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RADIO FREE EUROPE AND ITS AUDIENCE

July 1956 - June 1957

An Analysis Prepared for Dr. Wilbur Schramm

Audience Analysis Section
RADIO FREE EUROPE



INTRODUCTION

The following material consists of the answers given to questions regarding Radio Free Europe and its audience by Dr. Wilbur Schramm.

Should the reader desire additional information regarding any finding or hypothesis discussed herein, it is suggested that he consult RFE's Audience Analysis Monthly Reports and the several Audience Analysis Assessment Memoranda and Special Reports issued during the period under review.

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I. REGIME MEDIA RESPONSE TO RFE/FEC DURING JULY 1, 1956 - JUNE 30, 1957.

A. GENERAL FINDINGS

The volume of regime response to RFE/FEC everywhere increased over the previous year.

In 1956/57, the press and radio of the target countries have specifically referred to RFE/FEC in over 1869 separate press items and broadcasts. This is over five times as often as the second most frequently attacked Western station. The accompanying graphs indicate that of the 2628 references to specific Western broadcasts, 70% specified RFE/FEP operations.

	Czecho- Slovakia	Hungary	Poland	Rumania	Bulgaria	TOTAL
No. of References to:						
RFE/FEP Operations	748	375	339	208	198	1869
VOA	73	74	42	73	52	314
BBC	47	122	50	14	26	259
Other Specific Western Broadcasts	75	44	22	19	26	186
Unspecified Western Broadcasts	94	112	78	100	126	510

The most frequent themes of communist propaganda against RFE were the following:

1. RFE was responsible for inciting the Hungarian "counter-revolution", attempting to plant a fascist emigre government in Hungary, and encouraging false hopes about the outcome of the revolution. RFE wants to apply its "Hungarian plan" to other peoples' democracies.

2. RFE pretends the existence of "National Communism" which is but a myth and incompatible with any "People's Democracy".

3. RFE deliberately attempts to confuse its listeners by misinterpreting the Soviet 20th Party Congress and any communist discussion of past "errors."

4. The German and Austrian Governments are unable to exercise adequate control over foreign agencies operating within their boundaries. No country, this theme continues, can be considered "neutral" or "responsible" under these circumstances.

5. RFE is not a private organization but is financed and controlled by the U.S. Government.



B. SPECIAL FINDINGS FOR EACH COUNTRY

BULGARIA

Frequency and Tone of References

Prior to the Hungarian uprising, the Bulgarian regime was apparently confident of the efficacy of its own propaganda. It dismissed the Western radio stations as "dogs yapping behind the advancing socialist caravan". Accordingly, the first four months of the period under review were markedly quiet.

After the outbreak of the Hungarian uprising the average number per month of regime reactions increased over 20 times, with RFE being by far the main target (about 44% of the total). The last three months brought a gradual decrease of the violence of the campaign against RFE and VOA. The bulk of assaults near the close of the period were directed against unspecified Western radio stations.

Lines of Response

Prior to the Hungarian events the regime was carrying out a cautious, but gradual "destalinization" and a tactful rapprochement with the West. The few responses to Western broadcasts during these months were, in fact, complaints against alleged misrepresentation of the Soviet 20th congress and the subsequent developments in Bulgaria.

Two factors underlie the unprecedented rise of regime attacks against Western broadcasts in connection with the Hungarian uprising. The regime seems to have been alarmed at the revolution's impact on the Bulgarian population. It was also eager to prove that the uprising was not a product of any intrinsic drawbacks of the socialist system, but a plot of internal reaction and subversive activity on the part of RFE and VOA.

The regime used an elaborate propaganda technique with regard to the Hungarian events, both by sending special correspondents to Budapest and utilizing all Western criticism on RFE's alleged guilt for the bloodshed. It also enrolled in its propaganda apparatus many former members of the outlawed National Agrarian Union and published several redefectors' statements in an effort to discredit the RFE staff and exile leaders.

Regime Acknowledgement of Impact


Almost all sections of the population were influenced by the Western broadcasts, according to frequent admissions by regime leaders and newspapers. On November 28, 1956 the First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov warned the internal enemies "instigated by the foreign radio stations and acting upon instructions by the imperialist intelligence and counter-revolutionary centers abroad" not to play with fire again.

The youth paper Narodna Mladezh has referred to "deranged minds in our country who listen to the Western radio stations and their appeals; who



BULGARIAN REGIME MEDIA REFERENCES TO WESTERN BROADCASTS AND LEAFLETS

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dream of the recovery of their lost capitalist paradise...". "The enemy is making skillful use of the complacency of the people who do not deal a decisive rebuff to his subtle ambiguous chatter". Some village youths who refused to continue their membership in the Dimitrov Youth Organization were said to have their raised voices in harmony with the inimical radio stations.

Bulgarian intelligensia was also said to have been confused by unnamed programs of Western stations.



CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Frequency of References

Regime response to Western broadcasts was low during the first three months, and increased sharply through November - December. The Hungarian revolution and to a lesser degree the Polish events of October account for the marked increase in references in the last three months of 1956. However, the monthly level of regime references during the months following the Hungarian revolution remained high, especially during May 1957 due to the National Committee election.

Lines of Response

One of the notable features of regime media attacks against Western broadcasts was the contrast in their treatment of events in Poland and Hungary. Polish events were treated with extreme caution while panic and open hostility dominated references to Western broadcasts involving Hungary.

The regime line on the Poznan demonstrations followed the approach which Polish media had adopted only momentarily and then abandoned. "Poznan" was said to be largely the work of "imperialist agents" and "paid provocateurs," with heavy emphasis given to the "role" of RFE broadcasts. Concerning the October developments in Poland, Western stations were charged with reading their own meaning into them in an attempt to destroy "socialist unity." On the other hand, the Hungarian uprising was labelled a counter-revolution in which Western broadcasters were implicated.

The Hungarian revolution accounted for by far the greatest number of attacks on Western broadcasts. Events within Hungary not only constituted a major theme, but also offered the major occasion for increased accusations of interference by Western broadcasters in Czechoslovak internal affairs. The tone of the attacks was sometimes almost hysterical.

Exiles and exile affairs, as well as RFE internal affairs, found a place in regime propaganda. As before, the technique often used in discussing exile group affairs - and to some degree also RFE affairs - is the use of extensive quotations from various exiles papers of diverse political views.


Acknowledgment of Impact

Few direct admissions have ever been made by the Czechoslovak regime of the impact of RFE programs and FEP leaflets. Nevertheless, the volume of the response and the manner in which the regime constantly attempts to refute the charges made by RFE/FEC suggest regime concern over the potential influence which RFE exercises in Czechoslovakia. Some statements (for example, the Zapotocky speech about the uranium deliveries to USSR) indicate extreme regime sensitivity to the content of certain RFE programs.



CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME MEDIA REFERENCES TO WESTERN BROADCASTS AND LEAFLETS

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For the first time a leading Czechoslovak communist official openly admitted the jamming of Western broadcasts. Very frank discussions have also appeared in a periodical for journalists about how best to deal with "propaganda" from Western broadcasts.

Of particular interest have been the occasional references to intellectual and student dissidents whose behavior was said to have been encouraged and applauded by RFE broadcasts.



HUNGARY

Frequency of References

The 651 references to Western broadcasts in the Hungarian media between July 1956 and June 1957 almost quadruple those of the previous period and are nearly 8 times as high as between July 1954 and June 1955. 63% (410) of the references to Western broadcasts specified RFE/FEP, as compared to 80.5% in the preceding period,

However, it should be noted that in November and December 1956, when references to Western broadcasts registered their greatest incidence in the Hungarian media (especially regime radio), Western stations were often quoted in a neutral context as news sources. RFE was singled out in 80% of those references of a critical nature.

Pre-Kadar Government Response

Before the Hungarian revolution, the communist regime in Hungary constantly underplayed Western broadcasts save for participation in certain Soviet organized campaigns. Hungarian media had referred less frequently to Western broadcasts than had either Czechoslovak or Polish press and radio.

References to Western broadcasts during the summer of 1956 revealed certain regime insecurities. Such long standing propaganda ventures as the re-defection campaign showed signs of faltering: the dilemma of whether to give a hero's welcome to the returnees or to treat them as repentant sinners, remained unresolved up to the revolution.

Great concern was also shown by the regime about the ferment in intellectual life exemplified by the Irodalmi Ujsag (Literary Gazette) and the Petöfi Circle. Both were repeatedly accused of serving the interests of the "mud slinging Western broadcasts". At the same time, by blaming RFE and VOA for the "Petöfi Circle Affair", the Hungarian media conceded the impact of RFE's and VOA's reporting on these internal Hungarian events.

Toward the middle of October the Hungarian radio made the significant admission that "to a certain degree" some Western broadcasts had "correctly" treated Imre Nagy and his "new course" of 1953.

During October 23 - November 4, Western broadcasts were widely cited by the independent Hungarian radio stations for their "special service" in relaying news broadcasts from isolated centers of freedom and disseminating vital news and information to all. The broadcast appeals of Hungarian "freedom stations" to the UN and to RFE as they died one by one in the wake of the Soviet Union's second intervention are wellknown.


The Kadar Government Response

Once the Soviet army of occupation was installed in the Parliament building, the Kadar regime began to deploy a portion of its propaganda



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efforts against RFE and other Western broadcasts, giving particular emphasis to RFE's "leadership and participation". The regime claimed that "Western imperialists" tried with the help of RFE to use the "great people's movement of October" to overthrow the "people's democratic order". "Revelations" about RFE's role were clearly intended to embarrass the Austrian and West German governments, a propaganda effort in which the Soviet Union and other target countries joined.

Subsequently the "great people's movement" was step by step transformed into the "White Terror". A large segment of regime propaganda undertook to establish the ultimate "guilt" of RFE and, at the same time, to discredit the freedom fighters. The ground-swell of popular enthusiasm which had toppled the Rakosi-Gerő rule and, in the words of Mao Tse Tung had "disintegrated the party in a few short days", was explained first by the claim that "the masses had been misled", then later denied altogether. Workers were increasingly absolved of responsibility until, barely seven months after the revolution, State Minister Marosan confidently announced that the Budapest workers would gladly have defended "socialism" had they been given weapons. The October events, as well as the continued acts of resistance which followed, were asserted to be the responsibility of RFE and other Western broadcasts with the active collaboration of the agents of reaction and imperialism, criminals released from jail during the revolution, traitorous men of letters, and misguided youth.

As early as December, when it became clear that the regime could expect little cooperation from the men of letters, attacks against the writers began. Regime propaganda claimed that the activities of writers who had stayed behind (e.g., Hay, Dery) had "unmasked" them as the "local representatives of the inciting RFE/VOA". As for writers who had escaped to the West (e.g., Aczel, Enczi, Paloczi, Horvath, Ignotus), their broadcasts over Western stations were treated as direct evidence that they were, and had always been, "stooges of imperialism".

The Hungarian courts were used as propaganda fora: an overwhelming number of "counter-revolutionary" trials have touched upon the defendants' connections with RFE. These alleged connections ranged from "printing leaflets based on RFE and other Western broadcasts" to "receiving coded messages from RFE" and "maintaining radio connections with RFE". Speaking about the Central Budapest Workers' Council in the National Assembly, Kadar stated that this council had to be disbanded for being "under the thumb of RFE".

Extreme sensitivity was indicated about the manner in which RFE and other Western broadcasts referred to the victims of the Hungarian drumhead courts. The regime repeated again and again that those on trial were "murderers, prostitutes, the dregs of society" whom Western broadcasters alone regarded as heroes. Another means to equate the freedom fighters



with criminal elements was to play up brawls among Hungarian refugees in the West and the occasional Western newspaper reports on acts of violence committed by Hungarian refugees. References to such occurrences invariably sought to reflect the attitudes of Western broadcasters to the revolutionary trials. In this connection, redefectors never failed to stress that the refugee camps were full of "escaped convicts and common criminals" who ruled over the camp population.

Major Acknowledgments of Impact

It is significant that the "effects" of Western broadcasts have been repeatedly mentioned in connection with the winning over of the young and "the building of the party". Both are among the main ideological tasks confronting the present regime in Hungary.

The attitude of Hungary's "misguided" youth during the revolution was a rude shock to the communist regime. The blame for the stand of the young people was assigned partly to the "mistakes of the past" and partly to "imperialist subversion" either directly through "seditious broadcasts", or indirectly through their agents who were said to have managed to acquire positions of leadership in the revolution.

The admission was made that Hungarian propaganda's exaggerated image of a drab and cheerless West achieved the opposite of its aim: young people turned to the glittering picture painted on the same subject by Western radio stations and thus a large proportion of the refugees consisted of young boys. The responsibility of educators for the attitude of the Hungarian youth was mitigated by the realization that "children only stay five hours a day in our (teachers') care; at home, they listen to all kinds of radio stations with their parents".

Lack of communication between the different party echelons is said in part to have resulted from an absence of adequate information in regime media. Asserted a communist speaker at a party meeting in January 1957: "Radio Kossuth informs me that 'the poplar bends in the wind' (opening line of an old Hungarian song) while from RFE I get the news on what decrees the government has issued... in other words foreign press and radio comment sharply on... the events and react faster than the domestic media".

A white book on RFE's role in the revolution (May 1957) described "the speedy and adroit information service of RFE" in a chapter entitled "Fiendish Tactics", and characterized RFE's coverage of the Polish events as "exceptionally clever and restrained". "It (RFE) gave the news on debates and articles of which the Hungarian press had, alas, failed to give information". The pamphlet then warned: "Even today the information service of RFE is a living caution to us: we must never allow the imperialists to inform the radio listeners more speedily and adroitly than we do".

The availability of an independent, albeit "enemy" news service



is also conceded by the regime to have an adverse effect on its indoctrination efforts among the population as a whole. The "underestimate of the influence of enemy broadcasts" was a frequent point made during ideological debates on the "mistakes of the past". The opening of this debate coincides with a special Radio Kossuth program designed to combat RFE broadcasts.

In this connection not only was the need for a "speedy and adroit" news service (like that of RFE) held up as a desideratum, but a criticism of the Hungarian radio concerning its basic approach to information was also conceded by Radio Kossuth.

More recently, a very significant acknowledgment of the effect RFE and BBC coverage of Chinese ideological developments had on the Hungarian listeners was made in the opening paragraphs of an article on this subject in the party organ:

"Taking advantage of the temporary lack of information within Hungarian public opinion from this (Chinese developments) point of view, the bourgeois press and radio began, at great speed, to disseminate articles to the effect that China 'begins to move off the path of Moscow ideology', that 'the communist block is no longer as solid and no longer under the same unified command as before'... Although their (Western broadcasts) constant lies had a clear purpose it is nonetheless necessary to clarify what is really going on in China."



POLAND

Frequency and Tone of References

There were 324 references in Polish media to Western broadcasts and leaflets during the current period, compared with 593 the year before. (Broadcasts by Radio Homeland to exile audiences are not considered here.) 71% of the total references to Western broadcasts recorded during the period under review, mentioned RFE/FEP operations.

The tone of references to Western broadcasts, particularly since October, has usually been more measured and deliberate; the old "Stalinist" vituperative and abusive type of attack has become almost extinct in Poland.

Four factors may be responsible for this declining frequency and changing tone: 1) the very measured approach of Western broadcasts to Poland since October 1956 and the complete abolition of the leaflet campaign; 2) less frequent anti-Western propaganda in Polish media and their greater emphasis on news and information; 3) regime efforts to win over the exiles as allies abroad; 4) the fact that foreign scapegoat hunting and attacking "imperialist agents" etc. has become outmoded in Poland and is ridiculed when it occurs.

Major Campaigns Referring to Western Broadcasts

During this period a considerable proportion of references to Western broadcasts carried by Polish media were non-propagandistic in tone, and even non-antagonistic to RFE and other Western stations. This was true, to some extent, even before Gomulka's return to power. The non-propagandist references may be considered as representing the views of their authors and not as centrally inspired regime response. They are characteristic of the relative freedom of expression enjoyed in Poland during the past year.


The regime inspired campaigns (listed in chronological order) dealt with the following themes:

1. The FEP balloon operation. This was strictly a Polish campaign (in contrast to the Moscow-inspired drive throughout the Soviet orbit in February 1956) which, among other things, attempted to embarrass the West German government by emphasizing that relations between Poland and the Federal Republic could not be normalized so long as leaflet balloons continued to be launched from German territory. This campaign was waged in September 1956.
2. The October changes in Poland. Restraint was credited to RFE, BBC and VOA at the time of the 8th Plenary session of the PUWP, but was often labelled as insincere. RFE was alleged to have changed its tone and tactics only temporarily in order not to lose contact with



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its listeners, all of whom were said to approve the October changes. But it was predicted that the "wolf would soon shed its sheep's clothing."

3. RFE's role in the Hungarian revolution. Polish media did not devote much attention to this problem, but they did reprint a number of Western attacks on RFE in this context. At the same time, a Radio Warsaw commentator who returned from Budapest after November 4th asserted that RFE could not have been responsible for the revolution.

4. Polish general elections in January 1957. This was the last regime-inspired anti-RFE campaign to date. It claimed that RFE had finally revealed its cards and was flagrantly interfering in internal Polish affairs to sow unrest in the country and ruin all the beneficial changes brought about in October 1956. Regime propagandists seemed concerned that RFE was contributing to the possible defeat of the Gomulka slate, although this in fact was not the case.

However, since the elections, the only obviously regime-inspired references to RFE consisted of a few summaries of press agency reports of other countries of the Soviet bloc, attacking RFE.

The non-propagandistic campaigns, not inspired by the regime but containing frequent references to Western broadcasts, dealt with the following themes (in chronological order):

1. The trials of persons apprehended during the Poznan demonstrations. The charges accusing Western broadcasts and especially RFE of influencing the demonstrators were ridiculed and rejected not only by the defense lawyers, but also by all Polish press and radio commentators.

2. The jamming of Western broadcasts. At least 30 newspapers at the end of October and in early November published resolutions passed at various public meetings demanding the abolition of jamming.

3. Speech by Piasecki, leader of the discredited pro-Stalinist "Regime Catholic" organization "Pax". In this speech, delivered on May 5, 1957, Piasecki coupled attacks on his person published by the Polish communist press, with RFE and VOA campaigns against him. This was described as a ridiculous and outmoded type of argumentation by several newspapers.

Direct Program Reactions

During the period under review the Polish press and radio referred to 27 programs of the "Voice of Free Poland." No special sensitivity of the regime is discernible from the themes of these direct



program reactions, with the exception of attacks on individual programs dealing with the elections in January 1957. Programs pointing to regime failure in setting up a new youth organization also seemed to evoke more frequent reaction in the Polish press than many other themes.

Major Acknowledgments of Impact

The tendency in both propagandistic and non-propagandistic references was to play down the present effectiveness of Western broadcasts, especially RFE, while admitting their importance as sources of information in the past before the Polish communist news services were improved.

However, the nation-wide campaign for the abolition of jamming, widely publicized in the provincial press, revealed that the majority of the Polish public still attached great importance to Western broadcasts. There are indications that the regime did not plan to abolish jamming entirely, especially in the case of RFE broadcasts, but that it was forced into announcing the dismantling of the whole network of jammers under public pressure.

The appeals broadcast by RFE last October calling upon the Polish public to remain calm were acknowledged by regime media and officials as contributing to stability in Poland.

Available materials also show that Western broadcasts are still considered an important source of information and that they are also followed by newspapermen and writers as source material.



RUMANIA

Frequency of References

During the year under review, Rumanian regime media carried 280 references to Western radio stations as compared with 113 during the previous period. During summer and early autumn 1956, the frequency of such attacks was greatly diminished, reflecting faint indications of "thaw." From November 1956 to January 1957, RFE was singled out in 147 of 171 references to Western stations. Since April 1957, the number of attacks dropped to an average of 8-10 each month.

Lines of Response

In November 1956, the revolutionary events in Hungary provoked an extremely violent and aggressive regime campaign against Western broadcasts. In addition to what was mentioned above under "general comments," the Rumanian regime proved especially sensitive about information appearing in the Western press about unrest in Rumania. Comments of some Western stations about troubles among students and the ethnic Hungarian population in Transylvania attracted angry replies by all regime media. Western stations were accused of "interfering in the internal affairs of the countries of peoples democracies", of "inciting people in the Socialist countries to revolt against their governments and to commit actions of sabotage and resistance."

According to high regime officials, true U.S. policy -- typified by "encouragement" and "sponsorship" of the outbreak of the revolt in Hungary -- is exercised through the efforts of Western radio which "openly proposes the overthrow of existing political and economic regimes in the Socialist countries."


On the other hand, events in Poland and their possible connection with Western broadcasts have been ignored by the regime. Rumanian press and broadcasts reproduced, almost without comment, the various official communiques and statements released by the Polish press agencies. Entire passages were often omitted from the declarations made by Gomulka which would indicate a deviation from the regime's concepts of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Rumanian press and radio were equally extremely reluctant to comment on the Poznan uprising and abstained almost completely from commentaries in that connection.

In connection with events in Hungary, but later also independently, regime propoganda emphasized that exiles and refugees, helped by Western imperialist circles and radio stations, advocate a restoration



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of former social and political conditions existing in Rumania. Western stations, especially RFE, were accused of sponsoring these exiles and helping "all these fascist and reactionary elements" to resume their former activities and "easy life."

At the same time, Western stations (mainly RFE) were accused of staging a campaign of hostile propaganda against refugees wishing to return to their countries. During the last month of the period under review, in spite of the more moderate tone adopted with respect to Western stations, The Voice of Homeland, alone continued to carry the customary attacks against Western stations which have otherwise temporarily almost disappeared from the Rumanian press.

Non-Acknowledgment of Impact

The Rumanian regime, unlike other target regimes, made no admissions of Western broadcast impact during this period.

However, the frequency of direct regime reaction to specific Western programs, almost non-existent before, has noticeably increased during and after the Hungarian revolution. Forty(40) direct reactions to Western programs were recorded during the twelve months under review as compared with only one during the previous year.



SOVIET UNION AND EAST GERMANY

Prior to the Hungarian revolution neither the Moscow nor Pankow regimes were emitting more than the occasional snarl at RFE, mainly limiting themselves to routine attacks along the lines of other regime references to RFE.

With the Hungarian revolution came a protracted campaign against RFE and other Western stations, along the lines mentioned under "General Comments".

In December of last year, 46 (out of 47) attacks against Western broadcasts, referred to RFE. It was in December that the Soviet Union was trying to persuade the UN to debate 'subversion' and 'interference' in the affairs of East European countries. The East German campaign, in particular, took nourishment from numerous derogatory comments in the Western press about RFE's alleged role of incitement in the Hungarian revolution.

One feature of the campaign, besides Soviet mentions of RFE at UN sessions, was the wide coverage given to attacks on RFE in all the major newspapers. Komsomolskaya Pravda, Krasnaya Zvezda, Sovetskii Flot, Pravda, Izvestia, and Literarturnaya Gazeta all featured long articles about RFE for home consumption. The portion of the campaign for the benefit of the Western audience had also a subsidiary aim of upsetting relations between Western Germany, Austria and the US.

By February, the campaign dropped in intensity; the emphasis, if there was any, was now laid on the alleged illegality of U.S. foreign policy of which 'subversion' was said to be the keystone. By March the Soviet attempt to bring about a UN debate on this topic had failed, and with it the number of unfavorable references to RFE which declined to pre-revolution totals.



II. SUMMARY OF RFE AUDIENCE CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES

Introductory Note

The next immediate pages provide overall information about numbers of radio and television sets as well as audience mail.

Available information is necessarily incomplete. This varies with subject matter and country. The explanation for this incompleteness is fourfold: (1) Inadequate interviews sometimes due to factors beyond RFE's control, other times due to RFE's interview procedures which yet require perfection; (2) Absence of coordinated information about Soviet/satellite policies with respect to jamming and effects of local jamming; (3) Dependence on information from regime sources and (4) Absence of firsthand observation of most of the phenomena under discussion.

No effort is made to declare the size of the audience in each country or to describe particular segments of target country society where documentation is lacking.

Material about trends in audience characteristics and attitudes is presented on a country-by-country basis as follows:

A. Hard Indices

Radio Sets

Listener Letters

Factors Affecting Listening Habits

Jamming Effects

B. Psychological Climate

Trends in Public Sentiment

Implications for Audience Reaction



COMPARATIVE NUMBERS AND TRENDS IN RADIO (WIRELESS)
REGISTRATIONS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE TARGET COUNTRIES.

Country	Date of Latest Information for 1956/57 Period	Number	Date of Latest Information for 1955/56 Period	Number	Average Annual Increase (approximately)
Bulgaria	May 1957	457,000	May 1956	370,000	87,000
Czechoslovakia	March 1957	2,949,000	May 1956	2,900,000	58,800
Hungary	Dec 1956	1,250,000	Dec 1955	1,150,000	100,000
Poland	March 1957	2,280,000	July 1955	1,600,000	400,000
Rumania	Dec 1956	<u>688,000</u> 7,624,000	Dec 1955	<u>600,000</u> 6,620,000	88,000



TELEVISION STATIONS AND RECEIVERS IN RFE TARGET COUNTRIES


	<u>STATIONS</u>		<u>RECEIVERS</u>	
	<u>June 1956</u>	<u>June 1957</u>	<u>June 1956</u>	<u>June 1957</u>
Bulgaria	1*	1*	150	500**
Czechoslovakia	2	3	45,000	100,000
Hungary	1*	1	500	600
Poland	2	3	1,000	7,068
Rumania	1*	1*	100	500**

* experimental station

** estimates (regime reports at variance)



LETTERS RECEIVED BY RFE, MUNICH, FROM LISTENERS IN TARGET COUNTRIES: JULY 1955 - MAY 1957



A. Hard Indices

Radio Sets

Regime figures as of May 1957 indicated that there are 457,000 wireless sets registered. Approximately 87,000 of these sets were added during the period under review. New wired radio registrations have decreased considerably.

Listener Letters

Two letters were received from Bulgarian listeners during this period. At the same time, no systematic effort is made to solicit them.

Factors Affecting Listening Habits

Latest figures indicate that there may be as many as 500 TV sets running on a test basis in Bulgaria. Obviously, TV broadcasts offer no significant competition for overall listener attention. The little available information indicates that regime radio has not successfully competed for the interest of listeners to radio broadcasts, in spite of instructions by the Deputy Minister of Culture that home broadcasts contain more national character.

All available evidence indicates that listening to Western broadcasts was stimulated by the events in Poland and Hungary.

Jamming Effects

There is no evidence of change in audience size and characteristics because of jamming except for possible decreased listening in Sofia.

B. Psychological Climate

Trends in Public Sentiment

Unfortunately, evidence is incomplete about public sentiment in Bulgaria. The "semi-thaw" period which was indicated in Bulgaria prior to the Hungarian revolution has been succeeded by a return to more stringent controls. Although, from what is published in the mass media, this reversion remains subject to sharp challenge in some quarters, some people have come to believe that they can personally exert little influence over developments toward independence in their country.

Some Bulgarians have reportedly lost interest in ideological matters and the East-West conflict, although they previously experienced such interest. They are now more interested in improving their living standards (a form of accommodation to be anticipated on the part of some people), which according to almost all sources remains very low. Unemployment as a major problem is confirmed by both audience and regime.



The overwhelming majority of the population continues to oppose Soviet-imposed communism, but strong interest definitely exists in a form of national communism; the Polish experiment is said/^{to be} viewed with considerable interest by/^{many} Press and radio comments indicated a strong regime concern about people's reactions to events in Hungary. Press statements on students' demonstrations and clandestine groups during and after the Hungarian events indicate some regime concern for opposition which persists in asserting itself. Press eagerness to tighten local party organizations and to liquidate remnants of capitalism is an indirect admission of potential danger still existing from both the anti-communists and "revisionists".

The regime is felt to be eager to display a show of strength by stepping up an ideological campaign against remnants of capitalism as well as against revisionism and dogmatism within the Party. The deportations from Sofia are presumed to constitute a precautionary measure as well.

But the regime is also eager to display "Leninist democracy" by allowing some degree of freedom in literary circle discussions and even reprinting Mao's speech and other materials from China. There is an internal struggle going on in the Writers' Union. It is possible that liberal elements within the writers' group will be given further but not crucial encouragement.

In February, the communist party activized some of the members of the former Bulgarian parliament to opposition against the West, including three former Agrarian opposition members of Parliament.

Indications are that at least 30 former Agrarian members of Parliament and numerous local opposition functionaries have joined the regime propaganda and organization apparatus in the countryside in the last two years. According to Otechestven Front of March 21, 4/5ths of the leaders of the former "counter-revolutionary" opposition Agrarian Party had joined the Fatherland Front.

Apparently, the regime realized the failure of its agit-prop network to change people's minds and became eager to enroll some of its former rivals (the younger ones) in it. These new "allies" help the regime step up its drive against Western broadcasts and exiles and to encourage support for the Fatherland Front.

Two factors seem to underlie the anti-communists' discouragement mentioned above: the Soviet oppression of the Hungarian revolution and the new Bulgarian communist officialdom. The few available refugees from Bulgaria have told of the discouraged reactions of many Bulgarians to the Hungarian events. As to the second factor, many sources told of more fear regarding the premiership of former Minister of the Interior, Yugov, "the



hangman of the opposition," than for the deposed Chervenkov. Many Bulgarians also concomitantly accepted as a bad sign a cabinet reshuffle in which Yugov appointed two of his communist aides in the security police as heads of key ministries and dismissed from the government several supposed "national communists".

Consequences in Audience Reaction

The increased criticism of the West has encouraged more criticism of RFE and other Western broadcasts than ever before. It is felt that broadcasts in general should adopt a more reserved tone. Programs discussing the relative merits of various political systems ("ideological" programs) should be so improved as to refute regime claims that they are "void of lofty ideas and only serve the aggressive purposes of imperialist magnates."

Western stations, including RFE, are now praised chiefly as a source of information about world-wide events and much less often than formerly as a source of hope. In this connection, listeners are still more propaganda conscious than ever before. The feeling is that all Western broadcasters should watch this point if they want to remain influential with the Bulgarian population.

RFE is still the most popular Western station. But BBC has regained some of the popularity it enjoyed during the war and has climbed to second place. While in 1956 RFE was regarded as equally reliable and objective as BBC, in 1957 BBC became the most praised, and RFE the most criticized Western station so far as objectivity is concerned.

During the Hungarian events the interest in RFE's broadcasts increased greatly among all social strata and particularly among students and workers who did not conceal their dislike of the regime and some of whom started to prepare for their own "liberation."

However, when the revolution was suppressed and the West abstained from intervention, some intellectuals became quite critical of RFE and expressed a preference for BBC's "more reserved" and "more reliable" broadcasts.

Indications are that this development was due, to some extent, to the anti-RFE campaign of the regime which staged meetings, displayed anti-RFE posters and accused RFE of spreading rumors, instigating intrigues, etc. Regime propaganda is quoted by some sources to support their criticisms of RFE. It is still too early to consider this criticism a trend in the intelligentsia's attitude toward RFE.

Peasants' and workers' attitudes in general have not changed in the course of the period under survey, and their interest in RFE is also re-



ported unchanged. Even critical intellectuals admit that RFE still has significant influence among peasants and workers.

The communist audience has increased ever since the outbreak of the Budapest uprising. This is probably connected with the desire of communist officials to know about foreign developments and how to refute enemy "propaganda" stemming from such developments.

- 28 (a) -



CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A. Hard Indices

Radio Sets

Czechoslovakia, with 2,949,000 wireless radio sets as of March 1957 has approximately one radio set for each four persons. Wired radio has not made any considerable inroads on the radio audience (92,000 sets). New radio registrations are falling off, but this is obviously a result of the country's approaching something like saturation. It is also possible that the demand for television sets is beginning to some extent to cut into the demand for radio sets (see below).

Listener Letters

80 letters were received during 11 months as compared with 82 for the previous period.

The number of letters from listeners fluctuated between 15 received in August and November and none in March. Throughout most of the period the early 1956 average of between 10 and 15 per month was maintained, but the total received has declined considerably in the final months.

During those months, "spy arrests" involved charges of correspondence with RFE. Moreover, the total number of letters from Czechoslovakia never reached the significant levels that they did from Poland and Hungary.

Beyond the relaxation of regulations in May 1956 which permitted correspondents to deliver sealed letters addressed to the West to their local post offices, there is no evidence that Czechoslovak authorities have lifted any of their other controls or abandoned efforts to block mail addressed to Western stations.


Factors Affecting Listening Habits

No particular changes can be reported except that events in Poland and Hungary revived what was probably a declining interest in Western broadcasts. Available interviews indicate that there has been a decrease once again but that the plateau of active interest in Western broadcasts is probably greater than it was last year at this time.

Czechoslovak television, with approximately 100,000 sets (one set for 133 persons) said to be in use and three stations functioning with reasonably full evening and weekend programs, threatens to cut into Western broadcast audiences. Reports indicate that the technical standards are quite high and the programs are designed to give audiences the sort of entertainment they want. If plans for the future are achieved, it may well become a serious threat within a few years.



RFE LETTERS RECEIVED FROM CZECHOSLOVAK LISTENERS



Czechoslovak television, according to most testimony, seems designed to gratify a demand for amusement. Sports events predominate, and other programs reputedly aim at one form or another of entertainment or mild enlightenment. This is not to say that programs may not have a modicum of political or propaganda content, but it is a fair guess that Czechoslovak television will be more than an audio-visual equivalent of a Rude Pravo editorial. In some areas of Czechoslovakia, programs are also picked up from West German and Austrian television transmitters.

On the other hand, prices remain high for the small-screen sets that are sold. Complaints in the press indicate that obtaining new parts and adequate servicing are particular problems. And, of course, much of the country is not presently covered by transmissions.

Jamming Effects

The elimination of jamming remains one of the major unpublished demands of opposition elements. Czechoslovak Central Committee Secretary Koehler in a speech quoted in the press in March discussed the demand for an end to "the jamming of hostile radio stations", and concluded his remarks by reaffirming the regime's intentions of "jamming these stations wherever we can".

As far as is known, the size of the audience has not been affected by any changes in jamming policy.

B. Psychological Climate

Trends in Public Sentiment

Although no dramatic manifestations developed similar to popular reactions in Hungary and Poland, there is a considerable body of evidence to support the theory that in the past year Czechoslovakia has remained in a state of what may be called "tension under control". The major changes in psychological climate were products of the interplay of domestic and foreign events and the effects they had on already lagging expectations for the future.

The demands remained for more liberalization as an aftermath of the 20th Party Congress and in the wake of the several demands at the student demonstrations and the Writers' Congress. The regime, after making a few concessions, has taken a strong stand against "revisionism" and further compromise with the opposition. However, the demands of a number of writers, students and other members of the intelligentsia have apparently continued to exert some below-the-surface pressure right up to the present.

Economic concessions were announced by the regime several times during this period. These included reduction of working hours, improvement of national insurance, and price reductions and, to some extent, have evidently alleviated certain pressures on the regime. Nevertheless, workers have not hesitated to urge these concessions.



Some members of the opposition have confined their criticism to a "humanistic" interpretation of communist ideas. Some writers have indicated a degree of bad conscience although the extent to which this reflects active covert opposition to the regime is not clear. And one source's diagnosis of some anti-communists deserves consideration: "An additional danger is the infiltration of the communist way of thinking, to which even convinced non-communists gradually and unconsciously succumb. They miss the contact with a normal, Western way of thinking, for comparison. The entire public and private life is purposely and systematically embittered, and one cannot isolate oneself in order to avoid infection or to control its degree".

The character of opposition to the regime cannot be said to dwell in any particular social groups or classes. It is true, however, that the scope and intensity of opposition vary from group to group. Peasants, for example, have perhaps been most consistent in their opposition because of persistent basic conflicts of interest with regime policies. On the other hand, the potential for the most effective opposition toward the regime under present circumstances seems to be centered more among certain elements of the creative intelligentsia, especially the writers.

Discontent has bred those conditions which only make for more apathy and discouragement. The lack of concern on the part of state employees for the good of those they "serve", the impoverishment of the consumer economy, the pace of work, and the continued housing problems are fundamental elements of people's daily lives which they cannot shake off in spite of a steady flow of regime propaganda proclaiming how well off Czechoslovaks really are.

Discontent among writers and other intelligentsia is widespread. To quote from one estimate of the situation in Czechoslovakia based on information from several sources: "Discontent among the creative intelligentsia... was confirmed last December and January when a feeble attempt was made to institute the authors' right to criticize in social, political and economic affairs. This was immediately snuffed out by the regime but the allusions to circles and discussions of which there was no public record give grounds for suspecting that the disaffection is widespread. At this moment the Czechoslovak press seems to be among the most subdued of satellite presses, but this extreme caution has been a characteristic of the CPCS since the demoralization of 1951-1952".

Literary publications frequently criticize "groups" and "many authors" who cannot distinguish between a revolution and counter-revolution, and it has been publicly conceded that dissidents with respect to doctrine and discipline exist within the party itself. While there are apparently few



writers of merit who lend their active support to the regime, the battle between writer and regime censor continues to be won by the latter.

In the international field the major events bearing on the Czechoslovak population were the developments in Poland and Hungary. As yet the intelligentsia has not tried to introduce Mao's theory of "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions into open discussion against the regime's ideological perspective, although references to the theory's proscription of anti-communist ideas (e.g., Pres. Zapotocky's discussion at a recent meeting of the Union of Czechoslovak writers) indicates that Mao's speech is being discussed.

People devoted perhaps more attention to Polish developments than to the Hungarian revolution, especially after the Soviet second intervention. The Polish experiment is now generally considered as the only reasonable hope of dissolving the satellite system in favor of gradual independence. At the same time, however, there is little hope that a similar alternative exists for Czechoslovakia in the immediate future.

It is not impossible that many Czechoslovaks would have wanted to join the Hungarian revolution had the West intervened militarily. News about the revolution was followed very intensively. The population was very much stirred by the events. Party functionaries were clearly alarmed and the fall of the regime was anticipated by some.

The Czechoslovak population seems to have rejected any active revolutionary behavior on their own for three reasons, apart from personality considerations and absence of leadership: (1) Popular attention is not focussed on the Soviet enemy whose uniformed forces are outside of Czechoslovakia, yet who are felt by some people to be protecting their country from a possible German military onslaught; (2) What was felt by many to be indecisiveness on the part of the West discouraged action on the part of most elements of the Czechoslovak opposition; and (3) Some feel that there is a lack of understanding on the part of their countrymen of the historic importance of such an uprising.

Many now feel that their policy of "always wait and see" with respect to eventual freedom was vindicated as it never was before. Disillusionment with the West widely prevailed and previous passive attitudes toward internal developments were reinforced in the wake of the revolution's suppression.

Consequences in Audience Reaction

No startling departures in the present practice of Western broadcasts seem called for. People welcome the cross reporting of various developments in other communist countries. "Favorable" developments in Poland, China, and elsewhere are said to reinforce the resolution and bulwark the arguments of those less passive elements among writers, students and dissident party members.



The fact that opposition and non-opposition are not confined to any single group or class justifies the policy of broadcasting to many segments of Czechoslovak society in spite of some criticism that Western stations are overly preoccupied with a "mass audience".

No matter what "concessions" seem to be wrung from the regime to improve living standards, commentaries on shortcomings of communist economic policy and exploitation of the economy by the Soviet Union continue to have considerable impact -- although some condone regime economic policies.

Hard hitting and satirical commentaries continue to be strongly appreciated by Czechoslovak listeners as long as they do not enter into petty polemics with the regime.

Soviet exploitation of uranium, for example, continues to be a sensitive issue. In addition, a number of sources have suggested that RFE emphasize contrasts and comparisons between the Czechoslovak economy and the economies of Western European countries.

Regarding the international field, listeners during the last year have shown an increasing interest in and appreciation of full and undistorted coverage of important news events. There continues to be skepticism toward any effort to use news for propaganda purposes.



HUNGARY

A. Hard Indices

Radio Sets

Hungary as of December 1956 (last regime figures available) had 1,250,000 wireless sets, which represents approximately one set for every eight people. This constitutes an increase of 100,000 sets over the previous period. The total number of wired radio sets has remained approximately the same. Last year the Hungarian government announced plans to produce and sell 20,000 "People's Sets" (not designed to receive Western broadcast frequencies), but there has been no subsequent indication that this program was successfully carried out.

Listener Letters

The 321 letters from Hungarian listeners during this period show a striking correlation with the timing of events in the country. The letters received by RFE, as the graph indicates, reached the unusually high point of 119 in December after which they began to decline sharply, reaching the low level of 3 in May 1957. The exceptional situation in November, when so many Hungarians crossed the frontier and when families were completely in the dark as to what had become of their members, brought about the enormous increase in the number of letters. Most of these letters involved requests to locate people or to broadcast messages to them. Because of this, no definitive conclusions can be drawn from the letters about the size and characteristics of RFE's audience, beyond pointing out that the writers must have placed some reliance on RFE and must have been of the belief that their messages would be heard.


In explanation of the low point which listener mail reached in November, it should be pointed out there was an almost total breakdown of postal communications between Hungary and the West in that month. Some of the letters received in December may well have been sent during November and delayed as a result of this breakdown.

Factors Affecting Listening Habits

Western broadcasts suffered little in popularity from regime radio competition before the revolution and apparently almost none thereafter. 600 television sets were said to be functioning in Hungary as of March 1957, so there was little interest in television.

During the revolution, there is no question but what the communist radio stations turned "freedom stations" attracted great interest from the entire population. At the same time, Western broadcasts were considered more important than ever because of their function of rebroadcasting freedom station announcements and information about Western reaction. Regular





listening habits on the part of workers and young people were of course radically changed during the revolution and were by no means restored in its aftermath.

Jamming Effects

Jamming has continued unabated except during the revolution. During these few days the potential audience in urban areas was increased to the extent that local jamming facilities were not used. Soviet jammers were said to be concentrating some of their attention on broadcasts of Hungarian freedom stations and Western broadcasts that might be heard in other target countries, but this has not been verified. Enough interest in Western broadcasts existed during the initial phases of the Kadar regime to permit voices temporarily to be raised in opposition to the jamming of Western broadcasts.

B. Psychological Climate

Trends in Public Sentiment

In the early months of this period prior to the completely unanticipated revolution, most Hungarians had two primary objectives: Rid the country of the Soviet occupation forces and their Hungarian secret police counterpart; exercise the right of free elections in which a social democratic government retaining some economic policies of the regime would probably be the choice of the majority. National communism or "Titoism", although Tito was considered clever in his dealings with both east and west, was considered undesirable. Except for Imre Nagy who was considered a Hungarian before the communist he was also known to be, no national leader existed around whom to rally.

The communist party, a small minority, exercised its power only by virtue of its Soviet backing. Membership other than for a relative few was for expediency only. The party itself was divided at the outset of the period under review, with the "thaw" having made more progress than was always known to the West. Pressures were being exerted by intellectuals from within the party for liberalization; both writers and students were now publicly carrying their demands to the people.

Tension in Hungary had grown to tinderbox proportions and suddenly people were fighting for a way of life which was a thousand league jump from the life demanded of them a few hours before. The above mentioned objectives sought articulation and consistently emerged in many cities and towns throughout the nation. People were joined in a momentum against the newly established Nagy government against which they strove for every possible concession as long as they felt it was weak. It seems very doubtful that any Western agency could have exerted "control" over the "stages" of this revolution.

In the immediate wake of defeat, most Hungarians felt that they received insufficient assistance from the West after the second Soviet intervention. The average Hungarian did not view the absence of military assistance as a



dilemma confronting Western foreign policy. Instead he saw it as a failure to execute policy which he thought both he and the U.S. government had mutually agreed upon all along. At that time (this must be mentioned to appreciate public reaction to later American policy statements), he saw absence of assistance as a failure to do what the U.S. government had all along intended to do.

There are extremely few instances of people saying that they wished there had been no revolution. The majority of interview sources feel that the revolution was of merit in spite of its tragic outcome. They saw it in its historical perspective; they knew it as the sacrifice which aspirations sometimes exact of mankind; they felt that it had unified Hungarians as they had never been unified before.

After the revolution was broken, some hope persisted in many minds for at least a moderate solution of the issues which had been spelled out in the objectives of the revolutionary councils. Workers, intellectuals, and youth attempted through strikes, protests and reiteration of revolutionary demands to influence the regime. Many remained in Hungary because they felt they could thereby retrieve something of the revolutionary goals.

The ever growing terror gradually prevented every expression of political opposition. This terror coupled with the insecurity it created as to the very physical survival of the citizen brought about considerable lethargy and despair. It also encouraged escape from reality on a grand scale. Many in Hungary express the opinion that only war can save Hungary now. At the same time, the thought of a new war is an extremely sobering one for all contemplating such a solution.

The population maintains bitter hostility toward the Kadar regime, although few dare any longer to give open expression to this feeling. The regime's extensive propaganda remains without effect on the silent masses. The prestige of the revolution and its demands remain paramount with the great majority of the population. The establishment of a socialist welfare state with limited private enterprise is offered as the best possible future course by many respondents.

"Gradualism" as a possible mode of denouement seems to have little following among the listeners---first probably because they see a type of gradualism practiced by the Soviets, who strive to build up communism step by step against every resistance. People feel that they (the Soviets) are using "NEP" periods for the purpose of overcoming popular resistance. There is also an expressed popular fear that any controlled liberalization can always revert to outright dictatorship whenever the interests of the party so require.

A minority, although anti-communist, is tired of resistance and wishes to compromise with the regime. This segment considers that Western attitudes as expressed in Western propaganda represent an obstacle on this road.



Anti-Western feeling has been directed more against individual statesmen and Western policies than against what the West stands for. To overcome abiding belief in Western values, therefore, remains one of the chief aims of communist educational policy and propaganda. As the population gains distance from the revolution, feelings of disappointment are . . . On the other hand, there is a certain not yet significant drift away from all things Western: Some ask whether there is any point in trying to consider oneself as belonging to the West if one will perhaps never again partake of Western culture.

Consequences in Audience Reaction

There were, during the period preceding the revolution, unmistakable signs of people's increased interest in "doing something" on behalf of the country's greater independence. These signs were manifested in the emphasis laid on what was described as RFE's most important role: "keeping alive the spirit of the nation, its desire for freedom". Statements to this effect were not confined to specific groups of the population, they were made by respondents belonging to all occupational and social strata. Even after the revolution, when it became obvious that the Russians had no intention of withdrawing from Hungary, direct demands were made to RFE, asking for advice concerning the attitude people should take toward the Kadar regime.

Almost no acknowledgment of RFE's efforts to recognize the activities of students, writers and other intellectuals in the vanguard of the "thaw" was evidenced throughout the period in review. Since the revolution some complaints by intellectual respondents were registered to the effect that RFE failed to realize the tremendous importance of such phenomena as the Petöfi Circle debates. It is clear that those RFE programs which were aimed at encouraging the "thaw" elements were either missed or misunderstood by most of the intellectual interview sources.

Considerable interest was shown, mainly among listeners belonging to the working class, in the events of the Polish "thaw"; RFE reports on those events were appreciated. On the other hand, little if any interest was shown in the rest of the captive countries. This was true both before and after the revolution.

Generally intellectuals and better educated people strongly resented any propagandistic undertone in RFE broadcasts. Most respondents thought that Hungarian listeners were mature enough to draw their own conclusions from facts which should be presented without unnecessary comments and in a truthful, unbiased fashion. People were said to be fed up by communist propaganda anyhow, and therefore to have grown impervious to any kind of propaganda. Some of the most severe critics went as far as to say that



certain Western broadcasts reminded them of Dr. Goebbels' methods.

Although RFE was clearly not the cause of the revolution, it is clear that the force of events had an impact on the reactions of Hungarians to RFE broadcasts.

The population clearly has not blamed Western broadcasts for the cause or the outcome of the revolution. Hungarians who were interviewed during the revolt believed that it was spontaneous and unorganized, with many groups of Hungarians fighting the common Soviet enemy.

The more rational Hungarian asserted that he was able to distinguish between counsel to oppose the communist regime and incitement to arms. However, many refugees, in the first flush of their bitterness toward the West for absence of military assistance, asserted that RFE and other Western stations did encourage hopes for military aid by their very existence. And broadcast statements by Western leaders expressing the desire to "do all in our power to help", etc., were sometimes taken as assurances of forthcoming military assistance by people who were under fire.

As was true during the more active phase of the revolt, many Hungarians continued to express the hope that RFE would serve as an agency of information about events in Hungary to the West. Many Hungarians regard RFE as their spokesman in the West, particularly now that the country has been militarily occupied.

One thing is clear: anti-communist Hungarians almost never interpret the absence of military assistance to mean that Western broadcasters should not have been in business. Most considered any possibility of terminating Western broadcasts as bordering on the catastrophic. Not only would the need for information and ideas from the West be unfulfilled, they felt, but such termination would be interpreted as a desire on the part of the West to overlook both the past sacrifices and the future of the Hungarian population.

RFE's popularity among Hungarian listeners survived without serious damage in spite of the general embitterment and sadness that followed. It seems that immediately after the revolution many people ceased to listen to Western broadcasts; however, after periods ranging from a few weeks to a few months, most of them began returning to their old listening habits once more. Apart from people's own feelings of depression, however, many believed that in the months which followed the revolution RFE "pulled in its horns" to a point where it offended no one except the anti-communist who believed that the Kadar regime had to be strongly attacked and the revolutionists strongly praised.

RFE's popularity appears to be based on four main factors: The newscasts on international affairs, the close emotional contact with the Hungarian



people, the all-day transmissions and the great variety of programs. While RFE broadcasts still attract all strata of the population, a remarkable increase of interest was evidenced since the revolution on the part of students and other intellectuals who constituted during the second part of the year the main body of favorable minded listeners.

In consequence of the previously mentioned flight from reality, some listeners wishfully turn to the radio for hope and comfort. If nothing of the sort is forthcoming they feel frustrated.

Nevertheless most Hungarians want realism above all. Their concept of credibility under present conditions does not foreclose polemics with the regime but does demand realism in place of any tendency to minimize the "facts of life".



POLAND

A. Hard Indices

Radio Sets

Poland has had the greatest increase of radio (wireless) registration among RFE target countries. From July 1955 (the last date in the 1955-1956 period when official figures were available) until March 1957, wireless set registration increased from 1,600,000 to 2,280,000, which represents an annual increase of approximately 300,000 sets. Wired radio registration constitutes a steadily decreasing proportion of total registrations, amounting almost to a complete reversal of the previous trend. Apropos of this, more and more complaints about poor reception qualities of wired radio strongly suggest that it is becoming increasingly less acceptable to Polish audiences.

Listener Letters

Letters from Polish listeners to RFE increased tremendously within the period concerned (see graph) reaching an all-time monthly high in March 1957 of 391. 1395 letters were received by RFE from Poland (only through May) as compared with 184 during the previous twelve months. This veritable avalanche of letters may be attributed to two factors: (1) an apparent lifting or virtual lifting of censorship regulations; (2) an increased interest in RFE programs or charitable assistance. Moreover, because many speak of earlier letters mailed which RFE never received, it is obvious that previous figures would have been somewhat higher if regime controls had not intervened.


Factors Affecting Listening Habits

The most concentrated effort toward improving regime radio programs has been made in Poland. Program policy directors have devoted considerable time and effort to a succession of listener polls in order to determine what popular success the new program schedule introduced in August (and constantly revised) has had with its audience. In April 1957, the Director of the Radio Research Department stated that from next September public opinion polls on listener preferences will be conducted regularly twice a month.

Evidence indicates that Polish radio programs are being constantly revised to satisfy listeners' demands. Some of these revisions include faster and fuller news coverage, a "human touch" in the news (including such innovations as the broadcasting of birthday greetings to the intro-



RFE LETTERS RECEIVED FROM POLISH LISTENERS: JULY 1955 - MAY 1957.



July 1956 - May 1957 — 1395 Letters
 July 1955 - June 1956 - - - 184 Letters



duction of crime news), improved "on the spot" broadcasts of events such as the Sejm opening, a rescheduling of programs according to listener preferences, and the reintroduction of certain popular pre-war features.

Warsaw Radio (I) announced in March 1957 that an analysis of the results of some of the polls "justifies the contention that the new schedule has been favorably received by a majority of listeners."

These developments are cited at length because all available evidence indicates a thoroughgoing effort by the regime to win radio listeners. It is equally clear that an increasing amount of radio listening time is being given to Polish radio stations, some of which must be at the expense of attention that would otherwise be given to Western broadcasts.

Experimental television got underway in Poland in 1954 with Russian technical equipment and 500 sets imported from the USSR. Early experimental programs were broadcast from Warsaw, and in 1956 operations of the Warsaw station were expanded with technical components imported from France. Also in July 1956 a television station was inaugurated at Lodz, and on May 1, 1957 an experimental television center was opened in Poznan. Warsaw is now broadcasting on a five-day schedule in the afternoons and evenings, totaling $16\frac{1}{2}$ hours weekly. Lodz has a two-hour evening program three days a week. For the time being the Poznan center will be giving two programs a week. An agreement has been signed for Poland and the Soviet Union to exchange TV broadcasts in 1958.

Thus Polish television is in a promising stage at this time. Plans for the future are fairly ambitious for the production and import of equipment, and the expansion of facilities. The question of Polish television's effects on Western broadcast audiences, however, may very well hinge on political considerations as much as on technical achievements.

Western broadcasts are undoubtedly more popular this year in Poland than ever before, in spite of the competitive factors described above. Events in Poland and Hungary are the main explanation. The beginning of the period under review already witnessed increasing audience interest in how Western broadcasts were interpreting internal events. Simultaneously, people were continually checking what Western broadcasts had to say against the results of the newfound Polish press and radio freedom. Many people were anxious to learn about internal events in their country (particularly those articles and speeches which in themselves were "events", yet were known only to a small group) through the cross reporting which



RFE provided to all segments of the population. Events in Hungary, the position Western broadcasts might take on the Gomulka election, and the question of Western aid to Poland only whetted people's appetites.

Jamming Effects

On November 24, 1956 the Polish Radio Committee and the Ministry of Communications announced that "the radio stations jamming transmissions in the Polish language from foreign stations have ceased operation in Poland." The spokesmen observed in addition that "the cause of jamming which may occur are caused by jamming stations situated outside Poland and negotiations which have been initiated with the governments of neighboring states should lead to further improvement in reception in the near future."

Nevertheless, there have been persistent reports that radio reception in Poland is still disturbed by jamming. According to most of these reports jamming transmitters which affect Polish language broadcasts from abroad are located on Soviet and Czechoslovak territory. Other reports, however, speak of jamming from Soviet bases on Polish territory. Regardless of origin, there are still some complaints from urban areas of the jamming of Western transmissions.

B. Psychological Climate

Trends in Public Sentiment

In the period under review, the October events provide a clear-cut division line. Before October, a wave of reaction was sweeping the country of which the Poznan uprising was the most spectacular but not the sole symptom. There were stormy workers' meetings in many towns at which angry voices were raised against the Party leadership and the regime as a whole. The university students were restless and in an inflammatory mood. The intellectuals - writers, poets, scholars, journalists - were unceasingly exposing the seamy aspects of many fields of national life. These three main groups - the workers, students, and intellectuals - were the chief architects of the October events. But this alliance would probably have been ineffective if it had not been joined by a section of Party leadership and activists who held some of the commanding heights of power in the State.

The October peaceful revolution brought about a total re-alignment of forces in the country. Under the impact of Gomulka's personality and deeds, the present Government is no longer considered as imposed from



outside even though it is not of the people's choice. Whatever its merits and demerits, the system headed by Gomulka is accepted as a national and Polish Government by the majority of Poles.

Gomulka's popularity and authority is almost universal in all strata of the society. He is welcomed irrespective of people's age, social origin, political views, and world outlook.

The main reason for Gomulka's popularity is the fact that he personifies the aspirations of the people for national independence and for being full master of Poland's internal affairs. Gomulka is popular also because of his personal qualities, his announced reforms, and the hopes he inspires for the improvement of living standards and further democratization of public life.

The two main objections against Gomulka are prompted by nationalistic and economic considerations. Some people claim that Gomulka failed to secure the complete independence of Poland from the Soviet Union and object to his foreign policy based on an alliance with the Soviet Union. Others feel that Gomulka has not grasped fully the gravity of the economic situation, has no economic policy to speak of, and is unwilling to take the drastic measures that the situation requires.

An important effect of this development was the conversion of the so-called "internal emigration" which in its mass no longer repudiates the system but gives it qualified support. The "internal emigration" has split into two sections of "unconverted" and "converted" people. It is highly probable that the masses of the peasantry which in the past had constituted the nation-wide foundation of the "internal emigration" have now largely adopted the attitude of qualified support; they are members of the "converted group."

The "unconverted internal emigration" which still exists has changed its grounds for repudiating the system to a nationalistic objection against Gomulka.

The "converted internal emigrations" attitude of qualified support mentioned above considers the dictatorship of the Party as an objective necessity and the foreign policy based on an alliance with the Soviet Union as a realistic safeguard of national interests. It offers its cooperation to the Government in the work of saving the country from anarchy and economic collapse, pursuing economic, social and cultural reforms, and democratizing the life in Poland. These people have adopted the attitude of judging each measure of the Government on its merits, according to whether it does or does not further national interests.

The qualified support of the "converted" group does not imply its espousing the Communist ideology. It emphasizes the basic difference



between its own spiritual outlook on life and the materialistic Weltanschauung of Communism.

In the long run, people's attitudes to Gomulka and the system will be determined by the fulfilment of their expectations concerning democratization and an improved standard of living. If these expectations do not materialize, people are likely to change their attitude of support to that of opposition, which should not be confused, however, with repudiation.

The second major effect of Gomulka's accession to power was the ideological split and organizational disintegration of the Party. Although efforts have been repeatedly made to re-establish the unity of the Party, the continuing factional strife and the weakness resulting therefrom seems to be a phenomenon that might not be eliminated for a long time to come.

The combined effect of the greater measure of personal freedom and of the qualified support given to the system has made public opinion a factor in public life to be reckoned with. The importance of public opinion is enhanced by the fact that the Party is weak and is thus less likely a counter-weight to popular pressures. Moreover, the different factions in the Party carry their strife by voicing various popular demands and appealing directly or indirectly for popular support. Thus, the community has acquired some influence in the internal Party struggle.

The Hungarian revolution and its suppression by the Soviet Union with the Western Powers playing the role of an indignant but helpless witness, has resulted in bringing the anti-Soviet feelings to new heights and emphasizing that a country situated within the Soviet area must rely on itself both in an emergency and in its strivings for freedom and democracy. This latter realization should not be confused with anti-Western feelings of which there is relatively little evidence. On the contrary, the freer the flow of news, ideas, and people between Poland and the West becomes, the more pronounced and eager has become the interest in the life, institutions, policies, science, art, etc., of the Western world. Together with this interest has gone the expectation that the West will not fail to provide the Polish people with means to fend for itself and to conquer internal difficulties and obstacles barring the way towards the overall improvement of the economic and political situation of the country.

Possibly owing to reactions to earlier post-war experiences with Western policies, the impact of the Hungarian events was perhaps less pronounced than might have been expected. Public understanding of the



policies of the Western Powers would probably have been even readier had the actual dangers of an atomic war been more widely understood.

The relaxation of the State coercive powers has increased the potential danger of people's alienation from the constituted power which could lead to mass outbursts and disorders. Worker strikes and unrelated disturbances of the peace have frequently occurred.

There does not seem to exist at present the danger of internal conflict resulting from the fact of a non-Communist majority being ruled by a Communist minority. A more serious danger lies in the course of democratization, if it fails to satisfy the people's determination to participate increasingly in public life, to reform social and political institutions, and thus to secure more and more personal and civil freedoms. However, the most threatening source between regime and people is the hardship of the people and the despair that might get hold of them, should their hope of improved living standards be dashed. If this happens, the possibility of increasing disturbances cannot be excluded.

The influence of those in Polish society who advocate a break with the Gomulka regime is difficult to assess. In any case, it is a factor in public sentiment well worth keeping in mind. One group, representing an extreme liberal point of view, advocates continuing pressure for democratization regardless of the political and economic considerations summarized above. The other, best known as the Natolin group but representing many shades of reaction, advocates a return to the type of government typified by the pre-Gomulka era.

Those who favor continuous and persistent liberalization without regard for other considerations appear to constitute a relatively small and unnoticed fringe group. The second group has support outside of the party among those who, while not Stalinists per se, nevertheless hold a vested interest in the pre-Gomulka era for reasons of job, social status, or prestige. Thus, opposition to Gomulka on the grounds of vested interest in the old-type regime spring from some intellectuals and bureaucrats who might (on the basis of their social class origins) otherwise be expected to favor the Gomulka regime for the liberal developments it has brought about.

People differ about the outcome of Polish experiment. The weight of the Catholic church and other influences, including those of most Western broadcasts, has been bent in the direction of stability. Many people are said not to have any real concern at the moment for the future;



the excitement of the October events has been replaced by the demands of personal life, particularly those of earning a living. One point seems clear: although people fervently hope that the issue of Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union and who will rule Poland can be settled with the Party Congress in December, a clear return to the pre-Gomulka era would not be accepted by a vast majority of the people without open revolt.

Consequences in Audience Reaction

The influence of RFE on the psychological climate during and before the October crisis should be briefly assessed at this point. In the wake of Gomulka's ascension to power, the majority of people in Poland of course wanted to see their limited freedoms preserved and consolidated and, at the same time, to protect themselves from the fate of Hungary.

RFE became a major factor in achieving this objective. In spite of the overwhelming popularity of Gomulka himself, Polish Communists have freely admitted that RFE's message reached large sections of the population who would have remained unmoved and unconvinced even by Gomulka's appeals. Thus, it reached apparently everybody: the anti-Communist Gomulka enthusiasts, the anti-Communists who would have been recalcitrant even to Gomulka, and the Polish Communists. In many such instances, RFE's influence overlapped with the tremendous weight of Cardinal Wyszynski's authority which was exerted in the same direction. The Polish population, receiving an identical message from three such different quarters, must have realized its whole weight at this grave hour; moreover, in this combination of factors, almost every Pole was able to find "his own" authority whose word he could accept and then find "confirmation" in the other two points in this kind of triumvirate of influence. Thus, the situation in Poland - within the limits where all this depended on the Poles themselves - was saved owing to the heterogeneity of the factors working at the time to the same goal, however different their ultimate purposes may have been.

While the official praise and appreciation of RFE's role found its expression even in the Polish media, it was far more emphatically stated in unofficial statements by Polish Communists, sometimes in very high positions, when they could do so freely without fearing a possible Soviet accusation of collusion with RFE. Highest and almost unanimous praise came from the audience whose reactions in those days were unmistakable.

RFE is felt to have fully grasped the situation in Poland, and was generally praised for having entered an alliance, however temporary,



even with Communist forces working for the benefit of Poland. Thus, many felt that RFE was able to play a major and positive role in crucial events; it was referred to as "a part of the fighting nation."

However, two conflicting theories emerged from the source material about RFE's role in bringing about the October events.

a. The affirmative thesis asserts that the October events would have been inconceivable without Western broadcasts which had done so much to strengthen anti-Communist resistance.

Before the active phases of the "thaw," RFE programs were mainly directed towards the "internal emigration." It is claimed that by fortifying the "internal emigration" in its repudiation of the regime, RFE contributed to the developments preceeding October. Further, certain general national and moral values were kept alive in the minds of the people; news and information about events were provided that would have been unavailable otherwise.

More particularly, it was RFE who paved the way to the "Gomulkaism" by its consistent denouncements of Communist lawlessness and terror, which in turn led to the gradual liquidation of compromised Stalinists. There is a certain measure of support for this audience thesis from the regime sources which, as was mentioned in last year's report, freely and frequently admitted the impact of the Swiatlo broadcasts.

Moreover, this theory thus assumes a double impact on RFE: on the audience whose anti-Communist attitude it reinforces, and on the regime whom it forces to concessions by means of exposing its most vulnerable aspects. After all, there is a measure of scandal which no government can afford, not even in a totalitarian system, without trying to placate the population in some manner. The growing resistance of the masses and the consistent weakening of a compromised regime do then meet half-way to produce the effect in the form of the October revolution.

b. The negative thesis relies on the following main arguments: Western broadcasts are of no importance, compared with the nation's own powerful drive to freedom which exists and makes itself felt without any outside stimulus. Popular outbursts and popular pressure under certain definite conditions are recurring historical phenomena and revolutions are not unique to the era of psychological warfare broadcasting. Further, the October revolution was not the work of anti-Communists whom RFE has always been mainly addressing, but precisely those convinced Communists with whom it has been at war. This thesis recieves much more support from regime sources.

Finally, this theory emphasizes the fact that the Polish October revolution, highly organized and fully controlled as it was, was not



and could not have been the work of amorphous anti-Communist masses; on the contrary, it resulted from a well-defined, organized and politically active task force which, under the prevailing conditions, could have been only Communists or people accepting the Communist platform. RFE's influence, if any, existed only among those violently anti-Communist masses whom the totalitarian system had deprived of any means of coherent, organized and planned activity, such as exists for the opposition in democratic states. Between RFE and the Communists or pro-Communists who carried through the October revolution, there was not a relation of influence but of feud. Nor did they carry out their revolution from the fundamentally anti-Communist position which is represented by RFE, but from the position of an idealistic Communist revisionism.* If in this they were supported by the overwhelming mass of anti-Communist population, it was because at this juncture they also acted as Poles and in defense of national interests. But this alone does not make them anti-Communists, just as the national support for their action does not make the nation Communist.

These then are the two conflicting theories, presented in their most extreme form and apparently unbridgeable. Both deserve serious consideration. It may also be added that neither of them appears fully satisfactory; both are partisan and seem incomplete. Each one lacks those arguments which appear convincing in the other, and both overlook completely the importance of the actual Soviet developments such as Beria's fall, the 20th Congress and the consequent repudiation of Stalin. The October events in Poland were the outcome of a highly complex combination of causes. A thorough discussion and analysis of these happenings does not fall within the purview of this report.

The fact that public opinion has re-asserted itself has considerably extended the potential influence of RFE. RFE has benefitted accordingly. One of the first spontaneous and nation wide reactions to the October changes was the agitation for the abolishment of Polish jamming operations (see Regime Response - Poland, above). The decision to abolish jamming was one of compliance by the government with a demanding public.

The reaction of a section of the intelligentsia is also a case in point. It now appears that this part of the audience, formerly indifferent or hostile to RFE, started "re-discovering" RFE soon after the Soviet XXth Party Congress. Its interest in RFE seems to have grown with RFE's

* This revisionism must have received a powerful impetus after the Poznan events.



role in Polish affairs, and the October events encouraged a "conversion" on the part of some members of this critical group. This change in attitude in many cases took place at the expense of the BBC which previously was considered by many people as the only station of the intelligentsia; RFE was thought of as a station with mass appeal. The addition of this new audience did not coincide with any significant loss of old and well-tried listeners of RFE.

At the same time, RFE's relationship with public opinion is recognized by the audience as placing increasing demands on RFE's sense of responsibility; any mistake of judgment or tactics might have disastrous consequences. The increased possibility of exercising influence both for good and evil, by failing to say what is required or by saying what should be left unsaid or simply by bad timing, places RFE in an unenviable position of having its record, reputation and authority constantly exposed both to calculated risks and also to the vagaries of fortune.

This responsibility should be viewed against the demands made by RFE's audience. The total re-orientation in the basic attitudes of the population towards the system in power that came about in the wake of the October upheaval clearly implies that the present role of RFE requires constant consideration and, if necessary, re-definition in the light of immediate events. This implication is borne out by the very favorable audience reaction to the tacit support given Gomulka by RFE.

RFE's audience came to expect that RFE forego its previous repudiation of the system in power on the ground that the October events have resulted in a change for the better for the nation. The present system, most people feel, should be given guarded support against the return of the past masters of the country. This clearly does not mean supporting Communism but offers a realistic choice between two alternatives. While approaching the present situation as defined above, RFE should keep in mind that it does not conform to the ultimate aims of the people who will want support for further gradual and peaceful change. In a nutshell, the audience expects RFE to fulfil the role of a patriotic, constructive, and responsible opposition.



RUMANIA

A. Hard Indices

Radio Sets

As of December 1956, Rumania had 688,000 wireless radio sets; this represents about 1 set for every 25 people. There was an increase in wireless sets of approximately 10 % during this period. As of the same date there were said to be 632,000 wired radios in use; their proportion of total sets is steadily declining.

Listener Letters

In spite of efforts to encourage letters from anyone who could send them with safety, only one letter was addressed to RFE from Rumania during this period. There is said to be considerable fear about writing letters to an RFE designated address.

Factors Affecting Listener Habits

Interest continues to be great in Western broadcasts, in considerable part because like Bulgarians, Rumanian radio listeners receive relatively few Western broadcasts and are somewhat cut off from the Western world as compared with people in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. Events in Hungary and Poland are said to have provoked increased interest in Western broadcasts.

Rumania is credited with having approximately 500 TV sets and, last year, Agerpress reported that a contract had been concluded with France to deliver an entire TV station to Rumania some time in the future. Therefore, no competition exists for radio listeners from TV in Rumania or from the regime radio programs which have continued to maintain approximately their same standards.

Jamming Effects

Our findings are similar to those briefly described with respect to Bulgaria.

B. Psychological Climate

Trends in Public Sentiment

Less is known about public sentiment in Rumania because of the relatively few sources available for the period under review. Nevertheless certain points have clearly emerged, not only from what interviewees have said, but from the actions of the regime itself.



Before the second Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolution, people's expectations (for what they knew not) rose considerably. Students at Cluj and Timisoara, including those not always politically active, discussed resolutions and "doing things". Regime reaction was prompt, indicating that some importance was attributed to their activities; army patrols were situated on the sidewalks of Cluj with masses of students detained and many arrested in an effort to intimidate the student body. In Bucharest, it is reported that students met to protest the student arrests at Cluj. In one city, railway workers met to discuss possible strike action and were visited by party leaders who were said to be somewhat conciliatory. There is evidence that many members of the regime and militia felt a rising insecurity by November first.

These indications of opposition and concern by the regime were succeeded in November by efforts to digest the effects of the revolution and return to normal. Two factors were present; the extreme disappointment with the West on the part of anti-communists for not having intervened and the disillusionment which is said to have been felt among some members of the party ranks. Some available evidence provides a basis for the hypothesis that many party members are now realizing that their colleagues are not genuine communists as defined by dogma.

As to the first point, regime "status quo" propaganda probably helped cement the emerging viewpoint that any developments toward Rumanian independence would have to take place within the country rather than with the active intervention of the West. At the same time regime propaganda does not seem to have affected people's reaction to the West which is still regarded as a friend in need if not in deed by most people. The average person seems not bereft of hope and can find excuses for the absence of Western military intervention.

Any degree of "thaw" has been largely limited to certain concessions to students, workers and peasants (which indicates regime concern for their antagonism) and in literary circles. With each of the above three groups the carrot-and-the-stick techniques has been utilized whereby the regime has conceded certain forms of bounty (concerning scholarships, wages, and compulsory deliveries) providing that these groups in return adhere to certain requirements of the regime. No fundamental changes occurred in the institutions of ~~government~~.

Perhaps most significant is what is happening in literary circles. Disillusionment regarding the Hungarian revolution was particularly reflected in the "between-the-lines" behavior of the writers who had been



officially slapped down last year when the example was made of Alexander Jar who was dismissed from the party. But Rumanian literary magazines have continued to reflect, in some articles published by regime-appointed editors, attitudes and ideologies which are clearly not consistent with the doctrine of the politbureau. For example, a short time after the Soviet composers' conference, Contemporanul published a specially solicited interview with Shostakovitch. On the basis of special questions put to him by the Contemporanul correspondent, he enlarged upon his criteria regarding atonality, etc., which would undoubtedly be acceptable to any Western composer, and inconsistent with ordinarily prevailing dogma about musical composition. Discussions of "socialist realism" have sometimes not been doctrinaire. Some fables by Tudor Arghezi, one of Rumania's most famous poets and literary figures, were published not long after he had begun writing after a silence of seven years; these fables are felt to have clearly implied opposition to the regime. The fact that such material can be printed suggests that there are elements in the agit-prop organization who are doing what they can for liberalization.

At the same time, writers who had been ignored until recently have been appearing in regime periodicals. The fact that they are being subsidized to write of Socialist realism and their pessimism about the future have apparently encouraged some writers to leave their self-imposed exile.

It is difficult to know the attitudes of the population toward national communism. Tito has not been the target of attack that he has been in other nations, but this is presumably less a concession to people's attitudes than it is a reflection of the regime's views about Tito's future role. Some Rumanians have expressed favor for Tito.

No factions in the party have been known to emerge in support of any form of national communism, the members of the Central Committee being apparently cowed by the politbureau. Nor are there leaders about whom people could rally in the event of any overt movement in the direction of a national communist government.

In the last several months feelings have become ^{more} explosive than ever due to the increasing unemployment and its severe effects upon much of the population. A wave of dismissals occurred earlier this year; these people were largely not absorbed in new jobs.

The regime concern for subversive ideas has been emphasized by its preoccupation with specific RFE programs and comments expressed therein. Although the regime undoubtedly felt that there were certain weaknesses in some of the programs that deserved exploitation, the Rumanian regime has singled out specific RFE programs many times more often than the previous period in order to make particular points about them.



Regime concern for what its people should and should not know has also been indicated by its coverage of speeches and events. An example is the treatment of Gomulka's speech to the Polish IX plenum. A Rumanian Agerpress summary was used rather than the one sent out by Polish PAP; nothing that Gomulka said about agricultural policy or coexistence with the Catholic church was included. Usually, with events or speeches such as these, the Rumanian media wait a substantial interval (thus, among other things, being able to follow the line of the Soviet Union) before disseminating their version.

Some Consequences in Audience Reaction

Some Rumanian listeners under the impact of events in Hungary have become far more propaganda conscious than they were a year ago. This propaganda consciousness is particularly revealed in a general dislike of all broadcasts of a polemical nature. The average Rumanian listener wants RFE and other Western broadcasts to be as unlike regime broadcasts as possible. Therefore, factual newscasts are received with much more interest than political commentaries or political utterances of Western leaders. More frequent and complete newscasts continue to constitute the main requests.

Some Rumanian listeners appear to have become increasingly aware of the fact that RFE is largely financed from the United States; consequently, there has been a certain decline in the popular feeling toward RFE as a "Rumanian" station. This development is significant, as it could afford the regime a ready-made base for a certain type of anti-RFE campaign. As far as can be determined, this close association of RFE with its "American sponsors" - a new development for Rumania - has for the time being not changed the relative popularity of RFE with its Rumanian audience.

The average Rumanian listener appears to blame RFE for an "attitude of appeasement" toward the communist world which became particularly pronounced during the Hungarian revolution. Nevertheless, most of the population still thinks of RFE and other Western broadcasters as a most essential link with the Western world and with the United States in particular. The United States continues to be widely considered as "the great hope of all oppressed peoples".

Recalling the regime's tendencies for singling out specific RFE programs, there is reason to believe that the increased efforts made to discredit RFE (particularly in the aftermath of the Hungarian revolution) have in fact encouraged more popular interest in it.



Meaning of Regime Response

The fact that RFE is attacked is not significant for its own sake. Psychological warfare agencies can expect to attract expressions of hostility from their targets. Moreover, attacks often deliberately serve particular purposes which do not necessarily indicate RFE success: they may reflect any RFE deficiencies or vulnerabilities which the regime desires to exploit.

Nevertheless, the characteristics and timing of regime references to RFE indicate that RFE is believed to have had a significant role in the lives of their people despite jamming measures, intimidation, etc. Some of the points made herein are the same as those which emerged in the year previous to the current period under review. Thus:

1. The Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian governments openly acknowledged with increasing frequency that RFE broadcasts had an impact upon listeners and influenced both opinions and action. The importance of Western broadcasts as a competitive source of news and information was also more frequently mentioned.

2. According to evidence from regime media, more attention was given to RFE and other Western broadcasts by high officials and at meetings than ever before. Events, not merely propaganda techniques, clearly played an important role in response to RFE broadcasts.

3. The communist governments increasingly addressed themselves to the task of discrediting RFE with other nations throughout the world in an effort to provoke opposition to the continuance of RFE operations. In this connection, many efforts were made to embarrass the West German and Austrian Governments for their "toleration" of RFE facilities.

4. Efforts were made toward greater credibility in regime attacks against RFE. There were more frequently dignified efforts (by comparison) to present facts, to argue rationally, and to criticize with less antagonism. Distortion and invective remained to some extent, particularly after the Hungarian revolution.

5. The use of specific RFE programs as vehicles for regime propaganda occurred more frequently than ever before. The regimes were clearly sensitive to certain lines of political and economic argument. It is doubtful that communist propaganda would have been willing to advertise the content of RFE programs so frequently unless it was felt that they had already been received and discussed by a substantial number of people.



6. Regime radio programs clearly undertook to offer stiff competition to Western broadcasts, and were sometimes prepared to deal with questions raised by RFE news and commentaries.

7. The target regimes apparently believed that RFE contributed toward internal developments which would ultimately lead to greater independence from the USSR. RFE is probably actually believed by some regime officials to have played a contributing role in the Polish and Hungarian events. It is equally clear that the regimes associate RFE with internal pressures for more democratic government and with exposure of Soviet economic penetration and exploitation.

The Audience and Ideas

The main objective of any psychological warfare operation is to win and sustain the target audience's belief in given ideas and values. The purpose of seeking this adherence is to encourage certain attitudes and behavior which are consistent with the policy goals of the agency in whose behalf the psychological operation is performed.

The fact that this dissemination of ideas never takes place in a vacuum has never been more emphasized than during the period under review. The relationship between Western broadcasters and their audience, seen in the light of its undertaking, has never been so complex due to events over which the broadcasters had no control.

1. The events of the last year and their impact on the peoples in the countries where they took place and in neighboring communist countries have placed crucial responsibilities on what the broadcaster can say and new stresses on the listener's ability to understand the broadcaster's role and purpose.

2. The population of the target countries is less homogeneous than ever before with respect to its attitudes and behavior. Various groups have assumed greater and lesser political significance, personal alignments have sometimes changed, and new factions within some communist parties have emerged. Ideas which were enforced as doctrine have in some instances been seriously challenged, in other instances overtly repudiated. Even the allegiance which some groups had to a given set of ideas and expectations has sometimes changed.

3. The Western broadcaster is considered by many in the target population to be an apologist for a Western policy that may be strong in aspiration but is weak in substance. To some extent people's interpretation of events has foreclosed some of the rational consideration ordinarily assigned to ideas, including ideas which serve to explain these events. *

* The fact that RFE cannot support armed revolt or liberation through outside force seems now sufficiently understood by the audience so as not to engender further disillusionment. The extent to which this militates against RFE effectiveness in all countries except Poland remains to be seen.



4. The regimes have seemingly expressed themselves more frequently than the listener about the ideas contained in RFE broadcasts. This may be explained by the fact that the regime reactions are, so to speak, spread before the analyst while the listener's thoughts usually are known only through what can be learned by the interview or questionnaire. It may also be that those regime references to RFE dealing with ideas are in fact normal polemics which use RFE output as a vehicle for discussion.

On the other hand, this absence of listener discussion of ideas may be attributed to the following factors which deserve consideration:

- a. Some sources may be inarticulate or poorly interviewed.
- b. Listeners may accept most RFE "policy targets" as granted, and therefore feel little further concern for the ideas contained in their implementation.
- c. In view of point 3 above, some ideas may be consciously considered irrelevant by some and unconsciously disregarded by others.
- d. Not everyone is interested in RFE's ideas, and many of those who might be most expected to have interest are yet to be attracted to RFE and other Western broadcasts.
- e. Listeners continue to be propaganda conscious and desirous of thinking that they make their own conclusions.

The Audience and the News

1. Western broadcasts are welcomed by most listeners as purveyors of realism; hope and polemics are of secondary significance. For this reason, news and information is generally considered as the most important contribution which Western broadcasters can make to their lives.

Regime propagandists recognize this. More effort than ever before has been given to the communist versions of realism (e.g., "raison d'etat" the threat of West German military power, the economic advantages accruing from trade with the Soviet Union). Moreover, that forthright acknowledgment of Western broadcasting impact has often taken the form of discussing the competitive aspects of RFE's news and information service.

2. It is an error to assume that people are not influenced by the receipt of news and information. Contrary to claims which are still made, the presentation of news and information does influence people's attitudes and behavior. Psychological warfare broadcasting is no less warfare even if it employed news to the exclusion of any other broadcast content.

3. People have been less concerned about the propaganda of polemics. But many have expressed concern as to whether they actually receive the full or "straight" truth about international affairs. The fact that broadcasts are specially prepared and aimed in their direction is cited by those who feel that they constitute a special target, thereby receiving news which may not be as realistic as news disseminated to another audience.



4. The average listener, so habituated to the infiltration of other influences in his news, often lacks understanding of what is news, how news is made, and what news means to him. Often he will accept a propaganda release as news. A news item will not have the same degree of perishability as it does in the West. The fact that a news item is broadcast often causes him to accept it at face value. A statement may be learned, labelled, and incorporated in one's outlook without regard for its truth, its purpose, the circumstances of its delivery, or its meaning in a different context on a different day. The extent to which a listener will act otherwise depends entirely on what measures the broadcaster takes to insure a news item's comprehension and correct interpretation by the listener.

5. A preliminary conclusion of this section is that, contrary to assumption, people do not always believe what they want to hear.

Moreover, news which is relevant to the subject matter of people's hopes and fears probably has greater opportunity to be believed than that which lacks relevance. Most listeners are more interested in Western events, than in happenings in their own country, except when their country is involved in a crisis situation and/or when important domestic events have not been publicized by their government.

Regarding news within their own countries, people are more inclined to believe something when they see it. Significant in view of the point made in (4), news from the West needs only to be heard to be believed in many instances.

6. Listeners still are not satiated with respect to how their counterparts fare as individuals in the West. The impact of events on the individual makes news more credible and more interesting to many listeners. Thus, that portion of a news story which discusses the meaning for an individual peasant, for example, of new agricultural machinery production figures, may have considerably more impact than the overall figures themselves.

7. Any errors in news presentation with respect to internal events can badly damage a radio station's credibility. Many criticisms of RFE made during the last year originate with gossip among individuals and regime propaganda concerning occasional errors which RFE did actually make.

8. Is there a basic incompatibility between audience reaction to news and news programming techniques? Regardless of the amount and type of news available for a given day, the placement and length of news broadcast periods is usually pre-ordained along the lines of commercial radio. People react to the consequences of this by missing news stories completely or drawing erroneous conclusions because a story is underplayed or not sufficiently backgrounded.

