/3)
Mass Media

While personal communication was the most important source of these Hungarians' images of America, only 28 per cent of the respondents named it as their sole source. Fewer still, only 9 per cent, mentioned mass media as their exclusive source of information. Fifty-six per cent of the respondents said their information about the US came from both personal and mass communication. Their comments illustrate the ways in which the two kinds of media interact to maintain and reinforce their images of America.

In many cases it is clear that VOA has served to reinforce a conception about America which was originally derived from the experiences of friends. This was true of a young mother who first learned from the letters of a former neighbor that farms could be freely bought and sold in America.

Thirty years ago a young Hungarian woman went to Chicago from a village ten miles from 'X', to work as a cook. In the US she married a Hungarian-American. Soon enough they were able to buy a small farm. Today they have another huge farm ... She keeps writing letters home and sending one parcel after another to relatives and acquaintances. (05h/17)

When this woman was questioned about VOA's presentation of American life she mentioned having this same point made on the air:

* Fifty-six per cent of the respondents specifically mentioned foreign broadcasts as a source of images of America. Five per cent of the respondents derived these images solely through projection, which is discussed below. Two per cent got their images solely from other sources, like courses in school and travel.

*IPOR, Inc.
To me the VOA described American freedom well, the free choice and changing of the place of work, the possibility of free movement (from place to place) and the good results that can be achieved with diligent work. These broadcasts also showed that farms or houses could be bought and sold freely.

Another respondent, a young man, began his description of life in America by explaining how he knew of the high living standard of American workers through the experiences of acquaintances who had emigrated:

About three to four years ago a locksmith and a joiner emigrated to the US. Both wrote home that they already had their own house and their own automobile. People said that the Americans made a lot of money, considering that workmen can afford to buy such things.

Later, when questioned about VOA's presentation of American life, he indicated how VOA broadcasts had confirmed this impression.

VOA once drew a very fine comparison between a worker in the US and the USSR, and explained how long a worker in the USSR must work to be able to buy the same things as a worker in the States. This expresses the difference in the standard of living best.

Just as VOA broadcasts reinforce the information received from personal sources, so the latter information helps to confirm the credibility of the VOA.

By describing the life of the workers, the Voice of America sets workers back home agog. As a result of letters from their relatives and friends abroad, as well as dollar remittances, they know how truly the VOA speaks, and in consequence their bitterness against today's Communist world grows continually.
The VOA gives the best answer to Communist propaganda when it speaks about the truth of American conditions. The true facts prove its information. Hungarians had returned from American captivity looking well and wearing good clothes, while those who had been prisoners of war in the Soviet Union returned sick and in rags. (04/21)
Projection

There is still a third process which serves to reinforce the favorable images of the US held by Hungarian respondents. Because they hate the way of life imposed on them by the Communist regime, and because the US is to them the most powerful symbol of opposition to Communism, they project on to the American way of life the opposite of all that they dislike in their own. At least 60 per cent of the respondents clearly did some projecting of this kind. Most of these people had some concrete images from other sources on which to base their projections, but five per cent built their images practically entirely by simply ascribing to America the opposite of all the difficulties and annoyances of daily life in Hungary. A good example of this was a woman who, although she claimed to have had high school training, was completely ignorant of anything outside the rounds of her daily life. All that she knew about America was that the sister of some acquaintances of hers had become wealthy there. For the rest, her image of America reads like a catalogue in reverse of what she did not like in Hungary. At the end of her statement she placed together — with no information at all — a picture of American government based on bits of her local experience garnished with some Communist propaganda:

I know only what I learned in school. Besides this, there was a Hungarian woman in our neighborhood who came home from the US for a month's visit a few years ago. It must be a rich country because poor Hungarians went there and in a couple of decades they acquired something. This woman who visited her factory-worker brothers in the States had managed to become the owner of her own factory in the States, and she could afford to send packages to her relatives constantly. She surely had to work a lot, but
people in Hungary do the same. Nevertheless they cannot get the same returns as in America. I don't know why this is. I think their wages are higher. I'm sure they don't have to work two months for the price of a single suit, like in Hungary. Furthermore, you cannot even buy everything in Hungary. For instance, all last summer even cheap summer dress material disappeared from the market. This cannot happen in America because the reason that it disappeared in Hungary was that they took it to Russia. Meanwhile we have to wear trash. We didn't have children's shoes the whole summer, either. (There were no children's shoes in the stores.) I cannot believe that such a thing could happen in America. (Question: Suppose it should happen in the States, however; what would the citizens do?) I don't know. (Question: Would they not dare say a word because of fear of the police?) I don't know, but after all this cannot happen, because they don't take away goods from there to Russia. They certainly don't work on the basis of work norms. Or possibly they do, but in that case they don't raise the work norms every half year so that finally no one can fulfill them. They finish their working hours and then they can quietly go home. They don't have to go to meetings, and they don't have to run around for food, standing in line in different places. Because of this they have more free time. The Party Secretaries cannot interfere with one's free time. I even don't think that there is a Party. (Question: Who directs the population, if there is no Party?) A Party is not necessary for this. The factory management directs them. Besides this, the Mayor directs them. (Question: Where does the Mayor get his authority from?) He is elected by the high ranking officials in the Town Hall. (Question: This is the town; how is the nation run?) The entire United States is run by the King. (Question: Did you hear about an American King?) I didn't hear about an American King, but I guess he must run the country. They have special people to make laws — they are the lawmakers. I think they acquire higher and higher positions by studies, but I cannot say who puts them in charge of making the laws. (006/5-5)

The last part of this quotation is an atypical bit of fantasy; but this woman's statements to the effect that low wages, shortages, food queues, work norms and compulsory attendance at political meetings must certainly not exist in the US are typical of the projective comments made by most respondents.
Effects of Communist Propaganda on Hungarians' Images of America

From all that has been said, it is clear that the Communists have set themselves a difficult task in trying to convince Hungarians that American working men are impoverished, oppressed and exploited. Nevertheless, there are indications in the interviews that Communist propaganda is not totally ineffective. Despite their attempts to put up a psychological resistance to it, and despite the help they get from the material provided by foreign broadcasts, a few respondents admit that their belief in American prosperity was shaken by the constantly reiterated Communist "line." One man who left Hungary "because of hunger and misery" felt that many others were prevented from leaving precisely because the Communist propaganda had led them to doubt that things were any better in the West. He himself, although he "knew that Americans are not impoverished" had not been quite sure what to believe.

I could not know that it would be exactly like this because I had not been here before, but I did think it would be something like this. Those who had been in American prisoner-of-war camps in 1945 told me about this. But I still did not think it would be this good. This is one of the reasons why people at home are uncertain about their escape plans. The Communists keep stuffing their heads with talk that there is misery in the US, too. The few people who believe this wonder what would happen to those who escape if even America is in misery. I know that the Americans are not impoverished but I did not know exactly either, just how things are. (02h/11)

To take quite a different example of the unwitting absorption of Communist propaganda, some respondents believed the Communist claims that the US was using chemical warfare in Korea.* They counted this a hopeful

* See pp. 365 - 366.
indication of US strength, and not, as the Communists intended, a proof of American immorality. Should Hungarians lose hope that the US will eventually liberate them, however, beliefs like this might be turned to America’s discredit. The capacity to maintain a spiritual resistance to the Communist outlook is probably greatly dependent on the strength of this hope for liberation. Once disillusionment sets in, the motivation to resist diminishes. This thought was clearly expressed by one respondent who had undoubtedly experienced the process personally. He pointed out that people who were losing faith in America themselves ceased to “mind” the Communists’ anti-American propaganda and began to half believe what the Communists were saying about life in the US.

Until the dictatorship of the Communists became clear in Hungary after World War II, people trusted the US very much, with the exception of the Communists. The war-time air raids did not shake that trust because people thought that they were a part of the war against the Germans. However, people then saw the lack of American assistance and the successful elimination of the (power of) the Small Holders’ Party by the Communists, and as a result a certain disinterest and resignation took hold of the people. People thought that this happened because the US did not balance the aid given to the Communists by the Soviet Union. Disinterest and resignation have increased more and more lately. There are more and more people who do not mind the anti-American propaganda of the Communists, and who say that it does not pay to have hopes in America and to think about emigration. There (in the US), too, a man’s life is nothing but very hard work and one cannot hope for a better world from there, either.

(060/15-16)

This process may be further facilitated by the fact, already discussed in this report, that people who are losing faith in America tend to become somewhat disaffected with foreign broadcasts.
as well, which, in turn, probably increases their vulnerability to domestic propaganda. The great bulk of Hungarians, however, continue to hope that liberation will come and to believe in America as the land of opportunity and wealth.

One place where Communist propaganda tends to be highly effective, as is well known, is among children. A number of respondents alluded to the fact in discussing how Hungarians feel about the US. They pointed out that the predominant favorable images were no longer being effectively transmitted to the younger generation. The children are educated in Communist-run schools and their mothers, who must spend long hours at work in factories and after that stand for hours in queues to make the family purchases, have no time to counteract the influences the children are exposed to in school. Besides, as one respondent who described this situation pointed out, parents are often unwilling to contradict the Communist dogma they hear from the mouths of their children for fear of getting into trouble. The nineteen-year-old respondent who made this point, after painting a very favorable picture of the US himself, went on to say:

Of course, not everybody knows this at home, especially not the children who are being taught something quite different. They will see everything in a quite different light unless their parents teach them differently. They would be surprised, for example, if they came to Austria and saw how much better it is here. They were taught quite differently. They learned that production was lagging.

* See Part I, Chapter III for a discussion of the 12 per cent of VOA listeners who expressed disillusionment with VOA. See also the discussion on pp. 289 - 290.
and that the workers were unwilling to work for the low wages, and that they had no homes and were forced to roam the streets. They learned that those who were displeased with the situation were immediately arrested, and that prisons were being built for the workers, and that they were being sent to forced labor. I saw new elementary textbooks which included such things. There are, however, wonderfully beautiful things in the textbooks about the Soviet Union. They say that hospitals are being built there one after another, while in America none such are built because no one cares about the health of the people. The younger children believe in this, unless their parents or elder brothers and sisters tell them differently. There is, however, less and less enlightening of the children, because non-Communist people become less and less numerous. The men are being deported, etc. Other people do not dare tell the truth to their children, because they might get into trouble if the children mentioned this at school. Many parents therefore think that it will be time enough to tell the truth to the children when they grow older. But it is possible that by that time it will be too late.

(023/13)

The extent to which the learning process described in this quotation can supplant the older process by which Hungarian children learned about the golden land of America will unquestionably be important in the formation of the image of America to be held by future adult Hungarians.
Summary

The most pervasive and important source of Hungarians' favorable images of America is hearing about it, at first or second-hand, from their compatriots who have come to America and prospered. Eighty-four per cent of the respondents mentioned exposure to images of America from such a personal source. In Hungary today, foreign broadcasts play an important role in keeping these images alive and protecting them against corrosion by Communist propaganda; fifty-six per cent of the respondents mentioned getting some information about America from this source. Sixty per cent of the respondents constructed at least some of their images of America by sheer projection -- a process of ascribing to the US the opposite of all that most annoys them in Hungarian life. Although there is evidence in the interviews that a number of respondents have unwittingly absorbed some of the Communist anti-American propaganda, it is probably safe to say that as long as present-day adult Hungarians continue to hate the regime and to hope for liberation from the US, their images of this country are not likely to undergo much change. The children, however, are being taught that Soviet Russia and not America is the land where people prosper, and this fact may well affect the images of America which will be held by the Hungarians of the future.

IPOR, Inc.
PART III

IMAGES OF THE WORLD
CHAPTER I
THE KOREAN WAR

Introduction

All the respondents were aware that there is a war going on in Korea. Most of them (72 per cent) knew that the North Koreans and South Koreans are fighting against each other. There were, however, 26 people who were under the impression that the Koreans are united in fighting against the forces led by the Americans.

In the analysis which follows, the opinions of these two groups will be discussed separately. For convenience, the 26 respondents who did not know about the existence of two separate states in Korea will be referred to as “uninformed.” The majority, even though many of them had erroneous notions about other aspects of the Korean situation, will be designated “informed” respondents.
Ideas About the Korean War Among "Informed" Respondents

Respondents who are informed to the extent of knowing about the post World War II division of Korea into two opposing states put the responsibility for the Korean War at the door of the Russians. They believe the fighting broke out as a result of Communist aggression and that the United States is involved in the war for reasons of defense rather than aggrandizement. They consider the anti-Communist side stronger and able to win the war, though some wonder why this has not already happened. As things stand at present, not many people believe that the Korean War holds important implications for the future of Hungary, though there is some feeling that if Korea should develop into World War III, Hungary might then look for liberation.

Responsibility for the War

One-fifth of the "informed" Hungarian respondents claim to have no idea how the war in Korea got started, but the majority are convinced that the North Koreans were the aggressors. Two out of 3 of these interviewees said in effect that the fighting started when the North Korean Communists invaded South Korea. Not a single respondent goes along with the proposition that the South Koreans were the aggressors, but one person said that the United States started the war. For the rest, 2 people put the blame directly upon the Soviet Union; 2 others spoke of civil war breaking out between Communists and non-Communists without specifying which was the aggressor; and 3 did not discuss the problem at all.
### Table 42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communists, North Koreans</td>
<td>68%</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other explanation</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ascertainable</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cases (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>72%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The one respondent who believes that the United States was the aggressor in Korea is a young man of 19 who was about to graduate from commercial high school, but fled from Hungary in order to avoid the draft. He knows that Korea at one time belonged to Japan, but thinks that "somehow it must have become a colony of the United States after World War II." According to him, "perhaps two or three years ago, the US started the Korean War because it saw its colonial rule threatened."

He had read what the Communist newspapers at home had to say about Korea and constructed his own interpretation — one which, while making the US the aggressor, is not altogether anti-American:

According to the newspapers back home, the Communists have to fight in Korea because the US wants to defeat China and then the Soviet Union, after consolidating its rule in Korea. I believe that the US wants to maintain colonial rule in Korea and wants to hinder its replacement by Communist rule. It might also be possible that the US will try to reach the Soviet Union through Korea. (09/15)

The 15 people who said they did not know how the fighting started can actually be sub-divided into 2 groups. Most of them were people who, for various reasons, appear to have missed the initial reports. Either from lack of interest, or because news was inaccessible
to them at the time the fighting started, they knew nothing about the events which precipitated the war, and apparently never bothered to fill in this gap in their information:

Korea is so far away from Hungary — somewhere near China at the sea — that I was not interested back home in what was happening there. I don't know how this war started. (06/5/10)

I was in prison when war broke out, and it was only later that I heard about it. Korea was divided into two parts. One part was supported by the Americans, the other by the Soviet Union. The Korean population fought each other, but I wouldn't know which part attacked the other. (07/8/16)

There were a few people in this group, however, who were unable to decide which of two versions they had heard was the correct one. One of these, a 45-year old housewife who moved in professional circles, said:

According to the Communists, the Americans touched off the Korean war. However, it is the general conviction of people in Hungary that exactly the opposite happened, and that the Russians made the Korean Communists start an attack perhaps 3 years ago. .. .... I don't know exactly who started the war against whom, and why the Americans were there. (05/6/13)

A majority of the respondents, however, evidently had no problem deciding between the Communist and non-Communist versions of how the war started. For them, the issue was cut and dried. There was no doubt in their minds that "the North Koreans attacked the South Koreans." (02/5/12)

They were aware of the discrepancy between the Communist and anti-Communist versions of how the war started, and they chose to believe the anti-Communists. This was the case, in part, because the anti-Communist version fitted better with their image of the Communists:
I heard two explanations about how the war started. The Communists claim that the South Koreans invaded North Korea. According to the Western broadcasters, the North Koreans attacked South Korea at the instigation of the Russians, who claimed Korean territory. I believed the latter and so did my friends, because I knew how eager the Russians were to get close to the Yellow Sea and to the heart of America.

(050/12)

Reports of early victories for the North Koreans were also instrumental in making these Hungarians suspicious of the idea that the South Koreans had been the aggressors. They assumed that the attackers would be better prepared than the attacked, and reasoned from this that the South Koreans could not have taken the offensive:

The Communists started the Korean war. This is proved by the fact that the North Koreans gained territory in the beginning of the war. If the Americans had started the war, they would have prepared things in such a way that they would have defeated their enemies within a short time.

(073/16)

Regardless of the Communist statement to the contrary, the Korean War started with the attack of the North Koreans against the South Koreans. This was proved by the initial successes of the North Koreans. This also showed that the South Koreans were unprepared, and that the Communist charge that the South Koreans were the aggressors could not be maintained.

(053/19)

It further appears that while it is the North Koreans who are considered to be the immediate aggressors, it is the Soviet Union which is charged with the full responsibility for the outbreak of the war.

Three-fifths of the respondents who labelled the North Koreans the aggressors explicitly referred to Russia's instigation of the attack. In discussing how the war came about, these respondents often referred to Russia's influence in the North Korean Government, and indicated that they felt the North Koreans were acting on orders from Moscow.
The Communist puppet government (of North Korea), established under Soviet occupation, had received instructions and arms from the Soviet Union, and with that it started off to conquer South Korea. (098/20)

Until the end of World War II, Korea was a part of Japan or China. Immediately after the war, the American and Russian occupiers established separate zones there. The Northern part came under Russian, and the Southern part came under American authority. What I mean is, that each country had a control commission in the respective parts of Korea. The 38th parallel was the border between the two zones. There was a Communist government in North Korea, under Russian influence, and perhaps during the spring or summer of 1951, it launched the North Korean forces across the 38th parallel against the South Koreans. (099/17)

Respondents who referred to the war as a "military and political enterprise of the Soviet Union" (092/28), obviously see the Korean action in the context of Russia's desire for world domination, rather than as an isolated event. While this view was articulated by only a minority of the total sample in connection with the question of who started the war, the belief that Moscow is directing the North Koreans from behind the scenes is actually quite widespread. This emerges quite clearly in the respondents' discussion of the participants and their respective aims.

The Participants

Generally speaking, the "informed" respondents think of the Korean War as a sort of "indirect" battle between the Soviet Union and the United States. According to most respondents, the North Koreans and the Chinese are fighting in the lines of Communism, but it is Russia which is directing and supporting their action from the rear. Similarly, though a fairly large proportion of the interviewees mention the UN on
name specific countries which are fighting with the Americans in South Korea, the US is thought to be the commanding figure on that side.

**Participants on the Communist Side.** In the opinion of the overwhelming majority of these "informed" respondents, the North Koreans are being assisted in their fight by the Chinese and Russians. The presence of Chinese is attested to by 90 per cent of the respondents; and 89 per cent claim that Russia has a hand in the conflict.

As the figures indicate, many respondents said that both Chinese and Russians are fighting with the North Koreans. They make a distinction, however, as to the kind of activity each of these groups is engaged in.

**Table 43**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Koreans, Chinese and Russians</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Koreans and Chinese</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Koreans and Russians</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ascertainable</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cases (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>72%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is generally agreed that the Chinese are in the lines, fighting side by side with the North Korean soldiers. There is, however, a certain lack of unanimity regarding how and why the Chinese came to be in Korea.

On the one hand, there is a fairly large group of people, like the respondent who said "in the North, North Koreans and Chinese are fighting" (019/16), who appear simply to accept the fact that Chinese soldiers are to be found on the Communist side. A few other people comment upon the voluntary nature of their participation:

YPOR, Inc.
The North Koreans also asked aid from China, and she called on the population to volunteer. They volunteered probably because they were Communists and they were afraid of what would happen if the North Koreans were beaten. (029/12)

On the other hand, at least half of those who said that Chinese soldiers were to be found in the ranks of the Communists expressed active disbelief regarding the voluntary nature of their presence there. Some just referred to "the so-called Chinese volunteers" (038/15), but others were actually scornful of the idea that the Chinese might have volunteered, and almost seemed indignant that anyone would expect them to believe such a story. They even explained at length why it appears to them ridiculous to assume that the Chinese had acted of their own volition in joining the North Koreans. In this connection, they mention the modern equipment with which the Chinese fight, press reports extolling the enthusiasm of the Chinese volunteers, the extremely large number of Chinese said to be fighting in Korea, and the improbability of anyone in a Communist-controlled state doing anything voluntarily. A few examples of such statements follow:

The striking enthusiasm with which Communist volunteers rushed into the fight, according to Communist news sources, made it clear in Hungary from the first moment that this was the same type of enthusiasm with which Hungarian kulaks and small peasants offered their lands for collective farming. Another proof of the fact that this is not actually a matter of Chinese volunteers is that nowhere in the world can a volunteer army be found which, even after such heavy losses, would continue fighting. (021/39)
China entered the war at the intervention of the Soviet Union. Communist propaganda proclaimed that Chinese volunteers had gone to defend their brothers in race. This statement, however, is ridiculous. If they were really volunteers, there might be 6 or 10 thousand persons, but not the nearly one million who are fighting in Korea. It is almost impossible that volunteers would be equipped with the most modern heavy weapons, planes and tanks like the Chinese who are fighting in Korea. (01/9/26)

There are also Chinese troops in Korea, which the Communists call 'volunteers'. VOA or RFE made a very appropriate remark about these volunteers, saying that these troops volunteered to fight in Korea just as the Hungarian worker volunteers to take part in output competitions. That is, if they didn't go to Korea, they would be sent to internment camps or to the rack. (03/9/12)

Opposed to them (the anti-Communists) are the North Koreans and the Chinese. The Communists say these are volunteers, but we know because of the hospital personnel sent from Hungary to Korea that, under the Communists, volunteers are those who cannot avoid obeying the demand of the Party. That's the way it must be with the Chinese volunteers too. (01/7/13)

As far as Russia is concerned, respondents vary in their ideas about what and how she is contributing to the Communist war effort. For the most part, however, these Hungarians seem to be agreed that her role is a "supporting" or "unofficial" one, rather than one which involves her directly or officially in front-line fighting.

Approximately one-quarter of the respondents who speak of Russian participation do refer to the presence of Russian soldiers in Korea. Some of these people describe the North Korean line-up in such a way as to indicate they believe that Russia has sent her own troops to the front.
... The Russians are supporting (the North Koreans) with soldiers and weapons. (053/11)

Russians and Chinese volunteers are fighting in Korea against the Americans. (086/16)

... I heard at home that Russian soldiers are fighting there. (076/16)

Others believe that Russian assistance in manpower is limited to pilots who fly the planes which the Soviet Union is supplying:

One can learn from the press that the Russians themselves are also fighting. Namely, the reports tell about fights of North Korean jet planes — and it is impossible that the Chinese have any jet planes at all. Chinese industry is far from being able to produce such things. One could believe it more easily about Japan. (076/20)

There is some feeling among these respondents that Russia prefers not to have it known that her troops are engaged in the battle. Thus, one respondent said:

Chinese are also fighting on the side of the Communists, Russians are there too, but they keep it secret. (058/13)

Another group of about the same size believes that Russia is supporting the North Koreans with the materials of war, but is not actively participating in other respects.

The Soviet Union does not participate in this war with its soldiers, but with weapons, ammunition and other supplies which are delivered to the North Koreans in abundance. (007/15)

The Russians are not fighting officially, but they are shipping war materials to the Northerners. (077/11)
The largest proportion of the respondents who mention Russian participation in Korea apparently subscribe to the notion that Russia is the power behind the throne. This may be said to be the case for those respondents who believe that Russia instigated the war, even though they said nothing more specific than that about Russia's activities. In addition, however, there were those who explicitly said that Russia is directing the war from behind the scenes. Although these people may believe that Russia is also contributing war matériel, they do not specifically state this. Rather, they emphasize the fact that Russia is quietly controlling things from the rear.

It is possible that the Russians have no armed forces in Korea. But the situation in Korea is exactly like that in Hungary, where the army is completely under the control of the Russians. (073/16)

Now the Chinese are fighting in the North with Russian help. The Russians are chasing them into the fight from the rear. . . At the same time, the Russians do not intervene openly, and only direct the whole thing from the rear. (075/13)

Finally, there was a small group of respondents who did not indicate precisely how they visualized what Russia is contributing (other than vague aid) to the North Korean side. Such people made statements like "... one side is supported by the Russians" (006/9), or "the Russians began helping the Northerners" (024/16), or "South Korea . . . was invaded and overrun . . . by the North Koreans, helped by the Russians." (025/13)

Underlying most of these statements regarding Russian participation appears to be the assumption that Russia acts "unofficially" because
she fears that open involvement would provoke a new world war. This sentiment was articulated even by one of the respondents who thought that Russian troops were physically present in Korea:

... It is probable that Russia is also sending soldiers to South Korea, disguised as volunteer troops. Should Russia openly enter (the Korean war), then a world war would break out that very minute. (05/15)

Participants on the Anti-Communist Side. Although many of the respondents knew that people other than the Americans are supporting the South Koreans, the United States is generally viewed as the dominant figure on the South Korean side.

In talking about the groups which are engaged in fighting against the North Koreans, only one of the "informed" respondents did not name the United States. A majority of these respondents also said that other nations were present. Thus, more than two-fifths of them referred to the UN as well as the US; and a third as many, though they made no reference to the UN, spoke of other countries fighting along with the United States.* Two-fifths of the respondents, however, mentioned only the United States.

Table IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPANTS ON THE SOUTH KOREAN SIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States and UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and other foreign countries*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN, but no mention of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%) =</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The countries most often named by these respondents as fighting in Korea along with the Americans were: France (named by 6 people), England (named by 5), and Australia (named by 4). Turkey, Greece, Germany, Sweden, Canada and "the Atlantic Pact nations" were also mentioned in this connection, but no one of these was named by more than 3 individuals.

IPCR, Inc.
Altogether, therefore, three-fifths of the respondents think of the South Korean forces as in some sense involving international cooperation, while the rest consider it a unilateral action on the part of the United States.

Of those who describe the assistance being given the South Koreans as international in nature, the majority may be said to view it as formal (i.e., undertaken by an international organization which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities), while the remainder evidently think of it as an informal action on the part of the nations involved.

In the first place, there are the 32 respondents who refer to the presence of UN forces in Korea. Such people may be said to consider the action a formal one.* Many of them refer to the fact that the nations involved "are fighting under the United Nations flag". (04/26) A few of them give more explicit evidence that this is their understanding of the situation:

In Korea, Americans, South Koreans, French, English, Dutch, Greek and Turkish troops are fighting against North Koreans and the so-called Chinese volunteers. . . . The UN troops help smaller nations toward which the Russians extend their tentacles. Therefore, the question of the Korean attack was brought before the UN which sent police troops into Korea. (05/13)

* Such an interpretation seems justified in the light of the fact that most respondents who referred to the UN in connection with the Korean war knew what the organizational character of the UN is. In a later section of the interview, respondents were asked about the UN. Only one-third of them had an accurate picture of it. However, of those who referred to the UN as one of the participants in Korea, 78 per cent had an accurate conception of the nature and function of the UN. This means that only 22 per cent (7 people) of those who cited the UN as a participant on the South Korean side either had no knowledge of the UN or had misconceptions about it.
Two of the people who speak of several nations participating on the side of the South Koreans without mentioning the UN indicate that they too consider the action a formal one. These respondents believe that the countries are cooperating because of Atlantic Pact commitments, although their information about the makeup of NATO is somewhat inaccurate:

In accordance with their mutual assistance obligations undertaken in the Pact, the nations united under the Atlantic Pact are participating in the Korean war on the American side. For instance, there are Swedish planes there. (06/17)

The rest of the people who talk of various countries fighting with the South Koreans seem to regard the action as spontaneous, informal cooperation among the nations involved. This at least would appear to be the case for the respondents who, like the one quoted below, made no reference to any agreement or organization binding the participants:

In order to stop the advance of the Russians, the free nations have given military support to the South Koreans. The USA, England, Australia, France, Turkey and others have all sent troops. (05/27)

Some respondents quite unmistakably conceive of the participation as operating on a completely informal basis:

The armed forces of the United States, later joined by volunteers from Western nations, went to the help of the non-Communists. (03/6/14)

There are Australians and many other volunteers fighting against the Communists in Korea on the US side. (09/7/8)

On one side, there are the Communists — Chinese, Koreans and supposedly Russians, too — and on the other side there are the nationalist Koreans and the foreign volunteers: German, French and American volunteers. (05/9/13)

IPCH, Inc.
Whether or not they referred to the assistance offered South Korea as international or unilateral, the comments indicate that in general respondents consider the United States the all-important figure on the South Korean side.

Thus, 39 per cent of the respondents are under the impression that the United States is the only foreign nation fighting with the South Koreans. Obviously, for them, the US is the dominant figure on the anti-Communist side.

Another 19 per cent of these Hungarians speak of the US as the initiator of the movement to aid the South Koreans. In this sense, they too put the US in a position of primary importance:

In Korea, on the Southern side, the Allied nations (are fighting); . . . the Southern front includes: British, Canadian, American, Australian, Turkish, French, South Korean and some other troops, under the flag of the UN . . . The US was the first to hasten to help the attacked South Koreans, and then one after the other, the other Allies joined her. (Col/10)

Through the initiative of the US, the South Koreans are being aided by 20 (member) countries of the UN. (082/17)

Ten per cent of the respondents appear to consider the United States either the official or de facto leader of the combined forces fighting under the UN flag. Some say this in so many words; others indicate it by implication or by reference to the American generals who have commanded the UN troops:

TPOR, Inc.
It is a heavy responsibility which America had to assume there (in Korea). The handling of the worst difficulties in the Korean situation was left to American policy and American troops in order that Korea might be saved and the destruction of human civilization be prevented. The battles in Korea are being fought by a few British, fewer French and about 20 other nations, who all together make up less than one American war division. The principle of international cooperation and of solidarity among the free nations has materialized in Korea, but the main burden of the war is still with the Americans. (001/7-8)

... American and other UN troops hurried to help the South Koreans. The UN troops included English, Australian, New Zealand, Belgian and other units. These units are now under the command of the American General, MacArthur. General MacArthur was the commander of the UN troops prior to General Ridgway, but he was dismissed because he wanted to extend the Korean war to China and President Truman disagreed. (078/10-11)

A small group of people (8 per cent), while they do not mention America's role as decision-maker, nevertheless give her predominance as the heaviest contributor of manpower among the foreign troops fighting against the Communists:

Their (the Communists') opponents are the non-Communist Koreans, and the troops of the UN member nations under the UN flag, comphes overwhelmngly of American troops. (060/21)

After the initial surprise (attack), the UN managed to put a large and well-equipped army in against the aggressors, and to change the tide of war in its favor. The small forces sent to Korea by UN member nations had great moral significance. It did not relieve the US of its burdensome task, however, but it proved the solidarity of the free world against the Bolshevist danger. (093/26)
Finally, there is a group of respondents (13 per cent) whose statements about the non-Communist side imply that they conceive of it as being largely under the direction of the Americans. They tend to speak of the opponents to the Communists as "the American side"; or, in discussing the aims of the forces fighting against the Communists, they speak of what "the Americans want:"

The United Nations are in the South . . . . The United Nations have the following members: America, England, France, Belgium. It's not sure whether there are any Koreans among them, but I believe there are. . . . The Americans aim now at . . . . (090/1L)

Only a 10 per cent minority of the respondents appear to think of the United States as just one among the many nations supporting the South Koreans. In such cases, it is the UN which is thought of as playing the major role:

South Korea asked the UN for help. So there were then sent American troops and troops from other Western nations to help. (061/13)

The UN countries — the US, England, France and other smaller countries — are fighting on the Southern side under the UN flag. Of course, the South Koreans are fighting too. (033/1H)

All in all, therefore, the respondents consider the war in Korea an "American war" in the sense that the United States is more deeply involved than any other nation. This attitude should not, however, be interpreted as implying a criticism of the United States. There is little indication that respondents feel that America has dragged other nations into a war from which she alone will benefit. Rather, it seems to reflect a feeling on their part that the United States is the all-powerful figure of the non-Communist world. They seem
to be saying that her dominant role in Korea has been thrust upon her because of her ability to contribute more than other nations, and because of her position as the leader in the fight against the spread of Communism.

There is also some indication that respondents feel that in one sense the US is using the UN in somewhat the same manner as the USSR is making use of the Chinese and North Korean troops — that is, to minimize her participation lest she touch off a major war. There were at any rate a few respondents whose comments ran along these lines:

The armed forces of the US and of other countries belonging to the United Nations Organization are aiding the non-Communist Koreans . . . . The US could take care of the Korean war very fast if it wanted to. It is fighting the war under the flag of the United Nations because a firm and independent action (on the part of the US) could easily lead to a large-scale war, and it seems that the US wants to avoid this at all costs in connection with the Korean war. (05/1/21)

The Aims of the Two Sides

In discussing the objectives of the two sides now fighting in Korea, respondents made it quite clear that they consider the war to be one between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was these two countries, and the basic conflict dividing them, which respondents almost always referred to when the subject of aims was raised.

Generally speaking, in the eyes of these refugees, Russia appears in the familiar role of aggressor attempting to devour still another country. The United States, on the other hand, is seen as trying to prevent success for the Russians either now or in the future.
Aims of the Communist Side

Two things stand out about the "informed" respondents' remarks regarding the aims of the Communists in Korea. For one thing, they almost all refer to Russia; and for another, they generally describe the aims of the Communist side as aggressive.*

Table 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communist Objectives in Korea</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia wants all of Korea for strategic purposes (e.g., as a military base, as an outlet to the sea, for further expansion)</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary attempt, inspired by Moscow, to seize all of Korea</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary attempt of Communists to seize all of Korea**</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia wants to tie down American forces so that she is free to act elsewhere</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other aims</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ascertainable***</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Cases (100%) | (72) |

* The one respondent who said that the US had been the aggressor in Korea evidently believes that the Communists are engaged in a defensive action in Korea. Referring to the motivation of the Communists, he quoted from the Communist press:

According to the newspapers back home, the Communists have to fight in Korea because the US wants to beat China and then the Soviet Union, after it has consolidated its rule in Korea. (06/4/15)

** Respondents classified in this category made no reference to Russia in connection with the action undertaken by the North Koreans. Rather, they referred specifically to the North Koreans or spoke only of Communists without specifying whether these were North Koreans or Russian Communists.

*** In their discussion of the Korean War, the individuals in this group did not touch directly upon the aims of the Communists. However, more than half of them did express their ideas regarding the aims of the anti-Communists. What they said in this connection, together with their statements regarding Russia's role in instigating the North Korean invasion of South Korea, indicate that these respondents, like the majority, think that the Communists are attempting to impose their rule on Korea. In other words, they too tend to think of the Communists intentions as aggressive. This, then, reduces the actual number of "not ascertainable" responses on Communist objectives among "informed" respondents to 11 per cent of the total 72 cases.
As the Table above indicates, most of the respondents who talked about Communist goals see the desire for territorial gain behind the action of the Communists; and, with the exception of a fairly small group, they explicitly mention Russia as having a considerable stake in the operation. Otherwise, their interpretations of Russia's aims vary primarily from the point of view of whether or not they speak of those aims in the context of an overall plan for world domination.

One-quarter of the respondents understand the motivation of the Communists as a desire simply to bring all of Korea under Communist power. Half of them claim that Russia engineered the Korean Communist revolution because she wanted to control Korea. These respondents made statements like the following:

With propaganda and incitement, Russia persuaded the Korean Communists to engage in an armed war. It did not remain a cold war, as in Hungary. The Soviet Union wanted to expand Russian control over all of Korea, or at least wanted Communism in power through the whole country. (08/21)

The others in this group made no reference to Russian instigation of the war. Some of them, like the respondent quoted below, apparently regard the war as a domestic affair. They tend to see it, in effect, as a civil war:

North Korea was under Russian occupation, and South Korea was under American occupation. There might have been some feud between the two areas and the North Koreans attacked the South Koreans... There must have been some misunderstanding between the Koreans themselves. The quarrel must have developed because there was Communism in the Russian zone; the Southern zone, on the other hand, lived according to the American pattern. (08/15)
In cases like the one just cited, respondents apparently assumed that the aggression against South Korea was undertaken independently by the Communists of North Korea. In other cases, respondents spoke only of "the Communists", giving no indication as to whether or not they included the Russians in this general term. One person, for example, said: "The war started because the Reds wanted to take possession of all Korea." (059/13)

Whether or not they mentioned Russian instigation, none of the respondents in this quarter of the sample hinted that the Communists might want anything more than control of the Korean peninsula.

By contrast, another quarter of the "informed" respondents made it quite clear that they saw behind events in Korea a desire on the part of Russia for control of a strategic location from which to continue her plans for world domination. According to them, "the conquest of South Korea would be the preparation for further aggression." (039/15) In this connection, some of them spoke specifically of Korea's value as a base from which Russia could move against other countries in her effort to spread Communism:

The Soviet Union, remaining in the background, launched the army of the North Korean Communist government, which the Soviet Union is protecting against South Korea so they could gain a foothold in Korea as a whole and thereby establish an important base for the further expansion of Communist rule. (099/36)

Because of its geographic position, Russia wanted to have all of Korea, in order to get nearer to Japan... (052/15)
Others talked in more general terms about Russia's world ambitions; for them Korea is just another link in the chain of aggressive moves:

In June 1950, the Communist North Koreans attacked South Korea with a view to occupying the whole peninsula. When we observe the Soviets we see that they try to extend the power of the Soviet Government all over the world. I think that they pursued the same objectives when the North Koreans attacked South Korea. The same policy was pursued in the Balkans and in the Baltic countries. (028/10)

Always, however, respondents in this group discussed Korea as a means to an end for the Russians, rather than as an end in itself.

Still other respondents interpret the invasion of South Korea as an attempt on the part of the Russians to keep the military forces of the West busy in the Far East, so that the Communists may have a free hand in other parts of the world. These people made comments like the following:

Russia's probable aim is to tie down American strength and to divert her interests from Europe. In Korea, the Russians have sent to the Chinese, keeping themselves uncommitted and ready to act in Europe. (023/18)

The Communists wanted to tie down the free nations in the Korean War in order to gain a free hand for themselves elsewhere. (054/21)

There were other scattered comments to the effect that in bringing on the Korean War, Russia was interested in such things as "ascertaining what counteraction the United Nations are willing to undertake" (092/28); or "driving the Americans from Korea . . . so that the Americans won't have a base in Asia" (094/12); or creating "the opportunity for a new World War" (062/17); or getting under its control the natural resources of South Korea.

IPOR, Inc.
In any event, most respondents are convinced that the Communists, be they inspired by Russia or acting on their own initiative, want aggressively to increase the territory under Communist control.

Aims of the Non-Communist Side

Just as respondents tended to talk about what Russia wanted when discussing the aims of the Communist side, so they tended to conceive of the United States as the country to be considered in discussing the aim of the non-Communists. By and large, the motives attributed to the United States are more "favorable" in nature than those attributed to the USSR.

Whereas almost all the "informed" respondents characterize the Communists' motives as aggressive, only a few individuals see the United States as acting purely from motives of self-aggrandizement. On the contrary, most respondents think the American objective is to save Korea in order to protect the interests of the non-Communist world from the dangers of Communism rampant.

Table I-6

NON-COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

To defend democracy, liberate Koreans from oppression, stop Communist expansion or other "altruistic" motive .............................................. 45%
For "altruistic" motives and to secure US strategic position .................. 11%
To secure US strategic position ............................................. 11%
To test weapons ............................................................. 7%
To maintain or expand American influence and control in Asia .......... 3%
Other aims ........................................................................ 1%
Don't know ........................................................................ 2%
Not ascertainable ................................................................ 19%

Total Cases (100%) = .......................... (72)

IFOR, Inc.
It is obvious from the responses that the assumption that Russia has long-range plans for taking over country after country supplies the context within which respondents tend to interpret the interest which the United States has in Korea.

Almost one-half of the "informed" respondents in discussing the aims of the US in Korea say that she is primarily interested in keeping Korea from the Communists. In this connection, some people stress the liberation of the Korean people from the Communist yoke:

The US aim in this war is to give freedom back to the Korean people. (079/13)

Their intention is to establish a free and independent state in Korea. (074/15)

More often, however, emphasis is put upon the prevention of further expansion on the part of the Communists. The respondent (previously quoted) who said that Russia's interest in Korea had to do with its geographical relation to Japan, went on to say:

In the West, they saw that this was not a Korean civil war, but the expansion of the Soviet Union. In order to stop the advance of the Russians, the free nations have given military support to the South Koreans. (052/15)

A few of the people in this group also see in the Western action a warning to the Russians for the future:

Looking at it from the anti-Communist viewpoint, it is clear that America is showing her strength in Korea -- even if on a small scale -- and is warning the Russians that their violent expansion will be met with the strength of the United States. (061/19)

Another 11 per cent of the "informed" respondents feel, with the group discussed above, that America is motivated by a genuine desire to help oppressed people resist Communist expansion, but they attribute

TFR, Inc.
to the Americans the motivation of acting in the strategic self-interest of the United States as well. They believe that the US wants to stop the spread of Communism but that she is also interested in keeping a foothold in Korea in case of an open conflict with Russia in the future.

The US is acting in self-defense in Korea against a sneak attack. It maintains its position there in order to have a base for invasion, and it wishes to prevent people in Korea and elsewhere from coming under Communist oppression, or they want to keep this oppression from becoming permanent. (017/13)

Approximately the same number of respondents (14 per cent) go one step further. They express themselves in such a way as to give the impression that they believe the US is not so much interested in assisting the Koreans or keeping Communism out of Korea, as she is improving her own strategic position. For the most part, those who spoke about America's primary interest in Korea's strategic location were also thinking in terms of an eventual conflict between East and West:

The Americans' goal is to be able to keep, with the help of the South Koreans, a base in this part of Asia. They will need it in case of an eventual war -- a war which America would lead to destroy Russian Bolshevism. (094/12)

The war began when the North Koreans attacked South Korea. Then the Americans intervened. They would have done this even if they hadn't wanted to help the South Koreans. For from South Korea it is only a skip to Japan, and certainly the Reds cannot be allowed to enter there. If they did, then all Asia would be lost and the Russians would get Australia. It is the aim of the USA not to have to surrender this important base. But that, of course, is only negative. As to positive aims, I don't know what I can say, because I can't say that the aim is to destroy the enemy since the Chinese could keep sending new human material forever. (019/16)
A handful of respondents (7 per cent) spontaneously said that an American goal in Korea is to use the war as a proving ground for their new weapons and military tactics, or for learning about Soviet weapons and strategy. Two of the respondents in this group even consider weapons-testing to be the most important factor motivating American participation in the Korean war. One of them, for example, drew a parallel in this respect between this war and the Spanish Civil War:

The US considers the Korean War another Spanish Civil War. They are testing their new weapons and new strategy, with a view to applying it in World War III. . . . The US is preparing for a new World War . . . . The Americans consider it important to defend the freedom of the Korean people, but the 'Spanish War' experience is even more important. (OS/5/12)

Only two individuals accuse the Americans of having imperialistic designs on Korea. Both of them are under the impression that Korea was a colony of the United States prior to the outbreak of the Korean war and consequently believe that the US is out to maintain its hold on that territory. One of these was the respondent who believed that the US "started the Korean war because it saw its colonial rule endangered." (OS/4/14)

The belief that the US stands to profit economically from the Korean war was far from prevalent among the respondents as a whole, however. On the contrary, in most cases victory for the United States in Korea is seen not as an end in itself, but rather as a blocking action against Russian expansionism in general or as self-protection in the long-run sense of hanging on to or strengthening defenses against the possibility of an out-and-out fight with the Soviet Union in the Far East. In other words, the US is viewed as taking a defensive rather than offensive action in Korea. As one respondent concluded:

IPON, Inc.
The North Korean Communists and Chinese started the war, certainly by order of the Russians, in order to spread Communism in South Korea and Japan. They challenged the Americans, but I do not know how they (the Americans) got to South Korea. The US will restore peace in South Korea so that she may live in security. These are the aims of the US in the whole world, but it is not possible to achieve this aim all at once. . . . The Americans do not want to gain new territory in this part of Asia. . . . (91/11)

Relative Strength of the Two Sides

While one-fifth of the "informed" respondents say that they do not know which of the two sides now fighting in Korea is stronger, three-fifths are convinced that the non-Communists are stronger than the Communists. Of the remainder, a few say that the two sides are evenly matched, two say the Communists are stronger, and the others express no opinion on this subject.

Table 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Strength of the Two Sides</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West is stronger</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West is stronger: its technical superiority outweighs Communists'</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manpower superiority</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West is stronger, but prolongs the war</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal strength</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East is stronger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other answers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ascertainable</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Cases (100%) = (72)

Of those who give the anti-Communists the advantage over the Communists, half (31 per cent) state without qualification that

ITOH, Inc.
"the Americans are stronger" (077/11) or that "the UN troops are stronger than the Northern troops." (076/20) When people in this group explain why they feel this to be the case, the reason almost invariably proves to be a belief in the superior technical equipment of the West. Thus, respondents said things like:

The Southern side is stronger. They can advance because they have better weapons. (029/12)

That side (the US side) is stronger because of the better equipment and especially because of the excellent jet planes. Their great number gives the American side a strong superiority in the air, even though lately the Soviet Union has also sent good planes to Korea. (067/17)

Another considerably smaller group (12 per cent) offer a more measured judgment. They acknowledge a superiority in manpower for the Communists, but claim that this advantage is more than compensated for by the technical superiority and superior strategy of the anti-Communist forces:

Regardless of the fact that the Communists are 8 or 10 times superior numerically, technical superiority makes the American side the stronger one. Bombs are more effective against masses than against a small number of soldiers. The anti-Communists are able to use them freely. (019/26)

I think the American side is stronger because they surpass the others in air strength and equipment. Today, this is the crucial factor in armed conflict. Nowhere can such armaments be produced as in the US, and in the face of this superiority it can be of no vital importance if the Communists have superiority in manpower, even if that superiority is tenfold. (022/13)

In addition, there are those (18 per cent) who also put their faith in the superior strength of the anti-Communist side, but who differ
from other respondents in that they are concerned with finding some explanation to account for the fact that the side they believe is stronger has not yet won the war. Generally, it is thought that considerations other than military ones stand in the way of a decisive victory for the West. One respondent, for example, said he believed the UN side was restraining itself in order to avoid precipitating a major war; another suggested that the US needs the prolonged war in order to bring its war machinery to a state of preparedness.

In order not to create the danger of the immediate outbreak of World War III, the US and its Allies could not do anything but accept the Communist claim, contrary to obvious facts, that Communist China was not officially fighting in Korea, and that the Chinese forces there were only volunteers. The increased manpower of the enemy did not hinder the US and its Allies in making a stand in Korea. This was made possible because of their technical superiority and more effective strategy. The free nations were forced to give up the chance for a decisive Korean victory, however, in order to avoid World War III. (093/28-29)

In my opinion, it is right that the war is not being brought to an end for the following reasons: the US is thereby able to make use of part of its heavy industry for war production, the war material already produced does not become outdated, and it can test the usefulness of its products. All that prevents the danger of the US being attacked by the Soviet Union. In other words, its unpreparedness as in World War II cannot repeat itself. (099/20)

More often, however, respondents refer vaguely to "political" or "strategic" factors to explain the situation. They do not pretend to know precisely what these factors are, but they obviously are not prepared to discard their conviction that the West is strong enough to defeat the Communists. As a consequence, they rationalize by positing the existence of some reason, unknown to them, to explain the present state of affairs.

IPON, Inc.
In men, the Chinese are superior; in technical matters, the Americans. By men I naturally mean number and not quality. Despite the tremendous overseas distance and ship tonnage difficulties, America is holding up her end splendidly. The Southern camp is stronger. The Americans could decide the whole thing within a month, if they wished to, and if they were to use their special weapons. The Americans have 100 per cent superiority in the air. It amazes me that the Americans do not make use of the weapons with which the war could be decided immediately. They certainly must have some reason, but I don’t know what. My friends back home also have the impression that the USA is stronger. (025/16)

In my opinion, the South is stronger. Their superiority consists in their arms. They bombard a given territory and then they advance with tanks. They are evidently stronger; hence it must be a matter of tactics that they do not liquidate the situation immediately. Everybody at home thinks that the South is stronger. I don’t know what the motive for the delay might be; the American strategic staff knows it much better. (009/10)

I don’t know why the Korean War didn’t end after the unexpected Communist invasion was beaten back. If the UN wanted to, it could have already beaten its enemies. There must be political reasons which I don’t understand to explain why they haven’t done this. There are more weapons, tanks, armored cars, and air force on the American side. This makes them stronger. With the use of mechanized strength, they can spare the lives of their soldiers better than the Communists can. (025/13)

While the majority cling to a belief in the superior strength of the anti-Communist forces, there were a few people whose view of the situation did not permit them to give the UN troops the edge in evaluating the relative strength of the two opponents. Unlike those who dismissed the manpower resources of the Communists on the assumption that superiority of arms is more decisive than manpower, these respondents believe that
the Communist advantage in manpower is merely balanced by the technical advantage of the anti-Communist side:

It is the general conviction in Hungary that the US and its allies have technical superiority in the Korean War; the advantage of great masses, however, is on the other side. This advantage is fortified by the geographical situation and the transportation problems connected with it. (001/16)

Furthermore, two members of the sample contend that the Communists seem to be stronger than the anti-Communists. They are not, however, firmly convinced of this view. One of them is the 19-year-old high school student who blamed the outbreak of the war on the United States. He said that "the intervention of China assures a great numerical superiority in Korea for the Communist side, and maybe they are stronger as a result." (08h/15) The other, a 60-year-old widow of a former government employee, started out by saying: "The Communist Government is stronger in Korea than its opponents, because it receives great support from the Russians and the Chinese whose countries border on Korea and thus can easily help the Korean Communists." Immediately after saying this, however, she added: "Doubtless it is not its (America's) aim to settle with the Koreans there, for if it wished to do this, it would be easy through the use of the atomic bomb." (036/11b)

Apparently respondents find support for the view that the anti-Communist side is stronger than the Communist side in various sources. Some of these sources were indicated in the comments which were made in evaluating the relative strength of the two sides. A few respondents, for example, indirectly referred to news reports on the fighting when they said things like:

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The Americans are stronger in Korea. I presume it is because the Communists are not able to advance. (031/11)

A few others indicated that it was the way in which current news reports were being handled by the domestic press which proved to them that the Communists no longer had the upper hand in Korea:

That the Americans are winning is proven by the fact that the Korean news is published in the last corner of the page of the Hungarian Communist papers, instead of the more conspicuous spots. (016/13)

The Southern side is much stronger and the newspapers at home have toned down their stories from the Korean front. Hardly anything is printed about this now. All they say is that the heroic North Korean forces are holding their own. From this I could see that they are now in trouble. (023/18)

Still other respondents indicated that they knew of reports of the situation in Korea made by Hungarians who returned from the front. One man, for instance, gave the following account:

A wounded Hungarian came back from Korea. He reported that when the Americans attacked there, the air is dark with planes and the American infantry advance easily, smoking cigarettes, across the terrain shot up by the planes. If the Americans are faced with a larger attack, they calmly withdraw and wait until they can be certain of the success of their counter-attack. Such is the power of American mechanised forces there that the Americans could occupy all Korea within 24 hours. With this in mind, I have no doubt that in Korea the Western powers are the stronger.* (017/13-14)

* Remarks like the one quoted above may be only the restatement of a rumor. For the individual, however, the effect of the rumor may be as meaningful as a first-hand report from someone returned from Korea. As a rumor, a statement like this is also significant in showing how the hopes of the rumor-spreaders and -hearsers become blended with popular stereotypes of Americans — in this case, the hope for liberation by the overpowering (Footnote continued on next page)
It would appear, therefore, that the majority of respondents not only believe that the anti-Communist side has it within its power to win the Korean war, but that they find confirmation for this belief readily available in the press and through stories passed along by or about persons returned from Korea.

**Effect of Korean War on Hungary**

For the most part, the "informed" respondents saw no vital connection between the outcome of the Korean War and the fate of their own country. One-half of them did speak of a relationship between the Korean War and Hungary, but very few of these people felt the war can have a profound effect on conditions in Hungary; most spoke only of incidental or

*(Footnote continued from preceding page)*

"(Footnote continued from preceding page)" might of America blends with the stereotype of the American who is always plentifully supplied with cigarettes -- to produce stories which carry conviction. It is quite possible, however, that these stories referring to Hungarians returned from Korea may not be entirely fabrication, or may at least have been based originally on concrete fact. While the interviewees who referred to such incidents generally did not make clear whether or not they themselves had spoken first-hand with a returnee from Korea, or were vague in their characterization of the returnee (one person, for example, said he had spoken with a "Communist officer" without indicating his nationality), there was one respondent, described as an intelligent man of mature judgment by the interviewer, who was explicit on both these points. He had this to say:

Once, while traveling on a train, I met four Hungarian Medical Corps soldiers, and I found out that they had just returned from Korea. They told me that there are Hungarian doctors and medics in Korea. "We don't know what the Americans want; if they wanted, they could have occupied all of Korea long ago," they said. "Their planes drop such bombs that everything is burned down over a huge area. On a single day, they launched 75 air and infantry attacks against the Communists." *(O18/19-20)*

IPOR, Inc.
contingent effects. A few (4 per cent) said explicitly that "because of its localization, the Korean War can have no effect on Hungary." (092/29)
The remainder did not comment upon the war in relation to Hungary.*

Analysis of the comments made by the 50 per cent of the respondents who believe the Korean War does have implications for their nation shows that not many of them put faith in the Korean War as a way of effecting changes within Hungary.

In the first place, only a small group (about 11 per cent) saw a direct connection between events in Korea and the political future of their country. These people spoke of the effect the Korean War may have in weakening or strengthening the power of the Communists. Their statements, however, are worded in the most general, if not tentative terms; they do not spell out the ways in which life in Hungary might be affected by the various possible solutions to the Korean War:

The effect of the Korean War would be either to strengthen Hungarian Communism or cause its decline, depending on whether the Communist side achieved a decisive victory or whether the UN and the South Korean forces fighting on its side achieved a decisive victory against their enemies. (082/17-18)

If the Russians would understand that the forces of the Communists are not able to beat the Americans in Korea, maybe then they will not follow through with the Bolshevist plans for Hungary. (031/11)

* A number of people in this group did say that they thought the Korean War might develop into World War III, and were thereby implying that the Korean War would indirectly be instrumental in effecting the liberation of Hungary. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between liberation and World War III, see the chapter on World War III which follows.
The (Korean) question is important for Hungary, too, because success for the Communists in Korea would also make their hands freer (for action) in Hungary. (087/17)

It is obviously implied by these people that a Communist defeat in Korea will, by weakening the Communists, hasten the liberation of Hungary. Yet only a handful went as far as the respondent quoted below in stating this relationship explicitly:

The Hungarians believe that the hostilities in Korea might become intensified and that that would bring the liberation of Hungary closer because it would weaken the Communists. (086/16)

Another group of about the same size (11 per cent) spoke of direct effects the war has had on Hungary, but these were what might be called immediate and incidental effects, having nothing to do with the future of their country. The statements of these people dealt with the hardships which the Korean War has imposed on the people of Hungary by way of enforced contributions to the North Korean war effort. Such respondents talked with some bitterness of higher work quotas, and of foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies, and medical personnel being shipped to the Communists in Korea, all of which, they felt, further deprived the already hard-pressed population of Hungary:

The Communists sent Hungarian and Czechoslovak trains with medical personnel and medicines to Korea. And in our village, too, there was a collection of cereals and potatoes for Korea. The population grew bitter about this because the Communists had left very few of these foods, and people were obliged to give from what was left. (07/15)

The Communists sent a hospital train to Korea and started a collection for Korean relief. My friend and I were very angry because we knew that many

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thousands of people live under very bad conditions in Hungary and at the same time they (the Communists) extract millions to be sent to foreign people. (072/13)

The Korean War gave the Communist regime in Hungary a good pretext to squeeze money and work out of the people and to expand the army further. The pretexts used are aid to Korea and the danger of a world war. (021/10)

Still another small group (14 per cent) spoke only of contingent effects. In their opinion, the Korean War can affect Hungary only if it develops into World War III. They feel that as it stands now the Korean War bears no relation to the course of events in Hungary, but that if it should grow into a great war, Hungary could look forward to liberation. They assume, of course, that such a war would mean the defeat of Communism.

As one of these respondents put it:

Should Russia and China participate in the Korean War to a greater extent than they do at present, this could easily lead to a new world war, to which Hungary looks forward with the hope of liberation. (022/13)

Aside from a few additional, miscellaneous comments, this was all that the "informed" respondents had to say about the implications of the Korean War for Hungary. It is apparent that there is here no overwhelming feeling that the fate of Hungary hangs on the outcome of the battle in Korea.

At the same time, however, the interviews contain evidence that indicate this detachment may not always have been the case. There was one respondent, for example, who said the news of General MacArthur's dismissal had "caused a paroxysm of excitement in Budapest." (095/17) He, like other respondents, was agitated at the news because he agreed with
MacArthur's position. Clearly, such a reaction stemmed from genuine concern with the progress of the war. That this concern was probably closely related to hopes for Hungary's liberation seems to be borne out by the statements of others who explicitly referred to the fact that their hopes in this connection had been high when the Korean War first broke out. They looked upon it then as the first stage of a showdown with the Soviet Union -- a showdown which would end in the defeat of Communism and the liberation of Hungary. They have been disappointed, however, with the way things have worked out in Korea. Thus, there were a number of respondents who, like the following respondent, openly expressed their disillusionment on this score:

When the Korean War started, the Hungarians believed that the hostilities between the Communists and their enemies would extend to Hungary and that the long-awaited liberation would come about. In the time that has passed (since the beginning of the war), they (the Hungarians) have seen that this hope of theirs has not been fulfilled, and now they are afraid that maybe it will not be fulfilled at all. (099/18)

Comments like these suggest that if respondents had been questioned about the significance of the Korean War for Hungary when the war had been under way for only a short time, their replies might have had a different ring. At the present time, however, intense psychological investment is far from characteristic of the group interviewed. One gets the distinct impression that there has been a growing disenchantment among Hungarians regarding what the Korean War can accomplish for Hungary.
Ideas about the Korean War among "Uninformed" Respondents

The "uninformed" respondents are of two distinct types. Eleven of the 28 people (39 per cent) who give the impression that they are unaware of a North-South break in the Korean population are equally uninformed about every other aspect of the Korean situation. The remaining 17 people appear to be almost as well informed on Korea as other respondents in the sample, with the exception, of course, of their apparent ignorance regarding the division of Korea into 2 separate states following World War II.

The 11 Hungarian refugees who can be classified as totally uninformed about the war in Korea are quite explicit about their ignorance. One of them, for example, said "I do not know anything about this (Korea)." (057/8) Some had no idea even as to the whereabouts of Korea. At the most, they knew that fighting was going on in a place called Korea, but had only vague or erroneous notions as to who was fighting whom and why. They summed up their information somewhat along the following lines:

I only know this much: that over there the Americans and perhaps the English are fighting against the Russians or against the Communists. (068/G)

I only know that the Americans are fighting against the Russians in Korea, but I don't know when it started and what the reasons and aims of that war are. (06b/16)

The individuals in this group, which included both men and women, and ranged in age from under 20 to 60, were all people with no more than an elementary school education. Most of them had lived in rural areas prior to their flight from Hungary, and half of them had
never listened to foreign broadcasts while living in Hungary. They are, therefore, people whose background to a certain extent explains their uninformedness about events in Korea.

The other 17 people who were classified as "uninformed" by virtue of the fact that they failed to make any mention of a split between North Korea and South Korea have a good deal to say about the war nevertheless. It is only on two points that they differ from their compatriots: they talk about the war as if it were one between the Koreans as a whole and the United States, making no reference to the UN; and they do not for the most part discuss the question of how the war came about. In almost every other way, however, their comments are an echo of what has already been presented as the sentiment of the majority. More precisely, they believe that the United States is engaged in the Korean War either because it wants to free the Koreans from Communist oppression, or because it wants to inhibit Soviet expansion; they think of Russia's aims as aggressive; they believe that the forces of the United States are stronger than those of the Communists; and they do not feel that the Korean War will have any profound effect on political developments within Hungary (only 3 of them spoke of the war's outcome as related to the liberation of their country). The comments of one or two respondents in this group should serve to illustrate the differences and similarities between the attitudes and opinions of the "uninformed" versus the "informed" respondents:
The Russians have sent a lot of partisans to Korea to fight and to keep the people in misery. They (the Koreans) are being helped by the Americans against Communist oppression. I don't know how and when the Americans and the British got there, I know that, on Stalin's orders, there are Koreans and Communists fighting against the British and Americans, but I don't know about Koreans fighting on the American side. Accordingly, I cannot explain, either, why the Koreans would be fighting only against the Americans. It is certain, however, that if the Communists win in Korea then Russian Communism would again act with a larger force in Europe and on other continents. The American side is stronger in Korea, because they are better supplied with food and war material, and because they care more about their soldiers. All this is important for successful warfare, and the American advance is really better there (in Korea). They (the Americans) want to assure the freedom and good life of the Korean people, even if they (the Korean people) do not realize sufficiently the importance of American aid. At the same time, as I said, the United States also wants to hinder Communism from spreading elsewhere, as a result of a victory in Korea. Should the Communists win there, they would certainly start a similar war elsewhere. (U/l/9-10)

I believe Korea is not far from China. Therefore, it is possible that many Chinese volunteers help the Koreans. When Hitler started war, he promised land and other good things to people who were willing to serve with the SS. He succeeded in winning many young people in this way. Certainly it is the same now in Korea with the Chinese volunteers. For about two years there has been war. The Communists fight there against the Americans. The Russians, who helped the Korean Communists, claim that the US wishes to conquer Korea. I do not believe this. The rich USA does not need Korea at all. The US wants to liberate the Korean people from Communist oppression. The Americans are stronger there, because of the means at their disposal in the way of airplanes and mechanized weapons. The US is superior to its enemies, but it does not want to destroy Korea. That is the reason why the war has lasted for such a long time. Certainly the Koreans fight against the US because their Communist leader lied that the American
capitalists and factory owners wished to exploit Korea as a colony. Actually the Soviet Union intends to help the Communists seize power in all of Korea. If the Soviets were not interested there, the Communists in Hungary would not force medical aid for Korea in Hungary. Besides that, the collections for Korea and the offers to Korea meant increased production in the factories. Under this pretext, much more goods will be transported from Hungary into the Soviet Union than before. (069/11)

Half the respondents in this group had listened to VOA broadcasts while in Hungary, yet not one of them mentioned the presence of the UN in Korea. Some of them named other nationalities as being involved in the fighting along with the Americans, but always in a subsidiary capacity. It seems quite possible that their ignorance of the international nature of the assistance being rendered the South Koreans reflects an unconscious absorption of Communist propaganda which apparently stresses the dominant role of the US in the Korean conflict. That this might well be the case is borne out by the statement of one of the "informed" respondents. He said:

I didn't know much about the Korean War in France. After I returned to Hungary, I heard on the Hungarian radio that the US attacked Korea. The radio did not even admit that the forces of the United Nations were also fighting at the side of the American troops in Korea. From the VOA we found out that Dutch, French, British, Belgians and maybe even Norwegians were also fighting in Korea. (018/19)

As was the case for the totally uninformed respondents, most of the men and women in this partially informed group had no more than elementary schooling. Their greater acquaintance with the Korean situation may perhaps be due to the fact that most of them had lived in small towns or large cities rather than in rural areas.
Factors Influencing Ideas about the Korean War

It is obvious from what has been said that practically all of the respondents have a pro-Western orientation toward the Korean War. It is also apparent that the opinions they express about the various aspects of the war are influenced by such factors as education, exposure to Voice of America broadcasts, and basic attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the United States.

The close connection between awareness of the post-World War II division of Korea into two separate states and awareness of the role the UN is playing in Korea has already been pointed out. With one exception, none of the respondents who failed to distinguish between North and South Korea mentioned the UN as a participant on the side of the South. This means, in effect, that the international nature of the war and the support being given to the South Koreans are completely unfamiliar to the "uninformed" respondents. They appear to interpret the situation very much along the lines defined by Communist propaganda: the Korean war is, to them, essentially a battle of the Koreans, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union and the troops of other Communist nations, against the forces of the United States.

* This respondent, a 27 year old woman, appeared to be confused as to the geographic location of Korea. Her idea about the war was that the US had started it because Korea was somewhere near Vietnam, where the Communists had already won one war. She said of America's motives: "They wanted to get a foothold there in order to cut off the possibility of a Russian advance into India." She mentioned the UN, but declared immediately that this was merely a front for the Americans. When asked who is fighting with the Americans, she replied:

"Only the Americans. They are fighting under the UN flag, but it does not mean anything. That is only a swindle. I do not know why this was necessary." (020/11)
Analysis shows that both education and exposure to foreign broadcasts are important determinants of "informedness". That is to say, respondents who have had less than a high school education are much less likely than those with more schooling to be aware of the post-World War II division of Korea.

Table I.8

"INFORMEDNESS" AND EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University educated</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>Elementary school or less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Informed&quot;</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Uninformed&quot;</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%) =</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, those who did not listen to foreign broadcasts while in Hungary were also less likely than other individuals to know of the North Korean-South Korean split.

Table I.9

"INFORMEDNESS" AND EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN BROADCASTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Listened to foreign broadcasts</th>
<th>Did not listen to foreign broadcasts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Informed&quot;</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Uninformed&quot;</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%) =</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost all of those who listened to foreign broadcasts, of course listened to the VOA. The number of foreign broadcast listeners who did not listen to VOA is too few to allow assessment of the effect of VOA apart from other foreign stations.
Important as education and foreign broadcasts may be in shaping the individual's ideas about the Korean conflict, his basic attitude toward the USSR and the US may be considered even more important. The interviews contain several types of evidence to this effect.

The data clearly indicate a pervasive hostility toward the Soviet Union and a practically unqualified faith in the United States. Unlike what one usually finds in assessing opinions on issues of the day, there is here no range of attitudes. Almost everyone takes the same stand: anti-Soviet and pro-American. In connection with the Korean war, then, it seems that one is dealing with a basic "set" which colors the outlook of all respondents.

The interviews definitely leave one with the impression that the respondents are psychologically unable to attribute justness to anything the Soviets may do or to admit the possibility of ultimate success for them, and that they have a corresponding psychological need to believe that the US represents their own interests and has the power to defeat Communism.

In this connection, it might be pointed out that the "uninformed" respondents interpret the aims of the US in very much the same way as do the "informed" respondents. While they may have accepted Communist propaganda to the extent of believing that the battle is between Koreans and Americans, they obviously reject the Communist interpretation of US motives as imperialistic. Although they may have some difficulty understanding how the Americans came to be fighting in Korea, and how it is that Koreans are fighting against Americans, they nonetheless believe that the Americans are acting with the good of the Korean people in mind.
What the respondents have to say about the relative strength of the two sides provides even more compelling evidence of their need to believe in the United States as the savior of the non-Communist world.

As already indicated, the bulk of the respondents say that the forces of the West are stronger than those of the East. And they say this in face of the facts, as it were, because it cannot be denied that the war has gone on and the UN has not won it.

The respondents are not entirely unaware of this contradiction. This is indicated by the fact that some of them, for example, speak of the US as deliberately prolonging the war for political or other reasons.

The better educated are, perhaps, more conscious of the weakness of their position in believing that the US is stronger than the less well educated. A smaller proportion of the better educated than of those with less education state unqualifiedly that the West is stronger. However, when one combines all those who say that the West is in any way stronger, then the people with university and high school background say the West is stronger just as often as do those with less formal education. And, it might be recalled, only 2 respondents believe that the Communists are stronger.

In other words, from the indirect evidence as well as from comments such as the ones quoted below, it would appear that the Hungarians are prepared to rationalize away any sign that would indicate weakness on the part of the forces fighting against the Communists in Korea:

* That is, those who say unqualifiedly that the West is stronger, plus those who say the West is stronger and has deliberately prolonged the war, plus those who say that the technical superiority of the West outweighs the advantage the East has in manpower.

IFOR, Inc.
People weep when VOA reports American casualties and temporary defeats. They consider the casualties of the West in Korea and compare them to the great numbers of the enemy. But they are glad to hear that American soldiers escape by plane from the Communist trap. They know of the great superiority America has in the air and also that disclosure of their difficulties doesn’t mean weakness. (016/4)

The Hungarian people do not believe that the US is dragging out the Korean War for 25 months because of weakness. Probably it doesn’t want China to intervene in full force in Korea because then there would be a world war before the defense of Europe was completed. On account of political factors, it is impossible to end the Korean War until the Communists can be successfully squeezed into a vise all over the world. We could see that the US and its allies repulsed the Communists in a matter of moments when it seemed as though they would force them out of Korea completely. Such is the power of American mechanised forces there that the Americans could occupy all of Korea within 24 hours. With this in mind, I have no doubt that in Korea the Western powers are stronger. (017/23)

Another example of the force of the respondents’ need to believe in the ability of the United States to win battles against the Communists is found in the comments of two people who referred to the use of chemical warfare by the Americans in Korea. Both these respondents had evidently been exposed to Communist charges that the West was illegally employing such weapons:

The anti-Communist side is stronger there. A Communist first lieutenant told us back home: ‘How smart the Americans are. They released some gas in Korea which makes people and animals fall asleep for 24 hours. In the meantime they drop paratroopers and occupy everything.' Against such preparedness the masses of people the Communists have are useless. (056/1h)

IPCN, Inc.
There was a lot of talk recently about the VOA report that the US would be ready by 1952. We understood this in meaning (that they were ready) not only to start a war, but also to finish it. We compared this to American promises in 1942 and 1943, which always designated 1944 as the year of decision. We felt that the present advanced war techniques of the West would make a long war unnecessary. People combined these estimates with a report in Neziravaya according to which the Americans used certain chemicals in Korea which disabled their opponents for 12 hours. Neziravaya accused the Americans of carrying out prohibited chemical warfare. In conversation, however, we talked about this as a very human manner of waging a war because militarily important territories could be occupied without bloodshed, by capturing thousands of helpless, sleeping people. And they were captured unhurt, and without any adverse physical consequences. Thinking about similar modern weapons made us believe that with their aid a new world war would not last for years. (Od9/10-11)

It would appear from these remarks that the respondents' desire to see the United States emerge victorious from a war with Communists led them to interpret the propaganda to fit their own needs. Instead of making them feel hostile toward the United States (the obvious intention of the Communist propagandists), the propaganda boomeranged: the allegation that the US was using chemical warfare was understood by these respondents as an indication that the US had weapons up its sleeve which gave it the advantage over its Communist opponent.*

In effect, therefore, in their statements about the Korean War, respondents seem to be expressing their hostility toward Soviet Russia and the Communist regime in Hungary on the one hand, and their faith and hope in the Western world on the other.

* References to bacteriological weapons were notably absent in the respondents' discussions of the Korean war. The respondents quoted here who spoke only of gas which only temporarily immobilized the opponent fled from Hungary in November and December of 1951. Apparently, the Communist press had carried such items as far back as November 1951. The issue of germ warfare did not emerge until March of the following year when it was brought up by the Russians before the UN. Because almost all the interviews had been completed before that date, no attempt to probe this area was made.
Summary

All the respondents were aware that there is a war going on in Korea. Seventy-two per cent know that the North Koreans and South Koreans are fighting against each other; the remainder are under the impression that the Koreans are united in fighting against the Americans.

Considering first the "informed" respondents, one-fifth claim to have no idea of how the war in Korea started. With few exceptions, those who expressed an opinion were convinced that North Korean aggression started the war in Korea. At the same time, however, they hold Russia ultimately responsible for the war. They believe that the North Koreans invaded South Korea on orders from Moscow.

Generally speaking, they say that the North Koreans are being assisted by Chinese soldiers sent to the front by command of the Kremlin and that Russia supplies overall direction, food, arms and even pilots, while remaining in the background officially.

As regards the participants on the South Korean side, the United States is generally viewed as the dominant figure. Only one respondent did not name the United States as present in Korea. The majority said that others were also present: two-fifths of them referred to the UN as well as the United States; and one-fifth of them, though they did not mention the UN, spoke of other countries fighting along with the United States. But two-fifths of the respondents mentioned only the US. The latter, however, are not the only ones who view the US as the major participant on the side of the South Koreans. Most of the respondents think

IPCE, Inc.
of the non-Communist forces as "the American side." They speak of the US as the initiator of the movement to aid South Korea, or as the official or de facto leader, or as the heaviest contributor of manpower for carrying on the war.

In discussing the objectives of the Communist side, "informed" respondents generally spoke about what Russia hopes to accomplish by having initiated the Korean war. Their statements varied from the point of view of how concretely they visualized Russia's goal; but most of them in effect said that Russia was out to seize more territory.

Comparably, the aims of the non-Communists were discussed in terms of the United States. Here there was a certain range of opinion; most often people emphasized America's desire to stop the spread of Communism; others stressed the importance of Korea as a strategic base for the Americans in the Far East; still others said both factors were involved. In almost every case, however, respondents conceived of America's action in Korea as defensive.

As regards the relative strength of the two sides, three-fifths of the respondents believe that the non-Communists are stronger than the Communists. Thirty-one per cent state flatly that the West is stronger, 12 per cent say that the West's technical superiority more than compensates for the Communist superiority in manpower; and an additional 18 per cent claim that the US is stronger but is deliberately prolonging the war for reasons of her own. Two people said that the Communists are stronger; and a few believe that the two sides are evenly matched: the West's technical advantage being balanced by the greater resources of manpower which the Communists command. Very few of these people speak
of the possibility of the Korean War having a profound effect on conditions in Hungary; most refer only to incidental or contingent effects. There is reason to believe, however, that these respondents did at an earlier time count on the Korean War as an event which might hasten the liberation of Hungary, but that its "contained" continuation has put a damper on those hopes.

As regards the "uninformed" respondents (i.e., those who gave no indication of knowing that Korea had been divided into two states after World War II), they fall into two groups. Eleven of the 26 people so classified were totally uninformed about the Korean situation. The remainder differ from the other members of the sample in their ideas about the war primarily in that they make no reference to the presence of the UN on the South Korean side. They appear to have absorbed the Communists' description of the war as one between the Korean people as a whole and the forces of the United States. At the same time, however, the interpretation of Russian and American aims resemble those of the "informed" respondents, and they, like the "informed" respondents believe that the anti-Communist side is capable of winning the war.

Three factors play an important role in shaping the respondents' ideas about the Korean War. One is education, the second is exposure to foreign broadcasts and the third is their fundamental bias against Communism and complementary pro-Western outlook. It would indeed seem that in discussing the Korean war, respondents were really expressing their hostility toward Russia and their need to believe in the ability of the United States to bring an end to Russia's power.
CHAPTER II

WORLD WAR III

Is War Coming and Why

The belief that a third World War is likely to break out in the near future is almost universal among these respondents. More than half, in fact, are convinced that a major world conflict is inevitable.

Table 30

IMMINENCE OF WORLD WAR III

| World War III is inevitable | 56% |
| World War III is likely    | 38% |
| World War III is not very likely | 1% |
| No opinion                | 5%  |

Total Cases (100%) = (100).

Fifty per cent of these Hungarians assume that war will come because they find the thought of continued Soviet oppression unbearable. For them, Communism is an intolerable evil which must be destroyed. Since Russia will not give up her gains, especially dominion over the satellite countries, without fighting, war is sure to come. The conviction that present tensions will inevitably erupt into large scale armed warfare thus stems, to a large extent, from the respondents' own determination not to submit indefinitely to Communist domination. Since Hungary cannot realistically hope to undertake the destruction of Communism on her

* The lone respondent who thought a third World War improbable was a peasant boy of 19. He did not fail to point out that people are anxiously awaiting a new war even if they are not able to estimate when or how it will commence.

People at home do not think it is very probable that a new world war will start, and it is very hard for them to imagine where it would start. However, they are waiting for its beginning. (065/21)

TOR, Inc.
own, such statements rest on the assumption that this uncompromising antipathy for Russia is shared by other nations, particularly the US. These respondents simply do not believe or are unwilling to accept the idea that there can be peace in the world until Russia has been destroyed or at least forced to withdraw from the satellite countries.

The Russians are completely exploiting Hungary and the other nations they enslaved in World War II. All these nations want to free themselves of the Communist rule that makes this Russian exploitation possible. It cannot be expected that the Russians will stop this exploitation on their own. Therefore, it can be stopped only by war. (057/10)

The Hungarians think war is unavoidable because this is the only way they expect their liberation from Communism. Without this the country would be completely ruined. (03h/9)

The Hungarians regard the war as unavoidable because the Russians have made themselves at home in Hungary to such an extent that they could not be made to leave without a war. (086/11)

In my opinion, the situation cannot be solved without a war. The Communists refuse to budge, and even if Communism remained in power only over a small territory, it would still represent a danger to the world that cannot be tolerated. (066/1h)

The new world war is unavoidable because the Communists keep the world in a tension that almost equals that of war. There is no sign that they are willing to back down peacefully. Therefore, a normal world situation can be achieved only after a war during which Bolshevism is crushed. (022/1h)

Although many of these comments clearly attribute the responsibility for the existing explosive situation to the USSR, it is suggested that war will come as a reaction from the non-Communist world to existing
intolerable pressures. Twenty-four per cent of the respondents, however, place the blame squarely on the Soviet and suggest that war will come as the result of further aggressive action from the Communist camp. The impending world conflict is viewed as growing out of the willful expansionism of Communism which frustrates American efforts to come to a peaceful agreement. War will come because Russia cannot be permitted to further her plan of conquest unchecked.

In my opinion, this war cannot be avoided because the Soviet Union is striving for world domination. Therefore, it is ever striving to get new territories and to Bolshevise them. (01/14/43)

The Russians want more domination and they cannot be stopped peacefully in this desire. This is why there will be a third World War. (04/21/41)

A small proportion (8 per cent) contend that war is inevitable because of the fundamental incompatibility of the Soviet and democratic systems. The clash of political and ideological interests cannot be resolved without an armed showdown. Such respondents see the world as moving toward an armed conflict as the result of immutable and somewhat impersonal forces which divide the world and make the peaceful coexistence of Communism and democracy impossible. *

* Not infrequently it was extremely difficult to determine in which of the three response categories that have been discussed a respondent properly belonged. A middle-aged woman who had been a housewife and farm worker all her life provides a good example of the problem involved. She started out at one point in her interview speaking in detached terms about the inevitability of war as a result of the cross pressures between the free world and Communism. (Footnote continued on following page)
It is not right to divert the attention and preparations for an inevitable war by dreams . . . . Old and new contrasts among the peoples of the globe, powers suppressing democracy, camouflaged Soviet imperialism, economical, ideological, ethnic, historical, political reasons—all demand a final settlement. (001/9)

You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. So long as Communists remain the leaders in the Soviet Union, we cannot count on the dream of world Bolshevization disappearing. At the same time, so long as the leadership of the West is in the hands of democracy—by this I do not mean the Democratic Party, but quite independently of whether they or other parties are in power—so long as a democratic form of states obtains, we can count on their energetically opposing all Bolshevist aggression. Consequently, there is here such a clash of interests as cannot be resolved without war. (021/40)

* (Footnote continued from preceding page)

The nations are in arms on the Communist and on the opposite side alike. Both sides expect a settlement of accounts. The free world cannot tolerate the existence of the destructive armies of the Communists. On the other hand, the Communists want to maintain their own rule. That’s the reason for the rearmament on both sides and for the military preparedness which must be relieved somewhere through war. (056/13)

Subsequently she spoke of the aggressiveness and desire for expansion of the Russians.

If the Russians are offered a little, they want ten times more. They do not stop in their insatiable, they are hypocritical and so they cannot be trusted even if they are willing to come to a peaceful solution. (056/14)

It was the final phrases of her comment which crystallized her position on why war is inevitable. It is true that cross pressures exist and that Russia is intransigent and bent on conquest, but her conviction that war must come grew primarily out of her own felt need for a showdown with Communism.

An accounting must be called for with the terror of Communists. Since, according to what I have said, this cannot be done peacefully, a new world war is unavoidable. (056/14)
The power factors of world politics determined at the beginning of the twentieth century were still not balanced after World War II. The economic and political forces, already divided into two spheres of interest at that time (the end of World War II) have undertaken such financial obligations in the present period of war preparations that a peaceful solution without a world crisis would be impossible. Such a crisis would be worse for the white man's culture than a war with a successful outcome. (The "successful outcome" is, of course victory for the non-Communist world.)

(92/29)

An additional small number (7 per cent) simply point to Russian unwillingness to negotiate in good faith or make any compromises as evidence that the world cannot escape another major war. This implausible attitude of the Russians is, of course, implied in or clearly a part of most of the comments which have already been quoted. This small group, however, supports the contention that war cannot be avoided simply by reference to the faithlessness and intrusiveness of Russian diplomacy.

The American statesmen would like to come to an agreement with the Russians in order to avoid a new world war. But one cannot come to an agreement with the Russians. The more people give in to them, the more they demand.

(86/16)

About the same number (6 per cent) feel that war will come because the US will not stand for the oppression and exploitation of smaller nations. (They believe that America is too humanitarian to stand by indolently while other peoples suffer under Communism.) "The people of the US will fight to free us and Europe. I think the Americans can't just stand and watch the torment and suffering that exist behind the iron curtain." (59/11)

The table that follows summarizes the reasons given by respondents for their conviction that a new World War is in the offing.

IPG, Inc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communism is evil, unbearable, must be destroyed</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia or Communism is bent on expansion and aggression, must</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be prevented from making further gains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism and capitalism are incompatible, open conflict</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>must come</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia will not negotiate in good faith, will not make any</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compromises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US will not stand for the oppression and exploitation of</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smaller nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cases (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(100)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just 1/4 of the respondents hold out the possibility that war might be avoided at least for the present. This does not mean that these respondents think that war is not likely -- almost all of them think that war is coming. The only factor that most of them consider as serving to postpone all-out war is the naive belief of the Americans that they can successfully negotiate a settlement with Russia. However, none of these respondents really harbors the expectation that Russia will abandon her characteristically adamant stand and make some concessions.

Lacking experience in their own lives, the American people did not sufficiently recognize the Bolshevik danger. They have not sufficiently recognized it yet. Because they are highly cultured and traditionally humane, the Americans understandably protest the idea that the best sons of the US and other nations should perish in a new World War. Because of that viewpoint and the lack of a favorable public opinion for war, US policy is forced to try even what seems impossible in order to avoid World War III. (093/29)

. . . People at home can see from the example of Korea that America does not retreat or shrink from bloodshed. The people know it, even if they see in the meantime that America continues to negotiate politely with Russia at international conferences. They would consider it as a miracle if it were possible to curb a regime so used to bloodshed without war. (052/16)
Who Wants War?

As we have seen, respondents' convictions about the imminence of war are, not unexpectedly, almost invariably related to their conceptions of US and USSR motives and intentions. This section will explore in detail the question of which of the two major powers is most responsible for existing tensions and the war which is assumed by the respondents to be almost upon us. It will also go into the attitudes of satellite nationals themselves toward such a war. It will be necessary to review some of the ideas discussed in the section immediately preceding this in the new context of who wants a third World War as contrasted with whether such a war will break out.

Does the USSR Want War?

Although, as we have seen, Russia is regarded as primarily responsible for the tensions which have combined to make a new war inevitable, respondents are divided on the question of whether Russia is actually seeking an armed showdown with the US at present. Thirty-one per cent feel that Russia wants a war and is preparing for it; 20 per cent consider that Russia would prefer to further her program of conquest by more devious and less costly methods or is genuinely anxious to avoid a definitive test of strength on the field of battle. Forty-four per cent distinguish between the desires of Russian leadership which are categorized above and the wishes of the mass of the Russian people. They generally assert that the Russian people want a war because they too consider it as the only means for liberation from an oppressive regime. A small number (7 per cent) make the point that although Russian leaders may desire to provoke an armed conflict, the Russian people have had enough of war.

IPON, Inc.
Russia wants war and is preparing for it 31%
Russia would prefer to conquer world by small wars, intrigues, fomenting internal dissension in other countries, etc. 14%
Russia is fearful of the consequences of war, genuinely wants to avoid it 6%
Russia is rearming but respondent does not know if she wants war 1%
The Russian people do not want war 7%
The Russian people are awaiting war as the instrument of their liberation or will turn on the regime in case of war 37%
Other 5%
No opinion 23%

Total Cases (100%) = (100)

The active desire for war is almost always directly ascribed to Communist leaders rather than to the Russian people as such. When the Russian people are described as wanting war it is never in the sense of seeking national aggrandisement but rather as an opportunity for throwing off the bonds of oppression.

The leaders of the Soviet Union are preparing a war for the sake of their own ambitions. That is the reason they are not willing to solve problems by peaceful negotiations and dictate to satellite countries the size of the armies they must establish. (07/4/16)

Some respondents report the visible evidence of Soviet mobilisation going on about them as the basis for their conviction that Russia is preparing for a major aggressive blow at the West.
They believe at home that the Russians will start action in Europe also. Russian military trains filled with men and munitions are constantly on their way in Hungary. I saw trains, one after the other, Crept to Ceepal airport, in Dunafoldvar and other places. Returning soldiers say: 'In two months we'll attack Yugoslavia.' There is continuous shooting on the Hungarian Yugoslav border. I saw Russians holding military maneuvers all night long at Hegeshalom. (016/2t)

Three or four of this group who believe that Russia is actually preparing for a full-scale attack on the West judge that Russia does not yet feel strong enough to strike and, therefore attempts to disguise her warlike intents.

The Soviet Union also wants war. She wants to put Communism into power all over the world. However she still wants to save time for consolidation of her power, and this is why the Russians apply their well known tactics. (007/3o)

Closely akin to this last appraisal of Russian policy is the feeling that Russia prefers to further her aims by such techniques as small wars, intrigue, and promoting subversion in other nations rather than gamble on what would at best be a costly military victory. The implication of these statements is not necessarily that Russia does not want war but that she would certainly like to avoid it if she can achieve her plan of expansion without it. Such reasoning not infrequently leads to the conclusion that it would be to the advantage of the US and Western Europe to enter into full scale hostilities now rather than leave the initiative to the enemy.
American policy is aimed at the avoidance of war and at the stopping of the Russians by peaceful means. This, however, is a hopeless thing. The longer the situation drags on in its present form, the more serious it will become. The Russians will not start a war, but they will strain the point as far as they can. Since this way they would push themselves forward step by step, the Russians might believe that they would be able to conquer the whole world in this way if the West isn't firm.* (051/16)

Communists are against war, for this is how they hope to maintain and develop their rule. This is true of the political leaders of the Soviet Union who want to develop Communism and also to extend it to other peoples and develop it further in their own country through securing the kind of peace they like. (062/13)

In Korea too, the Russians are carrying out the same policy that they use in other countries under their rule. Russia draws more and more nations into its sphere of power in order to make the Communist world strong enough to rise against the free world and, primarily against

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* The reluctance of Russia to resort to open warfare as a means of implementing her aspirations to world dominance is explained by this respondent in terms of the unreliability of the armed forces built up from among satellite nationals as well as Russian troops themselves.

I don't think that Russia would dare to meet the West on the battlefield because she cannot trust her own man who had seen Europe in World War II, and she cannot trust the satellite countries either. They would immediately side with the West. She could not use any of the satellite countries' armies. For instance, she could not send the Hungarian army into battle on its own because there is no trained Hungarian military leadership. Secondly, there is no war material supply in Hungary. Obviously, the Russians do not dare to send great quantities of war material to Hungary because they do not trust the country. What they could do would be to send Hungarian youth to Russia in case of war and use them there for service in the interior. Or they might completely scatter the Hungarian army among Russian units. (051/15)

IPC, Inc.
America. Russia does not have its own armed forces in Korea, however. It does not want to create a basis for a US attack against the Soviet Union. ... The Soviet Union mainly wants to strengthen her hold on the countries under her rule so as to put Communism in power in the US too. (063/21/25)

As can be seen, what distinguishes such comments from those to the effect that the USSR is actively preparing for a major aggressive move but prefers to temporize with the West for the present are really hairline shadings of emphasis. The criterion which was used to discriminate between these groups was the degree of willingness to go to war which was ascribed to Russia. The first group felt that a world war is already an integral part of the Kremlin's plan. The second felt that Russia would prefer strongly to avoid war but implied that she would not shrink from it if to do so would mean abandonment of her plan of conquest.

A third group (6 per cent) said Russia is fearful of the consequences of war and genuinely wants to avoid it. These respondents consider that Russia recognizes that full scale war can end only in an ignominious defeat for her and will, therefore, not embark upon such a venture. "The leaders of the Soviet Union do not want war because they think that would end their rule." (066/11)

I do not suggest that they want war. If there were a war they would lose it. If America and England had not helped them, they would surely have lost the previous war. This is certainly well known to the Communist leaders, too. They fear America. (009/13)
Forty-four per cent of the refugees distinguished between the desires of Russian leaders with respect to war, which have been described in the foregoing paragraphs, and those of the mass of the Russian people. A small proportion of these (7 per cent) asserted that the Russian populace does not want a war but will, nevertheless, be forced to do the will of their leaders.

The Russian people do not want war, but the Kremlin rules them and is able to drive them into anything. (086/16)

The Russian people do not have an independent wish. None of the people wants an aggressive war, including the Russians. But they can be forced into it by their leadership. (099/18)

The remaining 34 per cent take a contrary view. The people of Russia do want war and are looking forward to it as eagerly as the people in satellite countries. War means liberation for them too, and they can be expected to help the West wrest power from their oppressors. The Russian people at large, or at least those elements which have had the opportunity to see for themselves that the capitalist world is not the monstrous place depicted by their Communist leaders, will turn on the regime at the first opportunity. Reports given by respondents about the state of mind of the Russian people are, of course, almost always second hand and are generally based on conversations with returned prisoners of war or Russian soldiers stationed in Hungary.

The younger brother of my mother was a prisoner of war for six years in Russia. He worked on a farm, and when he left, the farmer lamented, 'When will you come to liberate us?' My cousin said that he had seen large bills on the walls of railroad stations in Russia saying, 'Don't believe the returning soldiers.' The Russian soldiers were told that in Hungary there were clay
huts and the population was clad in animal hides. They were surprised to see that every house was a real 'store' full of flour, lard and other food. The Soviet soldiers related all this when they returned and strengthened the desire of the Soviet people to be liberated. There will be a revolution in the USSR if the people see that the Soviets are weak. The Russians too want this war. (03/13)

I talked to a couple of Russian soldiers in the vineyard back home last summer. We could understand each other because I knew Slovak. They said that they, too, would like to see the end of Bolshevism in Russia. They said they would rather stay in Hungary if the situation remained as it was in Russia. They said also that the Russian people were very tired of the Communist world because only the Communists were well off there and the other people had no freedom at all. In Russia there cannot build in 30 years what was built in Hungary in five years, and so Russian Communism is even worse than Hungarian Communism. Thus I am sure that the Russian people also want a war that would liberate them from Bolshevism. (04/10)

I heard that Russian soldiers too wait impatiently for the end of the Communist circus. The Russian people are oppressed, just as the people outside of the Soviet Union. They would not mind a war of liberation, either. (04/03/10)

I don't think that the Russian people are very happy about Communism. When the Russians came in 1944, many Russian soldiers were cursing Stalin. The Russian people surely want a war that would liberate them. (04/11)

It is, needless to say, open to doubt that opposition to the regime is as intense or as widespread in Russia as such statements would lead one to believe. These comments are much more useful for what they reflect of respondents' attitudes about war than for any information they might contain about the morale of the Russian citizenry. They are indicative of the general inclination among these respondents to understate and underplay the strength of the Soviet while exaggerating...
the probability of an easy and quick victory by the US and her allies. Victory, many say, can come quickly and easily, and even those who think it may be costly are convinced that it is assured.*

Does the US Want War?

These respondents are as strongly convinced that America does not want war and has made earnest efforts to avoid one as they are that Russia is actively seeking war or is at least responsible for the tensions which make a new World War inevitable. Despite their belief in the desire for peace on the part of the US, however, a great many of these respondents are firmly convinced that the US will fight to defend her own interests and those of other nations against the encroachments of Communism.

Thus, of some 60 per cent who said that the US does not want war, 21 per cent said the US will fight to stop Communism, 20 per cent thought the US will fight to liberate subjugated peoples, and 4 per cent said the US will fight to resist a Soviet attack on herself or friendly nations. The remaining 15 per cent felt that the US will continue to do everything in her power to avert a military contest with Russia. The large "no opinion" group (27 per cent) consists about equally of genuine "don't know" and a number who simply stated that the stage is set for war and skirted the issue of American intentions or desires with regard to war.

* Refer to the Sections, "Do Hungarians Want War" and "Anticipated Consequences of World War III."
Table 53

DOES US WANT WAR?

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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely wants war</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US does not want war but:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will fight to stop Communism (because it is in her own self-interest)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will fight to liberate captive peoples</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will fight if Russia attacks</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US is preparing for war but respondent is uncertain about US war aims</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US will do everything possible to avoid war</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the belief that America will fight is so widespread, it is never implied that America is a warlike country or looks to war as a means of furthering national ambitions. Even a handful (4 per cent) who say that the US definitely wants war consider that America has moved toward war only as a defensive step.

The US wants a third world war too. As long as world Communism is in power the American continent is in danger. The Americans want war because they want to end this danger and want to liberate the world oppressed by Communism. (6/1/13)

Much more common is the notion that although America does not desire war she will fight to defend herself and her interests against the threat of the Communist power drive. As has been noted, 21 per cent made the following type of statement:

American policy is aimed at the avoidance of war, and at the stopping of the Russians by peaceful means. This, however, is a hopeless thing. The longer the situation drags on in its present form, the more serious it will become. . . . Finally . . . the West will be forced to start a war, not only in order to make further Russian violence impossible, but also to correct what has happened previously. (5/1/16)

IPON, Inc.
As one respondent pointed out, American interest in blocking the expansion of Communism happily coincides with the aspirations for freedom of Hungarians and other peoples under the thumb of Moscow.

In my opinion, the American people do not want a third world war. It would mean a huge financial burden for them. We must be clear about the fact that the US is motivated by its own interests and not by the interests of the Hungarian and other people dominated by Communism. However, it is now the common interest of the free world not only to stop but to liquidate Communism. (063/20)

Another 20 per cent, however, feel that the American desire for peace is outweighed by her wish to see freedom safeguarded all over the world rather than by narrow self-interest. "The American people do not favor war, but they would be willing to undertake a war of liberation against Communism." (066/11)

"There is an underground movement which will contribute to the overthrow of the Communist regime in a war because they know that the Communist claim to world rule is opposed to the American tradition which is based on the idea of freedom." (073/17)

Only a direct attack or the total frustration of diplomacy would provoke America to fight according to one respondent. This feeling is shared by a handful of others among these Hungarians.

The American people do not want a war because they still remember the extremely heavy sacrifices in manpower in the two world wars, and also because their moral conscience protests against a new war. However, if they were provoked either by a direct attack or by the complete uselessness of conference table solutions, they would then be willing to relieve the tension with war. (069/27)

A substantial number (15 per cent) simply assert that the US does not want war and will continue to push her efforts to negotiate
a settlement with the USSR. Many of these respondents include the
liberation of Communist-dominated countries among American aims but
maintain that the US would prefer to achieve this liberation through
diplomatic means.

The US does not want war. It does not need
the crops and commodities of other countries.
It does not want to conquer other countries,
and it does not want to enslave other peoples.
It would like to have the peoples liberated
from under Russian rule without a war. (057/11)

The US would like to eliminate the danger of
Bolshevism and to liberate the countries under
its rule through diplomacy rather than war.
We Hungarians all hope that if she does not
succeed in this, America will want to drive
the Russians back by force of arms. However,
we see no signs that this is true behind the
American policy of patient readiness to negotiate
with the Russians. (050/22)

But this attitude is not typical. As has been noted, nearly
half of the respondents have no doubt that the US will eventually, either
of its own volition or under Russian pressure, overcome its reluctance
to go to war and face up to Russia militarily.

Do Hungarians Want War?

Perhaps the most significant finding in the context of respond-
ents' thinking about a future war is that not one among them made the un-
qualified statement that people in their country do not want war. Seventy-
six per cent stated or implied that they would prefer to avoid war but
said that since war is the only way to achieve liberation, they are ready
and willing to undergo the horrors of a major armed conflict. An addi-
tional 21 per cent made no qualifications whatever but simply stated that
they definitely want a war.
Table 5

DO HUNGARIANS WANT WAR?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely want war, no qualifications</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept war as the price of liberation</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cases (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(100)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fifth of the respondents who state unequivocally that their fellow citizens want war characteristically regard war as inevitable and imminent and ascribe to others in unhesitatingly positive terms an immediate and direct readiness for war. They are completely undaunted by the horrors of war and some even shrug off casually the possibility of atomic bombing.

Everybody wants it. Nobody is afraid of the atomic bomb either. If we have to die, we will die. At least those who should die will also die. It doesn’t pay to live like this anyway, in continuous fear of what will happen the next night. (143/13)

* This respondent did not really declare himself against war but hoped that such a war could be fought entirely on Russian territory thus sparing Hungary the destruction and suffering that inevitably accompany such large scale military action.

If there would be a war, they would bomb Hungary again. The country is afraid of this. The Hungarian people surely don’t want to have a war again in Hungary. If they would bomb Russia, wouldn’t that be enough? The Russians would get out of Hungary in this case, too. (008/8)

IPCA, Inc.
In the opinion of Hungarians, the liquidation of Bolshevism through war has already been delayed too long. They would not mind air raids against their country if only the world changed. (060/10)

The Hungarians await liberation from a new World War. In their opinion, even great and new war destruction would not be too high a price for it. Many people say that they would not mind if the Americans came with atomic bombs, if only they came. (096/11)

There was an individual in our village who had come from the town of 'X'. He told us that the women in 'X' used to yell in the streets that it would be better if bombs fell. With this everything is said. The people prefer a war, just so it brings an end to this situation. (061/11)

The overwhelming majority of the respondents (76 per cent) accept the prospect of a new World War as the price which must be paid for liberation from Communism. They take a much more sober view of the misery and destruction which will accompany a new war than does the first group but have decided that continuing life under a Communist regime is the greater evil.

The Hungarian people are very much afraid of the destruction of a new World War; everybody is worried about his parents, children, family. They would like it if the US could find a way to hold back Communism by political means. At the same time, it is deeply rooted in the people that a permanent Communist rule would be intolerable and should be eliminated even if it means war. (060/12-13)

Hungarians, in any case, want to be free of the unendurable rule of the Communists, and if there is no other way, then they want to achieve this even at the cost of war. (053/11)

Of course, it is not the war they actually want but the change in regime. But they know that this cannot happen without a war. (033/15)
Thus, if the testimony of these respondents about the feelings of their fellow nationals is at all accurate, great numbers of Hungarians are looking forward to a war of liberation, having already decided that even the grim prospect of a destructive and perhaps prolonged war is preferable to an indefinite oppression under Communism.
How Will War Start?

Respondents said very little regarding the exact circumstances which will lead to the outbreak of full scale hostilities between the USSR and America. As we have seen, these refugees place the burden of responsibility for existing tensions and the war to come on Russia. America is generally pictured as the non-aggressor — forced to strike back, finally, in the face of the intractable demands and threatening expansionism of Communist Russia.

Precisely under what conditions these pressures will erupt into a new World War is generally left unsaid by respondents. The war, which almost all of them profess to be awaiting anxiously as the instrument of their liberation, will come at some vague time in the future when Russia feels strong enough to take on the West or the US decides it will make no further concessions.

Although they were not directly questioned about who will start the war, about a fourth of the respondents made some comment on the matter. Thirteen of the 25 who commented on who will finally touch off a new war were of the opinion that the crucial act of provocation will come from the Communist camp.

In one way or another the Russians will eventually start it. They will invent something to start it. For example, they might have Hungary attack Yugoslavia, because she occasionally has a few of her men entering Hungarian territory . . . . It might even happen that not real Yugoslavs would enter Hungarian territory but Yugoslav partisans who are directed by the Russians. This would enable Hungary to start a war against Yugoslavia even without Yugoslavia having anything to do with the matter. (023/20)
If nothing else happens, the Soviet Union will attack. It will be the same as with Germany in the last war. Russia will wait until she gets strong enough and then she will attack. The later the war comes the worse it will be for us. (03/13)

The Russians will probably bully one of the people's democracies into starting it. (03/16)

Seven anticipated that the US or simply the non-Communist world would take the conclusive step toward war. "Everybody believes that a third World War will come. Russia will be attacked from both sides -- China and Western Europe -- and Communism will be expelled from the earth." (03/16) Those who expect the US to take the initiative make it clear that the US would do so only as a last resort after all peaceful efforts had proven ineffective. The quotation which follows was used previously to illustrate the reluctance to enter war which is generally attributed to Americans. It is repeated here because it serves equally well to illustrate the point that the US will resort to armed power only after extreme provocation. "... The West will be forced to start a war, not only in order to make further Russian violence impossible, but also to correct what has happened previously." (03/16)

The remaining five of these respondents who discuss the immediate circumstances which will touch off the new war believe that war could break out in a number of troubled areas and that it is not really important who makes the first openly hostile move. Yugoslavia is regarded as a likely place for war to break out by 4 of these 5 individuals.
World War III can break out in 1952-53 in China, Yugoslavia, Persia or possibly India and Pakistan. For the peoples of the satellite nations it is absolutely desirable that war should break out as soon as possible, because in no other way can they shake off Bolshevist oppression. I do not know who will begin the war. Basically, it is not of decisive significance which side opens hostilities. It depends on which side first finds a favorable opportunity for armed attack in the course of the race for the balance of power. (021/4)
Consequences of World War III

The most widely anticipated consequence of World War III is an American victory and concomitantly, the liberation of Hungary. Although only about a third of the respondents said in so many words that America or the non-Communist forces will win the war, the universal desire for war expressed by these refugees is predicated on the belief that America is the only earthly power that can overthrow the Soviet and restore freedom in Hungary. Only a handful of individuals suggested that ultimate victory might possibly go to Russia, and they were simply urging the US to take action soon before Russia can mobilize all her forces.

... the one who strikes first will be the winner. If the Americans become submissive the Russians will get into the saddle. Thus it would be more effective if they did not wait for the Communists to start the attack, but struck hard at them first. The longer they permit the Russians to feed their men in the occupied countries and take most of their goods to Russia, the more they facilitate the situation of the Russians. (018/22)

A few respondents mentioned other developments which they expected from another war. None of these, however, is mentioned by more than four individuals. They include the destruction of Communism, the restoration of private enterprise, economic recovery and full employment, and the formation of a federation of European states.

*IPOR, Inc.*
VOA and World War III

In the light of all these findings about attitudes toward a third World War, what position should VOA take with regard to the prospects of another war? Respondents were asked what they thought the general reaction would be to a VOA broadcast announcing the determination of the US to avoid war at all costs. As we have seen, respondents are generally agreed that the US is not seeking war. They, therefore, would interpret any strong pronouncements by VOA disclaiming the intention to fight, as a sign that the US is prepared to make further concessions to the Soviet. The major fear, of course, is that such concessions might mean an indefinite postponement of the liberation of satellite countries.

Table 55
ANTICIPATED REACTIONS TO VOA BROADCAST THAT THE USA HAS NO INTENTION OF GOING TO WAR

| People would feel themselves betrayed, would be demoralized, discouraged, would stop listening to VOA | 46% |
| People would not believe it | 8% |
| People cannot even understand American concessions to USSR up to now | 5% |
| Position would be acceptable if people were assured that a settlement with Russia (including Hungarian liberation) could be reached without war | 7% |
| Other* | 9% |
| No opinion | 29% |

Total Cases (100%) = (100)

* None of the "other" responses was mentioned by more than two respondents. They include a number of highly disparate ideas, Hungarians will revolt on their own or escape to the West (if America leaves them in the lurch). It's all right for America to say she does not want war now since she is not ready, the US does not recognize the danger she is in, etc.

IFOR, Inc.
The strongest negative reactions came from those who interpreted the question to mean that the US would come to an agreement with Russia that would leave Hungary indefinitely in the position of a satellite. Those who made this assumption asserted that such an announcement would cause bitterness, despair, and even hatred of the US and the VOA. Forty-six per cent of the total sample said people would feel betrayed or demoralized completely if they heard that the US really meant not to take up arms against Communism. Their comments vary in intensity, but all of them clearly show that this question stirred up strong feeling among respondents. Although few of them say so explicitly, the emotional tone of these remarks is one of shocked rejection of the idea that the US will fail to stand up to the Soviet, thus abandoning to their fate those countries already under the thumb of Moscow.

One would think with disdain of the States unless they wage war with the Bolshevik powers. Murderous hate would surge between the two peoples if no final decision is made. (062/8)

The Hungarian people expect VOA to express the love of peace, but also the determination of the US to wage war. If instead of this Hungarians hear that the US wants to avoid war even at the price of letting Communism consolidate in Hungary and other oppressed countries, it would create bitterness and a feeling of suffocation in the Hungarian people. Today there’s hardly any Hungarian Communist leader who wouldn’t admit that instead of prosperity, continuous decay is the lot of the country. Many of them stay in their high positions because they are forced to by those behind the scenes. But it’s evident for the whole people that the consolidation of Communism would mean the destruction of the country. The Hungarian people feel that American humanism and sympathy couldn’t tolerate that and that VOA wouldn’t express the real feelings of the American people if it would propagate such resignation. (062/13)
The Hungarians wait for the VOA to broadcast not only fancy words regarding the sufferings of the Hungarians and empty encouragement about the liberation, but it should mention exactly what means will assure the liquidation of Bolshevism. Of course, it would be a great thing for the Hungarians if this were achieved without a new world war. However, it would provoke tragic feelings in the Hungarians if the VOA said that the US wanted an unconditional maintenance of peace, even at the price of the Communist rule not coming to an end in Hungary. This does not apply to Hungary only but also to their other enslaved neighbors. The Hungarians regard it as impossible that the US could be indifferent to the fate of millions of people while the nations consisting of these people are valuable parts of human culture. (08/3/21)

VOA should never tell the Hungarians that the US wouldn’t go to war under any circumstances because then the people would despair. The Hungarians hope to be liberated by the Americans and it would destroy all their hopes if the US were willing to agree to Communist domination behind the Iron Curtain in order to prevent war. American aid to the Soviet Union during the campaign against the Nazis helped Soviet expansion. This is what the Hungarians think and therefore they expect the Americans to do all in their power to stem Communist aggression. (08/1/13)

*The idea that the US is directly or indirectly responsible for the present advantageous position held by Russia is reiterated by about a fifth of the respondents. They contend that the fact that Russia was able to extend her political and economic frontiers and can now arrogantly defy the world is in large measure a result of lack of foresight on the part of the US and the Western Powers in general after World War II. The implication of these statements which is fairly explicit in the quote above, is that the US is obligated to undo this past mischief by acting effectively now toward the liberation of satellite states.

America was instrumental in helping the Russians to power. The consequences are that the oppressive Communist regime makes the situation of many people impossible and Communism threatens the whole world. If the Russians had not obtained assistance in the second World War, perhaps the Communist regime would have collapsed in Russia. (07/1/1) (Footnote continued on following page)
An additional 8 per cent assert that such reports by VOA would be discredited by most Hungarians. These respondents either ridicule the idea that the US could seriously consider it possible to evade a showdown with Russia or reject the notion that VOA proclamations about the peaceful intentions of the US should be taken to mean that America is prepared to write off the satellite countries as casualties in the cold war.

The Hungarian people wait for the VOA to say that the US wants war because there is no other solution. The Hungarian people cannot imagine that the US still has not recognised this after the experiences gained from dealing with the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. For this reason they cannot believe that the VOA would want to drop the subject by expressing the unconditional readiness of the US to maintain peace. The American radio still says that they want peace. But it is very clear that America wants peace only with conditions and not that the Russians should stay where they are now. America wants peace, but only if the Russians give back freedom to the subjugated people. (075/43)

In addition to the bitter recrimination and scorn aroused by the suggestion that the US might fail to come to the rescue of Hungary,

2 (Footnote continued from preceding page)

The cynicism with which the Soviet Union renounces the obligations undertaken when it was in a difficult position long ago proves that the Soviet Union is the opposite of a fair negotiating partner and that it understands only the talk of superior power. It was a tragic error on the part of the western allies not to think that Churchill was right when he suggested that the fate of World War II should be decided by an invasion through the 'soft underbelly of Europe,' the Balkans. This tragic error was extremely costly because the Soviet Union was able to subjugate huge territories and to Bolshevise them, making Bolshevism an ever-increasing threat to the world. (093/30)
a small group of respondents (5 per cent) express impatience with the US for what appears to them as an abject and dangerous American tendency to placate the Soviet at every turn. They protest that they do not understand the many concessions which the US has already made to Russia.

It can be seen that the US has peaceful purposes because she makes acceptable proposals. The Soviet Union rejects them because she wants war. These fruitless efforts of the US make people annoyed back home. It's a waste of time. If they beat the Russians and wiped the Soviet off the map, then prosperity would follow because Communism would cease to exist. (02h/16)

Only 7 per cent of the total sample seem disposed to accept equably the idea that the US may succeed in avoiding an all-out war with Russia. These respondents, however, make the important reservation that the US should not enter into any agreement which does not guarantee a free (non-Communist) Hungary. The idea of a negotiated settlement of US-USSR differences is acceptable only if Hungarian independence is assured as part of the bargain.

Hungarians would be glad to hear that the US wanted to settle differences with the Russians peacefully. But they could not understand it if the VOA said that the US wanted peace even if it were not possible to liberate the people under the Bolshevik yoke peacefully. The present situation of these peoples is not much better than war, and if the US were to say that it will avoid war at all costs, it would actually mean that it wanted to make this situation permanent. (04h/11)

It seems clear, then, that the US has no problem as far as countering Soviet charges of warmongering is concerned. On the contrary, most of these Hungarians seem to require reassurance that America's desire to preserve world peace will not deter her from finally taking a...
firm stand against the Soviet and moving effectively toward the liberation
of satellite countries. Declarations of American desires for peaceful
coexistence, according to these respondents, must always indicate the
firm resolution to resist any new aggressive moves from the Soviet camp
and to assure Hungarian liberation.
Summary

The belief that a third World War is imminent is almost universal among these respondents. In fact, more than half of them are convinced that such a war is inevitable. The conviction that present tensions will inevitably erupt into large-scale armed warfare appears to stem primarily from the respondents' own determination not to submit indefinitely to Communist domination. They assume that the US shares their own implacable antipathy for Russia and will not tolerate further Russian expansion or permit Russia to consolidate her hold on satellite countries. Since Russia has committed herself to a program of political and economic expansion and is prepared to further her ends by any means, the situation can only result in war.

Although Russia is regarded as primarily responsible for the tensions which combine to make a new World War inevitable, there is some disagreement about whether Russia is actively seeking open warfare with the US at present. Substantial numbers of respondents feel that the Soviet would prefer to achieve her aims without dissipating her own resources in a costly war against the non-Communist world. Cold war techniques of infiltration, the fomenting of small wars of attrition through her satellites, and other similar methods better serve the Kremlin's plans. Many consider that the Russian people as distinguished from their leaders are eagerly awaiting war as a source of their own liberation. Such considerations also serve to increase the reluctance of Russia to face America on the field of battle.

The US is pictured as deeply concerned about the preservation of world peace but determined to resist any attempt by Russia to extend...
her political borders. In this regard, America is chiefly motivated by
the need to protect her own economic and political interests, although
she is also interested in the extension of democratic guarantees to
subjugated peoples.

Hungarians themselves, according to these respondents, have
already weighed the issue and decided that war is preferable to continued
domination by Russia. The threat of war, which has struck fear into the
hearts of millions the world over, thus represents for these respondents
and others like them in their home countries the only means to achieve
a longed-for liberation.

There is little said about the exact circumstances which will
lead to actual warfare, but it is generally agreed that provocation will
come from Russia or one of her satellites. Although the Soviet is con-
sidered to be the one actively seeking to embrace the West in an armed
struggle, respondents seem confident that ultimate victory will go to
the West. The most widely anticipated consequences of a new World War
are an American victory and Hungarian liberation.

There are indications that any sustained emphasis by VOA of
the desire of the US to preserve world peace may be interpreted by the
listeners behind the Iron Curtain to mean that America is prepared to
make further concessions to the Soviet and that they are to be abandoned
indefinitely to Communist oppression. If such an interpretation gained
any real ground, VOA would no longer be listened to, and great despair
would spread over Hungary, according to many respondents; but the thought
of America's giving in to Russia is so contrary to Hungarian hopes and
beliefs about the world situation that moderate broadcasts, reaffirming
the desire and willingness of the US to reach a peaceful settlement with Russia apparently would do little to impair Hungarian faith in the US.
CHAPTER III

THE UNITED NATIONS

Familiarity with the United Nations

Only one third of the Hungarian respondents were familiar with the aims and membership of the United Nations. One quarter had some misconception about the UN: 13 per cent of the total sample thought that the UN is a military alliance against the Soviet Union.

The United Nations was organized in America against the Russians. From it was born the Atlantic Pact, with the participation of the three Western Nations. The Hungarians trust that they will achieve a settling of accounts with Communism. (058/15)

Three per cent thought the UN is an economic organization; 9 per cent had a variety of other misconceptions. The following, seemingly rather odd, conception of the UN appeared in two or three Hungarian interviews. The countries mentioned as UN members are the chief places to which Hungarian refugees and DP's were able to emigrate through the offices of the UNR, a United Nations agency. It is this fact which evidently was responsible for this particular confusion.

The US, Canada, Australia and Brazil are the United Nations. Whenever it is necessary, one will help the other. They will discuss which of them needs what and they will act accordingly. They don't wage wars against each other. (025/11)

Of the remaining 42 respondents, 26 said they had heard of the UN but did not know what it is, and 16 said they had never heard of it.

VOA preferents and listeners were better informed than other respondents; however, more than a quarter of the listeners had misconceptions about the UN and 30 per cent of them did not know what it is.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have accurate knowledge</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>VOA Preferents and Listeners</th>
<th>Non-Listeners to VOA</th>
<th>Non-Listeners to Foreign Broadcast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>about UN</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have misconceptions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think UN is a military</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alliance against USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think UN is an economic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other misconceptions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have heard of UN but</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know what it is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of UN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Equality and Inequality among UN Members

Of the 33 Hungarian respondents who were informed about the membership and aims of the UN, over half thought that all UN members have an equal voice in the organization; 15 per cent thought that the UN is dominated by the great powers.

Table 57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informed Respondents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All UN members have an equal voice</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UN is dominated by the great powers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UN is dominated by the US</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents who said that the UN was dominated by the great powers were thinking mainly of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The individual member states have their equal voting rights in vain, because the Soviet Union is able to frustrate the will of the majority in important questions through the use of its veto right. (04/29)

The establishment of the big powers' veto right in the Security Council, however, meant a considerable limitation of voting equality and the consequences of its (the veto's) use had damaging results. Aided by that (veto right), the Soviet Union was able to monkey-wrench the great achievements expected from the UN. (09/31)
Effectiveness and Importance of the UN

Of the 33 informed respondents, 13 considered the UN to be an effective organization. Nine of them based this feeling largely on the action taken against Communist aggression in Korea:

The United Nations are strong. Their troops know why they are doing what they are doing. . . .

In the Korean war the United Nations showed their determination in the face of Bolshevism. (03/7/15, 16)

A number of respondents did not feel that the UN is presently very effective, but thought it might become so if the United States took a more aggressive stand, or if the Soviet Union were expelled.

You cannot expect anything from this organization unless they expel Russia. She is the one who does not want unity with anybody. She wants to become the master of the world. If they would expel the Russians, things would start moving immediately. There would be nobody to contradict everything. Then, the work could be done. And especially, the war against them could be started. (03/4/16)

Small nations are represented in the UN as well as larger ones. All together they could form a majority against the large nations. Only the Russians make difficulties in the UN in the same way that they make difficulties in other international relations. The Russian problem must be solved. (06/5/17)

A few respondents stated flatly that the UN cannot be effective in controlling disputes among the great powers:

This is the union of the peoples of the world, excluding the vanquished states of World War II. At the time of its formation, its aim was to preserve peace. This did not succeed as it should have, because the UN broke into two camps which hinder its operations. On one side there is the Soviet Union with its satellites. On the other side are all the other countries. I cannot mention any example, but in the group of the Western
states the small countries can also have their say, and they are also paid attention to. People back home are not clear about the meaning of the UN. Besides this, the feeling back home is that the UN cannot do anything effective concerning the Hungarian situation. Its biggest success to date has been resisting the Korean attack. The Russians did not officially intervene in Korea, and so they remained in the UN. But this shows what kind of confused situation the Soviet Union creates in the UN. All I expect from the UN is to keep the Western states together. There are matters made public by the UN Economic Council which are useful to the world. But the UN alone will not solve the fate of the world. This task has grown bigger than the UN can cope with.

(03/18)

Table 58
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informed Respondents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN is effective</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN would be effective if</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US were more aggressive or</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union were expelled</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN is ineffective</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly half (15) of the 33 informed respondents said that others back home feel as they do about the UN; a third (11) made no estimate of the feelings of the rest of the population; 6 claimed that the UN is not discussed much in Hungary. The Hungarians, this last group said, expect their liberation to come at the hands of the United States, and it is America that is discussed rather than the UN.

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At home (in Hungary) people don't discuss the UN. Maybe they don't even know what it is. They speak about America. People don't make a distinction when speaking; everything is America in their discussions; nobody mentions Canada or the UN when speaking about politics. Yugoslavia, too, is often mentioned during political discussions. People don't pay attention to the UN and don't even expect it to do anything important — they expect everything from America. (095/20)

One Hungarian respondent who did not say that he himself considered the UN to be ineffective did say that the people back home had no great hopes for it:

People back home don't know much about it. They do not understand why the Russians are in it. I don't know that, either. If she wants war, anyway, why doesn't she keep sitting there? She hinders unity and makes a war debate out of everything. I do not know what important thing the world organisation has accomplished so far. Should it want to do something important, the Russians would oppose it, anyway. She opposes everything that might be good for Hungary or the (other) peoples' democratic countries. (024/18)
SUMMARY

Thirty-three per cent of the Hungarian respondents are informed about the membership and aims of the UN; 25 per cent have some misconception about the UN and 12 per cent don't know what the UN is.

Among VOA listeners the proportion with accurate knowledge about UN membership and aims is 13 per cent.

Of the informed respondents, 15 per cent do not feel that the UN is at present effective, 40 per cent feel that it is effective and 15 per cent say they don't know. Those who are convinced of the UN's effectiveness are mainly impressed with the action taken in Korea.
Familiarity with the Marshall Plan

While the Hungarians had little or no knowledge of the technical details of the Marshall Plan, half of them knew (1) that the US sponsored the Plan; (2) that the beneficiaries were Western European countries; (3) that it involved some kind of economic aid from the United States. Respondents who had this much knowledge were classified as "informed about the Marshall Plan." Here are some typical examples of how respondents so classified described the Plan:

The Plan was worked out by the American general, Marshall, to aid the nations which had gotten into a difficult situation as a result of World War II. The aid consists of financial loans, industrial machinery and other means of production. I don't know which countries receive such aid, but I believe that Germany gets it, too, and that Austria received 120 million dollars under the Marshall Plan. (087/29)

America gives it to the Western states. She gives money and goods for which these states have a use. This was necessary because the Western European states, too, were in ruins. This is a loan. (081/24)

This is a form of American aid. America gave it after the war to countries which asked for it. This was a long term loan with which America helped these countries to get over their difficulties. They could rebuild better with the help of it. (078/17)
Table 59
INFORMATION ABOUT THE MARSHALL PLAN AND EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN BROADCASTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>VOAA Preferents</th>
<th>VOAA Listeners</th>
<th>Non-Listeners to VOAA</th>
<th>Non-Listeners to Foreign Broadcasts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informed about the Marshall Plan . . . 45%</td>
<td>6h%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Marshall Plan was a military alliance against the USSR . . . . . . . 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have some other misconception of the Marshall Plan . . . . . . . 8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have heard of the Marshall Plan but don't know what it is . . . . . . . 20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not heard of the Marshall Plan . . . . . . . 20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%) = (100)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A few respondents said that the Marshall Plan was a military alliance against the USSR:

The Marshall Plan is the unification of Western European countries and the establishment of a defense alliance against the Soviet Union. This is higher politics, the details of which I do not know. (05/16)

A few thought that the Soviet Union rather than the United States was included in the Plans:

The Marshall Plan is an economic agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western European states. But I really don't know anything about it. (07/9/14)
Appraisal of US Motives for Sponsoring the Marshall Plan

All but one of the informed respondents offered some interpretation of the motives behind American sponsorship of the Marshall Plan. The overwhelming majority of these (81 per cent) felt that the motive was to help western Europe to recover economically from the consequences of the war:

I know that the American General Marshall started an action in order to help countries which had too great losses as a result of the war. . . . It was the humanitarian duty of the US to help the feeble and the people who were too weak to help themselves. That was General Marshall’s idea. The aim of the plan is to help the industrial and commercial development of Europe. (005/17)

A few respondents mentioned political and military motives in connection with Marshall Plan aid:

The Americans give aid to certain Western European states. These states have been in a bad material situation since the second World War. The aim of the aid is to prevent a Russian invasion of these countries. (059/11)

I said before, the Marshall Plan helps the people and prevents the spread of dissatisfaction the way the Russians would like in the interest of the victory of Communism. (016/15)

Only 10 per cent of the informed respondents mentioned preventing the growth of Communism as a motive of the Plan. Only 6 per cent mentioned the development of a strong West as a motive. Twelve per cent said the United States hoped to gain military allies in direct return for the aid. Altogether, only 28 per cent of the informed respondents mentioned political or military motives, and all but 3 of these 11 people mentioned economic motives as well.
Table 60

UNITED STATES MOTIVES IN SPONSORING THE MARSHALL PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic motives:</th>
<th>Informed Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve economic conditions</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make a (normal) loan</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote trade between Europe and US</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a market for US goods</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and military motives:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent the growth of Communism</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote the development of strong countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which can serve as allies</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a strong West</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%) =</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretations of the Marshall Plan which attribute solely selfish motives to the US, such as "the establishment of US influence in Europe," were not given at all by the Hungarian respondents. The few who listed this or who mentioned "to provide a market for US goods" among the motives also mentioned, along with these, such altruistic motives as improving the economic conditions of other countries.
Attitudes Toward Communist Propaganda Against the Marshall Plan

Seventy-two per cent of the 49 informed respondents were familiar with Communist propaganda against the Marshall Plan, but claimed that the Communist arguments had no effect:

After World War II this was the Plan with which the US helped the impoverished European nations economically. The Communists hate it, because with this Plan the West has revived economically, has become able to defend itself, and because America became popular in Western Europe. People back home know little about the Marshall Plan. According to the Communists, under this Plan the US dumps its unusable commodities on Western Europe. People do not believe this. However, most of the time they don’t know what it is all about. (03/3/15)

Five informed respondents (12 per cent) mentioned Communist arguments which they said they were unable to answer:

They (the Communists) said that because of the Marshall Plan the European countries have gone economically bankrupt. I do not know what the truth is... (02/3/20)

According to the Communists, it is a preparation for the new war. I know that this is not so, but I am unable to answer them because I don’t know just how thing stand. Others do not know about it either, at least I didn’t meet anybody who did because they would have told me. While I was listening to it, the VOA did not talk about this. It would be good to tell the truth, because the Communists are lying about it so much. (02/4/16)

Two informed respondents (4 per cent) said that the Communists were no longer talking much about the Marshall Plan and six (12 per cent) had nothing to say about the Communist propaganda against the Plan.
Attitudes of Respondents with Misconceptions

Table 59 shows that there were eleven respondents in the sample who had misconceptions of the nature of the Marshall Plan. Of these, the three who thought that the primary objective of the Marshall Plan was preparation for war by the West approved of the Plan:

Countries belonging to the Western sphere, that is, England, France, Italy, and Greece, received financial aid from the US under the Marshall Plan for the purpose of military preparations, and to secure work opportunities. The latter was achieved by construction, mostly of military installations such as airfields and barracks. They secured the workers through the trade unions. According to the Communists, all of the Marshall Plan aid goes for rearmament purposes. I, too, think this is true, but one can only be happy over it, because it serves the liberation of the oppressed masses of people. (01/0/11)

The other 8 respondents were so completely misinformed about the nature of the Marshall Plan that their attitudes have little meaning:

I heard this term used by older people. When the Austrians and Hungarians were together in the monarchy that was the Marshall Plan. I have never heard of that recently. (01/0/10)
Summary

Only half the Hungarian respondents were informed about the Marshall Plan; 60 per cent did not know what it was. There were relatively few respondents who had misconceptions about the Plan.

Most Hungarian respondents thought that the US' motive in sponsoring the Plan was to aid Western Europe to economic recovery. Only 26 per cent of the informed respondents mentioned preventing the spread of Communism or building a strong West as motives of Marshall Plan aid.
CHAPTER V
YUGOSLAVIA

Familiarity with the Political Situation of Yugoslavia

Since Yugoslavia is a neighbor of Hungary and since there are both a substantial Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia and a Croat minority in Hungary, relations between the two countries have historically been lively. It is not surprising that the Hungarian respondents were quite well informed about the political developments in Yugoslavia since the end of the war. Sixty-two per cent knew both that the Yugoslav regime has broken with Moscow and that it has remained Communist; 26 per cent knew about the break, but were under the mistaken impression that Yugoslavia since that time has been non-Communist; 3 per cent had not heard about the break; and 9 per cent said that they knew nothing about political developments in Yugoslavia since the war. Sixty-nine per cent of foreign broadcast listeners as opposed to 35 per cent of non-listeners were informed about these developments.

Table 61
INFORMATION ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA AMONG LISTENERS AND NON-LISTENERS TO FOREIGN BROADCASTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Listeners</th>
<th>Non-Listeners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know about Yugoslav political developments</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know that Yugoslavia is still Communist</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know about Yugoslav-Moscow break</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed about Yugoslav political developments</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases (100%)*</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IPCR, Inc.
Attitudes toward US Aid to Yugoslavia

Of the 62 respondents who knew about Tito's rise to power and break with Moscow, all but 5 also knew about American aid to Yugoslavia and all but 10 expressed some attitude concerning this aid.

Three considerations entered into these attitudes. The first, mentioned by 76 per cent of the informed respondents, was the strategic advantage, both military and political, of having Yugoslavia on the side of the West. The Hungarians felt that in case of war with Russia the Yugoslav Army would be very valuable. They also inferred, from reading the domestic press, that Tito's defection was felt by the Moscow-controlled Hungarian Communists to be a bitter blow to their prestige. From this point of view they thought that aid to Yugoslavia was justified.

There were other things, however, to be said against the policy of aid. For many, 27 per cent, the incongruity of giving aid to an avowedly Communist country, as part of an anti-Communist crusade, was a cogent objection. Interestingly enough, almost as many respondents (19 per cent) cited the traditional hatred between the Hungarians and the Serbs as a reason for mistrusting Yugoslavia.

Many of the respondents were evidently pulled in two directions by these arguments pro and con, so that their attitudes form a continuum with no very sharp breaks, from those who gave the most weight to the strategic considerations to those who gave the most weight to the need for taking a consistently anti-Communist position.

Those respondents have been classified as having favorable attitudes who summed up their own stand on the subject as favorable to

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US aid. Most of them cited the strategic considerations as their reason, but a quarter of them mentioned one or both of the other arguments to indicate that they had some reservations. An example is the respondent quoted below:

It is right that Yugoslavia receives American aid, because she was destroyed in war. It is necessary that she should have an army, ready to strike. This reason is exactly what hurts the Hungarian Communists. Whenever the Hungarian broadcasts began to say 'the bandit of Tito . . . .' I generally shut the radio off, because I was not interested in what it was planning to say further. I believe that Yugoslavia will fight together with America, but many people in Hungary say that Tito cannot be trusted. I don't really know how the thing stands. There is some truth in the fact that Tito is just another Communist, and that the Serbs are merciless and would kill the Hungarians without compassion should there be a war, but, on the other hand, I also hope that Tito and his people will become sensible. (I think) that Eastern European solidarity would then become stronger than the hatred (between the Hungarians and the Yugoslavs). (018/23-2b)

Respondents who mentioned arguments both for and against aid, without themselves taking a very definite stand pro or con on the subject were classified as having mixed attitudes. The tenor of most of these mixed responses was to accept the strategic value of extending aid to Tito but to emphasise the dangers of this alliance, with which they as Hungarians feel very familiar, and the need to exercise great caution. That they emphasized the dangers rather than the positive value may be due to the fact that little more need be said in behalf of aid since it is now a fait accompli. Both the respondents in this group who are quoted below were informed people, interested in politics:

IFOR, Inc.
The US is supporting Yugoslavia with money. This is to strengthen a state which will be an important power in the fight against the Soviet Union. Many people at home enjoy the fact that Tito has blotted out Stalin. Yet many other people think as I do that Tito, in case of a war, could cause much trouble to the Western Allies if he were to break agreements entered into with them. Hungarians know the cruelty of Serbians from the past and think that it would be just the same in a new war. (007/15)

Tito was schooled in Moscow, therefore the US is warming a snake in its bosom when supporting Tito. I don't believe in any solution of the Danube basin problem where Tito is the main factor. It is right to use Tito's army as cannon fodder, but the US should watch out not to catch a bear by the tail with Tito. * The US should be careful not to get involved in situations and obligations when aiding Tito which would, in the long run, serve to strengthen Communism. Hungarians generally feel this way about the Tito problem. I was shocked when arriving in the West to see that the Western press is now praising Tito. In my opinion, Tito is just as great a gangster and mass killer as Stalin. (001/21)

Respondents classified as unfavorable to US aid for Yugoslavia either stated explicitly that they were opposed to it or else seemed to give greater weight to the negative than to the positive considerations.

One of these was a former official of the Peasants' Association who had rather anti-American attitudes in general, as compared with most Hungarian respondents:

The reasons for American aid to Tito's Yugoslavia are rooted in the same unfortunate policy in which lie the reasons for the postwar recognition of the Soviet Union's Bolshevist Party in international politics. Tito's acceptance by the West means the choosing of the lesser evil in deteriorated political conditions. Since they (the Western powers) did not succeed in enabling the followers

---

* Literally "to catch a Turk with Tito."
of King Peter - Mikhailovic - to assume power (in Yugoslavia), they at least wanted to use Tito, first against the Germans and then against Stalin. The Hungarians hold it against Tito that Hungarian refugees were badly treated in Yugoslavia, that many were sent to forced labor camps or forced to return to Communist-ruled Hungary. They (the Hungarians) do not respect his (Tito's) personality and they regard him as an adventurer who cannot become a friend of the Hungarians under any circumstances. Having the memory of the traditional borders of Hungary the Hungarians dislike Yugoslavia, which was enriched by large territories to the detriment of Hungary. For all these reasons the Hungarians are not happy about the aiding of Yugoslavia by the US. The realistic political reasons for the program do not greatly impress the Hungarians. (092/30)

Table 62 below shows the distribution of attitudes toward aid among the informed respondents.

Table 62

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUDES TOWARD US AID TO YUGOSLAVIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved of aid (mentioned no reservations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved of aid but had some reservations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapproved of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No attitude expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cases (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IFOR, Inc.
Attitudes of Respondents Who Have Misconceptions Concerning Yugoslavia

Of the 29 respondents who had misconceptions about the present political situation in Yugoslavia, 20 expressed attitudes toward US aid. Eighteen of these, believing that Yugoslavia is no longer Communist, approved of the aid for strategic reasons.

I read in the newspaper about this (aid to Yugoslavia), that arms were being manufactured in Western Austria (the Western-controlled sector) and sent to Yugoslavia. That is all I know about the aid to Yugoslavia. It is right to aid Yugoslavia, because she is not a Communist state and she is against Russia. (096/12)

One respondent had a mixed attitude because he was afraid Tito would revert to Communism and one disapproved of aid because he mistrusted the Serbs.

* As shown in Table 61, 26 per cent did not know that Yugoslavia is still Communist; 3 per cent did not know about the Yugoslav-Russian break.
Summary

For most Hungarians who are aware of current political developments in Yugoslavia, the advantage of having this country in the Western camp justifies the extension of American aid to the Tito regime. However, the respondents remain suspicious of Yugoslavia because it is still a Communist country and because of their historical mistrust of the Serbs. Even those who approve the aid policy feel that special care must be exercised lest Tito betray his new friends in the West.
CHAPTER VI
FAMILIARITY WITH THE COMINFORM

On the whole, the Hungarian respondents knew very little about the Cominform. Seventy-nine per cent did not know what the name refers to, although a third of these said they had heard it before. Five per cent gave a fairly complete and accurate description of the organization. Fourteen per cent had some conception of what it is but their ideas were either partly wrong or incomplete. Two respondents did not answer the question on Cominform. All of the correctly informed respondents are all but one of the partly informed were VOA listeners.

Table 63
FAMILIARITY WITH THE COMINFORM AMONG LISTENERS AND NON-LISTENERS TO VOA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Cases (100%)</th>
<th>VOA Listeners</th>
<th>Non-Listeners to VOA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never heard of Cominform</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard of it, but don't know what it is.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly informed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially wrong or incomplete conception</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondent quoted below was considered to be correctly informed about the Cominform.

The real aim of the Cominform is to bring the Communist parties of various countries under a completely uniform political influence, namely, the influence of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union. The apparent aim is to maintain

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an international mutual information service re-

regarding political matters of the Communist

Parties. (092/30)

A frequent misconception was that the Cominform is an associa-
tion of Communist governments, including only the Soviet Union and its
satellites. Respondents who thought this did not know that the Cominform
includes the Communist Parties of some non-Communist states.

The Cominform is an organisation of the satellites
led by the Soviet Union. One can't know anything
about its activities. It could be an organisation
similar to the Atlantic Pact. (076/23)

The Cominform is an organization to keep the Com-
munist states under control. It seems that no
deception from the Russian doctrine occurs. I
think its meetings are held in Bucharest. There
is spying, for instance, in Hungary, to see
whether governmental officials try to do any-
thing against Russian instructions. It prevents
any attempt for removal of the system. Its mem-
bers are the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Albania, and Czechoslovakia. I don't
know whether Eastern Germany belongs to it, too.
Anti-Titoist Serbs in exile represent
Yugoslavia, which formerly was also a member of
Cominform. The seat of the Cominform was in
Belgrade then, but later Yugoslavia was expelled
from membership. (007/29)

A good number of respondents, who were vague about the exact
formal organization of the Cominform knew that it was the organ for central
direction of Communist activities throughout the world.

The Cominform serves the organization of Communist
terror and subversion all over the world. It is
an organization of the Soviet Union towards such
an aim. (058/15)

The Cominform is an organization operating in
Moscow, which directs Communist espionage, organ-
izes strikes and carries out propaganda for Com-
munism in leaflets and newspapers, all over the
world. (087/19)

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(The Cominform included) the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the satellites. I don't know where its headquarters is, probably in Moscow. It directs the activities for the internal disintegration of Western countries. The common people know little about this at home, because this is not the thing they are the most worried about. (052/17)

One respondent explained that the Hungarian people, except for listeners to the foreign radio, are not familiar with the Cominform because the Communists have recently stopped talking about it.

After the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia became permanent, the Hungarian Communist propaganda stopped mentioning the Cominform and for that reason most of the Hungarians know hardly anything about the Cominform. The intelligentsia and most of the people who listen to Western radio are still clear about both the Cominform's officially expressed aim of serving the cultural collaboration of Communist states, as well as about the truth that behind this hidden aim stands an organization of international propaganda and subversion, a descendant of the Comintern. (053/32)