

Radio Free Europe, München

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THE HUNGARIAN LISTENERS OF
WESTERN BROADCASTS

AN AUDIENCE REACTION AND ATTITUDE SURVEY
BASED ON 315 PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH
HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

RESEARCH & LIBRARY
RADIO FREE EUROPE

Audience Analysis Section
Radio Free Europe
Munich, Germany

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I.
INTRODUCTION



THE SAMPLE AND THE METHODS OF RESEARCH

The present study took advantage of the last large influx of Hungarian refugees into Austria in order to have a group available which was still large enough to be representative of the Hungarian population; at the same time it was not to be as strongly under the immediate impact of the Hungarian revolution as previous groups of refugees had been. Most persons interviewed left Hungary two or three months after the revolution had ended.

The mere fact of having fled the country does not make the refugee population unrepresentative. A number of investigators (S. Kracauer, P. L. Bakman, R. C. Sheldon and others) have found that escape is not necessarily related to attitudes and opinions basically different from those of the non-escaping population.

In other words results based on a scientifically obtained sample of the refugee population are (within definable limits) representative of the attitudes of the total population.

The sample (315 respondents) was drawn from among Hungarian refugees found in Austria. The quota sampling method was used, which means that the respondents were so selected as to be representative of the Hungarian population as a whole. This procedure was made possible because statistics were available (see Section XII for a more detailed discussion) delineating the composition of the home population in terms of sex, age, occupation, place of residence, education and religion.

The actual field interviewing and the technical processing of the material was done by an Austrian opinion and market research organization, Institut für Markt- und Meinungsforschung. Thus reliability of the results was probably increased, as the identity of the sponsor of the research did not have to be disclosed. The study was designed, supervised and analyzed by the Audience Analysis Section of Radio Free Europe. Dr. Walter Fessel, President of the Institut für Markt- und Meinungsforschung, very ably aided the Audience Analysis Section in many aspects of this research project.

The interviews were conducted by a trained staff of Hungarian interviewers in the summer of 1957.

One important aspect of this study is its relatively high degree of projectability due to the statistical information available on the total population distribution which was used in the construction of the quota sample (Section XII). The successfully employed method of projective questioning (as used in Sections IV, IX, X and others) may become increasingly useful in the type of opinion research where direct samples from target populations cannot be drawn.



ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The report is divided into an introduction, 12 sections of main findings, and an Appendix which includes a tabulation of all results by population group breakdowns.

Section II through XII present the main findings and some preliminary conclusions which can be drawn from them. The tables in the Appendix are so arranged that they correspond to the various sections of the main findings which are primarily a statistical and verbal summary of the raw results tabulated in the Appendix. The reader is invited to consult the specifically designated sections of the Appendix when seeking more information on any subject.

At this time our primary interest is to present the major part of the quantitative data and the statistically most relevant and revealing aspects of the findings. Later analyses will more fully concern themselves with specific implications and interrelationships of these findings. Subsequent reports will deal in greater depth and more analytically with certain sections of this report.

It should be pointed out that the percentages listed in most of the tables of the main findings often refer only to particular population groups answering a certain part of a question and so cannot equal 100%. The tables in the Appendix show percentages (ratios) as well as absolute figures indicating the total numbers responding.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Many of the results presented here may have some applicability so far as other target countries are concerned.

Radio programs were grouped in broad categories (as well as investigated individually) in order to make the results pertinent and useful even after specific program changes have been made. This usefulness is not as quickly exhausted with the passage of time as would be the case with an analysis confined to specific programs.

Some questions are analyzed in terms of a certain group's communism-proneness. This group was isolated by asking relevant questions as described in Section XII, pages 88 and 89.

The sections on Listening Habits (II and IV) and on Program Preferences and Recommendations (III) are by far the most detailed in this study, in as much as the research project was primarily undertaken to investigate those areas. In many other areas (VII, VIII, X, etc.) the study is experimental, dealing for the first time quantitatively with questions which, in this specific context, have been up to now largely the preserve of non-quantitative methods of research. Subsequent research will have to show which of these experimental techniques can be employed most usefully.



MAIN FINDINGS



II.

GENERAL LISTENING HABITS (WESTERN BROADCASTS AND RFE)

LISTENING IN GENERAL
REGULARITY OF LISTENING INCLUDING
EXPENDED TIME
THE LISTENING TIMES



LISTENING IN GENERAL

Of the total of 315 interviewed persons 305 were listeners of Western broadcasts. This means that 97% of the sample of the population listened to Western broadcasts.

DID YOU LISTEN TO WESTERN BROADCASTS?	
Did listen.....	97%
Did not listen.....	<u>3%</u>
	100%

The 10 people (3%) who did not listen to Western broadcasts gave the following reasons for not listening:

REASONS FOR NOT LISTENING TO WESTERN BROADCASTS	
I did not have a radio.....	5 persons
I had no opportunity.....	3 persons
No answer.....	<u>2 persons</u>
	10 persons

This means that for all practical purposes all people who had radio sets or who had the opportunity to listen to a radio listened to Western broadcasts.

Of the 305 persons who listened to Western broadcasts 96% also listened to RFE. This means that 93% of the total population listen to RFE. These listenership figures are extremely high and probably without precedent. The following table demonstrates the overall listening habits of the population sample so far as RFE is concerned:



DID YOU LISTEN TO RFE BROADCASTS?

	<u>% of the total population</u>	<u>% of Western broadcast listeners</u>
Did listen.....	93%	96%
Did not listen.....	7%	4%
	100%	100%

Between men and women no significant differences exist so far as listening to Western broadcasts of RFE is concerned. The following table illustrates that men and women listen in about the same proportion to Western broadcasts and to RFE:

LISTENERS OF WESTERN BROADCASTS AND OF RFE BY SEX

	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>
Men.....	96%	93%
Women.....	97%	93%

On the other hand certain differences become apparent when age is taken into account:

LISTENERS OF WESTERN BROADCASTS AND OF RFE BY AGE

	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>
Up to 20 years.....	93%	87%
21 to 29 years.....	97%	95%
30 to 49 years.....	98%	95%
50 years and over*.....	100%	92%

* 25 respondents only



The preceding table shows that young people generally listen less to all Western radio stations than do older people. There are no significant differences between the various age groups so far as listening to RFE as against listening to Western broadcasts in general is concerned. Inasmuch as people under 20 years of age in general spend less time listening to the radio than older people the preceding results are only surprising in that as many people under 20 years of age seem to listen to Western broadcasts.

It is interesting to compare Budapest with the rest of the country in terms of listening habits:

	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>
Budapest.....	98%.....	96%
Other places.....	96%.....	92%

The surprising fact about the above results is that even outside Budapest and in rural areas practically as many people listen to Western broadcasts and RFE as listen to them in the capital. Inasmuch as fewer radio sets are available to the population outside of Budapest, these findings would appear to indicate that the interest in Western broadcasts and RFE is more pronounced outside of Budapest, for more people in rural areas may have to listen to Western broadcasts on radio sets owned by others. The severity of local jamming in Budapest is also a factor to be considered.

	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>
Professionals, self-employed.....	100%.....	94%
White collar workers.....	99%.....	95%
Workers.....	98%.....	93%
Farmers and farmhands.....	78%.....	78%
Others.....	97%.....	95%



While slightly more professionals and self employed people listened to Western broadcasts in general than listened to RFE, all farmers who listen to Western stations at all also listen to RFE. Farmers are also the only occupational group which significantly falls below the listenership average of 97% (Western Broadcasts) and 93% (RFE).

LISTENERS OF WESTERN BROADCASTS AND OF RFE BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS		
	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>
Upper class, upper- middle class and middle class.....	99%	96%
Lower middle class and lower class.....	95%	91%

Slightly more people from the higher socio-economic groups listen to Western stations in general as well as to RFE.

LISTENERS OF WESTERN BROADCASTS AND OF RFE BY EDUCATION		
	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>
Up to 8 years of schooling.....	95%	92%
9 to 12 years.....	98%	93%
Academic High School graduates.....	98%	96%
University graduates and students.....	98%	93%

The above results show no important differences so far as education is concerned nor are there any important differences in listening between RFE and Western stations on the basis of the variable of education.



REGULARITY OF LISTENING INCLUDING EXPENDED TIME

The prevalent majority of listeners are regular listeners (97%) listening either every day (72%) or at least two or three times a week (25%).

HOW REGULARLY DID YOU LISTEN TO WESTERN BROADCASTS?	
Every day.....	72%
2 or 3 times a week.....	25%
About once a week.....	2%
Less than once a week.....	-
No answer.....	1%
	100% *

* Listeners of Western broadcasts only.

Some interesting differences appear when listening frequencies are compared with age:

	Every day	2 or 3 times a week	About once a week	No answer
Up to 20 years.....	56%	39%	3%	2%
21 to 29 years.....	73%	23%	2%	2%
30 to 49 years.....	77%	21%	1%	1%
50 years and over.....	80%	20%	-	-

Younger people listen less frequently to Western broadcasts than any other group. This finding is parallel to an earlier one which showed that young people listen to the radio (Western stations) to a lesser extent than older persons.

An effort was also made to determine the average number of hours spent listening to Western broadcasts in general and to RFE in particular:



TIME SPENT LISTENING TO WESTERN BROADCASTS IN GENERAL AND TO RFE

	How many hours a day did you listen to Western broadcasts?*	How many hours a day did you listen to RFE broadcasts? **
More than 4 hours.....	10%.....	2%.....
3 to 4 hours.....	7%.....	2%.....
2 to 3 hours.....	23%.....	7%.....
1 1/2 to 2 hours.....	22%.....	16%.....
1 to 1 1/2 hours.....	14%.....	12%.....
1/2 to 1 hour.....	12%.....	34%.....
Up to 1/2 hour.....	6%.....	27%.....
Not regularly.....	6%.....	-.....
	100%	100%
Average time spent listening.....	<u>2,3 hours</u>	<u>1,4 hours</u>
* Listeners of Western broadcasts		** Listeners of RFE

It is evident from the above that the less time is spent for listening to Western stations in general, the more time is spent listening to RFE. This means people who do not feel they have enough time to listen to various Western stations prefer RFE to a very significant extent.

The following table shows this relationship more exactly:

	Out of those people who spent up to one hour liste- ning to RFE..	Out of those people who spent 1 to 2 hours liste- ning to RFE..	Out of those people who spent 2 to 3 hours liste- ning to RFE..
...spent also time for other Western radio stations	71%	67%	65%
...spent hardly any time for other Western radio stations	<u>29%</u>	<u>33%</u>	<u>35%</u>
	100%	100%	100%



The most significant aspect of these findings is that about one third of RFE listeners listen to RFE to the exclusion of all other Western broadcasters. In other words RFE had exclusive Western radio contact with a significant minority of the population sample. The other two thirds of the sample listened to RFE as well as to other Western stations. RFE is the one Western station with such a high exclusive listenership pattern.

In the following tables the average length of time spent listening to Western stations and to RFE is examined in terms of the various population characteristics in order to gain further insights into popular listening habits:

AVERAGE LENGTH OF TIME SPENT LISTENING TO WESTERN BROADCASTS IN GENERAL AND TO RFE BY SEX

	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>	<u>%</u>
Men.....	2.1 hours.....	1.3 h....	62%
Women.....	2.3 hours.....	1.4 h....	61%

The last column indicates the amount of time (in percentages) spent listening to RFE in relation to the total time spent listening to Western broadcasts. No appreciable differences between men and women exist. Sex appears to be no differentiating factor in this context.

AVERAGE LENGTH OF TIME SPENT LISTENING TO WESTERN BROADCASTS IN GENERAL AND TO RFE BY AGE

	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>	<u>%</u>
Up to 20 years.....	1.9 hours.....	1.4 h....	74%
21 to 29 years.....	2.1 hours.....	1.3 h....	62%
30 to 49 years.....	2.1 hours.....	1.5 h....	65%
50 years and over.....	2.9 hours.....	1.5 h....	52%



It is evident from the preceding findings that the youngest group of listeners spends relatively more of its Western listening time on RFE than do the other age groups. People over 50 years of age spent a smaller proportion of their general listening time on RFE than the other age groups. However, it must be borne in mind that the more time a person has (people over 50 have 2,9 hours on the average) to spend listening to the radio the more selective his listening may become and the less concentrated on any one station.

AVERAGE LENGTH OF TIME SPENT LISTENING TO WESTERN BROADCASTS IN GENERAL AND TO RFE BY OCCUPATION

	<u>Western broadcasts in general</u>	<u>RFE</u>	<u>%</u>
Professionals, self- employed.....	2.6 hours.....	1.5 h.....	58%
White collar workers.....	2.4 hours.....	1.4 h.....	58%
Workers.....	2.2 hours.....	1.4 h.....	64%
Farmers and farmhands.....	1.6 hours.....	1.0 h.....	62%
Others.....	2.1 hours.....	1.2 h.....	57%

Professional people (including self-employed and intelligentsia) spend more time listening to Western broadcasts than any other occupational group. Farmers spend the least amount of time. These divergencies may not be indicative of differences in interest, but may simply be based on differences in leisure time. No significant differences could be isolated for RFE, except that workers and peasants spend relatively slightly more time listening to RFE than the other occupational groups. This finding supports other findings concerning the listening preferences of workers and peasants.



THE LISTENING TIMES

The next concern will be general listening times and most frequent listening times:

DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU LISTEN TO WESTERN BROADCASTS?
 DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU LISTEN MOST FREQUENTLY TO WESTERN BROADCASTS?


	<u>Listen</u>	<u>Listen most frequently</u>
Before 7 AM.....	9%	4%
7 to 8 AM.....	6%	2%
8 to 9 AM.....	3%	1%
9 to 10 AM.....	2%	*%
10 to 11 AM.....	2%	*%
11 to 12 AM.....	1%	*%
12 to 1 PM.....	1%	*%
1 to 2 PM.....	1%	*%
2 to 3 PM.....	2%	1%
3 to 4 PM.....	2%	1%
4 to 5 PM.....	3%	1%
5 to 6 PM.....	6%	2%
6 to 7 PM.....	10%	5%
7 to 8 PM.....	20%	13%
8 to 9 PM.....	57%	46%
9 to 10 PM.....	54%	34%
10 to 11 PM.....	34%	20%
11 to 12 PM.....	15%	8%
After midnight.....	5%	3%
Inexact answers.....	23%	14%
No answers.....	5%	5%

*% = less than one half of one percent

The above table can also be presented graphically:



GENERAL LISTENING TIMES AND MOST FREQUENT LISTENING TIMES
(ALL WESTERN BROADCASTS)



The next table shows general listening times and most frequent listening times for RFE only:

DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU GENERALLY LISTEN TO RFE?
 DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU LISTEN MOST FREQUENTLY TO RFE?


	<u>Listen</u>	<u>Listen most frequently</u>
Before 7 AM.....	8%	4%
7 to 8 AM.....	1%	1%
8 to 9 AM.....	2%	1%
9 to 10 AM.....	2%	*%
10 to 11 AM.....	2%	*%
11 to 12 AM.....	1%	*%
12 to 1 PM.....	1%	*%
1 to 2 PM.....	1%	*%
2 to 3 PM.....	2%	*%
3 to 4 PM.....	2%	1%
4 to 5 PM.....	3%	1%
5 to 6 PM.....	4%	2%
6 to 7 PM.....	9%	4%
7 to 8 PM.....	15%	10%
8 to 9 PM.....	49%	37%
9 to 10 PM.....	37%	22%
10 to 11 PM.....	24%	14%
11 to 12 PM.....	8%	3%
After midnight.....	4%	2%
Inexact answers.....	19%	14%
No answers.....	4%	10%

*% = less than one half of one percent

The graphic presentation of above findings follows:



GENERAL LISTENING TIMES AND MOST FREQUENT LISTENING TIMES
(RFE ONLY)




Now it is possible to compare all Western broadcasts with RFE broadcasts in terms of general listening times:

	<u>Western broadcasts *</u>	<u>RFE broadcasts **</u>
DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU LISTEN TO WESTERN BROADCASTS?		
DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU LISTEN TO RFE BROADCASTS?		
Before 7 AM.....	9%	8%
7 to 8 AM.....	6%	1%
8 to 9 AM.....	3%	2%
9 to 10 AM.....	2%	2%
10 to 11 AM.....	2%	2%
11 to 12 AM.....	1%	1%
12 to 1 PM.....	1%	1%
1 to 2 PM.....	1%	1%
2 to 3 PM.....	2%	2%
3 to 4 PM.....	2%	2%
4 to 5 PM.....	3%	3%
5 to 6 PM.....	6%	4%
6 to 7 PM.....	10%	9%
7 to 8 PM.....	20%	15%
8 to 9 PM.....	57%	49%
9 to 10 PM.....	54%	37%
10 to 11 PM.....	34%	24%
11 to 12 PM.....	15%	8%
After midnight.....	5%	4%
Inexact answers.....	23%	19%
No answers.....	5%	4%
* Listeners of Western broadcasts ** Listeners of RFE		

Graphically, these comparisons look as follows:



GENERAL LISTENING TIMES TO WESTERN BROADCASTS AND TO RFE BROADCASTS




In the next table the most frequent listening times to Western broadcasts are compared with the most frequent listening times to RFE:

	<u>Western broadcasts *</u>	<u>RFE broadcasts **</u>
DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU LISTEN MOST FREQUENTLY TO WESTERN BROADCASTS?		
DURING WHAT HOURS DID YOU LISTEN MOST FREQUENTLY TO RFE?		
Before 7 AM.....	4%	4%
7 to 8 AM.....	2%	1%
8 to 9 AM.....	1%	1%
9 to 10 AM.....	*%	*%
10 to 11 AM.....	*%	*%
11 to 12 AM.....	*%	*%
12 to 1 PM.....	*%	*%
1 to 2 PM.....	*%	*%
2 to 3 PM.....	1%	*%
3 to 4 PM.....	1%	1%
4 to 5 PM.....	1%	1%
5 to 6 PM.....	2%	2%
6 to 7 PM.....	5%	4%
7 to 8 PM.....	13%	10%
8 to 9 PM.....	46%	37%
9 to 10 PM.....	34%	22%
10 to 11 PM.....	20%	14%
11 to 12 PM.....	8%	3%
After midnight.....	3%	2%
Inexact answers.....	14%	14%
No answers.....	5%	10%
* Listeners of Western broadcasts	*% = less than one half	
** Listeners of RFE broadcasts	of one percent	

The above findings are also presented on the following graph:



MOST FREQUENT LISTENING TIMES TO WESTERN BROADCASTS AND TO RFE BROADCASTS



As is evident from the foregoing tabulations and charts no significant differences exist between general listening times and most frequent listening times. This extremely high correlation between general and most frequent listening times suggests that occasional and frequent listeners tend to choose the same listening times. It is also apparent that the evening hours, particularly the hours between 8 PM and 10 PM, constitute the periods when listening is at its overall peaks so far as all three factors of maximal listening are concerned, namely: frequency, intensity, and preference. The data also indicate that listening drops off significantly after 10 PM and that popular listening before the hour of 6 PM is very limited indeed.

There is some occasional but not very frequent listening in the early morning hours. For all practical purposes the audience listening to Western broadcasts, occasionally or frequently, between the hours of 8 AM and 5 PM is extremely small and direct communication impact in this period is probably negligible.

The findings also show that by and large RFE is listened to almost to the exclusion of all other Western broadcasters during the "negative" listening hours of 8 AM - 5 PM. It is only during the best evening hours (approximately 8 PM - 10 PM) that RFE receives any appreciable competition from other Western broadcasting stations.

These data confirm again that so far as size of audience and listening frequency are concerned RFE dominates the Western broadcasting scene. The reader is reminded that in other sections of this study the findings about RFE's position of dominance among Western stations is corroborated.

In the now following graphic presentations we concern ourselves with the listening times to RFE primarily in terms of the various population characteristics (population structure). An effort was made to isolate certain factors such as age, sex, occupation, class, inclination toward communism, and city size which may have a contributing role to play in determining frequency of listening at certain times.

Brief conclusions are presented at this point so that all the pertinent diagrams may be shown without textual interruptions:

On the whole the various population groups show great similarities in their listening habits. There exist some relatively minor divergencies based on specific group characteristics.

Women listen to RFE more frequently than men in the early morning hours between 7 AM and 9 AM and also in the late evening between 9 PM and 12 PM. However the most interesting result found was that women listen to RFE less (!) frequently during the day than men. This is a most surprising finding and may need further substantiation before final conclusions can be drawn from it.



There are no very significant differences between the various age groups except that younger people listen to RFE more frequently between the hours of 8 PM and 9 PM, while older persons prefer the late evening hours after 10 PM to a slightly larger extent than the other age groups. Older people also show listening peaks at early hours.

Professional people listen more frequently in the early morning hours (7 AM - 9 AM) than the other occupational groups. Farmers show a late afternoon listening peak. Workers listen at least as late as all other occupational groups. Farmers and professionals exhibit an interesting overall listening peak between 8 PM and 9 PM which is matched to a less significant extent by the other occupational groups.

No important class differences at all exist between the higher and the lower socio-economic groups with respect to frequencies of listening times. A minor difference is that higher socio-economic groups listen with greater frequency during the day time hours of 10 AM and 3 PM.


People more prone to communist influence listen, by and large, less frequently than persons not under communist influence. This fact is especially evident during such high frequency listening hours as 8 PM to 10 PM. However, communist influenced listeners listen more frequently than uninfluenced persons after 10 PM in the evening!

So far as place of residence is concerned it was only found useful to distinguish between Budapest and the rest of the country.


No overall significant differences were observed. People living outside of Budapest listen more frequently than Budapest residents between the hours of 7 AM and 9 AM. Provincial residents also listen with greater frequency in the later evening hours between 10 and 11 PM. The peak listening times are identical for both geographic groups.




LISTENING TIMES TO RFE BY SEX




LISTENING TIMES TO RFE BY AGE GROUPS




LISTENING TIMES TO RFE BY OCCUPATION




LISTENING TIMES TO RFE BY SOCIO - ECONOMIC STATUS



LISTENING TIMES BY COMMUNISM - PRONENESS



LISTENING TIMES BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE



III.

PROGRAM PREFERENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PREFERRED PROGRAM CATEGORIES
PREFERENCE FOR SPECIAL GROUP PROGRAMS
THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAM
CATEGORIES BY POPULATION STRUCTURE
SPECIFIC PROGRAM PREFERENCE
THE USE OF THE PROGRAM CARD AND
RELIABILITY CHECKS



PREFERRED PROGRAM CATEGORIES

Each interviewee was asked to name RFE radio programs which he preferred most and those which he liked least.

The following table describes the types of program which listeners of the "Voice of Free Hungary" preferred. The table also indicates which program categories were liked least by the Hungarian audience. The third column in this table is indicative of the "net preference" of the particular program category, calculated by subtracting column two from column one.

	<u>Liked best</u>	<u>Liked least</u>	<u>Net Preference</u>
News.....	41%	3%	+38%
Commentaries (including Gallicus).....	37%	7%	+30%
Entertainment.....	30%	2%	+28%
Information and knowledge of the West.....	20%	1%	+19%
Religious programs.....	10%	2%	+ 8%
Youth programs.....	6%	1%	+ 5%
Farmers' programs.....	6%	5%	+ 1%
Workers' programs.....	4%	1%	+ 3%
Miscellaneous.....	21%	2%	+19%

The two following tables reveal the dominant position of news broadcasts compared with commentaries and all other program categories:



NET PREFERENCE FOR NEWS
AS COMPARED WITH COMMENTARIES

	<u>Net Preference</u>
News.....	+38%
Gallicus.....	+17%
Glossary.....	+ 6%
International Commentary.....	+ 5%
Home Commentary.....	+ 4%
Balogh Balazs.....	+ 2%
Satellite or Russian Commentary.....	+ 1%

NET PREFERENCE FOR NEWS
AS COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER PROGRAM CATEGORIES

	<u>Net Preference</u>
News.....	+38%
Entertainment.....	+28%
Information and knowledge of the West.....	+19%
Commentaries, excluding Gallicus.....	+16%
Religious programs.....	+ 8%
Youth programs.....	+ 5%
Workers' programs.....	+ 3%
Farmers' programs.....	+ 1%

As is clearly evident from the above tables, only entertainment programs, broadcasts concerned with life in the West, and the special program of Gallicus were in serious competition with news for the listeners' interest.



It is interesting to note that even the less popular programs showed a positive net preference which leads to the conclusion that not a single major program category has been rejected outright by the majority of the audience.

The popular preference for the various program categories will now be shown in terms of the various demographic groups (audience structure). The tables used will present a digest of results using only net preferences (already defined as the difference between positive and negative mentions).

News is about equally preferred by all groups as will be demonstrated in the following tables:

NET PREFERENCE FOR NEWS BY SEX	
	<u>Net Preference</u>
Men.....	+39%
Women.....	+36%
	Overall net preference: +38%

The above difference between men and women is without statistical significance.

NET PREFERENCE FOR NEWS BY AGE	
	<u>Net Preference</u>
Up to 20 years.....	+37%
21 to 29 years.....	+37%
30 to 49 years.....	+36%
50 years and over.*.....	+44%
* only 25 respondents	Overall net preference: +38%



Older people seem to prefer news even more than the other age categories, but the small number of replies does not permit a hard conclusion.

NET PREFERENCE FOR NEWS BY PRONENESS TOWARD CUMMUNISM

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Communist prone.....	+30%
Not prone.....	+41%
	Overall net preference: +38%

It was to be expected that people prone to communist influence would not like RFE newscasts as much as uninfluenced persons (internal reliability check); the significance of this result is that there are so many communist influenced people who prefer news to all other programs including entertainment, etc.

Inasmuch as so many members of the sample expressed a decided preference for the Gallicus commentaries, reactions to this program were also demographically analyzed:

NET PREFERENCE FOR GALLICUS BY SEX

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Men.....	+23%
Women.....	+11%
	Overall net preference: +17%

More men than women prefer Gallicus, although women by no means reject this program.



NET PREFERENCE FOR GALLICUS BY AGE

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Up to 20 years.....	+11%
21 to 29 years.....	+15%
30 to 49 years.....	+24%
50 years and over *.....	+20%
	Overall net preference: +17%

* only 25 respondents

While all age groups express a relatively high degree of preference for Gallicus, the trend seems to be to favor this program over others with increasing age.

NET PREFERENCE FOR GALLICUS BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Budapest.....	+24%
Other places.....	+14%
	Overall net preference: +17%

Place of residence also reflects a distinct difference in reactions.



NET PREFERENCE FOR GALLICUS BY PRONENESS TOWARD COMMUNISM

Net
Preference

Communist prone.....+12%

Not prone.....+18%

Overall
net preference: +17%

As was again to be expected, communist influenced people liked Gallicus less than their counterparts. However, Gallicus was having a definite impact on the communist-prone group as well.

The other commentaries (excluding Gallicus) showed relatively low net popular preference frequencies breaking them down by population groups could easily give an inaccurate or even misleading picture. Furthermore, the data did not show any clear lines of preference for the various commentaries which would justify conclusions to be drawn on demographic lines.

The grouped category of entertainment programs (mostly music) is broken down in terms of audience characteristics:

NET PREFERENCE FOR ENTERTAINMENT BY SEX

Net
Preference

Men.....+13%

Women.....+43%

Overall
net preference: +28%



NET PREFERENCE FOR ENTERTAINMENT BY AGE

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Up to 20 years.....	+56%
21 to 29 years.....	+20%
30 to 49 years.....	+19%
50 years and over *....	+28%
	Overall net preference: +28%

* only 25 respondents

The youngest people in the sample expressed by far the strongest preference for entertainment programs. It is noteworthy, however, that the age group 21 - 29 years did not like entertainment programs any more (even less) than older people.

NET PREFERENCE FOR ENTERTAINMENT BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Budapest.....	+19%
Other places.....	+33%
	Overall net preference: +28%

A large city presents its inhabitants with many more entertainment possibilities than smaller towns and villages (indirect validity check of results); therefore the above result is not at all surprising. People outside of Budapest depend more on radio in general for entertainment than "Budapesters". The degree of audience sophistication and effects of local jamming may also be contributing factors.



NET PREFERENCE FOR ENTERTAINMENT BY PRONENESS TOWARD COMMUNISM

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Communist prone.....	+45%
Not prone.....	+24%
	Overall net preference: +28%

The above result was again to be anticipated and serves as a check on the results of our investigation of communism proneness. Inasmuch as communist influenced members of RFE's Hungarian audience (sample only) express such a strong preference for entertainment programs, they can probably best be reached and influenced by inserting entertainment features into other types of programs.

The next major program category to be examined in terms of group preferences is Information and Knowledge of the West:

NET PREFERENCE FOR "INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEST" BY SEX

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Men.....	+22%
Women.....	+16%
	Overall net preference: +19%

These results support other evidence that men incline toward (thought type) programs.



NET PREFERENCE FOR "INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF
THE WEST" BY AGE

Net
Preference

Up to 20 years.....+16%
21 to 29 years.....+19%
30 to 49 years.....+20%
50 years and over.....+24%

Overall
net preference: +19%

The older the listener the more he favors this group of programs. The age trend here is very significant because of its regularity: 16% - 19% - 20% - 24%. However, the identified differences are not sufficiently large to justify sweeping deductions.

NET PREFERENCE FOR "INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF
THE WEST" BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Net
Preference

Budapest.....+24%
Other places.....+16%

Overall
net preference: +19%

The above relatively small difference may be the result of a large city's cosmopolitanism reflected in the attitudes of the inhabitants as against the more pronounced ethnocentricity of smaller town and rural inhabitants.



NET PREFERENCE FOR "INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF
THE WEST" BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Upper class, upper- middle class and middle class.....	+25%
Lower-middle class and lower class.....	+16%
	Overall net preference: +19%

The same explanation as offered for the preceding results may apply to the above findings. However, as this program category is a "thought" category, lower socio-economic status as also expressed in little education may be a more important reason than ethnocentricity so far as the above results are concerned.

The next table lends strength to this last conclusion:

NET PREFERENCE FOR "INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF
THE WEST" BY EDUCATION

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Up to 8 years of schooling.....	+13%
9 to 12 years without final examination.....	+17%
Academic High School graduates (erétsegi)...	+26%
University graduates and students.....	+28%
	Overall net preference: +19%



The more education people have, the more they prefer these types of programs. The progression is continuous (not mathematically so), thus increasing the reliability of the findings.

NET PREFERENCE FOR "INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEST" BY PRONENESS TOWARD COMMUNISM	
<u>Net Preference</u>	
Communist prone.....	+23%
Not prone.....	+18%
Overall net preference: +19%	

These results are surprising and will be analyzed in a later study in great detail. Meanwhile, it is apparent that communist influenced people may be "reached" by RFE most easily through its entertainment programs and more importantly through the type of programs dealing with the West in a more or less nonpolitical sense. The above findings may be one of the most important results of this study in terms of possible program exploitation of certain vulnerabilities of those having some degree of sympathy for communism (20% + of the sample).

So far as religious programs of RFE are concerned, the following picture evolves after the necessary group break-downs have been made:

NET PREFERENCE FOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS BY SEX	
<u>Net Preference</u>	
Men.....	+ 5%
Women.....	+13%
Overall net preference: +8%	

As could be expected, women prefer religious programs to a much more significant extent than men.



NET PREFERENCE FOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS BY AGE

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Up to 20 years.....	+ 5%
21 to 29 years.....	+ 8%
30 to 49 years.....	+ 8%
50 years and over *....	+24%
	Overall net preference: +8%

* only 25 respondents

The common knowledge that religious programs are preferred by older persons is clearly borne out by the results which remain statistically significant inspite of the relatively small number of respondents over the age of 50.

NET PREFERENCE FOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS
BY RELIGION OF THE RESPONDENTS

	<u>Net Preference</u>
Catholics.....	+9%
Protestants.....	+8%
	Overall net preference: +8%

It is noteworthy that differences in religious denomination do not influence religious program preference.



PREFERENCE FOR SPECIAL GROUP PROGRAMS

The next four program categories to be discussed are special group types of programs: Youth programs, farmers' programs, and workers' programs, and the program: "For Women".

NET PREFERENCE FOR YOUTH PROGRAMS BY AGE

	<u>Net Preference</u>	
Up to 20 years.....	+10%	
21 to 29 years.....	+ 7%	
30 years and over.....	+ 2%	
		Overall net preference: +5%

Youth programs are about twice as successful with young people under the age of 20 as with the population at large. However the absolute preference for this program as expressed by young respondents is not very high. Young people between the ages of 21 and 29 prefer these programs only slightly more than the whole population as such.

NET PREFERENCE FOR FARMERS' PROGRAMS BY OCCUPATION

	<u>Net Preference</u>	
Farmers.....	+28%	
All other occupations....	0%	
		Overall net preference: +1%

Farmers' Programs are a definite success among farmers. No other occupational group expresses a net preference for these programs; thus its success is limited to, but very pronounced with the farmers. The Farmers' Programs found greater support among the ranks of its special target group than did any other similar program.



WOMEN'S PREFERENCES OF THE SPECIAL PROGRAM "FOR WOMEN"

Net preference

Women 7%
Men -

Clearly women are not overly enthusiastic about "their" program although they do give it more than token preference. It should be remembered that there was only one women's program at the time in question.

NET PREFERENCE FOR WORKERS' PROGRAMS BY OCCUPATION

Net preference

Workers + 5%
All other occupations ... + 2%
Overall
net preference; + 3%

The workers' program is the only special group program category which has failed to have strong appeal for its special audience. Few workers prefer it; an even smaller number of workers prefer it because of special group appeal inasmuch as the occupational differences are very small so far as the workers' program is concerned.



THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAM CATEGORIES BY POPULATION STRUCTURE

In the next part of this section category preferences will be re-examined in terms of the various population groups and the three most preferred programs of each group.

SEX AND THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAMS			
	<u>Highest net preference</u>	<u>Second highest</u>	<u>Third highest</u>
Men	+39% News	+23% Gallicus	+22% Inf.*
Women	+43% Entert.**	+36% News	+16% Inf.*

* Information and knowledge of the West ** Entertainment

The main apparent difference is male preference for Gallicus and female preference for entertainment programs.

AGE AND THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAMS			
	<u>Highest net preference</u>	<u>Second highest</u>	<u>Third highest</u>
Up to 20 years	+56% Entert.**	+37% News	+16% Inf.*
21 to 29 years	+37% News	+20% Entert.**	+19% Inf.*
30 to 49 years	+36% News	+24% Gallicus	+20% Inf.*

* Information and knowledge of the West ** Entertainment

The chief divergencies are that younger people prefer entertainment programs, and it is primarily older people who favor Gallicus. All age groups place the information and knowledge of the West type of programs in the third highest preference position. News has high preference with all age groups. Older people do not rate entertainment programs among the three most preferred categories.



OCCUPATION AND THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAMS

	Highest <u>net preference</u>	Second <u>highest</u>	Third <u>highest</u>
Professionals	+25% News.....	+19% Inf.*...+13%	Gallicus
White collar workers.	+36% News.....	+28% Inf...+26%	Gallicus
Workers	+39% News.....	+24% Entert**+16%	Gallicus
Farmers	+33% News.....	+28% Farm.***+22%	Gallicus
Others	+52% Entert**.....	+41% News...+18%	Inf.*

* Information and knowledge of the West ** Entertainment *** Farmers' programs

In all specified occupational groups news has the highest preference rating. The category "others" includes housewives and youth under 20 years of age which explains why entertainment is given first choice rather than news (another internal consistence check). Programs dealing educationally with the West are ranked high by the "higher level" occupational groups. Only news can compete with farmers' programs so far as farmers are concerned. All designated occupational groups list Gallicus in third place.

PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAMS

	Highest <u>net preference</u>	Second <u>highest</u>	Third <u>highest</u>
Budapest.....	+40% News.....	+24% Gallic***+24%	Inf.*
Other	+37% News.....	+33% Entert**+16%	Inf.*

* Information and knowledge of the West ** Entertainment *** Gallicus

The differences apparent from the above comparisons have already been discussed in another context. The importance of the information programs dealing with the West for both Budapest residents as well as others should be emphasized again, especially as these types of programs (earlier analysis notwithstanding) are ranked also third by persons residing in smaller towns and in rural areas.



SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAMS

	<u>Highest net preference</u>	<u>Second highest</u>	<u>Third highest</u>
Upper class, upper-middle class and middle class	..+35% News.....	+29% Entert.**	+25% Inf.*
Lower-middle class and lower class	...+39% News.....	+28% Entert.**	+18% Gallicus

* Information and knowledge of the West ** Entertainment

No differences by class exist in terms of first and second choices. The shown third choice difference is probably not as significant as it appears, considering that fourth-choices have not been tabulated and also in view of the fact that Gallicus is rated third by the higher occupational groups (see earlier tables).

EDUCATION AND THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAMS

	<u>Highest net preference</u>	<u>Second highest</u>	<u>Third highest</u>
Up to 8 years of school	+39% News.....	+33% Entert.**	+17% Gallicus
9 to 12 years	+30% News.....	+25% Entert.**	+17% Inf.*
Academic High School graduates	..+42% News.....	+30% Entert.**	+26% Inf.*
University grad.....	+37% News.....	+33% Gallicus	+28% Inf.*

* Information and knowledge of the West ** Entertainment

Breakdowns by education do not show many differences in rank order of popular preference. It is interesting to note that the appeal of Gallicus is especially concentrated among the least and the best educated. This is a rare achievement for any radio program. Again it is evident that people of the highest educational levels do not particularly like RFE's entertainment programs, while the lowest



educational levels do not seem to prefer information and education programs about the West; all other levels rank these programs third in overall preference. Interest in news dominates all educational levels.

PRONENESS TOWARD COMMUNISM AND THE THREE MOST PREFERRED PROGRAMS			
	Highest <u>net preference</u>	Second <u>highest</u>	Third <u>highest</u>
Communist influenced	..+45%	Entert.**...+30%	News.....+23% Inf.*
Not influen- ped+41%	News.....+24%	Entert.**.+18% Inf.*

* Information and knowledge of the West ** Entertainment

The reader is referred to earlier comments concerning the above two population groups.



SPECIFIC PROGRAM PREFERENCES

The various large program categories will now be broken down to specific programs. However a "demographic investigation" cannot be meaningfully undertaken, as in most cases the resultant preference figures are too small to permit a reliable audience structure analysis. A larger sample would have solved this problem.

PREFERENCE OF THE VARIOUS ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAMS

	<u>Net preference</u>
Gypsy Music	+ 10%
Jazz Music	+ 7%
Classical music	+ 6%
Light Music	+ 3%
Play of the Week.....	+ 1%
"This Type of Program"	+ 9%

PREFERENCE OF THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS OF THE MISCELLANEOUS GROUP

	<u>Net preference</u>
Black Voice	+ 9%
Musical Messages	+ 4%
For Women	+ 4%
Márai Sándor	+ 2%
Messages	+ 1%
Eastern Patrol	+ 1%
Calling Communists	+ *%
Question Time	+ *%

*% = less than one half of one percent.

Only the "Black Voice" program plays an important role among the programs summarized in the miscellaneous category. Attention is invited to the very low preference figures of certain programs in this category.



In summary the following table will show audience (sample) preferences for all specific programs with a net preference rating of more than 5%.

ALL PROGRAMS WITH A NET PREFERENCE OF MORE THAN 5%.

	<u>Net preference</u>
News	+ 38%
Gallicus	+ 17%
Gypsy Music	+ 10%
Black Voice	+ 9%
Jazz Music	+ 7%
Colonel Bell	+ 6%
Classical Music	+ 6%



THE USE OF THE PROGRAM CARD AND RELIABILITY CHECKS

It may be of interest to point out that interviewers were permitted to use a printed card listing all programs of the Voice of Free Hungary in case the respondent could not recall the name of a particular program but which he could otherwise describe. In only 80 of 305 cases was it necessary to employ the program card.

USE OF CARDS DURING INTERVIEWING ABOUT THE PROGRAM

Card used	26%
Card not used	74%
	100%

The card was used very sparingly and then only under the earlier described circumstances. In order to determine any possible biasing of the results due to usage of the card, the program preferences of the two groups were compared with usage or non-usage of the program card as the postulated differentiating factor:

PROGRAM PREFERENCES IN TERMS OF THE USE OF THE PROGRAM CARD *

	<u>Card used</u>	<u>Card not used</u>
News	40%	41%
Gallicus	23%	24%
Gypsy Music	5%	11%
Black Voice	10%	11%
Jazz Music	7%	6%
Colonel Bell	7%	7%
Classical Music	10%	6%
And so on		

* The figures in this table indicate the percentages of persons who liked these programs best.



The preceding table shows that the usage of the card did not affect the overall results inasmuch as the audience responded almost exactly alike whether the card was employed or not. The card consequently was no factor in influencing the results. The other conclusions contained in the preceding juxtaposition is that the RFE audience is made up of people who listen to broadcasts with sufficient attentiveness that program recall becomes easy. The level of purposeful (high threshold of awareness) listening in the case of the Hungarian audience sample is much higher than usually associated with radio listening in general.

The following is an overall internal reliability check on findings presented in this section:

INTERNAL RELIABILITY CHECK OF PROGRAM PREFERENCES *	
What kind of programs would people like yourself want <u>most</u> to hear on RFE?	Individually expressed net preferences:
News	36%..... + 38%
Musical broadcasts and other enter- tainment	33%..... + 28%
Commentaries	13%...(Gallious).. + 17%
Other answers	51%
	<u>133%</u>

* Only the three programs which were mentioned most frequently.

The degree of consistency is very high; the above table and the two following tables show that individually expressed preferences and estimates of other people's preferences always resulted in the selection of the same categories in an identical order of preference with one exception. The results listed above must "a priori" show a close resemblance; the significance for this study is that the interview situation and other intervening factors did not alter this necessarily existing relationship but that it was confirmed in the findings and arrived at independently.



A similar internal consistency check is also possible, among other aspects of the study, for various population characteristics as investigated here:

INTERNAL RELIABILITY CHECK OF THE WORKERS' PREFERENCE OF PROGRAMS	
What kind of program would the workers most like to hear?	Workers' own expression of net preferences
News	57%..... + 39%
Commentaries	18%...(Gallicus).... + 16%
Entertainment	16%..... + 24%
Other answers	<u>38%</u>
	129%

In addition to serving as an internal reliability check (in a similar way as was explained in connection with the above table), these results confirm that the population as a whole has a good understanding of the workers' likes and dislikes. Evidence has now been presented which clearly indicates that the indirect method of projective questioning (a vital tool for RFE audience research, which is discussed in detail in the next section) as used in this study ("what do you think your friends, workers, young people, etc. would do, like etc?") is remarkably reliable.

The following table again illustrates this point:

INTERNAL RELIABILITY CHECK OF THE FARMERS' PREFERENCE OF PROGRAMS	
What kind of program would the farmers most like to hear on RFE?	Farmers' own expression of net preferences
News	49%..... + 33%
Farmers' programs	16%..... + 28%
Commentaries	13%...(Gallicus).... + 22%
Other answers	<u>52%</u>
	130%



IV.
GENERAL LISTENING HABITS UNDER THE IMPACT OF THE
HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION



This section deals with any changes in the listening habits of RFE's Hungarian audience which occurred in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution. As the majority of the respondents left Hungary in January or February of 1957 the findings here presented reflect the situation as it existed in Hungary about two or three months after the revolution was crushed.

The persons interviewed were not asked to describe their own listening habits in relation to the Hungarian Revolution; instead they were given the opportunity to record their estimate of how the various groups in the population as a whole behaved. This method has been used at specific points in this study in order to learn more about the whole population so far as certain attitudes or behavior patterns are concerned. Furthermore, the method of indirect questioning (what did your friends think...?) is often more revealing than direct questions especially when areas of high personal sensitivity or bias are being probed.

Consequently, while the figures presented in this section (and wherever the above method has been used) represent respondents' estimates of other people's behavior, these estimates are made with respect to the total population and in addition are derived from the most representative sample available. The method employed has probably reduced the biases and special sensitivities of the respondents. Using both direct and indirect methods of questioning in related problem areas can also serve as an internal reliability check (see foregoing section).

The following table contains respondents' estimates as to how many people in the total population stopped listening to RFE, VOA and BBC under the impact of the revolution. For purposes of comparison, results are listed separately:

HOW MANY PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY STOPPED LISTENING TO RFE, VOA, BBC AFTER THE REVOLUTION?			
<u>Estimated number of people</u>	<u>RFE</u>	<u>VOA</u>	<u>BBC</u>
Almost all	18%	7%	4%
A large group	8%	7%	7%
Few	9%	12%	5%
Nobody or hardly anybody	34%	36%	46%
Don't know	31%	38%	38%
	100%	100%	100%

} % of interviewees making the estimate.



The differences in responses with respect to the various stations become even more meaningful when the "don't know" answers are extracted and the actual replies are made to total 100%. Moreover, it is possible to assign a weight (percentage index) to the answers (estimates) received: "almost all" = 90%; "a large group" = 60%; "few" = 15%; "nobody or hardly anybody" = 5%:

HOW MANY PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY STOPPED LISTENING TO RFE, VOA, BBC AFTER THE REVOLUTION?			
<u>Weighted results:</u>			
	<u>RFE</u>	<u>VOA</u>	<u>BBC</u>
Almost all (90%)	26%	11%	7%
A large group (60%)	12%	11%	11%
Few (15%)	13%	20%	8%
Nobody or hardly anybody (5%)	49%	58%	74%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
 AVERAGE	 35%	 22%	 18%

The "averages" on the last line of the above table are actually mean percentage weights or indices, they indicate that the "average opinion" of the sampled refugees was that 35% of the total population stopped listening to RFE after the Revolution, that 22% stopped listening to VOA, and only 18% discontinued listening to BBC. While these calculated figures cannot represent the exact numbers of persons who stopped listening to Western broadcasts, they are probably the best available estimates of the situation. The calculated differences between the stations (35% - 22% - 18%) make it apparent that about twice as many people stopped listening to RFE as discontinued their BBC listening.

Presently more significant than the above findings is the determination of how many have resumed listening to RFE. It must be borne in mind that the next table represents the situation of January and February 1957.



HOW MANY OF THESE PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY WHO STOPPED LISTENING TO RFE AFTER THE REVOLUTION HAVE STARTED LISTENING AGAIN?

Most of them	19%
About half of them	10%
Few of them	10%
Hardly any of them	15%
Don't know	<u>46%</u>
	100%

The above table can also be expressed (the earlier described method) as follows:

HOW MANY OF THESE PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY WHO STOPPED LISTENING TO RFE AFTER THE REVOLUTION HAVE STARTED LISTENING AGAIN?

Most of them (90%)	35%
About half of them (60%) ..	18,5%
Few of them (15%)	18,5%
Hardly any of them (5%) ...	<u>28%</u>
	100%
<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>46%</u>

Thus, according to the "average opinion" of the sample, approximately half of those who stopped listening to RFE had by February started to listen again. Related findings suggest that the trend toward resumption of listening to RFE has continued and that the bulk of temporarily lost listeners has been fully recovered. But these related findings have not been of a nature to permit correlating them with the above findings.



FREQUENCY OF LISTENING TO RFE AFTER THE REVOLUTION

How many people in your community listened to RFE less frequently after the revolution than they had before the revolution?

How many people in your community listened to RFE more frequently after the revolution than before it?

	<u>Less frequently</u>	<u>More frequently</u>
Almost all	15%	34%
A large group	10%	8%
Few	13%	7%
Nobody	30%	21%
Don't know	32%	30%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The above table can also be recalculated to show average differences:

FREQUENCY OF LISTENING TO RFE AFTER THE REVOLUTION

How many people in your community listened to RFE less frequently after the revolution than they had before the revolution?

How many people in your community listened to RFE more frequently after the revolution than before it?

	<u>Less frequently</u>	<u>More frequently</u>
Almost all (90%)	22%	49%
A large group (60%)	15%	11%
Few (15%)	19%	10%
Nobody (5%)	44%	30%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>34%</u>	<u>54%</u>



The mean percentage indices clearly show that significantly more people listened to RFE more frequently after the revolution than listened less frequently. These findings also indicate and support the trend toward gaining back lost listeners. Moreover, it can be deduced from the preceding results that already in February a development had set in marked by an increased and intensified interest in RFE on the part of the majority of its listeners. In other words the majority of RFE listeners became more interested in RFE a certain time after the revolution than they had been before the uprising!

As can be seen from the following table, the sample was largely of the opinion that more workers and more members of the intelligentsia stopped listening to Western broadcasts temporarily than members of other population groups.

CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THE PEOPLE WHO STOPPED LISTENING TO RFE, VOA OR BBC AFTER THE REVOLUTION?

42% They were workers
42% They were intelligent people
15% They were farmers
10% They were people who felt betrayed
9% They were people of the middle class
4% They were low educated people
7% Other answers
13% Don't know

142% *

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

The next table contains revealing comparisons in terms of listening habits coupled with background characteristics:



CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THE PEOPLE WHO LISTENED LESS FREQUENTLY AFTER THE REVOLUTION THAN BEFORE IT?

CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THE PEOPLE WHO LISTENED MORE FREQUENTLY AFTER THE REVOLUTION THAN BEFORE IT?

<u>Less frequently</u>	<u>Answer</u>	<u>More frequently</u>
38%.....	They were workers.....	39%
34%.....	They were intelligent people	24%
9%.....	They were farmers	15%
16%.....	They were people who felt betrayed	5%
8%.....	They were people of the middle class ..	5%
9%.....	They were people of the total popula- tion	10%
-	They were people who did not loose hope	5%
3%.....	They were timid people	-
6%.....	Other answers	11%
5%.....	Don't know	4%
128% *		118% *)

* More than 100% because some interviewees gave more than one answer.

While workers and intelligentsia exceed all other groups who listened less fequently or stopped listening after the revolution, they also represent the two groups who more than all other groups began to listen more frequently after the revolution. The explanation for this phenomenon will be explored in a forthcoming special study.

By and large the various population groups follow the trend toward complete resumption of listening to RFE. It appears that the greater the losses (workers, intelligentsia) the greater also the gains, although the listenership losses among the intelligentsia are being made up at a somewhat slower rate than listenership losses among workers or farmers (fastest rate).

The data and the depicted trend indicate that RFE's listenership losses have been made up and that the present Hungarian audience does not essentially differ in size and composition (structure) from the pre-revolutionary audience. If any appreciable change has occurred it may be in that the Voice of Free Hungary is listened to by more people more frequently now than ever before.



V.
THE NAME "VOICE OF FREE HUNGARY"



This section deals with popular reaction toward the identification symbols of RFE's Hungarian programs.

IS THE NAME "VOICE OF FREE HUNGARY" A GOOD ONE?

Yes, it is a good one	56%
No, it is not a good one..	37%
Don't know	7%
	<u>100%</u>

The majority of the sampled population believed the name "Voice of Free Hungary" to be a good one; the minority disagreeing with these identification symbols was sizeable but presumably not alarmingly so.

The various occupational groups reacted to this question as follows:

IS THE NAME "VOICE OF FREE HUNGARY" A GOOD ONE?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Sum</u>	<u>Net preference</u>
Professionals, self-employed	38%	50%	12%	100%	- 12%
White collar workers	45%	50%	5%	100%	- 5%
Workers (skilled and unskilled).....	67%	28%	5%	100%	+ 39%
Farmers and farmhands ...	50%	39%	11%	100%	+ 11%
Others	54%	36%	10%	100%	+ 18%



It is evident that the professional and self employed groups as well as the white collar workers more often (see net preference of minus 12% and minus 5%) opposed this name than supported it. All other occupational groups, particularly workers, are more in favor of the name "Voice of Free Hungary".

The reliability of these findings was further checked by comparing the answers in terms of socio-economic status and education:

IS THE NAME "VOICE OF FREE HUNGARY" A GOOD ONE?					
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Sum</u>	<u>Net preference</u>
Upper class, upper middle class and middle class	50%	44%	6%	100%	+ 6%
Lower-middle and lower class	61%	32%	7%	100%	+ 29%

IS THE NAME "VOICE OF FREE HUNGARY" A GOOD ONE?					
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Sum</u>	<u>Net preference</u>
Up to 8 years schooling	63%	32%	5%	100%	+ 31%
9 to 12 years without final examination ...	58%	34%	8%	100%	+ 24%
Academic High School graduates, University graduates and students	47%	45%	8%	100%	+ 2%

Clearly, people with lower education and of lower socio-economic status express more favor for the present name than persons with more education and of higher status.



The reasons for rejecting the name "Voice of Free Hungary" ran as follows:

(IF "THE NAME VOICE OF FREE HUNGARY IS NOT A GOOD ONE")

WHY NOT?

A free Hungary does not exist	86%
It is not the voice of Hungarians; it is another voice	10%
Other answers	2%
Don't know	2%
	<hr/>
	100% *)

*) Respondents only who said the name is not a good one.

The majority who opposed the name apparently felt that it was presumptuous to broadcast in the name of a free Hungary from beyond the borders enclosing an enslaved Hungary. They presumably believed that only one Hungary can ever exist.

The above conclusion is supported by the next table which shows that the majority offering a substitute name omit any reference to a free Hungary and instead refer to free Hungarians as individuals only.

IF THE NAME "VOICE OF FREE HUNGARY" IS NOT A GOOD ONE:
DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR ANOTHER NAME?

Voice of Free Hungarians; Voice of Free Hungarians in Foreign Countries	46%
Voice of the Free World; Voice of the West; Voice for Hungary	9%
Voice of Suppressed Hungary; Voice of the Suffering Hungarians	8%
Other answers	5%
Don't know	32%
	<hr/>
	100% *)

*) Respondents only who said the name is not a good one.

Due to the fact that only less than half of those who do not like the name "Voice of Free Hungary" (37%) were able to agree on a substitute name (Voice of Free Hungarians), the present name appears by all means to be the most popular specific name so far as public consensus is concerned.



VI.
REACTIONS TO RFE'S "APPROACH"



This section is concerned with popular reaction to the approach (general line) of RFE as the sample perceived it in February, and with popularly detected changes in approach, tone, etc., since the revolution.

HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE RFE'S PRESENT "TONE" OR APPROACH?

More moderate and more objective than before	16%
Encouraging	9%
True, objective	2%
Other unfavorable	16%
Other favorable	12%
No answer, don't know	46%
	<hr/>
	101% *

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

The above table is self-explanatory. It will be noted that only 16% reacted unfavorably to RFE's approach. In order to determine more precisely whether the audience had detected changes in RFE's tone or approach a specifically relevant question had to be asked:

HAVE THERE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN THE TONE OF RFE BROADCASTS SINCE THE REVOLUTION?

Yes	38%
No	44%
Don't know	18%
	<hr/>
	100%



In view of the fact that many of the respondents left Hungary relatively soon after the revolution, it is not surprising that 44% did not detect changes in the tone of RFE broadcasts. It is significant that already in January or February 38% of the listeners had noticed certain changes in RFE's approach. These changes were described as follows:

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THESE CHANGES IN RFE PROGRAMS?	
More moderate than before	62%
More reliable than before	16%
More objective, gives less commentaries	19%
Other answers	10%
	107% *

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

Practically all respondents described the perceived changes in terms of a more moderate tone or a more reliable and objective approach. The degree of insight with which these changes - particularly moderation in tone - were noted is remarkable and a very significant clue to the audience's high degree of discrimination.

As can be seen from the next findings, the great majority of the respondents approved of the noted changes. However, 25% of those detecting moderation in tone were dissatisfied with this development:

CHANGES OF RFE'S TONE AND WHAT THE RESPONDENTS THINK OF THEM			
	<u>More moderate than before</u>	<u>More reliable than before</u>	<u>More objective, gives less commentaries</u>
It is right	60%	74%	64%
It is partly right	8%	-	18%
It is wrong	25%	5%	5%
Other answers	3%	5%	9%
Don't know	4%	16%	4%
	100%	100%	100%



All interviewees were also asked to advance their own ideas as to still desirable changes:

ARE THERE ANY FURTHER CHANGES YOU WOULD ADVOCATE IN RFE PROGRAMS?	
Broadcasts should be more objective ..	34%
Wishes concerning special programs and other comments	26%
Don't know	40%
	<hr/>
	100%

It appears that a significant portion of the audience was still inclined to view RFE as not objective enough. This problem is also dealt with in Sections VII and VIII. Wishes concerning special programs are analyzed in Section III.

It can be deduced from the data that an ever increasing and approving number of listeners is becoming aware of the changes instituted. The dominant remaining wish of the audience is for increased objectivity. A more detailed analysis of these findings as far as they relate to objectivity will be published later.



VII.

"OBJECTIVITY" AS CONSTRUED BY THE AUDIENCE



This discussion is concerned with the popular impression of objectivity among Hungarian listeners; whether any or all Western broadcasts are in fact always objective is not the concern of this chapter.

Basically the majority of listeners (85%) do not appear to distinguish between objectivity and credibility, as they say they will always believe a radio station which in their opinion is objective. From available data it can be assumed that objectivity and credibility are so intimately related in the eyes of the audience that a high degree of interchangeability of these two concepts exists:

IS THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TRUE OR FALSE: LISTENERS WILL ALWAYS BELIEVE A RADIO STATION WHICH IS OBJECTIVE.

Yes (true)	85%
No (false)	12%
<u>Don't know</u>	<u>3%</u>
T o t a l	100%

There are no significant differences between the various population groups so far as this question is concerned. The minority (12%) who did not subscribe to this hypothetical statement regarding credibility and objectivity did not refute this statement either, as most of this group of respondents expressed the notion that a radio station need not be objective if it has certain predetermined functions (reenforcement of people's views and wishes, encouragement etc.) to perform. In other words, to this small group objectivity and credibility were not the issue and in consequence the responses touched only tangentially on the problem of relating the two concepts.

The evident conclusion is that the Hungarian audience (as sampled) will always believe a radio station which has established for itself ("rightly or wrongly") the popular image of objectivity.



The sample audience was then asked which Western broadcasting station was most objective:

WHICH WESTERN BROADCASTING STATION IS MOST OBJECTIVE?	
BBC is most objective	60%
RFE is most objective	16%
VOA is most objective	14%
Others are most objective	5%
Don't know	5%
	<u>100%</u>

Clearly BBC far outdistances all other Western broadcasters so far as the popular image of objectivity is concerned.

The following demographic differences within the above percentages are worth noting: while relatively more men than women thought BBC most objective, more women than men felt RFE and VOA to be most objective. Also relatively more professionals and white collar workers than workers considered BBC most objective, while more workers than the other occupational groups felt that RFE and VOA are the most objective stations.

The lower the educational level, the more RFE and VOA considered objective. The higher the educational level the more BBC was considered most objective.

More members of the "higher" socio-economic classes thought BBC most objective, while more than twice as many "lower class" persons than "higher class" people considered RFE as the most objective Western station.

Age, religion and place of residence did not play a differentiating role as far as the popular image of objectivity is concerned.

It must be remembered, however, that the majority among all population groups considered BBC more objective than RFE and VOA. The demographic differences referred to in this section apply only (as pointed out before) to detected group differences for each separate station.



Various findings in this study showed that the most significant popular differentiation between Western broadcasters is made in terms of relative objectivity as conceived by the audience. This confirms earlier Audience Analysis Section findings that "objectivity" was a concept frequently volunteered as a criterion by which people expressed favor or disfavor for Western broadcasts. In Section VII BBC, RFE and VOA are ranked by the audience in terms of their relative (effect of) objectivity. Inasmuch as objectivity is the most readily recognized differentiating factor, objectivity is employed as a base from which other criteria of differentiation between stations can be derived:

OBJECTIVITY AND RELATED POPULAR CRITERIA OF DIFFERENTIATION:			
	Which station is most objective?		
	+ BBC	++ VOA	+++ RFE
They restricted themselves to objectiveness and did not give commentaries	38%	12%	-
According to my experience their news was reliable	32%	42%	4%
They did not provoke or incite war; did not make propaganda	21%	12%	2%
They were more concerned with Hungary than others	1%	9%	47%
They had the best sources of information	3%	9%	-
They were independent financially and politically	2%	-	4%
Other answers	4%	23%	35%
Don't know	1%	-	10%
	102%	107%	102% *
* More than 100%, because some respondents gave more than one answer.			
+ Respondents who feel that BBC is most objective			
++ Respondents who feel that VOA is most objective			
+++ Respondents who feel that RFE is most objective.			



The answers concerning incitement to war are not important in this context as they merely reflect attitudes pertinent to a particular situation in time and place. It is very interesting that most persons who feel RFE to be the most objective station give reasons for RFE objectivity which are not at all related to the commonly understood meaning of objectivity, (e. g., "RFE is objective because it is mostly concerned with Hungary. "). The finding that even these strong supporters of RFE ("RFE is the most objective") did not really refer to objectivity is further borne out by the fact that 35% of them gave other irrelevant answers, and a relatively high percentage (10%) did not know why RFE is most objective in their opinion. On the other hand, as can be seen from the preceding table, those responding in favor of BBC (and to a lesser extent VOA) clearly indicate reasons related to objectivity.



VIII.
THE OBJECTIVES OF RFE AS ASSESSED BY THE AUDIENCE
(A STUDY OF EFFECTIVE GOAL IMPLEMENTATION)



The selected cross-section of the Hungarian population was asked for its opinion about the central objectives (goals) of RFE so far as Hungary is concerned.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF RFE SO FAR AS HUNGARY IS CONCERNED? *

Encouraging people to persevere against Communism	92%
Furnish information not easily available in Hungary	56%
To bring Western ideas to Hungary	21%
Entertainment	14%

* The percentages total to more than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

The extent to which RFE is effectively accomplishing its mission in regard to Hungary is difficult to determine precisely. However, there is a way of estimating a radio station's overall impact and a follow-up method has been employed to estimate the degree of effectiveness of this impact so far as public opinion is concerned.

The hypothesis was that one criterion of effectiveness lies in the ability of the target population to isolate and identify the main goals of RFE. The foregoing table furnishes clear evidence that the sample population had definite ideas about the main objectives of RFE. Not only were the respondents at the time in question fully aware of RFE's goals, but they also ranked them as to their relative importance more or less consistent with RFE's basic objectives at that time.

This means that RFE policy as revealed in its goals and ensuing programming has had significant overall impact on the audience. More simply put, the audience knows not only what RFE wants to achieve but also what it wants to achieve most of all. The foregoing table shows beyond doubt that the basic message of RFE has been successfully (not necessarily effectively - see next discussion) communicated to the Hungarian target as a whole.

There exist no significant demographic differences so far as the major population groups are concerned. All of the sampled population have recognized the chief objectives of RFE almost equally clearly. The only possible exception is that decidedly more women (23%) than men (5%) feel that entertainment is one of RFE's chief functions.



What is an initial step in measuring the effectiveness of this communication of RFE's objectives? To estimate the degree of effectiveness of the above mentioned communication impact, listeners were asked the following question pertaining to each RFE goal listed by them:

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU FEEL RFE HAS SUCCEEDED OR FAILED TO SUCCEED IN IMPLEMENTING AND FULFILLING THESE OBJECTIVES?

	Entirely	To a size-able extent	Partly	Hardly or not at all	Don't know
Encourage people helping them to persevere against communism (help people oppose communism).....	42%	11%	28%	12%	7%
Furnish information not easily available in Hungary	46%	16%	25%	4%	9%
To bring Western ideas to Hungary ..	48%	14%	28%	10%	-
Entertainment	64%	14%	22%	-	-

From the above table the index of effectiveness was calculated in the following manner: Replies stating that a particular RFE objective had been entirely implemented and fulfilled were given the index of 100 (100% effective), fulfilment to a sizeable extent was indexed as 60 (60% effective), partial fulfilment was made equal to 15 (15% effective), and hardly any or no fulfilment of objectives was weighted as 5 (5% effective). It will be noted that the assigned indices are conservatively low so that errors will tend to underestimate RFE goal effectiveness rather than overestimate it:



RFE GOAL EFFECTIVENESS AS JUDGED BY ITS AUDIENCE:

	<u>Effectiveness range</u> <u>(0-100)*</u>
Encourage people to perse- vere against communism	57.4 (%)
Furnish information not available	65.4 (%)
To bring Western ideas to Hungary	61.1 (%)
Entertainment	75.7 (%)

* 0 = 0% effective
100 = 100% effective.

The audience judged RFE as a whole to be 61.6 (%) effective as far as accomplishing all its chief goals are concerned. The figure 61.6 is the overall popular index of effectiveness. The index (61.6) can be expressed qualitatively in terms of the verbal categories (entirely, sizeable extent, etc.) from which it was originally derived. Thus expressed, 61.6 as an index of effectiveness means that the station as a whole is implementing and fulfilling its chief objectives to a significant extent so far as its audience judges the situation. Recalling the cautiously conservative calculation of this index the conclusion is justified that the degree of judged RFE goal effectiveness (as sample determined) is very high.

The last table also showed that the "political" and "ideological" objectives (57.4 and 61.1 respectively) of RFE are somewhat less effectively implemented and attained than the goal-categories of information and entertainment. As these last two objectives (entertainment and information) are to begin with easier to implement program-wise, the results gain added significance as far as their reliability is concerned.

The difference between the entertainment effectiveness index of 75.7 and the political (perseverance against communism, etc.) effectiveness index of 57.4 is significant. However, considering the many factors (not part of this study) impinging upon political effectiveness, the index of 57.4 is quite satisfactory.

The above is an experimental method to determine goal impact and effectiveness as audience determined. It is only a necessary first step in quantitatively measuring the effectiveness of this type of



radio communication as such. In order to determine "basic" effectiveness or influence, the attitudes and behaviour patterns of a given target would have to be causally related to a given communication. Though the present study has revealed one phase of RFE's communication impact, it has only delineated aspects of effectiveness as determined by the audience in relation to general communication goals (impact). Further research must deal with the effectiveness aspects here isolated in terms of direct influence on audience attitudes and behaviour.

There were no significant and reliable differences between the various population groups so far as their judgment of RFE's effectiveness is concerned.



IX.
ANTI-RFE REGIME PROPAGANDA AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE AUDIENCE



This section deals primarily with the differential effect of anti-RFE regime propaganda on the various population groups. Because of the nature of this problem area and because of the relative unrepresentativeness of a sample of refugees with respect to the influence of communist propaganda, respondents were asked to give their estimate of total population attitudes and behaviour (same method also used in Section IV) but were not questioned directly as to the possible influence of regime propaganda on themselves.

WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY ARE INFLUENCED BY THE KADAR REGIME PROPAGANDA AGAINST RFE?

These people are

...communists and those who sympathize with the regime	39%
...those who want to keep their positions, unprincipled people	31%
...people of lower classes	13%
...a part of the workers	6%
...a part of the intelligent people	3%
...a part of the farmers	2%
Other answers	6%
Don't know	20%
	<u>120% *</u>

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

A very large majority of the sample felt that only communists and opportunists are under the influence of the regime propaganda against RFE. The fact that 13% mentioned the lower classes in this connection does not mean that people are considered susceptible to regime propaganda because of their lower class membership as such; some respondents felt that the lower classes are more prone to believe regime propaganda because of lower educational standards. All other percentages in the preceding table actually indicate the extremely low level of regime propaganda influence.

So far as regime propaganda influence on the population as a whole is concerned, about 19% of the respondents felt that very few people are under the influence of regime propaganda. Only 9% of the sample were of the opinion that the regime exercised an appreciable influence on important segments of the population.



When examining the next table it must be remembered that the results listed apply only to those people interviewed who singled out one or another group as influenced to a certain extent by regime propaganda. Therefore the picture of regime propaganda effectiveness appears as unduly overdrawn. The real significance of the findings lies in the expressed differences between the various groups.

ABOUT HOW MANY "MEMBERS" OF THE VARIOUS POPULATION GROUPS ARE INFLUENCED BY REGIME PROPAGANDA?						
	<u>Very many</u>	<u>About half</u>	<u>Few</u>	<u>Hardly anybody</u>	<u>Sum</u>	<u>Number of respondents</u>
"WORKERS"						
TOTAL :	4%	11%	42%	43%	100%	144*
* Listeners of Western broadcasts only who said that workers are thus influenced.						
"PEOPLE WITH HIGH EDUCATION"						
TOTAL :	3%	9%	40%	48%	100%	122*
* Listeners of Western broadcasts only who said that "people with high education" are thus influenced.						
"FARMERS"						
TOTAL :	2%	5%	22%	71%	100%	87*
* Listeners of Western broadcasts only who said that farmers are thus influenced.						
"COMMUNISTS"						
TOTAL :	43%	27%	19%	11%	100%	37*
* Listeners of Western broadcasts only who said that "Communists" are thus influenced.						
"PEOPLE WITH LOW EDUCATION"						
TOTAL :	50%	27%	14%	9%	100%	22*
* Listeners of Western broadcasts only who said that "people with low education" are thus influenced.						
"MIDDLE CLASSES"						
TOTAL :	-	25%	50%	25%	100%	8*
* Listeners of Western broadcasts only who said that the middle classes are thus influenced.						
"OTHER GROUPS"						
TOTAL :	8%	17%	46%	29%	100%	24*
* Listeners of Western broadcasts who said that are thus influenced.						



So far as the interviewees are concerned, people with little education are even more vulnerable to regime propaganda than communists. Besides these two groups, only the "middle class" would also appear to be slightly vulnerable but the findings for the middle class are unreliable because of too few (8) actual mentions in this connection. Farmers emerge as the least vulnerable group, followed by persons of high education and by workers in that order.

The following method was employed to assess the relative effectiveness of anti-RFE propaganda on the groups or persons under regime propaganda influence: (1) It was estimated by the respondents what "influenced" people thought of RFE; (2) what was then cited as the views of "influenced" people was compared with the official propaganda line against RFE:

WHAT DO THESE PEOPLE WHO ARE INFLUENCED BY THE REGIME THINK ABOUT RFE?

These people think about RFE

...that RFE lies, provokes, makes propaganda	45%
...that it is a radio station of the enemy	16%
...that it is hardly to be taken seriously	7%
...that it is a capitalistic, American radio station	8%
Other comments	5%
Don't know	32%

113% *

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

The correlation between what regime-influenced people thought of RFE and the official regime line is very high. A quantitative correlation could not be worked out because of the nature of the data. It appears that those few people who seem influenced by the regime against RFE are influenced the way the regime wishes them to be.



The next table shows the different explanation offered why members of certain population groups are influenced by regime propaganda. We are now not interested in numbers influenced but merely in the personal reasons of individuals under regime influence:

<u>Reasons:</u>	<u>Some workers</u>	<u>Some people with high education</u>	<u>Commu- nists</u>	<u>Some Farmers</u>	<u>Some people with low education</u>	<u>Other groups</u>
Personal considera- tions (opportunism)	71%....	77%...	72%...	74%....	41%.....	68%
They are Communists	..14%....	..16%...	..24%...	..11%....	..6%.....	..11%
They are too timid etc.	7%....	5%...	13%...	10%....	3%.....	14%
They are too foolish..	12%....	8%...	6%...	9%....	38%.....	14%
They are disappointed in the West	9%....	7%...	2%...	7%....	3%.....	7%
Other answers	2%....	1%...	4%...	1%....	15%.....	4%
	115% *	114% *	121% *	112% *	106% *	118% *

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.
(100% = those people who answered the question for this group.)

The most interesting single finding is that with the possible exception of a minority of communists, nobody seems to be influenced by regime propaganda because of the merits or skills of that propaganda. The sample population believes that most Hungarians are influenced by regime propaganda only when they choose to be so influenced because of personal considerations quite apart from the content of the propaganda. This appears to hold for all population groups listed, with the exception of some of the poorly educated who may more readily fall victim to a particular propaganda line.



Even as early as two months after the revolution, disappointment in the West did not seriously bolster regime propaganda effectiveness.

Finally, the groups with whom regime propaganda is ineffective have been isolated by still another question:

WHAT ARE THE GROUPS (TYPE OF PEOPLE) IN THE POPULATION WITH WHOM ANTI-RFE REGIME PROPAGANDA IS INEFFECTIVE?

These groups are

...people with high education	29%
...workers	28%
...farmers	23%
...Hungarians with patriotic feelings.....	15%
...people of the middle class	3%
Other answers	6%
Don't know or no special group mentioned	29%
	<u>133% *</u>

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

These results in general support (internal reliability check) similar findings derived from an earlier table in this section.



The specific reasons why regime propaganda has been ineffective with the groups (farmers, workers, intelligentsia) least vulnerable to it are suggested in the answers volunteered in response to the following question:

WHY IS THE REGIME'S ANTI-RFE PROPAGANDA INEFFECTIVE WITH THESE GROUPS?	People with high education	Workers	Farmers	Other groups
They have had bad experiences with communism	70%.....	84%.....	88%.....	77%
They are anti-communists	9%.....	5%.....	7%.....	11%
They feel pro-Western.....	6%.....	2%.....	3%.....	3%
They are more intelligent and cannot be influenced	22%.....	10%.....	4%.....	11%
Other answers	2%.....	4%.....	1%.....	-
Don't know	1%.....	1%.....	1%.....	4%
	110% *	106% *	104% *	103% *

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

It is very apparent that the factors which militate most strongly against the effectiveness of regime propaganda lie in negative personal experiences with communism and the regime. Anti-communism and pro-Westernism are very minor factors indeed in this context. No significant differences between the groups are apparent with the possible exception that well educated persons reject regime propaganda more often on intellectual grounds than do the other groups. The evident overall-conclusion is that communist reality is (certainly propagandistically) its own worst enemy.



X.

POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION



An attempt was made (probably the first of its kind) to investigate by quantitative methods the entire question of popular participation in the Hungarian revolution. It was of interest to determine quantitatively overall participation, participation of specific population groups, reasons for participation and non-participation, intensity of participation, etc. This is predominantly a social psychological problem area ("the nature of revolutionary movements"), but emerging findings have important indirect applicability for audience research because of the identification of the type of group attitudes which did result in overt revolutionary behavior patterns.

The projective method of questioning (discussed earlier and particularly in Section III) was employed. Each respondent was asked about his friends' and acquaintances' exact role in the revolution. Independently of this question the average number of friends and acquaintances respondents had in Hungary was determined. All pertinent "background" information about each interviewee's circle of friends and acquaintances was also elicited. By mathematical calculation it was then possible to gain quantitative insights into type and degree of revolutionary participation on the part of various population groups. Furthermore, related attitudes could also be quantitatively determined in a similar fashion.

Inasmuch as the sample is postulated to represent the Hungarian population within definable limits, the assumption was made that the friends and acquaintances of the interviewees do not differ in personal characteristics from the friends and acquaintances all Hungarians have, that is to say from the total population. Any biasing factors involved in this sample do not invalidate this particular method any more than they might invalidate the results obtained by direct questioning. To the contrary, the method of projective questioning may be more reliable with the type of sample available (see earlier discussion). This method is admittedly experimental, but the results obtained established the confidence in it after they were inspected and also checked against information derived from other independent sources. The following table shows non-projected averages only, it is self-explanatory:



Average number of friends and good acquaintances of each respondent ...27,5 persons

Average number of friends and good acquaintances who actually fought in the revolution with gun in hand 3,05 persons...11%

Average number of friends and good acquaintances who did not actually fight in the revolution with gun in hand but who actively participated in some aspect of the revolutionary effort 4,4 persons...16%

Average number of friends and good acquaintances who supported the revolution without actually fighting or actively participating in it 2,2 persons... 8%

Average number of friends and good acquaintances who did not support the revolution 0,6 persons... 2%

In the next table the above average numbers are projected on the population as a whole:

PARTICIPATION IN THE REVOLUTION

(Adult population only)

Actually fighting	11%
Actively participating without fighting	16%
Supporting without fighting or participating	8%
Inactive (not against the revolution) ...	63%
Against the revolution	<u>2%</u>
	100%



The often made assumption that the Hungarian revolution was a popular uprising is thus for the first time confirmed by using methods of some scientific rigor: The overall active participation figure of 26% and the opposition figure of only 2% furnish the evidence that a popular revolution had taken place.

However, it is also significant to consider the very high percentage (63%) of people who presumably were inactive, some of whom were probably neutral.

The percentage of adults who "fought with gun in hand" is very high (11%), but certainly more conservative and entitled to consideration than some less scientific estimates which were made at different times.

The next tables relate population structure and type of participation or non-participation. Results are again projected to the population as a whole:

PARTICIPATION IN THE REVOLUTION BY SEX						
	Actually fighting	Actively participating without fight.	Supporting without fighting or participation	Inactive	Against the revolution	Sum
Men	20%	27%	12%	38%	3%	100%
Women	1%	4%	5%	89%	1%	100%

As was to be expected (partial validity check) women did hardly any actual fighting and, on the whole, were much less active in all aspects of the revolutionary efforts. Six out of ten Hungarian men were participating in some way in the revolution, so was one out of ten women.

PARTICIPATION IN THE REVOLUTION BY AGE						
	Actually fighting	Actively participating without fight.	Supporting without fighting or participation	Inactive	Against the revolution	Sum
Up to 20 years ...	11%	6%	3%	75%	5%	100%
21 to 29 years ...	19%	14%	8%	58%	1%	100%
30 to 49 years ...	5%	23%	10%	59%	3%	100%
50 years and over	1%	24%	15%	57%	3%	100%



It is evident that the younger age groups did most of the actual fighting (again a partial validity check for these results). The high inactive percentage for persons under the age of 20 is based on the fact that some very young adolescents are included in this group; otherwise there are no significant differences related to age so far as inactivity or opposition to the revolution is concerned.

The older groups' share in active revolutionary participation without arms is very high indicating that the strongest overall support (including logistic) for the fighters came from these groups.

PARTICIPATION IN THE REVOLUTION BY OCCUPATION

	Actually fighting	Actively participating without fight.	Supporting without fighting or participation	Inactive	Against the revolution	Sum
Professionals	14%	53%	25%	6%	2%	100%
White collar work.	2%	9%	5%	82%	2%	100%
Workers	13%	18%	7%	61%	1%	100%
Farmers and farm-hands	6%	16%	13%	62%	3%	100%
Others including students	20%	10%	6%	62%	2%	100%

White collar workers and farmers were the two groups who participated least actively in the revolutionary effort. Because of the nature of the revolutionary activity this finding is only surprising for white collar workers who apparently represent the least active element in the Hungarian population. All other occupational groups shared about equally in the actual fighting (professionals, students, workers), so far as overall participation in the revolution is concerned professionals and related "high" occupational groups far outdistanced all other occupations. Inasmuch as the workers constitute the numerically second largest occupational group in Hungary, the absolute number of workers fighting with arms in the revolution was larger than any other group's actual number of armed fighters.



The next tables will relate attitudes ("reasons") and revolutionary participation:

WHY DO YOU THINK YOUR FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES ACTUALLY FOUGHT WITH GUN IN HAND AND WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH MERELY SUPPORTING THE REVOLUTION?

To reach freedom, to dislodge the Russians	37%
They were anti-communists	30%
They believed the only chance was fighting	25%
They became involved in violent actions and emotions	12%
They were soldiers	3%
Other comments	3%
Don't know	3%
	<u>113% *</u>

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

The dominant reason for actually fighting in the revolution was first of all the desire to be free of the Russians, in second place ranked an anti-communistic attitude.

WHY DO YOU SUPPOSE YOUR FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES DID NOT ACTUALLY FIGHT WITH GUN IN HAND, BUT DID ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE REVOLUTION?

They had other things to do in the revolution	35%
They could not get arms	15%
They were afraid, they had to care for a family	16%
They were unfit for fighting (women, too old, too young)	9%
No fighting near them	10%
They felt the revolution could not succeed	7%
Other comments	6%
Don't know	<u>2%</u>
	100%



An important finding seems to be that most people who actively participated in the revolution (without actually fighting) would have fought if given the opportunity or called upon to do so. It is, therefore reasonable to assume that their attitudes are not essentially different from those expressed by the actual fighters.

WHY DID SOME OF YOUR FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES NOT SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION AT ALL?

They were communists	67%
They were afraid	23%
They had private reasons	4%
They felt the revolution could not succeed	4%
Don't know	5%
	<u>103% *</u>

* More than 100%, because some respondents gave more than one answer.

Most respondents understood this question to mean opposition to the revolution. It is apparent that only people sufficiently communistically indoctrinated opposed the revolution to any appreciable extent. Those who were afraid do not represent a specific attitudinal group so far as revolutionary participation is concerned.

The overall attitude toward the revolution is also revealed very strongly in the following table:

DO YOU THINK THAT THE PEOPLE WHO FOUGHT OR PARTICIPATED IN THE REVOLUTION ARE NOW SORRY THEY MADE THIS DECISION? - HOW MANY?

Yes, more than half now regret	1%
Yes, about half now regret	3%
Yes, few now regret	4%
Yes, but hardly anybody now regrets	2%
Yes, but don't know how many now regret	*%
No, nobody regrets	<u>90%</u>
	100%



Even though the revolution failed, more than 90% did not, according to the respondents, regret their decision to participate which "translated into attitudinal terms" probably means that there was no serious change in the attitudes contributing to the revolution during the period covered by this study. On the contrary, indirectly results indicate that a strengthening of these attitudes has probably occurred.

Finally it may be of interest in this context to examine popular expectations regarding liberation from within:

IN WHAT WAY DO YOU THINK HUNGARIANS CAN BRING ABOUT THEIR FREEDOM WITHOUT MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM THE WEST?

Not at all	61%
Not before the Russians leave Hungary	14%
By diplomatic ways	10%
By the ruin of Russian Communism	3%
By neutralization of Hungary	2%
Through free elections	2%
If the West would leave Germany	2%
By economic or other pressures on Russ.	1%
Other answers	4%
Don't know	3%
	<u>102% *</u>

* More than 100%, because some respondents gave more than one answer.

The results indicate that while the course of the revolution has probably increased anti-Russian and anti-communist attitudes, it has also in parallel fashion brought about an attitude of helplessness toward the ultimate achievement of freedom from within. A much more detailed analysis of the data presented in this section will be published at a later date.



XI.

THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS



The data show that most acknowledged revolutionary leaders were either workers (44%) or mainly young members of the intelligentsia (38%). Other population groups were not said to have contributed significant numbers to the revolutionary leadership. This does not mean that leaders coming from such groups as liberated political prisoners (11%), members of the old democratic parties (7%), and officers (5%) did not contribute decisively to the leadership structure of the revolution especially in terms of high individual positions of leadership. Nevertheless, because of the often small and unintegrated character of many revolutionary actions, leaders coming from worker groups as well as young intellectuals probably dominated the revolutionary scene so far as leadership is concerned. They (workers and students) also evidently constituted the "natural leaders" because they emerged from the two population groups most dominant throughout the revolutionary efforts.

The details and intricacies of the processes by which leaders emerged during the revolution were not sufficiently well revealed by this study (or any other study of this type).

Respondents answered more often in terms of the later stages of leadership emergence or selection:

HOW DID THESE PEOPLE (MENTIONED EARLIER) BECOME LEADERS?	
They were elected	60%
People trusted them	15%
Bravery	9%
They made themselves leaders ..	7%
Other answers	8%
Don't know	11%
	110%

* More than 100% because some respondents gave more than one answer.

A significant fact which emerges is that there was an orderly process by which leadership positions were assumed. Only a minority of leaders were apparently able to force themselves on their followers.

No significant differences between the various population groups so far as selection for leadership is concerned could be detected, with the possible exception that farmers did not believe in the elective process of leadership selection nearly as much as the rest of the population. A much more detailed analysis of this entire problem area will be published at a later date.



The overwhelming majority of the sampled population (90%) felt that the relationship between leaders and followers was harmonious and marked by high degree of rapport. This result increases confidence in the previous findings as to the elective nature of revolutionary leadership.

Workers and the young intelligentsia constitute the two groups of the probably most effective resistance leaders, inasmuch as they not only represented the largest absolute number of leaders but also emerged from the two groups with the highest combatant revolutionary participation, and thus, no doubt, could establish closest rapport with large segments of the most active revolutionary participants. The implications of this finding are clearly manifold.



XII.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SAMPLE AND SOME POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL GROUP CHARACTERISTICS OF HUNGARIAN LISTENERS



As was pointed out in the introduction, the quota sampling method was employed using as a basis (wherever judged reliable) the latest available figures on the Hungarian population structure as published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Population</u> (Hungarian Central Statistical Office)
<u>Sex:</u>		
Men	51%	48%
Women	49%	52%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
 <u>* Age:</u>		
Up to 20 years	22%	15% 15 to 20 years
21 to 29 years	36%	15% 21 to 25 years
30 to 49 years	34%	15% 26 to 30 years
50 years and over	8%	24% 31 to 45 years
		16% 46 to 60 years
		<u>15%</u> 61 years and over
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* Grouped categories used in the sample do not exactly correspond to groups employed by the Hungarian Statistical Office.

Continued next page!



	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Population</u>	(Hungarian Central Statistical Office)
<u>Religion:</u>			
Catholics	68%	68%	
Protestants	28%	30%	
Others	4%	2%	
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	
<u>Occupation:</u>			
Professional	5%	4%	
White collar workers	26%	7%	
Workers	42%	28%	
Farmers and farmhands	7%	41%	
Others	20%	14%	
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	
<u>*Education:</u>			
		5%	illiterate
Up to 8 years sch.	44%	62%	Primary
9 to 12 years	21%	27%	Middle
Acad.High Sch.grad.	18%	5%	High
University etc.	17%	1%	University
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	
<u>Place of Residence:</u>			
Budapest	35%	19%	
Other places	65%	81%	
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	
* Grouped categories used in the sample do not exactly correspond to groups employed by the Hungarian Statistical Office.			



The only two noteworthy discrepancies exist in the occupational and age categories, because an inadequate number of farmers and older persons was included in the sample due to conditions beyond control. Although white collar workers appear to be overrepresented in the sample, it is very unlikely that the low figures given by the Hungarian Statistical Office are correct considering the highly bureaucratic structure of all aspects of the state machinery. The sample probably is overrepresentative of higher educated people but not to the extent indicated by above figures. Residents of Budapest and men are slightly overrepresented.

The results when analyzed in terms of the various population groups, generally indicate differences only in the degree of attitudes held but not basic attitudinal differences in kind. Thus it can be assumed the possible under-representation of one group and over-representation of another group is not serious enough to forbid projection of the results to the population as a whole. Furthermore, the isolated differences (as expressed in percentages) between the opinions of groups with different characteristics remain valid considering the fact that (except for farmers) all larger population groups are adequately represented in the sample to permit projecting noted differences between them to the population as a whole.

By and large, the sample obtained was probably the best obtainable and most projectable sample under the circumstances. It can be considered (except in the case of farmers) as having met the usual requirements of "quota sampling" and on those grounds is representative, within definable limits, of the total population on which its selection was based (see Introduction for a more general discussion).

The following question was asked to determine the approximate number of persons in our sample who were or could be brought under communist influence. Attention is invited to the fact that communism proneness, as far as this study is concerned, has been determined only on the basis of the two questions discussed in this section. However, studies conducted under similar situational circumstances, have previously proven the reliability of this type of question in identifying "sympathizers" of ideas or forms of government unacceptable to the West.



WOULD YOU MORE OR LESS AGREE TO THIS STATEMENT: COMMUNISM IS ESSENTIALLY A GOOD IDEA BUT HAS BEEN BADLY CARRIED OUT IN HUNGARY?

Yes, good idea badly carried out	20%
No, bad idea carried out well	1%
No, bad idea, badly carried out	78%
No, good idea carried out well	-
Don't know	1%
	100%

Considering some of the selective (most refugees are pronounced anti-communists) and related biasing factors, it was significant to find that a full 20% more or less supported the idea of communism. By inspection alone this result increases confidence in the representativeness of the sample, as the above referred to selective factors apparently were not operational in eliminating people under some degree of communist influence from leaving the country and thus becoming available for this sample.

The next question probed more deeply into the attitudes of the group which revealed susceptibility to communism:

PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY IT IS A GOOD IDEA BUT BADLY CARRIED OUT:

It is impossible to realize this idea	38%
Up to now the idea has been badly carried out	38%
This idea has been carried out by terror	12%
Other comments	8%
Don't know	4%
	100%



The answers indicate that of the communist influencable group some respondents are probably susceptible to communism more than others, but no basic opposition to the idea was apparent. Considering that the position of the interviewee, the locale of the interview and the interviewing situation as a whole would tend to minimize any expression of even remote and "theoretical" ideological communist sympathies, the results were considered reliable and indicative enough of some degree of communist influence, and consequently were used as an additional vantage point from which to examine attitudes, listening habits, and preferences etc.

The following tables show differences in susceptibility toward communism in terms of respondents' sex, age, and religion:

COMMUNIST PRONE PEOPLE BY SEX

Men	15%
Women	25%

COMMUNIST PRONE PEOPLE BY AGE

Up to 20 years	32%
21 to 29 years	22%
30 to 49 years	13%
50 years and over	4%

COMMUNIST PRONE PEOPLE BY RELIGION

Catholics	23%
Protestants	13%



Younger people are more susceptible to communism than older people. The fact that communist "influence" definitely decreases with age is quite apparent. These results are another reliability check on our findings in general and on this question in particular. Men are less often influenced by communist ideas than women, and Catholics more often than Protestants. The fact that Protestants in Hungary may be less communist prone than Catholics is not as unexpected as it would seem, because a religious minority is often more closely tied to central religious doctrines and principles than the religious majority. Consequently, the atheistic aspects of communism, for instance, may be even more strongly opposed by the average Hungarian Protestant than the average Catholic in Hungary.

Many social psychologists feel that the most important aspect of social class is attitudinal, that is to say if a person identifies himself (thinks he belongs) with a certain class then he will exhibit behaviour patterns and hold attitudes generally associated with the class of his identification. It was, therefore, considered meaningful to ask the following questions to determine changes in social structure:

WHAT SOCIAL CLASS WOULD YOU SAY YOU BELONGED TO BEFORE THE COMMUNISTS CAME TO POWER?

WHAT SOCIAL CLASS DID YOU BELONG TO AT THE TIME YOU LEFT HUNGARY?

	<u>Before the Communists came to power</u>	<u>At the time of departure</u>
Upper class	1%	*%
Upper-middle class	3%	2%
Middle class	46%	42%
Lower-middle class	38%	39%
Lower class	11%	16%
Don't know	1%	1%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

*% = Less than one half of one percent.

This means that so far as the interviewees were concerned, no significant changes in Hungarian class structure occurred in spite of communist efforts to eliminate the bourgeois classes and the attitudes associated with them.



The small changes that did occur in popular awareness so far as changes in class structure are concerned, are shown in the next two tables:

CHANGE OF SOCIAL CLASS OF THE RESPONDENTS	
Lower class than before	11%
No change	87%
Higher class than before	2%
	<u>100%</u>

CHANGE OF SOCIAL CLASS BY AGE	
	<u>Lower class than before</u>
Up to 20 years	7%
21 to 29 years	11%
30 to 49 years	14%
50 years and over	16%

These results do not mean that the prevailing majority of respondents (Hungarian population) felt that they occupied the same status positions in Hungarian society at the time of their departure that they had occupied before the communists came to power. But the findings do mean that the individual Hungarian interviewee considered his class undestroyed and his class affinity unchanged. This means that some middle-class (and peasant) attitude patterns remain almost as firmly entrenched in Hungarian society today as before the communists came to power. In other words so far as people's own judgments (attitudes) as to their class membership are concerned Hungarian society probably did not change profoundly except for certain limited inroads made by communism. However, all modern societies are marked by situational changes and the above findings should not be construed to mean that no changes have occurred in Hungarian group (class) attitudes; the results merely indicate that the population is



unwilling to accept the social structural (class) and ideological (attitude) changes dictated by the regime. At the same time, popular non-acceptance of communism does not mean unaltered adherence to all traditional attitudes. To isolate some of the new emerging popular attitudes was one of the chief tasks of this study.

