The spectre of the trial and execution of Imre Nagy, for the past 18 months hovering over the entire "socialist camp", has now become an irreversible reality. Made inevitable by the inexorable logic of the "pure" ideology being propagated in the intensified campaign against revisionism in theory, forced relentlessly towards this verdict by the pressures of the geopolitical premises of the concept of the "indestructible nature of the camp of socialism" to an endless reiteration of the charge of "treason", the ultimate penalty inflicted upon the "National Communist" leader and his Party and military supporters closes the chapter on experimentation and innovations introduced into the Stalinist control mechanism within the orbit.**

As less than two months after First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev, the head of the CPSU, assumed the role of chief of government, the previous policy of political trials and executions has been re instituted as the ghoulish symbol of the mono-Party-State power.

The timing of the announcement, at the height of the current Soviet-Yugoslav controversy, places that chronic ideological dispute in its proper perspective. As a result of his acceptance of the second Soviet intervention in Hungary as necessary to correct the consequences of Nagy's practice of national communism (Pula speech, 11 November 1956), Tito has deprived himself of all convincing argumentation against the Soviet interpretation of the "unity of the Socialist Camp"; through the imprisonment of Milovan Djilas for his analyses of Communist theory -- the Soviet as well as the Yugoslav orient -- Tito has denied himself the chance of an unambiguous rejection of Soviet accusations. To preserve the national independence of the State he controls, Tito must nevertheless try to split the ideological hairs of Party doctrine. The Soviet decision to order the execution of Nagy, which, as all else in Moscow now, must be attributed to Khrushchev personally, reduces Tito's protestations to the compromised testimony of the actual source of poisonous heresy (revisionism) and of the accomplice in political crime (treason). As long as Khrushchev's tactics were directed at bringing Tito back into the bloc the postponement of the Nagy trial could, from the Soviet point of view, be justified; like the promise of safe conduct for Nagy given to the Yugoslavs in November, 1956, this delay would have been prolonged only until the Yugoslav participation in the Warsaw Pact and

* See Background Information, 1 February 1959; also General Desk Background Papers, 5 December 1956 and 30 April 1957.
Comesoon would have made withdrawal impossible. As soon as the break with
Yugoslavia had widened into an unbridgeable chasm, the fate of Imre Nagy
was sealed; the first step was almost certainly the Yugoslav abstention
from the conference of "Ruling Parties" in November; the implementation
decided (or announced) at the unexpected meeting of Party secretaries and
heads of government in Moscow a month ago. No less in ignorance than the
Western journalists who are still disseminating Polish inspired versions of
that conference was Tito unaware of that momentous decision. Utterly obliv-
ious to the implications of the connection between the "traitor Nagy" and the
Yugoslavs being made in the Soviet campaign against revisionism, the Yugo-
slav leader in his speech only two days ago (Tanjug, 15 June 1956) had not
seen fit to mention the most serious of the bloc-wide, not only Chinese,
accusations -- the Yugoslav complicity in the Hungarian uprising. Today
Nikita Khrushchev has cashed the check Marshal Tito wrote in November, 1956.

Within the Soviet Union the execution of Imre Nagy can hardly pass
without repercussions. Although the victim of Khrushchev's need for a
demonstration of the fate of anyone attempting to "disintegrate the Socialist
Camp" made no distinction between any of the Soviet leaders in his treatise
on Communism, (Praeger, New York, 1957), the chronology of his appointment
(June, 1953) and dismissal (March, 1955) as Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters and his policy in industry coincide too closely with the incumbency of
G.M. Malenkov not to be exploited by Khrushchev at some future date. Alrea-
d associated by the First Secretary with the Yezhovstchina (1937-38), held
responsible for Beria's crimes in Leningrad (1949), publicly disagrees on
the issues of industrial and agricultural policy, deprived of all State and
Party posts as the result of defeat on internal issues in the intra-Party
struggle for power, Malenkov can now be made the scapegoat for the conse-
quences of Khrushchev's policy towards the bloc. In possession of a complete
monopoly on political -- and police -- power at home, the First Secretary -
Chairman of the Council of Ministers can, in fact he must, rewrite the
history of the past five years in order to justify his present actions.

** The case of Poland and Gomulka seems to be an exception; it should,
however, be remembered that the possibilities of economic pressure, complete
military integration, and geographical location exclude the possibility of
Poland's leaving the camp. The key problem of Party and police relationships
remains unclarified for the moment; the delay in convening the Party Congress
is a measure of Gomulka's unwillingness to test his strength within the Party
apparatus against those who might accept a return to the previous pattern of
inter-Party dealings.